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Sep 27, 2018, 9:02:36 PM9/27/18

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Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:

- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences

- all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.

- scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.

What are your thoughts.

Regards

Sep 28, 2018, 12:52:44 AM9/28/18

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A well-written response is by Jeremy Butterfield [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Butterfield ]:

extended arXiv version: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.4348

(though I always chuckle at the Britishism "maths").

-pt

Sep 28, 2018, 3:44:18 AM9/28/18

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On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:

Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).

- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences- all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.

What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.

- scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.What are your thoughts.

If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).

The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise theory of quanta and qualia.

In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.

What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting supersitition.

Bruno

Regards--

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Sep 28, 2018, 3:54:14 AM9/28/18

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That is still physicalism in disguise, and an implicit elimination of the first person.

Some critics there are valid, and have been presented here a long time ago. But other critic can be done. Maybe later …

Bruno

-pt

Sep 28, 2018, 5:32:04 AM9/28/18

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Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:

f

- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences- all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.- scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.What are your thoughts.

If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG

Regards

Sep 28, 2018, 8:42:11 AM9/28/18

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On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.What are your thoughts.If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise theory of quanta and qualia.In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting supersitition.Bruno

On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition.

Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are material: They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or ink glyphs on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that .

There is nothing outside matter.

(Materialism is not physicalism.)

- pt

Sep 28, 2018, 9:52:19 AM9/28/18

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Sep 28, 2018, 11:09:33 AM9/28/18

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https://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Mitra_without.pdf

Whether or not there exists a mathematical multiverse is, of course,

debatable. However, a multiverse of any sort that's large enough to

give rise of identical copies of observers, will affect the laws of

physics. Since the laws of physics are what we observe them to be, this

means that what we observe already includes the effects of the

multiverse, i.e. the laws of physics actually describe some sector of

the multiverse rather than a particular universe.

This then means that if the mathematical multiverse hypothesis is

correct, the laws of quantum mechanics should be considered to give an

effective description of that multiverse. The set of all your copies

considered as algorithms that are in the same state (your state simply

refers to what algorithm is running including what information is being

processed), are distributed over the entire multiverse, they are not all

in the same universe. To derive the effective laws of physics, one needs

to do statistics over the ensemble of identical observers. This involves

performing summations over the multiverse, but these summations are with

a constraint that says that some given observer is present.

Mathematically it is more convenient to perform unrestricted summations,

a convenient way to take into account constraints is by including them

using phase factors.

For example, if we want to compute a summation over a function f(n1, n2,

n3, n4,....) where the nj are integers, we can just sum over n1,

n2,...etc., independently. But suppose that we need to sum over f(n1,

n2, n3, n4,....), such that some other function g(n1,n2,n3,...) is kept

fixed to some constant value M. The way one handles that is by summing

over the function f(n1, n2, n3, n4,....) Exp[i t g (n1,n2,...)] without

any restrictions. This summation then becomes a function of the

parameter t. By taking the Fourier transform of this function, one can

extract the component of Exp[i t M] of that function, obviously only

terms of the original summation such that g(n1,n2,...) takes the value

M, contribute to that.

In case of keeping track of a given observer, one needs to include a

vast number of constraints, one can then get to a something similar to

the path integral formulation of QM. But I have no rigorous arguments at

this moment that one can really reproduce QM this way.

Saibal

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Sep 28, 2018, 11:10:33 AM9/28/18

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I don't know. I think physicists say that there is no place in space where there is actually nothing at all (and everything is somewhere).

- pt

Sep 28, 2018, 12:00:58 PM9/28/18

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On 28 Sep 2018, at 14:42, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.What are your thoughts.If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise theory of quanta and qualia.In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting supersitition.BrunoOn the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition.

With Turing’s definition (or any equivalent one (Church, Kleene, Post, …), the existence of universal number is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. Robinson arithmetic is itself a universal number, but has not the cognitive ability to prove it. But Peano can, without any problem.

It is has nothing to do with arithmeticalism. Most logicians are materialist (without necessarily vindicating it), but none doubt that the universal numbers exist in the same sense (of existence) than the prime numbers.

Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are material:

Yes, but that does not make it existing ontologically. Keep in mind that Plato and Aristotle differs on the very criterion of existence. To see, touch, observe, measure is not a criterion of existence, as we can dream this things, and then with mechanism we have a model where number existence is enough to have the dreams.

Observing and touching matter is not an argument of existence, unless you assume materialism at the start. But when we do metaphysics seriously, we cannot assume any ontology other that what we need to develop the discourse.

They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or ink glyphs on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that .There is nothing outside matter.

That is strong materialism.

That is a quite strong metaphysical assumption. It is incompatible with Mechanism in cognitive science.

In fact, even weak materialism (matter exists ontologically and is not reducible to anything else) is incompatible with Mechanism.

(Materialism is not physicalism.)

Physicalism does not imply materialism. OK.

Yet, I define matter by “the object of study of physics”, or the study of the observable mode, making strong materialism implying physicalism.

Bruno

- pt

Sep 28, 2018, 12:04:41 PM9/28/18

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With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.

You are begging the question.

Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used to prove that anything exist, but an observer.

Bruno

If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AGRegards

Sep 28, 2018, 12:13:57 PM9/28/18

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> On 28 Sep 2018, at 17:09, smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote:

>

> On 28-09-2018 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:

>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about

>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that

>> hypothesis:

>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences

>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the

>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.

>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in

>> diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or

>> mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.

>> What are your thoughts.

>> Regards

>

> I've written up my thoughts here:

>

> https://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Mitra_without.pdf

>

> Whether or not there exists a mathematical multiverse is, of course, debatable.

The notion of the whole of mathematics is not definable in mathematics, and I am not sure it makes any sense.

Fortunately, with mechanism; we can limit ourselves to the arithmetical truth, and eventually to the sigma_1 arithmetical truth, which is related to the universal dovetailer (which is sigma_1 provability). G* proves them equivalent, but G does not, so the equivalence of sigma_1 truth and sigma_1 provability is known only by “God".

> However, a multiverse of any sort that's large enough to give rise of identical copies of observers, will affect the laws of physics.

> Since the laws of physics are what we observe them to be, this means that what we observe already includes the effects of the multiverse, i.e. the laws of physics actually describe some sector of the multiverse rather than a particular universe.

>

> This then means that if the mathematical multiverse hypothesis is correct, the laws of quantum mechanics should be considered to give an effective description of that multiverse. The set of all your copies considered as algorithms that are in the same state (your state simply refers to what algorithm is running including what information is being processed), are distributed over the entire multiverse, they are not all in the same universe. To derive the effective laws of physics, one needs to do statistics over the ensemble of identical observers. This involves performing summations over the multiverse, but these summations are with a constraint that says that some given observer is present. Mathematically it is more convenient to perform unrestricted summations, a convenient way to take into account constraints is by including them using phase factors.

>

> For example, if we want to compute a summation over a function f(n1, n2, n3, n4,....) where the nj are integers, we can just sum over n1, n2,...etc., independently. But suppose that we need to sum over f(n1, n2, n3, n4,....), such that some other function g(n1,n2,n3,...) is kept fixed to some constant value M. The way one handles that is by summing over the function f(n1, n2, n3, n4,....) Exp[i t g (n1,n2,...)] without any restrictions. This summation then becomes a function of the parameter t. By taking the Fourier transform of this function, one can extract the component of Exp[i t M] of that function, obviously only terms of the original summation such that g(n1,n2,...) takes the value M, contribute to that.

>

> In case of keeping track of a given observer, one needs to include a vast number of constraints, one can then get to a something similar to the path integral formulation of QM. But I have no rigorous arguments at this moment that one can really reproduce QM this way.

The physical reality becomes the border of the Turing universal machine's mindscape.

Bruno

>

>

> Saibal

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Sep 28, 2018, 12:16:30 PM9/28/18

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Everting physical is somewhere, except the physical universe, if that exists.

But with mechanism, there is no physical universe. The physical reality is entirely phenomenological.

A persistent illusion of numbers, living in deep and linear histories…

Bruno

- pt

Sep 28, 2018, 12:37:17 PM9/28/18

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On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:f- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat are your thoughts.If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality.With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.You are begging the question.

Sep 28, 2018, 2:26:23 PM9/28/18

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On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:00:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Yet, I define matter by “the object of study of physics”, or the study of the observable mode, making strong materialism implying physicalism.Bruno

I think (along with Philip Goff*) that physics is not complete in its study of matter. Either a new physics is needed, of there is a theoretical gap between physics and brains.

- pt

Message has been deleted

Sep 28, 2018, 2:49:37 PM9/28/18

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Thank you everybody for your responses.

Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computer

Here for example (4min video) Edelman:

Please give me your thought on that.

Sep 28, 2018, 3:00:20 PM9/28/18

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On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 6:49:37 PM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:

Thank you everybody for your responses.Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computerHere for example (4min video) Edelman:

The question can be turned around. Why would anyone think a brain is strongly comparable or identical to a computer? It has some superficial similarities such as being able to store memory and logical functions (which are simulated by a computer), but its cells are not two state systems like computer transistors. AG

Sep 28, 2018, 3:16:59 PM9/28/18

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On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:37:17 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:f- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat are your thoughts.If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality.With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.You are begging the question.In what way? The MUH says, for example, that for every mathematical solution or equation, there is a (perceived) physical universe mapped identically from, or into that solution or equation. I gave a simple counter example. AG

Sep 29, 2018, 2:40:05 AM9/29/18

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On 28 Sep 2018, at 18:37, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:f- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat are your thoughts.If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality.With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.You are begging the question.In what way? The MUH says, for example, that for every mathematical solution or equation, there is a (perceived) physical universe mapped identically from, or into that solution or equation. I gave a simple counter example. AG

If that is the MUH, then that it is plainly ridiculous, indeed. To have a perceived universe, you need a measure on the computation/sigma-sentences. The physical emerges from an arithmetical phenomenon (assuming mechanism in cognitive science).

The version of mathematicalism implied by mechanism does not lead any choice for the “physical reality”, it has to be a statistic on computations structured by the “observable” mode of self-reference. That indeed predicts quantum logic, and the many “histories” interpretation of arithmetic. Oracle are not impossible, but there are no evidence for them, and should be invoked in last resort (a bit like the “Alien” in cosmology).

The empirical evidence is that there is no physical universe at all.

Bruno

Sep 29, 2018, 2:45:10 AM9/29/18

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On 28 Sep 2018, at 20:26, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:00:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:Yet, I define matter by “the object of study of physics”, or the study of the observable mode, making strong materialism implying physicalism.BrunoI think (along with Philip Goff*) that physics is not complete in its study of matter.

I agree. Physics can predict an eclipse, but is unable to predict why we feel to see an eclipse when we can predict it.

It uses to that effect an identity thesis linking “my mind” to “my brain”, but with mechanism, we all have an infinity of brain in arithmetic.

Either a new physics is needed, of there is a theoretical gap between physics and brains.

With mechanism, it is easy to understand that there is a theoretical gap between brains, mind, and physics.

But Mechanism solves that problem, although probably not like the Aristotelians (weak materialist) would like.

Bruno

Sep 29, 2018, 3:09:30 AM9/29/18

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I don’t like to be negative on people. Edelman makes a lot of good points, but he seems to have no idea what a computer is. He has, like many, a reductionist conception of machine, which is totally impossible to maintain after Gödel’s discovery of Incompleteness in 1930 (transformed by Turing, Kleene, and some others).

Before Gödel, mathematicians hoped to reduced the mathematics of the infinite by the mathematics of finite system having discourse on the infinite. But Gödel found that this is not only impossible, but that even by using the mathematics of the infinite, we can control the mathematics of the *finite*.

The responsible of incompleteness has been found, by Tarski (somehow), and is the (Turing) universal machine. We know today that we know nothing about them, and if the Church Turing thesis is true, we will never know them completely, we can only scratch the surface. Those negative result are constructive. Today we know that the universal machine, once “rich enough cognitively” (which does not ask for much) is aware that it has a soul that this soul is not a machine, and that this can be verified empirically, because the theory of matter becomes a sub-theory of that soul theory. Here soul is basically the representational body (the relative code) in conjunction with a notion of truth.

Bruno

Sep 29, 2018, 3:16:01 AM9/29/18

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On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 6:40:05 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Sep 2018, at 18:37, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:f- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat are your thoughts.With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.You are begging the question.In what way? The MUH says, for example, that for every mathematical solution or equation, there is a (perceived) physical universe mapped identically from, or into that solution or equation. I gave a simple counter example. AGIf that is the MUH, then that it is plainly ridiculous, indeed. To have a perceived universe, you need a measure on the computation/sigma-sentences. The physical emerges from an arithmetical phenomenon (assuming mechanism in cognitive science).The version of mathematicalism implied by mechanism does not lead any choice for the “physical reality”, it has to be a statistic on computations structured by the “observable” mode of self-reference. That indeed predicts quantum logic, and the many “histories” interpretation of arithmetic. Oracle are not impossible, but there are no evidence for them, and should be invoked in last resort (a bit like the “Alien” in cosmology).The empirical evidence is that there is no physical universe at all.Bruno

Sep 29, 2018, 3:16:41 AM9/29/18

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A bacteria is already a computer (at least), and a neurone is already a rather sophisticated society of bacteria and viruses, plausibly enough. So, a society of billions of neurons should not be compared to transistors. The substitution level is plausibly much lower than the level of neurons.

But we don’t know in Nature anything which at some level is not emulable by a computer, except for controversial notion like

A) primary matter (if that exists, it is not emulable by a computer)

B) the reduction of the wave packet (if that exists, it is provably not emulable by a computer).

But there are no evidence neither for A) nor for B).

Bruno

Please give me your thought on that.

Sep 29, 2018, 4:57:54 AM9/29/18

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On 29 Sep 2018, at 09:16, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 6:40:05 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 18:37, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:f- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat are your thoughts.With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.You are begging the question.If that is the MUH, then that it is plainly ridiculous, indeed. To have a perceived universe, you need a measure on the computation/sigma-sentences. The physical emerges from an arithmetical phenomenon (assuming mechanism in cognitive science).The version of mathematicalism implied by mechanism does not lead any choice for the “physical reality”, it has to be a statistic on computations structured by the “observable” mode of self-reference. That indeed predicts quantum logic, and the many “histories” interpretation of arithmetic. Oracle are not impossible, but there are no evidence for them, and should be invoked in last resort (a bit like the “Alien” in cosmology).The empirical evidence is that there is no physical universe at all.BrunoThis double-talk nonsense IMO. I clearly gave a counter-example to the MUH,

You want make some mathematical object physical real. That assume some physical reality, which cannot be done.

To say that a mathematical object exist physically, does not make sense. It starts with a category error.

No mathematical object can be a physical object. But what remains possible is that a physical object belongs to the dream of a person supported by (infinity) of computation (which are arithmetical object a priori).

falsifying it. Moreover, I explained clearly why I used "perceived". I just meant that plane waves can never be observed,

You don’t need to go that far. The numbers 0, 1, 2, … cannot be observed. No mathematical object can be observed. They do not belong to the category of what can be observed.

Now, an observation might be explained by a sort of arithmetical prestidigitation. Some numbers can make some numbers believing in a lot of things.

and since they are solutions to Maxwell's equations, the MUH is false.

The MUH is only the idea that the physical might be a part of the mathematical. Not that mathematical things have to exist physically.

Tp put it simply, mathematicalism is the idea that there is no physical universe at all.

There is no time, no space, no energy, those are just Löbian machine's elaborate fiction to figure out our indexical local geography.

Look at a experimental physicist. He measured numbers, and infer relation between numbers, and then avoid the qualia:consciousness question, which indeed is only “physical” in string version of materialism, which requires the brain and body to be infinite entities.

To refute mathematicalism, you need a theory of matter giving an observable role to some infinite entities, having secondary observable consequence. Mechanism is a bit like that: if the physics deducible from mechanism is different from what we observe, that might be used to infer such infinite entities, but the preliminary results, and QM, does not go in that direction.

Deal with that directly and stop with the double talk about the non-existence of the physical universe. That's not even an issue, since I am only dealing with what can be observed. AG

If you take “observation” as a criteria of reality, you assume right at the start the theology of Aristotle.

I just say that this is incompatible with the idea that a brain is Turing emulable.

Study the sane04 paper, which explain all this, and ask question if something is unclear.

Bruno

Sep 29, 2018, 5:22:30 AM9/29/18

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On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 8:57:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Sep 2018, at 09:16, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 6:40:05 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 18:37, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:f- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciencesWhat are your thoughts.With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.You are begging the question.The empirical evidence is that there is no physical universe at all.BrunoThis double-talk nonsense IMO. I clearly gave a counter-example to the MUH,You want make some mathematical object physical real. That assume some physical reality, which cannot be done.

Tegmark's MUH is: *Our external physical reality is a mathematical structure*.^{[3]} That is, the physical universe is not merely *described by* mathematics, but *is* mathematics (specifically, a mathematical structure).
**Mathematical existence equals physical existence, and all structures
that exist mathematically exist physically as well. **Observers,
including humans, are "self-aware substructures (SASs)". In any
mathematical structure complex enough to contain such substructures,
they "will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically
'real' world".^{[4]}

To say that a mathematical object exist physically, does not make sense. It starts with a category error.

Sep 29, 2018, 5:33:12 AM9/29/18

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The arithmeticalist thinks matter is fiction.

The materialist thinks arithmetic is fiction.

That's all I know. :)

- pt

Sep 29, 2018, 5:48:44 AM9/29/18

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Sep 29, 2018, 6:41:42 AM9/29/18

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On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 4:48:44 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

It claims that all mathematical objects exist in "physical" reality, which is sort-of isomorphic or in some sense identical to these objects. That is, no dichotomy between "physical" and mathematical objects, and all the latter including plane waves exist in this reality. But you will never observe a plane wave, so the MUH is falsified. AG

1. Tegmark claims everything in the universe is mathematical - that is, the universe consists of mathematical objects.

2. Tegmark also says that infinities should be eliminated from physics - in fact, **infinities are ruining physics**.

So then via Tegmark there can be no real continuous (infinitely divisible) objects like (mathematical) waves, putting 1 and 2 together. Only particular mathematical objects exist.

- pt

Sep 29, 2018, 7:16:26 AM9/29/18

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On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 10:41:42 AM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 4:48:44 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:It claims that all mathematical objects exist in "physical" reality, which is sort-of isomorphic or in some sense identical to these objects. That is, no dichotomy between "physical" and mathematical objects, and all the latter including plane waves exist in this reality. But you will never observe a plane wave, so the MUH is falsified. AG1. Tegmark claims everything in the universe is mathematical - that is, the universe consists of mathematical objects.2. Tegmark also says that infinities should be eliminated from physics - in fact,infinities are ruining physics.

Bruno wrote 1 & 2. AG

So then via Tegmark there can be no real continuous (infinitely divisible) objects like (mathematical) waves, putting 1 and 2 together. Only particular mathematical objects exist.

According to Wiki, and what I've heard from its adherents, the MUH posits that ALL mathematical object or entities exist in nature. But plane waves do not exist in nature. (Do you know what they are?) So the MUH as claimed by Wiki and its adherents is falsified. AG

- pt

Sep 29, 2018, 7:34:15 AM9/29/18

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On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 7:16:41 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Sep 2018, at 21:00, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 6:49:37 PM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:Thank you everybody for your responses.Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computerHere for example (4min video) Edelman:The question can be turned around. Why would anyone think a brain is strongly comparable or identical to a computer? It has some superficial similarities such as being able to store memory and logical functions (which are simulated by a computer), but its cells are not two state systems like computer transistors. AGA bacteria is already a computer (at least),

Sep 29, 2018, 8:52:02 AM9/29/18

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In his original arXiv [ https://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0646 ] and in other places he presents MUH as different "levels", so a level-one MUH would have different mathematics than a level-four MUH, etc.

To be honest, I find MUH to be both boring, adding nothing to science, and somewhat (or maybe a lot) confused.

- pt

Sep 29, 2018, 8:59:48 AM9/29/18

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On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 6:34:15 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 7:16:41 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:A bacteria is already a computer (at least),Really? Then you should be able to identify the entities that store binary information. And where is the clock which pulses and advances the instruction pointer? And where is the instruction pointer located? AG

There is the famous tic-tac-toe playing enzymes [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_computing#Tic-tac-toe_game ] created in 2002. Maybe the first synbio life forms to compute things. (More recent little biocomputers are in the news all the time.)

- pt

Sep 29, 2018, 2:59:34 PM9/29/18

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On 9/29/2018 12:16 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

On 28 Sep 2018, at 21:00, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 6:49:37 PM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:Thank you everybody for your responses.

Here for example (4min video) Edelman:

The question can be turned around. Why would anyone think a brain is strongly comparable or identical to a computer? It has some superficial similarities such as being able to store memory and logical functions (which are simulated by a computer), but its cells are not two state systems like computer transistors. AG

A bacteria is already a computer (at least), and a neurone is already a rather sophisticated society of bacteria and viruses, plausibly enough. So, a society of billions of neurons should not be compared to transistors. The substitution level is plausibly much lower than the level of neurons.

It has been estimated that simulating a single neuron requires a
micro-controller like an AVR, which contains 80,000 transistors.

Brent

Brent

Sep 29, 2018, 4:07:12 PM9/29/18