On Feb 10, 2:20 am, Tim <
thcus...@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 3:47 pm, Joe <
jfg...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 7, 3:12 am, Herbiep <
jackiestann...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> > > I haven't suggested
>
> > > " ...theoretically removing the concept of time..."
>
> > > However if time was an irrelevance to god, that is for god there is no
> > > arrow of time and his knowledge is not limited by a particular
> > > location in spacetime, then his omniscience means that he knows
> > > everything throughout time, past present and future. This would
> > > contradict free will (in some forms) since he knows the outcome of all
> > > decisions and did so before he made the creature making the decision.
>
> > How would that contradict the creature making the decision with free
> > will? Knowledge of an outcome does not cause the outcome.
>
> If an entity knows what "happened" in the future, then nothing could
> have changed what happened, including what ever that was causing in
> the future. No ability to change = no free-will.
>
What if what happens is a deliberate change in accordance with a
will? Then it is the action of the will that we are observing,
causing the change, so it is absurd to say that there is "no ability
to change." Plainly, there is the ability to change the universe from
what it was, to what the will wills it to be.
You appear to be conflating the causing of a deliberate change in the
universe with the causing of a deliberate change in one's deliberate
action to cause change. This is of course impossible, but not by
anyone's omniscience, but simply by the law of non-contradiction. It
is impossible to both do and not do the same action. If one does the
action, then one does it; if one does not do it, then he does not do
it. The fact of the action either taking place or not taking place is
a fact of reality, and determining factor in whether or not it is a
reality is just the action of that will. If the action is known to
occur or not occur, then that knowledge matches up with the reality of
the action occurring or not occurring. If the action is unknown, the
reality of the action occurring or not occurring is still what it is,
without regard to whether or not it is known. Thus knowledge of the
action occurring or not occurring is entirely inconsequential to the
reality of it occurring or not occurring. And if it was (or is or
will be) a free will action, then that is what kind of an action it
was (or is, or will be.) Obviously, no one can change an action from
what it was, or is, or will be. This appears to be the source of your
confusion. You appear to want it that one cannot change the past, but
one can change the future, which is our intuitive concept of the
distinction between past and future. There is nothing wrong with our
intuitive concept, but it must be clearly understood, in light of
another intuitive concept that "it is what it is." It is easy for us
to get confused when we talk about the future and the past. We can
eliminate some of that confusion (hopefully, if you are honest) by
assigning the "is" of "it is what it is," to the past, the present,
and the future. Normally, the verb "is" is applied only to the
present, the future and the past being covered by "will be" and "was,"
respectively. But if we are going to examine the world in four
dimensions rather than three, we need to take the fourth dimension
into account and equalize it, so to speak, with the other three. This
is tricky for us because our experience moves along the dimension of
time. But seeing that we have an interior fifth dimension, we can
step back from our bondage to forward temporal motion, and picture the
universe as a four-block, a four-dimensional construct rather than
only three. And in this sense, then, we can say that the past is what
it is, the present is what it is, and the future is what it is.
With this in mind, then, consider the fact of a free-will decision and
the resulting free action. If the action already took place in the
past, then that past action is what it is, and no one can change it.
That much is intuitively obvious. Considering actions of the past is
the only way we, from our perspective in the present, can have a
handle on them and say that "it is what it is and no one can change
it." Person P did action A in the past. Does that mean that person P
could not have done action B as an alternative? No, it doesn't mean
that. But action B remains an unfulfilled hypothetical. P could
have, but did not do B. P could have not, but did do A. Now consider
the case where P is acting presently. Can he change his mind? Of
course he can. Does he? That is a question that will determine the
reality, either A or B. Suppose he does not change his mind and does
A. Then in the future, we will be able to look back with our clear
handle on things and say, "it is what it is," of this present, as the
past, in that future. Suppose, alternately, he changes his mind and
does not do A but does B instead. Then, from our future perspective,
we will say that B is what it is, and nothing will change it. But P
could have changed it, in what is currently the present to us, by
deciding differently. P can change the future now, if he chooses to.
But whatever he decides, A or B, will in the future become irrevocably
the past, that nothing can change. We can see both that there is the
possibility of either A or B, and that one or the other will be the
actuality, and not both. It is impossible (let us stipulate) to
choose both, so given A, it is not possible that B, and given B, it is
not possible that A.
If the decision is still in the future, then, all the same logic will
apply once that future becomes present, and thus plainly, P's free
will will be intact in the future, unaffected by our coming knowledge
in a more distant future of his decision. But the fact does not
remain in flux once the decision is made. The decision, as the
determining factor, determines the reality. The decision is a free
will decision, whether in the past, the present, or the future. The
decision is the determining factor, whether in the past, the present,
or the future. Thus, if in the past, the present, or the future, A or
B becomes irrevocable fact, it was, or is, or will be, due to that
free will decision, and thus, far from eliminating free will, the fact
of A or B points to its necessity as the determining factor.
Not even God can make a thing both be and not be in the same way at
the same time, as that is a logical contradiction and thus
incoherently specified. But the unfreedom of God or creatures to make
things contradictory is not an inability to make them be, just an
inability to produce a contradiction. Freedom of will does not
include freedom to produce a contradiction, any more than omnipotence
includes power to produce a contradiction. The problem is not
omniscience, but simply the impossibility of a contradiction, as
something incoherently specified.