Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
The short answer is that I am proposing that :1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the positionthat consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may makesuch calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond therange of computabilitlity.
Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enoughmathematics to be more specific.
If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
=======================================================
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent property"
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:
A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ?
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html
"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that
1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information,
and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons."
B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?
Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an emergent property of
the behavior of many minds.
IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position.
Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:
http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html
One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced.
All art and insight comes from such an experience.
On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of
quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex entities.
He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong to the realmof spin networks.
This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability,and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
Instead, I propose the following:1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the positionthat consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may makesuch calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond therange of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enoughmathematics to be more specific.=================================================================
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
--
-- Onward! Stephen
Hi Stephen P. King
Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is thatconsciousness, arises at (or above ?)the level of noncomputability. He just seems tosay that intuiton does. But that just seemsto be a conjecture of his.
ugh, rcl...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
-- Onward! Stephen
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Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for not saying "I don´t know", that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.
2012/10/16 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>
Hi Stephen P. King
Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is thatconsciousness, arises at (or above ?)the level of noncomputability. He just seems tosay that intuiton does. But that just seemsto be a conjecture of his.
-- Onward! Stephen
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I argued previously about that the most primitive conciousness emerged from predation/prey dynamics and the neural machinery necessary for them. Because in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity, not a gift given by the Gods of computation Turing and Godel, among others ;)
2012/10/16 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for not saying "I don´t know", that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.
-- Onward! Stephen
Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
On 10/16/2012 10:04 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
I argued previously about that the most primitive conciousness emerged from predation/prey dynamics and the neural machinery necessary for them. Because in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity, not a gift given by the Gods of computation Turing and Godel, among others ;)
2012/10/16 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for not saying "I don´t know", that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.
-- Onward! Stephen
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On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
> have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
> Craig
>
Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
have. But I missed it.
--
Onward!
Stephen
-- Onward! Stephen
Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
-- Onward! Stephen
Brent
--Hi Brent,
-- Onward! Stephen
I agree 100%. All 3p related concepts are abstractions constructed from many different 1p's. The idea of "Reality" is a good example of this and it is why I define Reality as "what which is incontrovertible for some collection N (N > 2) of observers that can communicate (or interact) in some meaningful way. Of course the word "meaningful" is a bit ambiguous...
I can't find the post where we were talking about simulation, but I was going to lay it out like this.
I'm in the desert and I see a shiny patch in the distance.
I can consider the shimmering patch many things:
A. Under-Signifying Range of Sense:
1) A perceptually modeled representation of dynamic changing optical conditions based on photon collisions and retinal stimulation.
2) A correlate for neurological functions evolved to link reflection with the presence of life sustaining H2O.
a) this condition is either validated by the presence of water of negated by its absence.
b) the limitations of 2) commonly lead to false positives owing to the similarity of patterns between heat convection and reflection off of the surface of water.
B. Signifying or Personal Range of Sense
1) maybe a mirage (simulation of water)
2) maybe water (which could be just as easily called a simulation of a mirage)
C. Over-signifying or Super-personal Range of Sense
1) hope and salvation
2) punishment from God/trickery from the devil.
3) a dramatic point in the story
Simulation, to me, arises in the personal range of sensemaking. In the lower ranges, simulation is not applicable (saccharine molecules do not simulate sucrose molecules, polymer resin doesn't simulate the cellulose of a tree, etc) and in the upper ranges, interpretation is already ambiguous and faith based. You can't have a simulated dark night of the soul, it is an experience that already defines itself as unique and genuine (even if it's a genuine experience of being tricked).
Simulation then, is about the level of preference and (drumroll) Free Will. If something satisfies our expectation criteria of what it is intended to substitute for, then we say it is a simulation. The mirage is an example of how ephemeral and relative this really is. The mirage only passes for simulating water to us, at a distance. Probably don't see a lot of insects or plants fooled by convection optics. It's only a simulation in one sense or set of senses. This is why AI simulation will fail to generate human subjectivity, because it only looks like a human if you program it to play Jeopardy or chess or drive a car, etc.
I agree with you that, in this regard, everything only has one best simulation and that is itself. Only one instantiation of something can fulfill all possible expectation criteria for interaction with that thing for an indefinite period. I'm not sold on simulation being especially useful as a cosmological feature, but I think that it has potential within this Personal Range, and the bi-simulation is part of that. The personal range is the primary range anyhow. The loss of voluntary participation in the sub-personal, super-personal, and impersonal ranges coincides with the decrease in the relevance of simulation, as the 'seems like' range of direct relation gives way to the 'simply is' range of indirect (second hand) perceptual inertia.
Craig
-- Onward! Stephen
On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
It seems to me that all talk of "orbital electron scattering a photon" that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction.
Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that could be defined as 3p iff possible.
-- Onward! Stephen
--
On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
It seems to me that all talk of "orbital electron scattering a photon" that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction.
Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement about 1p experience. But my point is that consciousness is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.
Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing".
Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.
On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
It seems to me that all talk of "orbital electron scattering a photon" that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction.
Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement about 1p experience. But my point is that consciousness is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they are only the shared experience of atoms.
It seems to me that all talk of "orbital electron scattering a photon" that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction.
Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement about 1p experience. But my point is that consciousness is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.
I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this article http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022 spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.
Craig
-- Onward! Stephen
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing".
I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.
COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.
Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.
COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
-- Onward! Stephen
On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they are only the shared experience of atoms.
Hi Craig,
Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to accept electrons! Best not go there!
On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing".
I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
Hi Craig,
I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies".
Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.
COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.
I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.
Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.
I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an "externalization" of sense.
We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while pointing outside of 1p.
It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood to be problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or the terms we use and cannot be.
COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone "do the work" that they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles heel.
-- Onward! Stephen
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they are only the shared experience of atoms.
Hi Craig,
Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to accept electrons! Best not go there!
Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms tells me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an accounting of atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are objective in some senses but subjective in others (photons being subjective in more ways). That seems the most likely.
Do we have a way of isolating electrons which are independent of ions? When I look up the research online, it is always (naturally) a foregone conclusion that they do exist in isolation but I haven't found anything which explains how specifically we know that (or how we could know that).
I'm not anxious to try to advocate for electron agnosticism on top of photon agnosticism, but if there is nothing convince me otherwise, then there is no reason not to go there as well (other than fear of ridicule, which I only care about if I'm actually wrong).
Craig
-- Onward! Stephen
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing".
I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
Hi Craig,
I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies".
I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper structure is a distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, which tries to reconcile all views of all other views rather than the significant themes that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To do big picture, I think it has to be broad strokes.
Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.
COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.
I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.
What seems true about COMP?
Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.
I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an "externalization" of sense.
I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant.
We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while pointing outside of 1p.
There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p.
It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood to be problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or the terms we use and cannot be.
I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we say can remind us of what we experience first hand.
COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone "do the work" that they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles heel.
Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics?
-- Onward! Stephen
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
-- Onward! Stephen
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On 10/16/2012 10:03 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Hi Craig,
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Brent,Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
Brent
--
How so? Do we humans have "orbital electron scattering" of photons as actual experiential content?
No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they are only the shared experience of atoms.
Hi Craig,
Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to accept electrons! Best not go there!
Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms tells me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an accounting of atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are objective in some senses but subjective in others (photons being subjective in more ways). That seems the most likely.
Interesting challenge! What if we jettison as a confabulation all of physical theory... What is left? Shall we cast aside the nice predictive values that we have gotten? What then? I am willing to go there for the sake of discussion, but to where?
Let's try something. Consider the Bp&p idea. Belief in a proposition and it is true. Can we reconstruct explanations from this? We would have to have a plurality of entities that would have the beliefs, no? Where do we get that plurality? Let's stipulate that we have a plurality somehow. There should be something that distinguishes them, something other than positions in space and time... or is there anything that would generate distinctions?
Maybe the beliefs are frames in different languages that require some transformation to translate the propositions of one into something equivalent for all others. My assumption is that we have to have a common reality to recover something like physical theories and we can get that either by imbedding our entities into a single space or by simply having a common set of propositions that form a non-contradictory set, something isomorphic to a Boolean algebra if and only if the propositions are satisfiable such that the total logical formulation is TRUE. I favor the latter idea, but it requires that the physical universe that we observe to be representable as a true Boolean algebra and a repudiation of the idea that "substance" is ontologically priomitive.
How is it determined to be satisfiable becomes an interesting question! Most thinkers seem to assume that its global logical consistency is completely determined ab initio by the combination of "physical laws" and initial conditions. But exactly how did the physical laws come to exist such that they never generate a logical inconsistency (violating satisfiability) and thus "white rabbits"? I think that the physical laws are the result of an underlying process that is, in the ontological sense, eternal and that what we observe as a physical universe is just an intersection of logically true beliefs for some finite collection of entities.
Do we have a way of isolating electrons which are independent of ions? When I look up the research online, it is always (naturally) a foregone conclusion that they do exist in isolation but I haven't found anything which explains how specifically we know that (or how we could know that).
Are electrons entities that we can capture in a jar? Yes! http://cerncourier.com/cws/article/cern/29675
I'm not anxious to try to advocate for electron agnosticism on top of photon agnosticism, but if there is nothing convince me otherwise, then there is no reason not to go there as well (other than fear of ridicule, which I only care about if I'm actually wrong).
Craig
Umm, I think that you are wrong on this one, but I am OK with the possibility of being wrong. ;-)
One thing that I should add en passant. In my current thinking an entity has sense or 1p if and only if it can be represented by a separable QM system. When we consider such "monads" as interacting QM systems (and assume decoherence theory) they are no longer separable (as they are entangled) their 'common" observables form a commutative (Abelian) sheaf that maps (somehow) to a Boolean algebra. The "classical world" is just the topological dual of the Boolean Algebra.
-- Onward! Stephen
On 10/16/2012 10:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing".
I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
Hi Craig,
I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies".
I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper structure is a distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, which tries to reconcile all views of all other views rather than the significant themes that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To do big picture, I think it has to be broad strokes.
Hi Craig,
But we sacrifice detail that matters for those broad strokes...
Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense.
If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
Craig
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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Hi Craig Weinberg
By sense do you mean Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness?
Or all three as a process ?
Hi Roger,
On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?
No!
The short answer is that I am proposing that :1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the positionthat consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
No!
2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may makesuch calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond therange of computabilitlity.
No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already shown this!
Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enoughmathematics to be more specific.
Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of Löb property. This is also available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/
"Löb's Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness without becoming inconsistent."
A slightly more technical discussion here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox
If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
I will!
=======================================================
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent property"
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:
A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ?
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html
"Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that
1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information,
and
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons."
That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...
B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?
Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon
at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an emergent property of
the behavior of many minds.
Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mind is only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under consistent self-reference (which is what Löb's Theorem is all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow!
IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position.
Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:
http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html
One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced.
All art and insight comes from such an experience.
No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the Horse's mouth.
http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf
This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:
"In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and
insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect
than the material world of our external experiences,
but just as real."
Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains to be explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.
On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of
quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex entities.
He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong to the realmof spin networks.
The "physical universe" yes, he believes that... He has shown how one can derive a crude version of space-time using spin combinatorials.
This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability,and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
Not even wrong!
Instead, I propose the following:1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the positionthat consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
No!
2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may makesuch calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond therange of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directedcalculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason,the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enoughmathematics to be more specific.=================================================================
We must study the math, there are no short-cuts!
--
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
-- Onward! Stephen
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On 16 Oct 2012, at 14:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense.That is a form of idealism.It pre"suppose sense, so I find it very poor as I am interested in understanding sense (and matter).
Withc omp we pressuppose only numbers and +, and *, and define computation in that theory, then the coupling consciousness+material-realities emerges naturally in a testable manner.
If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.Assuming that we are infinite, with an infinity not recoverable by the first person indeterminacy.
Bruno
On 10/17/2012 4:12 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Life may support mathematics.Hi Alberto,
OK, we can think of Life, in a very abstract sense, as the generator of variety and pattern, so that might work. This makes Life = God!I would say that if the above stipulation is true, then this claim applies to the individual "life forms" and not Life (the Form), no?
Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve .
What other kind of computers could there be? Are we not part of the natural world, Reality and thus Nature and thus what we make is "natural computers"? I do not understand the word "artificial", I must tell you, it seems oxymoronic! Why the Man v nature dichotomy? This seems a vestige of the doctrine of "The Fall" within Abrahamic religions. ...
This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible:
Kinda redundant, no? If the physical laws are not capable of being represented by mathematics, what would they be? Patternless chaos in randomness?
in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature.
Those two semi-sentences seem equivalent to me...
Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.
Sure, all universes that have patterns that repeat more than once. But do we even need to stipulate universes that don't contain observers? Or are you considering only anthropomorphic observers: observers that can create elaborate narratives and/or even confabulations to each other?
So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is thatconsciousness, arises at (or above ?)the level of noncomputability. He just seems tosay that intuiton does. But that just seemsto be a conjecture of his.
Hi Roger,
IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
-- Onward! Stephen
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
>> >Craig
>> >
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
> Richard
Hi Richard,
Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.
Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything.
The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views).
Craig
--
Onward!
Stephen
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On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
>> >Craig
>> >
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
> Richard
Hi Richard,
Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.
Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything.This is equivalent with saying "I will not do science", and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5.
You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures.
Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth.
The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views).This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.).
On 10/16/2012 12:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:42:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Alberto,
OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: "Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything." and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: "... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity".
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as "reportablity" of consciousness, but the property of "having a subjective experience of being in the world" itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.
If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?
For a person, sensory deprivation typically leads to powerful phenomenological perceptions or unconsciousness. Hard to guess what happens on a subatomic level, but there is no reason to assume that sense is limited to perceptions of the outside. Sense comes from within as well (it's just different than what comes from without).
As I recall, what happens is that after about 45min, a person's conscious thoughts tend to enter an loop.
Brent
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On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
> It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem
> that is its Achilles heel.
No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it
constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level
measurable.
You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the laws of
physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/
matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are
hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,
are already given and tested.
That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.
The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation
shown incompatible with comp.
Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can
formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to
study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to develop
an authentic non-comp theory.
Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the
body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is
just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.
Life may support mathematics.
Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
>> >Craig
>> >
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
> Richard
Hi Richard,
Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.
Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything.
This is equivalent with saying "I will not do science", and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5.
You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures.
Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth.
The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views).
This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.).
-- Onward! Stephen
On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles heel.
No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level measurable.
You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the laws of physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case, are already given and tested.
That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.
The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation shown incompatible with comp.
Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to develop an authentic non-comp theory.
Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.
-- Onward! Stephen
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:11:00 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
> It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem
> that is its Achilles heel.
No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it
constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level
measurable.
You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the laws of
physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/
matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are
hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,
are already given and tested.
That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.
The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation
shown incompatible with comp.
Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can
formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to
study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to develop
an authentic non-comp theory.
Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the
body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is
just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.
This is exactly why Comp is misguided, as awareness is by definition not emulable in any way.
In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an a priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. emulation requires the existence of something to emulate which is itself ultimately traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.
Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original, beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through which no trace of an original can be accessed.
This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is ultimately inside out.
You can't claim to be revealing the primacy of unreality while insisting on the same time of the reality of that revelation. In Comp, Comp itself is just another Bp, and the significance of whether it is Bp or Bp + p is really an obscure footnote.
-- Onward! Stephen
On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:Life may support mathematics.Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person subject. But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to bet about something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the ontology, as the "inside view" will already explode in a non mathematically unboundable way.You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to choose numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life pattern, as they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/realities.The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the computed beings are confronted to both the computable and the non computable, and a complete transfinite ladder of surprises.Bruno
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2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:Life may support mathematics.Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an ordinary process of matter from the idea of computation as the ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality because computation in living beings becomes a process with a cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality. In essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... ,In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by definition, so they may not restrict anything in the reality that we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not of evolution but a product of random computations. we may perceive elephants flying...
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person subject. But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to bet about something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the ontology, as the "inside view" will already explode in a non mathematically unboundable way.You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to choose numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life pattern, as they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/realities.The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the computed beings are confronted to both the computable and the non computable, and a complete transfinite ladder of surprises.Bruno--
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Alberto.
In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an a priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. emulation requires the existence of something to emulate which is itself ultimately traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.
Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original, beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through which no trace of an original can be accessed.
Nice idea! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation But the concept of a self-erasing copy (a copy without an original) is just a restatement of the Kleene/Church-Curry relation of the application of computable functions to their own descriptions! This idea is interesting to me because this sorta backs up Bruno's claims about quantum aspects implied by comp!
This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is ultimately inside out.
So? Why are you kicking against the pricks? All you need to show is that your concept of Sense is just the involution of Bruno's object of bets and thus bridge the gap between your ideas that are mutually exclusive at this point.
You can't claim to be revealing the primacy of unreality while insisting on the same time of the reality of that revelation. In Comp, Comp itself is just another Bp, and the significance of whether it is Bp or Bp + p is really an obscure footnote.
Wow, reflexivity! Nice, but your going too far, Craig. Your argument does not demolish Bruno's comp, it just shows that it is "different" from yours.
-- Onward! Stephen
I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't make something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing something. Once you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present and meta-represent all kinds of awareness within itself.
-- Onward! Stephen
On 10/17/2012 4:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Hi Craig,I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't make something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing something. Once you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present and meta-represent all kinds of awareness within itself.
But that is exactly the same thing that both I and Bruno agree on. We call it 1p.
The trick is to figure out how to chain together a sequence of 1p's to create a mathematical model of a "flow of conscious awareness". ;-) I have an idea as to how to do this as Pratt explains it.
-- Onward! Stephen
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 5:44:40 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/17/2012 4:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Hi Craig,I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't make something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing something. Once you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present and meta-represent all kinds of awareness within itself.
But that is exactly the same thing that both I and Bruno agree on. We call it 1p.
I am saying that it is 1p and 3p both though. Not ideal 3p, but actual 3p as it is a 1p experience which reflects other 1p experiences in a qualitatively flattened way.
The trick is to figure out how to chain together a sequence of 1p's to create a mathematical model of a "flow of conscious awareness". ;-) I have an idea as to how to do this as Pratt explains it.
Music is a pretty good model of that already.
Craig
-- Onward! Stephen
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On 10/17/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could
>> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
>> >Craig
>> >
> Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
> and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
> have. But I missed it.
> Richard
Hi Richard,
Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett
and the materialist, try to deny its existence.
Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of anything.
This is equivalent with saying "I will not do science", and coherent with your idea that 2+2=5.
How so? You are requiring that *any* intersection of 1p truths to = a truthful 3p. This is wrong!
You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures.
Come on, Bruno, I am trying to "met you halfway" in your comp result!
Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth.
I am defending truth but must be consistent with the fact that we can only *know* finite approximations of truth.
The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative) experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token views).
This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories, and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in cognitive sciences, etc.).
Sure, I agree but notice that your statement is of "theories". We have to be able to falsify them with reference to multiple 1p content for them to be possible 3p.
On 10/17/2012 8:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)the level of noncomputability. He just seems tosay that intuiton does. But that just seems
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
Hi Roger,
IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of p-zombie?
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
If the Doctor's replacement parts preserve the possibility of quantum entanglement then I would say, Yes to her. No, otherwise. I do not believe that p-zombies can exist.
2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:Life may support mathematics.Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an ordinary process of matter
from the idea of computation as the ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality because computation in living beings becomes a process with a cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality. In essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... ,In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by definition,
so they may not restrict anything in the reality that we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not of evolution but a product of random computations. we may perceive elephants flying...
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person subject. But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to bet about something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the ontology, as the "inside view" will already explode in a non mathematically unboundable way.You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to choose numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life pattern, as they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/realities.The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the computed beings are confronted to both the computable and the non computable, and a complete transfinite ladder of surprises.Bruno--
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2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona <agoc...@gmail.com>2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:Life may support mathematics.Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an ordinary process of matter from the idea of computation as the ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality because computation in living beings becomes a process with a cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality. In essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... ,In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by definition, so they may not restrict anything in the reality that we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not of evolution but a product of random computations. we may perceive elephants flying...And still much of your conclussions coming from the first person indeterminacy may hold by considering living beings as ordinary material personal computers.
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person subject. But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to bet about something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the ontology, as the "inside view" will already explode in a non mathematically unboundable way.You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to choose numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life pattern, as they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/realities.The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the computed beings are confronted to both the computable and the non computable, and a complete transfinite ladder of surprises.Bruno--
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Alberto.
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On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona <agoc...@gmail.com>
2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Life may support mathematics.
Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.
Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.
OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.
I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an ordinary process of matter from the idea of computation as the ultimate essence of reality is that the first restrict not only the mathematical laws, but also forces a matemacity of reality because computation in living beings becomes a process with a cost that favour a low kolmogorov complexity for the reality. In essence, it forces a discoverable local universe... ,
In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by definition, so they may not restrict anything in the reality that we perceive. we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not of evolution but a product of random computations. we may perceive elephants flying...
And still much of your conclussions coming from the first person indeterminacy may hold by considering living beings as ordinary material personal computers.
Yes, that's step seven. If the universe is enough "big", to run a *significant* part of the UD. But I think that the white rabbits disappear only on the limit of the whole UD work (UD*).
Bruno
-- Onward! Stephen
A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional module in the mind has´nt to be an area of the brain. Because the model of the mid in EP assumes comp, and assumes an specific, testable model for mind-brain design (natural selection) it is well suited for issues like this.Severe autists lack a module called "theory of mind" . this module make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people interesting object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about the fact that other humans are like him, they can learn to take care of them. But they are not naturally interested in people. They dont care about if you have a mind, because they do not know what means a mind in another being. they just experience their own. For them, yuou are robot that they do not understand.
We ask ourselves about the existence of the mind in others because we have a innate capacity for perceiving and feeling the mind in other. However, a robot without human gestures, without human reactions would not excite our theory of mind module, and we would not have the intuitive perception of a mind in that cold thing.However this has nothing to do with the real thing.The theory of mind module evolved because it was very important for social life. But this is compatible with a reality in with each one of us live in an universe of zombies (some of them with postdoc in philosophy, church pastors etc) where we have the only soul. Of course I dont belive that. I have the "normal" belief. But this is one of the most deep and most widespread beliefs, because it is innate and you must fight against it to drop it out. This belief save you from a paralizing solipsism. That´s one of the reasons why I say "I believe, therefore I can act"
On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote:A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional module in the mind has´nt to be an area of the brain. Because the model of the mid in EP assumes comp, and assumes an specific, testable model for mind-brain design (natural selection) it is well suited for issues like this.Severe autists lack a module called "theory of mind" . this module make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people interesting object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about the fact that other humans are like him, they can learn to take care of them. But they are not naturally interested in people. They dont care about if you have a mind, because they do not know what means a mind in another being. they just experience their own. For them, yuou are robot that they do not understand.That is possible, but I would say that "empathy", your module of a "theory of mind" is already present for all universal machine knowing that they are universal. Autist, in your theory, would be a L¨bian entity with some defect in that module, with respect to its local representation/body. Possible.
Hi Bruno Marchal
In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.
The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop
(I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).That would be a test of zombieness.
2012/10/19 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote:A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional module in the mind has´nt to be an area of the brain. Because the model of the mid in EP assumes comp, and assumes an specific, testable model for mind-brain design (natural selection) it is well suited for issues like this.Severe autists lack a module called "theory of mind" . this module make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people interesting object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about the fact that other humans are like him, they can learn to take care of them. But they are not naturally interested in people. They dont care about if you have a mind, because they do not know what means a mind in another being. they just experience their own. For them, yuou are robot that they do not understand.That is possible, but I would say that "empathy", your module of a "theory of mind" is already present for all universal machine knowing that they are universal. Autist, in your theory, would be a L¨bian entity with some defect in that module, with respect to its local representation/body. Possible.But the theory of mind in the case of an universal machine conscious of himself lack the strong perception of another selves that humans have from the visual clues of the gestures and reactions of others. The human theory of mind is not an abstract theory of mind, but a human theory of mind, which evoques mirror feelings like worry, compassion, anger that we would never have when contemplating a machine. It´s not a philosophical-rational notion, but a instinctive one. And because this, it does not permits to fall into solipsism. Unless a robot mimic an human, he can never trigger this instinctive perception.
In the other side an autist may have the rational theory of mind of an universal machine, but lack the strong perception of "there are others like me around". This is a very important difference for practical matter but also for theoretical ones, since the abstract, rational theory of mind is a rationalization that builds itself from our instinctive perception of a soul-mind in others.