Review of the 36 Arguments for the Existence of God # 33. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE UNREASONABLENESS OF REASON
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Pastor Jennifer v2
Feb 23, 2012, 9:09:36 PM2/23/12
to Evidence For God
33. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE UNREASONABLENESS OF REASON
(from R Goldstein)
1. Our belief in reason cannot be justified by reason, since that
would be circular.
2. Our belief in reason must be accepted on faith (from 1).
3. Every time we exercise reason, we are exercising faith (from 2.)
4. Faith provides good rational grounds for beliefs (since it is, in
the final analysis, necessary even for the belief in reason – from 3).
5. We are justified in using faith for any belief that is so important
in our lives that not believing it would render us incoherent (from
4.)
6. We cannot avoid faith in God if we are to live coherent moral and
purposeful lives.
7. We are justified in believing that God exists (from 5 and 6).
8. God exists.
Reason is a faculty of thinking, the very faculty of giving grounds
for our beliefs. To justify reason would be to try to give grounds for
the belief: “We ought to accept the conclusions of sound arguments.”
Let’s say we produce a sound argument for the conclusion that “we
ought to accept the conclusions of sound arguments.” How could we
legitimately accept the conclusion of that sound argument without
independently knowing the conclusion? Any attempt to justify the very
propositions that we must use in order to justify propositions is
going to land us in circularity.
FLAW 1:
This argument tries to generalize the inability if reason to justify
itself to an abdication of reason when it comes to justifying God’s
existence. But the inability of reason to justify reason is a unique
case in epistemology, not an illustration of a flaw of reason that can
be generalized to some other kind of belief- and certainly not a
belief in the existence of some entity with specific properties such
as creating the world or defining morality.
Indeed, one could argue that the attempt to justify reason with reason
is not circular, but rather, unnecessary. One already is, always will
be, committed to reason by the very process one is already engaged in
– namely, reasoning. Reason is non-negotiable; all sides concede it.
It needs no justification, because it is justification. A belief in
God is not like that at all.
FLAW 2:
If one really took the unreasonability of reason as a license to
believe things on faith, then which things should one believe in? If
it is a license to believe in a single God who gave his son for our
sins, why isn’t it just as much a license to believe in Zeus and all
other Greek gods, or the three major gods of Hinduism, or the Angel
Moroni? For that matter, why not Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy? If
one says that there are good reasons to accept some entities in faith,
while rejecting others, then one is saying that it is ultimately
reason, not faith, that must be invoked to justify a belief.
FLAW 3:
Premise 6, which claims that a belief in God is necessary in order to
have a purpose in one’s life, or to be moral, has already been
challenged in the discussions of #16. The Argument from Moral Truth
and #19 The Argument from Personal Purpose.
(from R Goldstein)
1. Our belief in reason cannot be justified by reason, since that
would be circular.
2. Our belief in reason must be accepted on faith (from 1).
3. Every time we exercise reason, we are exercising faith (from 2.)
4. Faith provides good rational grounds for beliefs (since it is, in
the final analysis, necessary even for the belief in reason – from 3).
5. We are justified in using faith for any belief that is so important
in our lives that not believing it would render us incoherent (from
4.)
6. We cannot avoid faith in God if we are to live coherent moral and
purposeful lives.
7. We are justified in believing that God exists (from 5 and 6).
8. God exists.
Reason is a faculty of thinking, the very faculty of giving grounds
for our beliefs. To justify reason would be to try to give grounds for
the belief: “We ought to accept the conclusions of sound arguments.”
Let’s say we produce a sound argument for the conclusion that “we
ought to accept the conclusions of sound arguments.” How could we
legitimately accept the conclusion of that sound argument without
independently knowing the conclusion? Any attempt to justify the very
propositions that we must use in order to justify propositions is
going to land us in circularity.
FLAW 1:
This argument tries to generalize the inability if reason to justify
itself to an abdication of reason when it comes to justifying God’s
existence. But the inability of reason to justify reason is a unique
case in epistemology, not an illustration of a flaw of reason that can
be generalized to some other kind of belief- and certainly not a
belief in the existence of some entity with specific properties such
as creating the world or defining morality.
Indeed, one could argue that the attempt to justify reason with reason
is not circular, but rather, unnecessary. One already is, always will
be, committed to reason by the very process one is already engaged in
– namely, reasoning. Reason is non-negotiable; all sides concede it.
It needs no justification, because it is justification. A belief in
God is not like that at all.
FLAW 2:
If one really took the unreasonability of reason as a license to
believe things on faith, then which things should one believe in? If
it is a license to believe in a single God who gave his son for our
sins, why isn’t it just as much a license to believe in Zeus and all
other Greek gods, or the three major gods of Hinduism, or the Angel
Moroni? For that matter, why not Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy? If
one says that there are good reasons to accept some entities in faith,
while rejecting others, then one is saying that it is ultimately
reason, not faith, that must be invoked to justify a belief.
FLAW 3:
Premise 6, which claims that a belief in God is necessary in order to
have a purpose in one’s life, or to be moral, has already been
challenged in the discussions of #16. The Argument from Moral Truth
and #19 The Argument from Personal Purpose.
Brock
Feb 25, 2012, 11:15:33 AM2/25/12
to Evidence For God
On Feb 23, 9:09 pm, Pastor Jennifer v2
<jennifer.s.jo...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> 33. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE UNREASONABLENESS OF REASON
> (from R Goldstein)
>
> 1. Our belief in reason cannot be justified by reason, since that
> would be circular.
> 2. Our belief in reason must be accepted on faith (from 1).
> 3. Every time we exercise reason, we are exercising faith (from 2.)
> 4. Faith provides good rational grounds for beliefs (since it is, in
> the final analysis, necessary even for the belief in reason – from 3).
> 5. We are justified in using faith for any belief that is so important
> in our lives that not believing it would render us incoherent (from
> 4.)
> 6. We cannot avoid faith in God if we are to live coherent moral and
> purposeful lives.
> 7. We are justified in believing that God exists (from 5 and 6).
> 8. God exists.
Again, the same limitations apply to this treatment:
> 33. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE UNREASONABLENESS OF REASON
> (from R Goldstein)
>
> 1. Our belief in reason cannot be justified by reason, since that
> would be circular.
> 2. Our belief in reason must be accepted on faith (from 1).
> 3. Every time we exercise reason, we are exercising faith (from 2.)
> 4. Faith provides good rational grounds for beliefs (since it is, in
> the final analysis, necessary even for the belief in reason – from 3).
> 5. We are justified in using faith for any belief that is so important
> in our lives that not believing it would render us incoherent (from
> 4.)
> 6. We cannot avoid faith in God if we are to live coherent moral and
> purposeful lives.
> 7. We are justified in believing that God exists (from 5 and 6).
> 8. God exists.
* there is no one "THE ARGUMENT ...", rather it refers to a general
category of arguments, thus to defeat one specific example is not
adequate to dismiss the category
* the argument, to the degree it is a paraphrase, doesn't adequately
represent (either intentionally or accidentally) the argument as put
forward by a proponent, and faces the danger of being simply a straw-
man
Regards,
Brock
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