On 4/6/2013 10:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> Fingelkurts, A., Fingelkurts, A., and Neves, C. (2010). �Natural World Physical, Brain
> Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time�. *Physics of Life Reviews* 7(2): 195-249.
>
> http://scireprints.lu.lv/141/1/Fingelkurts_Space-time_in_Physics_brain_and_mind.pdf
>
> �We would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational
> space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise distant physical
> space-time reality.�
Which just says that you can think about things that are far way.
>
> See Fig 11 where the phenomenal world is in the brain.
I don't see anything in this paper to support Craig's "top down" magic.
On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:
> Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11
>
> http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg
>
I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors
literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically speaking
in the brain.
See for example
Section 3. Space and time in mind, 3.1. Phenomenal space
�As it was pointed Smythies [333] this phenomenal space may be identical
with some aspect of brain space but not with any aspect of external
physical space. The same idea was explicitly formulated by Searle [334]:
�The brain creates a body image, and pains, like all bodily sensations,
are parts of the body image. The pain-in-the-foot is literally in the
physical space of the brain.��
This immediately leads to Max Velmans paradox {"The real skull (as
opposed to the phenomenal skull) is beyond the perceived horizon and
dome of the sky."}, see
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html
and to some further possible speculations like
'Another researcher, Kuhlenbeck [335] made an even stronger claim,
suggesting that "... physical events and mental events occur in
different space-time systems which have no dimensions in common."
On 07 Apr 2013, at 19:20, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>> On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:
>>>> Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11
>>>>
>>>> http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors
>>> literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically
>>> speaking in the brain.
>>
>> Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains). It's
>> not "there" geometrically speaking. Geometry and "there" are part of
>> the model. Dog bites man.
>
> Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it
> literally as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to
> philosophy.
But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink.
Neurophilophers are usually computationalist and weakly materialist,
and so are basically inconsistent.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.
but would output behaviors consistent with our expectations for those experiences.
Craig
Bruno
>
> Evgenii
>
>
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> or put phenomenological consciousness into the brain.
I don't know what this means. That phenomenological consciousness depends on the brain is
empirically well established.
Each bit would be an atomic configuration, and programs would be atomic assemblies.Two apples is not the number two.
Maybe this makes it easier to see why forms and functions are not the same as sensory experiences, as no pile of logic automata would inspire feelings, flavors, thoughts, etc.That is what we ask you to justify, or to assume explicitly, not to take for granted.
On 10.04.2013 07:16 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/9/2013 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is
Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made
my comments
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html
Still tilting at that windmill?
"A) From thermodynamic tables, the mole entropy of silver at standard
conditions S(Ag, cr) = 42.55 J K-1 mol-1 is bigger than that of
aluminum S(Al, cr) = 28.30 J K-1 mol-1. Does it mean that there is
more disorder in silver as in aluminium?"
Yes, there is more disorder in the sense that raising the temperature
of a mole of Ag 1deg increases the number of accessible conduction
electron states available more than does raising the temperature of a
mole of Al does.
I agree that disorder is not necessarily a good metaphor for entropy.
But dispersal of energy isn't always intuitively equal to entropy
either. Consider dissolving ammonium nitrate in water. The process is
endothermic, so the temperature drops and energy is absorbed, but
the process goes spontaneously because the entropy increases; the are
a lot more microstates accessible in the solution even at the lower
temperature.
You'd better look at what biologist say. For example:
http://www.icr.org/article/270/
“and that the idea of their improving rather than harming organisms is contrary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which tells us that matter and energy naturally tend toward greater randomness rather than greater order and complexity.”
Do you like it?
Evgenii
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This is close to an idea I have been mulling over for some time... that the source of the phenomenological feeling of pleasure is in some way identified with decreases in entropy, and pain is in some way identified with increases in entropy. It is a way to map the subjective experience of pain and pleasure to a 3p description of, say, a nervous system. Damage to the body (associated with pain) can usually (always?) be characterized in terms of a sudden increase in entropy of the body. Perhaps this is also true in the mental domain, so that emotional loss (or e.g. embarrassment) can also be characterized as an increase in entropy of one's mental models, but this is pure speculation. The case is even harder to make with pleasure. It would be weird if it were true, but so far it is the only way I know of to map pleasure and pain onto anything objective at all.
Terren
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Hi Telmo,Yes, those are good counter examples.
But I think to say "pain and pleasure are fine-tuned by evolution..." is a sleight of hand. Pain and pleasure are phenomenological primitives. If evolution created those primitives, how did it do that? By what mechanism? �
Another way to think of this is to acknowledge that pain signals are mediated by special nerves in the nervous system. But what makes those nerves any different from a nerve that carries information about gentle pressure? �You may be able to point to different neuroreceptors used, but then that shifts the question to why different neuroreceptors should result in different characters of experience.
But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink.
Neurophilophers are usually computationalist and weakly materialist,
and so are basically inconsistent.
“Thus, changes in entropy provide an important window into self-organization: a sudden increase of entropy just before the emergence of a new structure, followed by brief period of negative entropy (or negentropy).”
I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made my comments
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html
Evgenii
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Brent