2) Dennett on qualia "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19] Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological experimentation. His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is so imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the situation in question, or that the questions posed by the introduction of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special properties defined for qualia." Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them
Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color can be communicated
and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta than qualia.
So
extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have a language for
communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most people don't speak
differential equations either. But those are all things that can be shared. The pain of
a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But there are
experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective scales of pain. So
I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the language; I just don't
think color is the best example.
You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
being executed.
Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>:
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>>
>> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
>> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
>> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
>> being executed.
>>
>
> That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
> activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.
>
> Craig
>
That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed.
I don't think
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of
Nature implies this.
You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is being executed.
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:16:47 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>:
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>>
>> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
>> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
>> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
>> being executed.
>>
>
> That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
> activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.
>
> Craig
>
That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed.No, it means that there may in fact be no algorithm that can be executed in the brain of a person who is blind from birth which will result in visual experience.I don't thinkThis is precisely what I do argue - that no mathematical description of Nature is complete
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of
Nature implies this.
and that all perceptual experience is rooted in an authenticity which transcends rationality.
Comp isn't true.
Nature cannot be described in any terms outside of experience itself.
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On 26 Oct 2012, at 01:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:16:47 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>:
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>>
>> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
>> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
>> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
>> being executed.
>>
>
> That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
> activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.
>
> Craig
>
That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed.No, it means that there may in fact be no algorithm that can be executed in the brain of a person who is blind from birth which will result in visual experience.I don't thinkThis is precisely what I do argue - that no mathematical description of Nature is complete
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of
Nature implies this.I agree, but today we know that there is no mathematical description of arithmetic capable of being complete.
and that all perceptual experience is rooted in an authenticity which transcends rationality.That can be shown as necessary when you assume comp.
Comp isn't true.The reductionist conception of comp is not true.
Nature cannot be described in any terms outside of experience itself.What is "Nature" ?
On Saturday, October 27, 2012 8:08:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 26 Oct 2012, at 01:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:16:47 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>:
>
>
> On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>>
>> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states
>> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system
>> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is
>> being executed.
>>
>
> That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from birth,
> activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience.
>
> Craig
>
That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed.No, it means that there may in fact be no algorithm that can be executed in the brain of a person who is blind from birth which will result in visual experience.I don't thinkThis is precisely what I do argue - that no mathematical description of Nature is complete
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of
Nature implies this.I agree, but today we know that there is no mathematical description of arithmetic capable of being complete.
I agree with that too. I would say that my prediction is that the infinities of arithmetic and the infinities of Nature overlap in topology-logical algebra, and they underlap in experience-qualia (which is the canonical conjugate of the former, i.e. 'entopic-eidetic' gestalt). Entopic refers to hallucinations which are repeating visual patterns, which seem to directly present neural mechanisms visually while eidetic hallucinations are about rich visual tableaus which inspire character or plot driven interpretations (delusions, stories). I'm only borrowing these terms to make it less cumbersome than 'apocatastatic trans-rational algebra' and 'a-merelogical non-spatial transduction', but I don't want to borrow the connotation of illusion with them. To the contrary, the experiences of being informed and formed are the only source of realism in the cosmos. Illusion is a matter of density of significance and scope of participation, which I am saying arise from the interaction between the entopic-eidetic 1p and topological-algebraic 3p.and that all perceptual experience is rooted in an authenticity which transcends rationality.That can be shown as necessary when you assume comp.
Sure, which is part of why I don't assume comp. Where we disagree I think is that I don't think that it is possible to escape the universal 3p context, even if we may not locally think we should be able to tell the difference. No spoofed 3p simulation is good enough to substitute for the universe forever. Because 1p is trans-rational, it has a better nose for imitation than it can consciously understand. I think maybe this is where Godel fits in. Intuition and real participation begin where numbers leave off.
Comp isn't true.The reductionist conception of comp is not true.
If I extend the definition of comp to include the trans-rational grounding of participation and perception, then there isn't enough left of comp to say if it's true or not.
Nature cannot be described in any terms outside of experience itself.What is "Nature" ?
The apocatastatically rejoined perception of everythingness as capitulated by some fragmented collections of somethingness. Something like that.
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We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove it.
We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove it. We bet on Church thesis, simply.
On 24 Dec 2012, at 00:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/23/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:57, meekerdb wrote:
Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color can be communicated and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta than qualia. So extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur you have a language for communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most people don't speak differential equations either. But those are all things that can be shared. The pain of a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But there are experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce objective scales of pain. So I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the language; I just don't think color is the best example.
I disagree here. No qualia are communciable in the sense that quanta, or numbers, are communicable. We can talk and understand talk on color only because we bet that we share similar experience in front of electromagnetic wave with certain wave-length.
We only agree on numbers and counting because we distinguish objects in the same way.
We only can distinguish objects in the same way because we have brain which can use numbers and count, in the universal way.
We bet it is universal and that seems to work (most of the time) - but the same is true of representing colors by numbers. We do it that way, instead of representing numbers by colors, because our discrimination of colors is not quite as good as our discrimination of objects (e.g. some people are color blind).
Bruno
Brent
Otherwise your mother could not have taught you to count.
I still feel guilty how much I made my mom suffering on this.
1, 2, What!?!, I stopped already at 2. What is that? Why?
With the amoeba I got acquainted with the 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ... idea.
But it will take me the reading of Nagel & Newman "Gödel's proof" to get the 0, 1, 2, 3, ... profoundness, and to decide to study mathematics instead of biology.
Bruno
Brent
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Bruno and Brent:we T H I N K we have an idea what 'qualia' may be and ACCEPT our figment on 'quanta' (i.e numbered 'objects' - figments as well).None of the two(?) are closer to the essence (read: 'truth') we just got better used (evolved?) to quantitative thinking and language concerning such because it seemed simpler to follow in primitive life.
Now, with Bruno's highly developed apparatus in arithmetics, quanta (numbers!) look like a 'reality' as compared to our still flimsy ideas about other qualia. Yet qualia they are (in a quantizing sense)Language development went in parallel with a mental development.This asymmetry may be the base for Bruno's:"No qualia are communicable in the sense that quanta, or numbers, are communicable."No OTHER qualia, that is - as Brent remarked.
Turing (universal) and Church (thesis) are compatible products of the presently developed state of the human mind, evolved as some justification (base?) for the workings of the latest and still holding) version.
They comfort the finite thinking (even in the infinite inclusions) which is our restricted way to apply human logic and 'ascertainable' reality. \
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Bruno
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John,
On 24 Dec 2012, at 21:16, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno and Brent:
we T H I N K we have an idea what 'qualia' may be and ACCEPT our figment on 'quanta' (i.e numbered 'objects' - figments as well).None of the two(?) are closer to the essence (read: 'truth') we just got better used (evolved?) to quantitative thinking and language concerning such because it seemed simpler to follow in primitive life.
But there are tools in math to handle qualities too, like modal logic.
Such tools cannot create qualia, nor perhaps explain them completely, but Earth Geography cannot create Earth, nor explain it completely, and is still useful.
Now, with Bruno's highly developed apparatus in arithmetics, quanta (numbers!) look like a 'reality' as compared to our still flimsy ideas about other qualia. Yet qualia they are (in a quantizing sense)Language development went in parallel with a mental development.This asymmetry may be the base for Bruno's:"No qualia are communicable in the sense that quanta, or numbers, are communicable."No OTHER qualia, that is - as Brent remarked.
We can know our own qualia, but it is not clear if we can communicate about them even to ourselves. We can experience them, or live them.
On 12/26/2012 1:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Dec 2012, at 19:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/24/2012 2:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove it.
Can we? How would you prove than every person's brain can compute every computable function?
By teaching them to reduce combinators, which is very simple, or by teaching them to play the Game Of Life, or to interpret a LISP Expression, or more simply by teaching them how to add and multiply natural numbers. If they succeed in one of those task, they can emulate any Universal Turing Machine, and are proved to be themselves Turing Universal. With comp that is enough to conclude that their brain is Turing universal.
But that doesn't show they can compute every computable function; some functions will take too much memory space and some computations are very long so there will inevitably be mistakes.
Brent
Bruno
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On 26 Dec 2012, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2012 1:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Dec 2012, at 19:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/24/2012 2:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:We don't have to bet the brain is (Turing universal), we can prove it.
Can we? How would you prove than every person's brain can compute every computable function?
By teaching them to reduce combinators, which is very simple, or by teaching them to play the Game Of Life, or to interpret a LISP Expression, or more simply by teaching them how to add and multiply natural numbers. If they succeed in one of those task, they can emulate any Universal Turing Machine, and are proved to be themselves Turing Universal. With comp that is enough to conclude that their brain is Turing universal.
But that doesn't show they can compute every computable function; some functions will take too much memory space and some computations are very long so there will inevitably be mistakes.
That's the fate of ALL universal number. They have NEVER enough memories. The available 'tape' is always too much short. They always feel like having something more to say. And they always make mistake, unless they are ideally correct, a condition which is met only in the universal number's mind.
Computable does not mean, concretely computable. That would makes addition and multuplication NOT computable, as nobody can add the 10^10000 first digits of PI.
Bruno
This is intuitive and amenable to thought experience, like the experience of the blind Mary which studies many books on color and qualia and still has any clue what it is like to be a seeing person.
But then that breaks the chain of inference that fundamental physics is inconsistent with CTM.
Brent
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