1p & 3p comparison

[Craig Weinberg]

Dennett's Comp:
Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is an illusion
Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally

My view:
Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality
which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic
nestings.
Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p
quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.

Bruno:
Machine or human 1p = (1p(f(x)) - Subjectivity arises as a result of
the 1p set of functional consequences of specific arithmetic truths,
which (I think) are neither object, subject, or sense, but Platonic
universal numbers.

Is that close?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> Dennett's Comp:
> Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -

What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?

> Subjectivity is an illusion

And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense.

> Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally
>
> My view:
> Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality
> which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic
> nestings.

Even infinite "organic nestings", which might not even make sense.

> Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
> hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p
> quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.

Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
existence of philosophical zombies, that is: the existence of
unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances.

>
> Bruno:
> Machine or human 1p = (1p(f(x)) - Subjectivity arises as a result of
> the 1p set of functional consequences of specific arithmetic truths,
> which (I think) are neither object, subject, or sense, but Platonic
> universal numbers.
>
> Is that close?

I just say that IF we are machine, then some tiny part of arithmetical
truth is ontologically enough, to derive matter and consciousness, and
is necessary (up to recursive equivalence). Subjectivity comes from
self-reference + Truth.

"Truth about a weaker LUM" is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM
can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role
of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are
defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question)
arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Dennett's Comp:
> > Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -
>
> What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?

I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or
third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/
holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. Dennett thinks
that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each
other.

>
> > Subjectivity is an illusion
>
> And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense.

Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and
cannot doubt it. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to
imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity.

>
> > Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally
>
> > My view:
> > Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality
> > which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic
> > nestings.
>
> Even infinite "organic nestings", which might not even make sense.

No, only seven or so nestings: Physical <> Chemical <> Biological <>
Zoological <> Neurological <> Anthropological <> Individual

>
> > Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
> > hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p
> > quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.
>
> Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
> Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
> existence of philosophical zombies,

I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,
puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.

> that is: the existence of
> unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances.

Not perfectly imitating, no. That's what that whole business of
substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of
substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a
lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing
Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a
TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants
(even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be
used to detect the puppet strings).

The first consideration with this is that it would need to be extended
to have a duration value because any puppet might not reveal it's
strings in a short conversation. A TD00 program might decay to TD75 in
an hour, and TD99 in two hours, so there could be a function plotted
there. It may not be a simple arithmetic rise over time, participants
may change their mind back and forth (and I think that they might)
over time. There could be patterns in that too, where our expectations
wax and wane with some kind of regularity for some people and not for
others. It's not just time duration though, we would need to factor in
the quantity and quality of data. How hard the questions are and how
many of them. Answering long questions too fast would be a dead
giveaway. A sparse conversation may have giveaways too - how they
express impatience with long delays, whether they bring up parts of
the conversation during the gaps, all kinds of subtle clues in the
semantic character of what the program focuses on.

There are so many variables that it may not even be useful to try to
model it. The TD will undoubtedly be affected by how the participants
have been prepared, whether they have experience with AI or have seen
documentaries about it just before or whether they have been instead
prepared with sentimental stories or crime dramas which sensitize them
or desensitize them to certain attitudes and behavior. If the program
speaks in LOL INTERWEBZ slang, or general informal terms vs precise
scientific terms that would have an effect as well.

Whether or not a true TD00 -> universal human puppet could be possible
in theory or practice is not what I'm speculating on. If I were to
speculate, I would say that no, it is not possible. I don't think that
even a real human could be TD00 to all other humans for all times and
situations. That's because it's a continuum of 'seems like' rather
than a condition which 'simply is' - it's indexical to subject and
circumstance.

All of this in no way means that the TD level implies actual
simulation of subjectivity. TD is only a measure of imitation success.
As I have said, the only way I can think of to come close to knowing
whether a given imitation is a simulation is to walk your brain
function over to the program, one hemisphere at a time, and then walk
it back after a few hours or days. Short of that, we can either be
generous with our projection and imagine that puppets, computers, and
programs are potential human beings given the right degree of
sophistication, or we can be more conservative and limit our scope so
that we only give other humans, animals, or living organisms the
benefit of the doubt. I think the more important feature is the
scoping itself, because it is rooted in what kinds of similarities we
pay attention to and identify with. If we identify with logic, then
anything which impresses us as logical gets the benefit of the doubt.
If we identify with feeling, then anything which seems like it feels
like us gets the benefit of the doubt. I think that logic arises from
feeling rather than the other way around, and both arise from sense.

>
>
>
> > Bruno:
> > Machine or human 1p = (1p(f(x)) - Subjectivity arises as a result of
> > the 1p set of functional consequences of specific arithmetic truths,
> > which (I think) are neither object, subject, or sense, but Platonic
> > universal numbers.
>
> > Is that close?
>
> I just say that IF we are machine, then some tiny part of arithmetical
> truth is ontologically enough, to derive matter and consciousness, and
> is necessary (up to recursive equivalence).

I agree that would be true if we are only machines, however that would
make it a 3p version of matter and consciousness (a la Dennett). Even
the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as
1p, but the machine would not.

> Subjectivity comes from
> self-reference + Truth.

I think that our experience shows us though that in human development,
subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation
which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the
invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is
trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-
reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a
machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we can.

>
> "Truth about a weaker LUM" is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM
> can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role
> of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are
> defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question)
> arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions.

Yes, from what I can understand, I agree. I have always thought that
you are on the right track with your insights into the incompleteness
of any given machine or person's understanding. Because of the way
that the interior of the monad is diffracted into spacetime
exteriority, it may very well be the case that our own limitations of
self-knowledge are in fact mechanical 3p limitations, which can be
modeled successfully by comp.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>> Dennett's Comp:
>>> Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -
>>
>> What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
>
> I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or
> third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/
> holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication.

?

> Dennett thinks
> that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each
> other.

Yes. Even in the physical sense. I am not sure if he really means that
we know that, but then I am used to give a strong sense to "knowing".

>
>>
>>> Subjectivity is an illusion
>>
>> And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense.
>
> Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and
> cannot doubt it.

OK.

> If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to
> imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity.

OK.

If we doubt it, we have a subjective experience.
If we don't doubt it, too.
So we cannot doubt it.

>
>>
>>> Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally
>>
>>> My view:
>>> Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality
>>> which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic
>>> nestings.
>>
>> Even infinite "organic nestings", which might not even make sense.
>
> No, only seven or so nestings: Physical <> Chemical <> Biological <>
> Zoological <> Neurological <> Anthropological <> Individual

By UDA to have no comp you will have to continue such nesting in the
"Physical".
I let you this as a non completely trivial exercise.
I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot
ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you
did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
manifested in a consistent history.

>
>>
>>> Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
>>> hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate
>>> human 3p
>>> quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.
>>
>> Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
>> Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
>> existence of philosophical zombies,
>
> I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,
> puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.

Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and
philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent
qualia and having no qualia, also.

>
>> that is: the existence of
>> unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all*
>> circumstances.
>
> Not perfectly imitating, no.

Sorry but it is the definition.

> That's what that whole business of
> substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of
> substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a
> lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing
> Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a
> TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants
> (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be
> used to detect the puppet strings).

?
By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if
he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine.
(That happens!)).
By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The
only difference is that they lack the 1p experience.

Not at all. The contrary happens. Matter becomes a first person plural
appearance. There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.

Deriving the appearance of matter from arithmetic does not imply that
matter is made of number. matter simply does not exist, and the
appearance of matter emerges from the complex statistics and topology
of the dreams of the universal numbers, entangled in deep computations.

> Even
> the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as
> 1p, but the machine would not.

No, it is the contrary. Read UDA, it will make you understand why.

>
>> Subjectivity comes from
>> self-reference + Truth.
>
> I think that our experience shows us though that in human development,
> subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation
> which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the
> invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is
> trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-
> reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a
> machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we can.

Trivially, because you assume non-comp.

>
>>
>> "Truth about a weaker LUM" is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM
>> can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role
>> of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are
>> defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question)
>> arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions.
>
> Yes, from what I can understand, I agree. I have always thought that
> you are on the right track with your insights into the incompleteness
> of any given machine or person's understanding. Because of the way
> that the interior of the monad is diffracted into spacetime
> exteriority, it may very well be the case that our own limitations of
> self-knowledge are in fact mechanical 3p limitations, which can be
> modeled successfully by comp.

OK. But the 3p limitations have impact on the 1p too. And on the
physical, which is really 1p plural.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> >>> Dennett's Comp:
> >>> Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -
>
> >> What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
>
> > I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or
> > third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/
> > holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication.
>
> ?

I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a
top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level
mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical
processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or
incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. This is a very different
scaling than 3p, since there is a continuum of voluntary and
involuntary incorporation. It's not a bunch of discrete gears or
subroutines, it is a fugue of directly and indirectly experienced
motives

>
> > Dennett thinks
> > that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each
> > other.
>
> Yes. Even in the physical sense. I am not sure if he really means that
> we know that, but then I am used to give a strong sense to "knowing".
>
>
>
> >>> Subjectivity is an illusion
>
> >> And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense.
>
> > Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and
> > cannot doubt it.
>
> OK.
>
> > If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to
> > imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity.
>
> OK.
>
> If we doubt it, we have a subjective experience.
> If we don't doubt it, too.
> So we cannot doubt it.
>

Yes!

>
>
> >>> Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally
>
> >>> My view:
> >>> Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality
> >>> which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic
> >>> nestings.
>
> >> Even infinite "organic nestings", which might not even make sense.
>
> > No, only seven or so nestings: Physical <> Chemical <> Biological <>
> > Zoological <> Neurological <> Anthropological <> Individual
>
> By UDA to have no comp you will have to continue such nesting in the
> "Physical".
> I let you this as a non completely trivial exercise.

I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual
nesting. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is
the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail
really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as
a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity
is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes
unto themselves.

> I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot
> ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you
> did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
> complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
> manifested in a consistent history.

I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. The 3p quant
correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive
of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, therefore we cannot assume
the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power
to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their
own.

>
>
>
> >>> Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
> >>> hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate
> >>> human 3p
> >>> quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.
>
> >> Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
> >> Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
> >> existence of philosophical zombies,
>
> > I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,
> > puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.
>
> Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and
> philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent
> qualia and having no qualia, also.

A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by
the puppet master. The difference between absent qualia and no qualia
is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already
know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well.

>
>
>
> >> that is: the existence of
> >> unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all*
> >> circumstances.
>
> > Not perfectly imitating, no.
>
> Sorry but it is the definition.

That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a
practical realism.

>
> > That's what that whole business of
> > substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of
> > substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a
> > lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing
> > Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a
> > TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants
> > (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be
> > used to detect the puppet strings).
>
> ?
> By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if
> he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine.
> (That happens!)).
> By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The
> only difference is that they lack the 1p experience.

That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies. They assume
simulation rather than imitation. There is no such thing as a perfect
imitation because a perfect imitation would be the same thing as the
genuine original.

No, I don't think that it does. Matter becomes a 3p computational
feedback invariance - like a graphic avatar in a video game collides
with a wall of colored pixels and bounces back. There is no experience
involved at all. The wall could feel like marshmallows or solid steel,
but would it be the avatar feeling the wall or the wall feeling the
avatar, or the negative space feeling both, or the software feeling
graphic vectors, or hardware feeling the logical collisions on the
microprocessor? ...why not the pixels on the monitor themselves
feeling the event? None of it really makes sense to me. The experience
is orphaned in Platonia or otherwise generalized to a free floating
truth condition.

> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.

I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
explain the experienced character of matter. Again, it could be
sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather than
a reality.

>
> Deriving the appearance of matter from arithmetic does not imply that
> matter is made of number. matter simply does not exist,

This is the mirror image of Dennett. I explain it in multisense
realism as the Logos position. Why wouldn't matter exist just as much
as anything else? As much as numbers?

> and the
> appearance of matter emerges

Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where? To where? Why is it
necessary? Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
our world? Can you light a brick of charcoal on fire with an
arithmetic function alone? Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
materialize?

> from the complex statistics and topology
> of the dreams of the universal numbers, entangled in deep computations.

I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
intangible dreamy universal entanglement.

>
> > Even
> > the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as
> > 1p, but the machine would not.
>
> No, it is the contrary. Read UDA, it will make you understand why.

I have tried, but it doesn't make sense to me.

>
>
>
> >> Subjectivity comes from
> >> self-reference + Truth.
>
> > I think that our experience shows us though that in human development,
> > subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation
> > which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the
> > invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is
> > trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-
> > reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a
> > machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we can.
>
> Trivially, because you assume non-comp.

I don't assume anything, I have only to observe the difference between
any person who has ever lived and any machine that has ever been
built.

>
>
>
> >> "Truth about a weaker LUM" is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM
> >> can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role
> >> of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are
> >> defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question)
> >> arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions.
>
> > Yes, from what I can understand, I agree. I have always thought that
> > you are on the right track with your insights into the incompleteness
> > of any given machine or person's understanding. Because of the way
> > that the interior of the monad is diffracted into spacetime
> > exteriority, it may very well be the case that our own limitations of
> > self-knowledge are in fact mechanical 3p limitations, which can be
> > modeled successfully by comp.
>
> OK. But the 3p limitations have impact on the 1p too. And on the
> physical, which is really 1p plural.

Sure, yes. All of the levels and modalities influence each other in
different ways.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Dennett's Comp:

Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -

What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?

I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or

third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/

holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication.

?

I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a
top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level
mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical
processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or
incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves.

But how, precisely?

I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual
nesting.

Are you assuming quantum mechanics?

I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is
the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail
really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as
a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity
is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes
unto themselves.

With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something.

I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot

ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you

did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a

complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be

manifested in a consistent history.

I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.

This is a "don't ask" assumption. 

The 3p quant
correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive
of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,

We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation.

The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also.

therefore we cannot assume
the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power
to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their
own.

This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. 

Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to

hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate

human 3p

quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.

Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.

Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the

existence of philosophical zombies,

I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,

puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.

Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and

philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent

qualia and having no qualia, also.

A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by
the puppet master.

Which means that the puppet is not autonomous, like a human, or its behaviorally equivalent zombie.

The difference between absent qualia and no qualia
is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already
know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well.

OK. It is consciousness with a lacking qualia. Philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, and all qualia.

that is: the existence of

unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all*

circumstances.

Not perfectly imitating, no.

Sorry but it is the definition.

That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a
practical realism.

But we reason about theory. 

That's what that whole business of

substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of

substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a

lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing

Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a

TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants

(even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be

used to detect the puppet strings).

?

By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if

he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine.

(That happens!)).

By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The

only difference is that they lack the 1p experience.

That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.

The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the person having that body.

Not at all. The contrary happens. Matter becomes a first person plural

appearance.

No, I don't think that it does. Matter becomes a 3p computational
feedback invariance - like a graphic avatar in a video game collides
with a wall of colored pixels and bounces back. There is no experience
involved at all. The wall could feel like marshmallows or solid steel,
but would it be the avatar feeling the wall or the wall feeling the
avatar, or the negative space feeling both, or the software feeling
graphic vectors, or hardware feeling the logical collisions on the
microprocessor? ...why not the pixels on the monitor themselves
feeling the event? None of it really makes sense to me. The experience
is orphaned in Platonia or otherwise generalized to a free floating
truth condition.

You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.

There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But

the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.

I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
explain the experienced character of matter.

Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia which has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.

Again, it could be
sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather than
a reality.

You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and proposing theories.

Deriving the appearance of matter from arithmetic does not imply that

matter is made of number. matter simply does not exist,

This is the mirror image of Dennett. I explain it in multisense
realism as the Logos position. Why wouldn't matter exist just as much
as anything else? As much as numbers?

Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a consequence of the theory we are working on.

Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion. I have never seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive matter.

and the

appearance of matter emerges

Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?

From the average minds of the average universal numbers. 

To where?

To here and now.

Why is it
necessary?

Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams, and their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).

Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
our world?

This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable relations.

Can you light a brick of charcoal on fire with an
arithmetic function alone?

Yes.

Shows me a charcoal brick which you could prove that it would not be a result of arithmetical function.

That might be possible, for example if the material arithmetical hypostases were contradicting physics, but up to now, it fits nicely.

Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
materialize?

Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing, or to not assuming all what we want to explain.

Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made any progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like PA are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at all.

from the complex statistics and topology

of the dreams of the universal numbers, entangled in deep computations.

I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
intangible dreamy universal entanglement.

It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that  ExP(x) is true if it exists a number verifying the condition P.

Even

the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as

1p, but the machine would not.

No, it is the contrary. Read UDA, it will make you understand why.

I have tried, but it doesn't make sense to me.

Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory made by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself from your assumption. I think.

You also find obvious that we are not machine, but clearly it is not. Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of consciousness to other entities.

Subjectivity comes from

self-reference + Truth.

I think that our experience shows us though that in human development,

subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation

which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the

invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is

trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-

reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a

machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we can.

Trivially, because you assume non-comp.

I don't assume anything, I have only to observe the difference between
any person who has ever lived and any machine that has ever been
built.

So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of observation. You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a public solution to a problem.

Bruno

"Truth about a weaker LUM" is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM

can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role

of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are

defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question)

arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions.

Yes, from what I can understand, I agree. I have always thought that

you are on the right track with your insights into the incompleteness

of any given machine or person's understanding. Because of the way

that the interior of the monad is diffracted into spacetime

exteriority, it may very well be the case that our own limitations of

self-knowledge are in fact mechanical 3p limitations, which can be

modeled successfully by comp.

OK. But the 3p limitations have impact on the 1p too. And on the

physical, which is really 1p plural.

Sure, yes. All of the levels and modalities influence each other in
different ways.

Craig

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 12, 6:54 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> >>>>> Dennett's Comp:
> >>>>> Human "1p" = 3p(3p(3p)) -
>
> >>>> What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
>
> >>> I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct
> >>> phenomenology or
> >>> third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/
> >>> holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication.
>
> >> ?
>
> > I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a
> > top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level
> > mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical
> > processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or
> > incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves.
>
> But how, precisely?

It doesn't translate as a how or what, it's a who and why. How do you
make your signature your own? How do you stay the same person even
thought your body changes? It doesn't work that way, it's a whole
other sense which is symmetrical but anomalous to the what and how
senses of 3p architecture.

>
>
>
> > I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual
> > nesting.
>
> Are you assuming quantum mechanics?

I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the
interpretations.

>
> > I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
> > most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is
> > the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail
> > really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
> > anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as
> > a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity
> > is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes
> > unto themselves.
>
> With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means
> something.

Why not?

>
>
>
> >> I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I
> >> cannot
> >> ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you
> >> did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
> >> complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
> >> manifested in a consistent history.
>
> > I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
> > need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
> > it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.
>
> This is a "don't ask" assumption.

No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want,
I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. No amount of whats
and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not
dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense
(making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy',
and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.)

>
> > The 3p quant
> > correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
> > any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
> > get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
> > in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive
> > of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
> > die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,
>
> We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no
> 1p-3p relation.
> The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat
> catch a mouse, also.

Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the
same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense.

>
> > therefore we cannot assume
> > the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power
> > to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
> > their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
> > universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
> > understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their
> > own.
>
> This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still
> waiting for a list of what you assume and derive.

I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I
derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which
themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list
of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We
are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before
we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of
the world. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis and never precedes
or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
the wind? Nothing.

>
>
>
> >>>>> Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to
> >>>>> hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate
> >>>>> human 3p
> >>>>> quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p.
>
> >>>> Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious.
> >>>> Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the
> >>>> existence of philosophical zombies,
>
> >>> I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia,
> >>> puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place.
>
> >> Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and
> >> philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent
> >> qualia and having no qualia, also.
>
> > A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by
> > the puppet master.
>
> Which means that the puppet is not autonomous, like a human, or its
> behaviorally equivalent zombie.

The human is it's own puppet master (to some extent), and so they are
potentially autonomous.

>
> > The difference between absent qualia and no qualia
> > is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already
> > know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well.
>
> OK. It is consciousness with a lacking qualia. Philosophical zombie
> lacks consciousness, and all qualia.

A P-zombie and a puppet both lack consciousness and all qualia, but a
puppet is an ordinary object which illustrates how we can project
consciousness onto something inanimate, while a P-zombie makes the
very same ordinary thing seem like a supernatural absurdity. It's
inverted because it assumes simulation and substitution level rather
than imitation and indexical persuasiveness.

>
>
>
> >>>> that is: the existence of
> >>>> unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all*
> >>>> circumstances.
>
> >>> Not perfectly imitating, no.
>
> >> Sorry but it is the definition.
>
> > That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a
> > practical realism.
>
> But we reason about theory.

I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.

>
>
>
> >>> That's what that whole business of
> >>> substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula
> >>> of
> >>> substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50
> >>> represents a
> >>> lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD
> >>> (Turing
> >>> Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet
> >>> with a
> >>> TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants
> >>> (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be
> >>> used to detect the puppet strings).
>
> >> ?
> >> By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if
> >> he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine.
> >> (That happens!)).
> >> By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The
> >> only difference is that they lack the 1p experience.
>
> > That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.
>
> The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies
> have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the
> person having that body.

That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie,
there is no confusion and it all makes sense without invoking infinite
complexity. The puppet isn't one thing. It's a bunch of parts. Besides
being a bunch of parts on the outside, we are also one simple 'I'
thing on the inside. The I side is opposite to the parts side, so it
is very different; an experiential flow instead of discrete
mechanisms. I can see myself in as simple or complex terms as I like.
The outside cannot be seen that way. It is not subject to a 'seems
like' shifting of attention - it is instead a fully explicated 'simply
is' which can be quantified in terms like finite or infinite. The I
side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is
the sense maker itself.

>
>
>
> >> Not at all. The contrary happens. Matter becomes a first person
> >> plural
> >> appearance.
>
> > No, I don't think that it does. Matter becomes a 3p computational
> > feedback invariance - like a graphic avatar in a video game collides
> > with a wall of colored pixels and bounces back. There is no experience
> > involved at all. The wall could feel like marshmallows or solid steel,
> > but would it be the avatar feeling the wall or the wall feeling the
> > avatar, or the negative space feeling both, or the software feeling
> > graphic vectors, or hardware feeling the logical collisions on the
> > microprocessor? ...why not the pixels on the monitor themselves
> > feeling the event? None of it really makes sense to me. The experience
> > is orphaned in Platonia or otherwise generalized to a free floating
> > truth condition.
>
> You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.

I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't
matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no
sensation or experience there.

>
>
>
> >> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
> >> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.
>
> > I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
> > explain the experienced character of matter.
>
> Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia

That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic. If you conflate qualia
with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of
qualia entirely.

> which
> has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the
> quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non
> provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.

Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified
optical patterns verbally? You would never have to squint or wonder
what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of
every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-
visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.

>
> > Again, it could be
> > sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
> > since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather than
> > a reality.
>
> You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and
> proposing theories.

I don't know what reality isn't, but I do know that what we experience
directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.

>
>
>
> >> Deriving the appearance of matter from arithmetic does not imply that
> >> matter is made of number. matter simply does not exist,
>
> > This is the mirror image of Dennett. I explain it in multisense
> > realism as the Logos position. Why wouldn't matter exist just as much
> > as anything else? As much as numbers?
>
> Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not
> human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a
> consequence of the theory we are working on.

Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
function-product relation.

> Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has
> ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.

Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
notions. This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos
and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought.

> I have never
> seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive
> matter.

Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition. What do you
assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or
theories?

>
>
>
> >> and the
> >> appearance of matter emerges
>
> > Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?
>
>  From the average minds of the average universal numbers.

Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?

>
> > To where?
>
> To here and now.

Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W

>
> > Why is it
> > necessary?
>
> Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams, and
> their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first
> person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).

Why would they? Once you have numbers dreams, why would you need
anything else? Number dreams should be the alpha and omega of the
cosmos with no appearances, emergences, or coherences at all.

>
> > Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
> > our world?
>
> This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and
> explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs
> in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have
> personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical
> evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable relations.

That's my point is that it makes no sense to jump from numbers to
appearances of matter.

>
> > Can you light a brick of charcoal on fire with an
> > arithmetic function alone?
>
> Yes.
> Shows me a charcoal brick which you could prove that it would not be a
> result of arithmetical function.
> That might be possible, for example if the material arithmetical
> hypostases were contradicting physics, but up to now, it fits nicely.

Show me a charcoal brick which you could prove that is could not be
anything else but the result of arithmetic function. I still don't
know how you burn it with an equation.

>
> > Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
> > materialize?
>
> Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc
> complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing,
> or to not assuming all what we want to explain.

That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
true. Arithmetic isn't primitive, but rather it is the part of the
interior palette of sense which is most exterior facing. Substance
then becomes no more or less primitive than assumptions, theories,
feelings, consciousness, etc. All different categories of sense forms
and contents.

>
> Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made any
> progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both
> mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an
> explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like PA
> are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your
> feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that
> matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at all.

Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
acceptance of uncertainty. My idea is to notice the symmetry between
the two approaches and understand that the symmetry itself is the true
primitive.

>
>
>
> >> from the complex statistics and topology
> >> of the dreams of the universal numbers, entangled in deep
> >> computations.
>
> > I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
> > intangible dreamy universal entanglement.
>
> It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual
> sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that  ExP(x) is true
> if it exists a number verifying the condition P.

See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there. The dreams are the
only reality but reality isn't really primitively real...and there
really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not... It's
a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
distinction between dream and reality.

>
>
>
> >>> Even
> >>> the 1p would be a 3p de-presentation/description of what we know as
> >>> 1p, but the machine would not.
>
> >> No, it is the contrary. Read UDA, it will make you understand why.
>
> > I have tried, but it doesn't make sense to me.
>
> Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory made
> by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself
> from your assumption. I think.

I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a
primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.

> You also find obvious that we are not machine,

We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but
we also have wholes.

> but clearly it is not.
> Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of
> consciousness to other entities.

In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child
can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says
THANK YOU on the lid.

>
>
>
> >>>> Subjectivity comes from
> >>>> self-reference + Truth.
>
> >>> I think that our experience shows us though that in human
> >>> development,
> >>> subjectivity is rooted in fantasy and idiosyncaratic interpretation
> >>> which is not directly self-referential. I would say truth is the
> >>> invariance between subjective and objective sense. Self-reference is
> >>> trivial compared to self-embodiment and self-identification. Self-
> >>> reference can be imitated by a machine, but I don't think that a
> >>> machine can use the word 'I' in the full range of senses that we
> >>> can.
>
> >> Trivially, because you assume non-comp.
>
> > I don't assume anything, I have only to observe the difference between
> > any person who has ever lived and any machine that has ever been
> > built.
>
> So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of
> observation.

I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt
it.

>You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone
> who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a public
> solution to a problem.

If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared
solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as
long as it is true also.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the
interpretations.

So you assume QM? 

I think that what we measure at that level is literally the

most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is

the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail

really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are

anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as

a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity

is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes

unto themselves.

With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means

something.

Why not?

Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations. 

I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I

cannot

ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example, you

did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a

complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be

manifested in a consistent history.

I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not

need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed

it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.

This is a "don't ask" assumption.

No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want,
I'm explaining why you will never get an answer.

I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I know it follows from comp.

No amount of whats
and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not
dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense
(making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy',
and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.)

?

The 3p quant

correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish

any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it

get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings

in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive

of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and

die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,

We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no

1p-3p relation.

The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat

catch a mouse, also.

Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the
same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense.

This makes brain mysterious.

therefore we cannot assume

the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power

to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on

their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the

universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete

understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their

own.

This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still

waiting for a list of what you assume and derive.

I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I
derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which
themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list
of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We
are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before
we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of
the world.

Sure, but those things are not as the same level. You are saying that we cannot life science, because we have to alive for doing that. This is incorrect.

Logic is always an a posteriori analysis

No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic. Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings*  attempting to get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth.

and never precedes
or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
the wind? Nothing.

What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious assumptions?

Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging question move.

I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.

Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory.

That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.

The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies

have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the

person having that body.

That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie,
there is no confusion and it all makes sense without invoking infinite
complexity. The puppet isn't one thing. It's a bunch of parts. Besides
being a bunch of parts on the outside, we are also one simple 'I'
thing on the inside. The I side is opposite to the parts side, so it
is very different; an experiential flow instead of discrete
mechanisms. I can see myself in as simple or complex terms as I like.
The outside cannot be seen that way. It is not subject to a 'seems
like' shifting of attention - it is instead a fully explicated 'simply
is' which can be quantified in terms like finite or infinite.

I don't see any sense in that paragraph. Sorry.

The I
side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is
the sense maker itself.

Looks like the machine's 1p. It is far too much imprecise to be sure.

You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.

I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't
matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no
sensation or experience there.

How do you know that. 

This implies p-zombies.

There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But

the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.

I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to

explain the experienced character of matter.

Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia

That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic.

?

Qualia themselves are not logic at all.

But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not you just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels.

If you conflate qualia
with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of
qualia entirely.

You are right. So let us not conflate qualia and the theory of qualia.

which

has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the

quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non

provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.

Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified
optical patterns verbally?

No. But the hypostases defined with "& p" are provably non verbal.

You would never have to squint or wonder
what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of
every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-
visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.

Not to myself.

Again, it could be

sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but

since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather than

a reality.

You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and

proposing theories.

I don't know what reality isn't,

That contradicts your non-comp statements.

but I do know that what we experience
directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.

Sure.

Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not

human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a

consequence of the theory we are working on.

Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
function-product relation.

It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form----content relation.

Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has

ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.

Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
notions.

I did not.

This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos
and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought.

On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth transcend our intellect.

You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist view of numbers and machines.

I have never

seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive

matter.

Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition.

Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels).

What do you
assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or
theories?

I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory, which assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories.

and the

appearance of matter emerges

Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?

 From the average minds of the average universal numbers.

Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?

It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to point on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't need either.

To where?

To here and now.

Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W

The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the numbers.

Why is it

necessary?

Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams, and

their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first

person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).

Why would they?

Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's begging the question again.

Once you have numbers dreams, why would you need
anything else? Number dreams should be the alpha and omega of the
cosmos with no appearances, emergences, or coherences at all.

What if that's the content of the (sharable) dreams?

That's the case for reason explained in UDA (+AUDA).

Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in

our world?

This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and

explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs

in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have

personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical

evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable relations.

That's my point is that it makes no sense to jump from numbers to
appearances of matter.

But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach.

Why would arithmetic want to pretend to

materialize?

Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc

complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing,

or to not assuming all what we want to explain.

That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
true.

Sure, but then show me the non-computable element. 

Arithmetic isn't primitive,

Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from it.

Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made any

progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both

mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an

explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like PA

are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your

feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that

matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at all.

Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
acceptance of uncertainty.

You are the one who seems certain.

I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of

intangible dreamy universal entanglement.

It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual

sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that  ExP(x) is true

if it exists a number verifying the condition P.

See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there.

I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence".

The dreams are the
only reality

No. The numbers and +, and * is the only assumption. 

but reality isn't really primitively real...

No. You are foggy. Physical reality, and experiential reality is not primitively real, but the phenomenlogy is explained. 

and there
really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not...

There is an important relative difference.

It's
a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
distinction between dream and reality.

It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the test confirms that we are in a multiuser  dream.

Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory made

by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself

from your assumption. I think.

I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a
primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.

That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in communicating it.

You also find obvious that we are not machine,

We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but
we also have wholes.

All machines have wholes.

but clearly it is not.

Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of

consciousness to other entities.

In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child
can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says
THANK YOU on the lid.

I don't see the argument.

So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of

observation.

I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt
it.

Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to assume that your extrapolation is true.

You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone

who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a public

solution to a problem.

If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared
solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as
long as it is true also.

Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very confusing.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> > I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the
> > interpretations.
>
> So you assume QM?

I assume the observations, but not the interpretations. For example: I
assume that the double slit experiment produces a particular pattern
of illumination under the given conditions, but I think that pattern
is really interfering waves of sensitivity spread across the target,
rather than a literal wave of photons in space. I assume that bubble
and cloud chambers produce trails under the given conditions, but I
don't assume that means that a physical particle has penetrated the
chamber - it could be an event within the chamber that has an external
cause.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> I think that what we measure at that level is literally the
> >>> most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena.
> >>> It is
> >>> the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small
> >>> detail
> >>> really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are
> >>> anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres
> >>> as
> >>> a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then
> >>> authenticity
> >>> is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary
> >>> universes
> >>> unto themselves.
>
> >> With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means
> >> something.
>
> > Why not?
>
> Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from
> truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations.

It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between
emerging from truth and embodying logic.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>> I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I
> >>>> cannot
> >>>> ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me "yellow" as example,
> >>>> you
> >>>> did not convince me. The qualia "yellow" is 1p simple, but needs a
> >>>> complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be
> >>>> manifested in a consistent history.
>
> >>> I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not
> >>> need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed
> >>> it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions.
>
> >> This is a "don't ask" assumption.
>
> > No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want,
> > I'm explaining why you will never get an answer.
>
> I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I
> know it follows from comp.

How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to
a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no
specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It
might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it
has no way to describe in what way the experience differs.

>
> > No amount of whats
> > and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not
> > dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense
> > (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy',
> > and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.)
>
> ?

What and how are questions that can be asked about literal machines.
Who and why are questions that can be asked about figurative stories.
They don't mix, but they are symmetrical aspects of the same
underlying when & where root sense. Actors (who and why) + Stage (what
and how) = Show (when and where).

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> The 3p quant
> >>> correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish
> >>> any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it
> >>> get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings
> >>> in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even
> >>> conceive
> >>> of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and
> >>> die with nothing but the 1p descriptions,
>
> >> We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no
> >> 1p-3p relation.
> >> The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat
> >> catch a mouse, also.
>
> > Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the
> > same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense.
>
> This makes brain mysterious.

No more than the back side of a tapestry.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> therefore we cannot assume
> >>> the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the
> >>> power
> >>> to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on
> >>> their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the
> >>> universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete
> >>> understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on
> >>> their
> >>> own.
>
> >> This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still
> >> waiting for a list of what you assume and derive.
>
> > I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I
> > derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which
> > themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list
> > of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We
> > are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before
> > we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of
> > the world.
>
> Sure, but those things are not as the same level. You are saying that
> we cannot life science, because we have to alive for doing that. This
> is incorrect.

?

>
> > Logic is always an a posteriori analysis
>
> No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic.

What does it depend on?

> Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting to
> get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth.
>
> > and never precedes
> > or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
> > experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
> > history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
> > emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
> > What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
> > the wind? Nothing.
>
> What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious
> assumptions?

Then it's an infinite regress of unconscious assumptions that neurons,
molecules, atoms, and quantum has to make. It forces an infinitely
efficacious microcosmic reality with a whole universe of arbitrary
spectator illusions. My thinking is that there is no reason to presume
that our relative size and complexity makes us any less grounded in
absolute reality. We are direct participants in the universe as much
as the brain is.

> Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging
> question move.
>

It's not showing me that.

>
>
> > I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.
>
> Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory.

I don't know that that's true.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies.
>
> >> The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies
> >> have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the
> >> person having that body.
>
> > That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie,
> > there is no confusion and it all makes sense without invoking infinite
> > complexity. The puppet isn't one thing. It's a bunch of parts. Besides
> > being a bunch of parts on the outside, we are also one simple 'I'
> > thing on the inside. The I side is opposite to the parts side, so it
> > is very different; an experiential flow instead of discrete
> > mechanisms. I can see myself in as simple or complex terms as I like.
> > The outside cannot be seen that way. It is not subject to a 'seems
> > like' shifting of attention - it is instead a fully explicated 'simply
> > is' which can be quantified in terms like finite or infinite.
>
> I don't see any sense in that paragraph. Sorry.

I'm saying that the idea of a machine being one thing is fictional.
It's a group of things which we can interpret as acting like one thing
(a puppet) but it's not actually one thing. The term zombie assumes
that the machine is one thing but missing itself. Puppet means it
never had a self to begin with, and only achieves imitation through
the intention of the puppeteer and audience.

>
> > The I
> > side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
> > finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is
> > the sense maker itself.
>
> Looks like the machine's 1p.

That locates 1p within a 3p context. I'm saying that 1p is the primary
context.

> It is far too much imprecise to be sure.

Imprecise why? Because it's paradoxical or symmetrical?

>
>
>
> >> You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.
>
> > I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't
> > matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no
> > sensation or experience there.
>
> How do you know that.
> This implies p-zombies.

How do I know that the news anchorman isn't Nostradamus? How do I know
that traffic signals aren't as excited as I am when they turn green?
It doesn't imply anything philosophical at all, it implies the
possibility of common sense. When we suffer from psychosis, we can
attribute intentionality and dialogue with inanimate objects, the
weather, etc. We might think that it is literally for us for whom
every bell tolls. This is a solipsistic experience which is supported
by consciousness, but it isn't realism.

To have realism, there has to be a way of conceiving of appearances
coinciding with expectations without being causally linked. Should we
tell the schizophrenic that the tree probably is talking to them
because otherwise that implies talking tree zombies? If we design a
machine to imitate our thinking, we cannot be surprised that no actual
person appears from the imitation. It's not like 'build it and they
will come'.

>
>
>
> >>>> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
> >>>> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.
>
> >>> I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
> >>> explain the experienced character of matter.
>
> >> Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia
>
> > That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic.
>
> ?
> Qualia themselves are not logic at all.

I wouldn't say that. There is a logic to the aesthetics of color
mixing and sound arrangement.

> But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not you
> just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels.

I'm not confusing levels at all, I'm completely clear. I don't ever
say 'don't ask', I welcome the asking, I only say that the answer is
cannot be seen with the same assumptions which used when asking the
question. Just because non logical things can be studied logically
doesn't mean that nothing is lost in that approach. It is entirely
likely that things which are completely non logical can only be
completely misrepresented by logic. It's not even logic, but 3p
empiricism. Forcing a literal what-how mechanism onto a figurative who-
why narrative.

>
> > If you conflate qualia
> > with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of
> > qualia entirely.
>
> You are right. So let us not conflate qualia and the theory of qualia.

Ok

>
>
>
> >> which
> >> has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the
> >> quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non
> >> provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.
>
> > Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified
> > optical patterns verbally?
>
> No. But the hypostases defined with "& p" are provably non verbal.

Ok, then a technology which identifies optical patterns unconsciously.

>
> > You would never have to squint or wonder
> > what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of
> > every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-
> > visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.
>
> Not to myself.

Right.

>
>
>
> >>> Again, it could be
> >>> sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but
> >>> since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather
> >>> than
> >>> a reality.
>
> >> You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and
> >> proposing theories.
>
> > I don't know what reality isn't,
>
> That contradicts your non-comp statements.

I don't know for a fact that trash cans aren't polite, but common
sense makes it a good bet.

>
> > but I do know that what we experience
> > directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.
>
> Sure.
>
> >> Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not
> >> human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a
> >> consequence of the theory we are working on.
>
> > Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
> > matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
> > function-product relation.
>
> It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form----
> content relation.

It seems like comp is pure form to me - axiomatic forms and
consequential relativistic forms. I don't see any content at all, it's
only set off to the side with a circle drawn around it.

>
>
>
> >> Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has
> >> ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.
>
> > Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
> > notions.
>
> I did not.

"does not exist" = undefinable

to me, does not exist = non-sense

>
> > This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
> > theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos
> > and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
> > is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
> > possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought.
>
> On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth
> transcend our intellect.

That just extends the intellect into the superhuman realm.
Arithmetical truth is still an intellectual system - not a visceral,
tangible experience.

> You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist
> view of numbers and machines.

Like what facts?

>
>
>
> >> I have never
> >> seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive
> >> matter.
>
> > Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
> > The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
> > instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition.
>
> Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed
> to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels).

You can define definition without meta-definition?

>
>
> > What do you
> > assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or
> > theories?
>
> I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and
> compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive
> ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory, which
> assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories.

If you assume elementary arithmetic, then isn't comp a tautology?

>
>
>
> >>>> and the
> >>>> appearance of matter emerges
>
> >>> Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?
>
> >> From the average minds of the average universal numbers.
>
> > Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?
>
> It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to point
> on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non
> sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't
> need either.

So since physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of physical
reality.

>
>
>
> >>> To where?
>
> >> To here and now.
>
> > Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W
>
> The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the numbers.

Why do they define positions for everything else?

>
>
>
> >>> Why is it
> >>> necessary?
>
> >> Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams,
> >> and
> >> their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first
> >> person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).
>
> > Why would they?
>
> Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your
> point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's
> begging the question again.

Then you have to show that numbers do dream, and that we can tell the
difference to make non-comp false. If no, that's begging the question

again.

>
> > Once you have numbers dreams, why would you need
> > anything else? Number dreams should be the alpha and omega of the
> > cosmos with no appearances, emergences, or coherences at all.
>
> What if that's the content of the (sharable) dreams?
> That's the case for reason explained in UDA (+AUDA).

Then physical matter is as primitive as pure fantasy or arithmetic
truth.

>
>
>
> >>> Can you write an equation that emerges as actual matter in
> >>> our world?
>
> >> This has no sense. I can only describe a reality (arithmetic) and
> >> explain why some numbers will have some physical feeling and beliefs
> >> in material thing. I have no evidence for actual matter. I have
> >> personal evidence for consciousness and qualia, and historical
> >> evidences for measurable numbers and plausible locally stable
> >> relations.
>
> > That's my point is that it makes no sense to jump from numbers to
> > appearances of matter.
>
> But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us
> that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's
> obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach.

No, just the opposite. I'm encouraging asking. I'm asking you directly
- how does it make sense that numbers have something to do with matter
appearing? You are the one telling me I can't ask.

>
>
>
> >>> Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
> >>> materialize?
>
> >> Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc
> >> complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing,
> >> or to not assuming all what we want to explain.
>
> > That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
> > true.
>
> Sure, but then show me the non-computable element.

I am the non-computable element. Blue is the non computable element.

>
> > Arithmetic isn't primitive,
>
> Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from it.

Sense. Arithmetic is derived from rhythm and metaphor. Pattern
recognition.

>
>
>
> >> Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made
> >> any
> >> progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both
> >> mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an
> >> explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like
> >> PA
> >> are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your
> >> feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that
> >> matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at
> >> all.
>
> > Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
> > certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
> > acceptance of uncertainty.
>
> You are the one who seems certain.

I'm certain that it makes sense to me.

>
>
>
> >>> I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of
> >>> intangible dreamy universal entanglement.
>
> >> It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual
> >> sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that ExP(x) is true
> >> if it exists a number verifying the condition P.
>
> > See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there.
>
> I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence".

I think it just moves the level of mystery one level down. You say
what numbers verify exists, but what makes numbers verify anything?

>
> > The dreams are the
> > only reality
>
> No. The numbers and +, and * is the only assumption.
>
> > but reality isn't really primitively real...
>
> No. You are foggy. Physical reality, and experiential reality is not
> primitively real, but the phenomenlogy is explained.

It's not explained, it is only accounted for.

>
> > and there
> > really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not...
>
> There is an important relative difference.

Why?

>
> > It's
> > a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
> > matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
> > about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
> > distinction between dream and reality.
>
> It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the
> test confirms that we are in a multiuser dream.

That doesn't distinguish dream from reality, it only says there is no
reality and it is all dream.

>
>
>
> >> Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory
> >> made
> >> by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself
> >> from your assumption. I think.
>
> > I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
> > interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
> > implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a
> > primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.
>
> That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in
> communicating it.

It seems like different people get different parts of it. All I can do
it try to make more sense out of it.

>
>
>
> >> You also find obvious that we are not machine,
>
> > We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but
> > we also have wholes.
>
> All machines have wholes.

I don't think that they do. Only in our eyes, but not in 'their own'.

>
>
>
> >> but clearly it is not.
> >> Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of
> >> consciousness to other entities.
>
> > In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child
> > can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says
> > THANK YOU on the lid.
>
> I don't see the argument.

The argument that unconsciousness can also be obvious.

>
>
>
> >> So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of
> >> observation.
>
> > I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt
> > it.
>
> Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to
> assume that your extrapolation is true.

I don't know it is true, only that it seems true.

>
>
>
> >> You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone
> >> who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a
> >> public
> >> solution to a problem.
>
> > If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared
> > solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as
> > long as it is true also.
>
> Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even
> more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of
> personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very
> confusing.

I don't find it confusing. I find looking for a what-how explanation
of who-why to be confusing. A person's character makes sense in terms
of their biography, but it would be very confusing indeed if you tried
to explain who a person is by medical description alone.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

You tell me. Emerging from arithmetical truth just means "true in arithmetic", or "proved by some correct UMs", etc. It is standard terms for logicians, engineers, etc. With comp, first person views are more complex, due to the first person dissemination in infinities of computations, which needs more subtle internal limit, but again comp has a tool which is computer science and math. I prefer to search a key under a lamp.

I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I

know it follows from comp.

How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to
a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no
specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It
might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it
has no way to describe in what way the experience differs.

That's just free negative speculation. Blue is a quasi singularize deep experience involving collection of experiences, and having some non communicable quality, says the machine.

Of course if you treat the machine as a zombie, there are few sense that you will ever listening to her.

Logic is always an a posteriori analysis

No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic.

What does it depend on?

That's a mystery. The question is: do you believe in it. Does the theorem of Fermat story makes sense. Does the problem of the distribution of prime numbers make sense to you. 

All introspecting UMs is confronted to that mystery, and understand that IF they are correct machine, then that mystery is insoluble.

Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings*  attempting to

get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth.

and never precedes

or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense

experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the

history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in

emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.

What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel

the wind? Nothing.

What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious

assumptions?

Then it's an infinite regress of unconscious assumptions that neurons,
molecules, atoms, and quantum has to make.

Why an infinite regress?

It forces an infinitely
efficacious microcosmic reality with a whole universe of arbitrary
spectator illusions. My thinking is that there is no reason to presume
that our relative size and complexity makes us any less grounded in
absolute reality. We are direct participants in the universe as much
as the brain is.

That's about how I see the thing. All UMs are grounded in the absolute arithmetical reality. With comp, the theory of everything is already taught in high school. But that's not the theory of "reality", it is just a simple universal ontological frame in term of which we can formulate (mathematically) the mind-body problem, which actually become the belief-in-body problem. 

Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging

question move.

It's not showing me that.

You are so lucky.

I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.

Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory.

I don't know that that's true.

OK. Note that I did not say it is the only way to search. We can search with the heart, and our evolving intuition when we get familiarized with new ideas. But for the public, I find better to share only precise hypothesis, and reason through them. 

We are at cross of each other because you don't want to play the game of science, which is the game we are playing, or trying to play, here.

I'm saying that the idea of a machine being one thing is fictional.
It's a group of things which we can interpret as acting like one thing
(a puppet) but it's not actually one thing. The term zombie assumes
that the machine is one thing but missing itself. Puppet means it
never had a self to begin with, and only achieves imitation through
the intention of the puppeteer and audience.

You ignore that computer science has a branch devoted to self-reference.

The I

side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both

finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It is

the sense maker itself.

Looks like the machine's 1p.

That locates 1p within a 3p context. I'm saying that 1p is the primary
context.

That was not locating the 1p in a 3p context (in which you can hardly have something finite and infinite). 

But 1p, with comp, is only 1p primary, not 3p primary. It is even the price to pay to attribute a mind to another one.

It is far too much imprecise to be sure.

Imprecise why? Because it's paradoxical or symmetrical?

Because the background is fuzzy.

You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential programs.

I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It doesn't

matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still no

sensation or experience there.

How do you know that.

This implies p-zombies.

How do I know that the news anchorman isn't Nostradamus? How do I know
that traffic signals aren't as excited as I am when they turn green?
It doesn't imply anything philosophical at all, it implies the
possibility of common sense. When we suffer from psychosis, we can
attribute intentionality and dialogue with inanimate objects, the
weather, etc. We might think that it is literally for us for whom
every bell tolls. This is a solipsistic experience which is supported
by consciousness, but it isn't realism.

Attributing experience to inanimate object is animism, or panpsychism. 

Solipsists attribute consciousness only to themselves, everyone else is a zombie.

Comp idealism is saved from solipsism thanks to the first person plural notion, which comes from the linear symmetrical bottom core of the physical reality (the quantization on the sigma_1 sentences). Normally.

To have realism, there has to be a way of conceiving of appearances
coinciding with expectations without being causally linked. Should we
tell the schizophrenic that the tree probably is talking to them
because otherwise that implies talking tree zombies? If we design a
machine to imitate our thinking, we cannot be surprised that no actual
person appears from the imitation. It's not like 'build it and they
will come'.

Yes, it is more complex indeed. But not infinitely complex so as to jump in the infinite lower comp level.

There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But

the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.

I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to

explain the experienced character of matter.

Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia

That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic.

?

Qualia themselves are not logic at all.

I wouldn't say that. There is a logic to the aesthetics of color
mixing and sound arrangement.

OK. That my point. Let us not confuse qualia and a theory of qualia, nor should we confuse machine's qualia and machine's theory of qualia.

But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not you

just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels.

I'm not confusing levels at all, I'm completely clear. I don't ever
say 'don't ask', I welcome the asking, I only say that the answer is
cannot be seen with the same assumptions which used when asking the
question. Just because non logical things can be studied logically
doesn't mean that nothing is lost in that approach. It is entirely
likely that things which are completely non logical can only be
completely misrepresented by logic. It's not even logic, but 3p
empiricism. Forcing a literal what-how mechanism onto a figurative who-
why narrative.

Comp is open a priori for many mechanism, but you throw them all, like if you knew that you are superior (your term) to a vast and immensely big of variate creature. 

If you conflate qualia

with it's capacity to represent, you amputate the significance of

qualia entirely.

You are right. So let us not conflate qualia and the theory of qualia.

Ok

which

has a bigger non communicable, yet know true by the machine, than the

quanta parts. The hypostases splits along the provable and non

provable parts, from the point of view of the machine.

Would you trade your eyesight for a technology which identified

optical patterns verbally?

No. But the hypostases defined with "& p" are provably non verbal.

Ok, then a technology which identifies optical patterns unconsciously.

Yes.

You would never have to squint or wonder

what something is, the computer would just present you with a list of

every object you would be seeing if you could see. Using this non-

visual interface you could 'prove' that you could see.

Not to myself.

Right.

Again, it could be

sufficient, had we no authentic subjectivity to compare it with, but

since we do, virtual matter remains a theoretical concept rather

than

a reality.

You talk like if you knew what is reality. We are searching and

proposing theories.

I don't know what reality isn't,

That contradicts your non-comp statements.

I don't know for a fact that trash cans aren't polite, but common
sense makes it a good bet.

None of us are saying that all machines can think. 

but I do know that what we experience

directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.

Sure.

Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not

human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a

consequence of the theory we are working on.

Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that

matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a

function-product relation.

It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form----

content relation.

It seems like comp is pure form to me - axiomatic forms and
consequential relativistic forms. I don't see any content at all, it's
only set off to the side with a circle drawn around it.

Because you don't study the theory. There is no form in arithmetical truth, only in the intellect of universal numbers, the content will emerge from the fixed points in universal transformation.

Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody has

ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.

Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use

notions.

I did not.

"does not exist" = undefinable

Definability and existence are not related in that way.

to me, does not exist = non-sense

Nor in that way. 

You know, an advantage with comp is that we can use freely classical logic, and be very clear on all this.

This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for

theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because logos

and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it

is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the

possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual thought.

On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth

transcend our intellect.

That just extends the intellect into the superhuman realm.
Arithmetical truth is still an intellectual system - not a visceral,
tangible experience.

You don't get it. Arithmetical truth is more like God, or the ONE of Plotinus. from the machine's point of view, although the machine (and us) cannot know that (but in a sense "meta-know it in a correctness conditional way"). 

The viscerable tangible experience is the fate of the universal numbers, not arithmetical truth.

You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist

view of numbers and machines.

Like what facts?

The theorem of the limitation of machines, and the fact that those theorem are discovered by the machine, and this at different level, and from different points of view. You ignore the richness of computer science.

I have never

seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive

matter.

Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.

The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely

instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition.

Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed

to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels).

You can define definition without meta-definition?

If you can at least agree with the axiom I gave to Stephen for arithmetic, yes. With less than that, I can't.

What do you

assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or

theories?

I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and

compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive

ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory, which

assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories.

If you assume elementary arithmetic, then isn't comp a tautology?

No. Why? Comp is a strong statement. If comp was a tautology in arithmetic; I guess even you would not discuss it.

You doubt arithmetic? 

and the

appearance of matter emerges

Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?

From the average minds of the average universal numbers.

Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?

It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to point

on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non

sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't

need either.

So since physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of physical
reality.

Of course not. If the physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of comp.

But not only it does not, but it put a new light on the origin of the physical laws and the physical sensations.

But if we get a contradiction from AUDA, we might first get rid of the classical theory of knowledge, and be less naive on that, before abandonning comp, but if no machines epistemology works, we will be left with tool for measuring our degree of non-computationalisme. 

To where?

To here and now.

Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W

The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the numbers.

Why do they define positions for everything else?

Only for he physical things. Pain for example are not 3-localized, when you think twice on the phantom limb. Of course they are often 1-localizable, although not always.

Why is it

necessary?

Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams,

and

their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first

person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).

Why would they?

Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your

point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's

begging the question again.

Then you have to show that numbers do dream, and that we can tell the
difference to make non-comp false. If no, that's begging the question
again.

You don't get it at all. I don't bet the question of comp, because I do not pretend that comp is true. I assume it. I put in on the table at the start. I study its consequences, that's all.

Now you come and say; "oh but comp is false". 

 We say "Ah, OK, what is your argument?".

And basically we are still waiting, or trying to explain to you that you are not even arguing. Just telling us that machines cannot do this and that without presenting argument or more primitive assumption in which that statement is made.

But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us

that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's

obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach.

No, just the opposite. I'm encouraging asking. I'm asking you directly
- how does it make sense that numbers have something to do with matter
appearing? You are the one telling me I can't ask.

On the contrary. I love question, and that one in particular, on which I work since years aand which I explain on this list, where we share reasoning, and abstract deep idea (notably that everything, or nothing, is simpler than something). 

Its a PhD in computer science, and I have published a sequence of more pedagogically accessible versions. 

Please read sane04 for a concise answer to your question, but you have to get familar how to reason in comp.

Why would arithmetic want to pretend to

materialize?

Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc

complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains nothing,

or to not assuming all what we want to explain.

That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't

true.

Sure, but then show me the non-computable element.

I am the non-computable element. Blue is the non computable element.

All machines can discover this. Their 1-self is not a machine. The "Bp & p" is not even arithmetical.

Arithmetic isn't primitive,

Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from it.

Sense. Arithmetic is derived from rhythm and metaphor. Pattern
recognition.

That's probably, when made precise, recursively equivalent with RA.

Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made

any

progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both

mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an

explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like

PA

are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to your

feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that

matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at

all.

Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory

certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual

acceptance of uncertainty.

You are the one who seems certain.

I'm certain that it makes sense to me.

Then be aware of the gap between understanding and sharing understanding.

I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm of

intangible dreamy universal entanglement.

It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the usual

sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that  ExP(x) is true

if it exists a number verifying the condition P.

See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there.

I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence".

I think it just moves the level of mystery one level down. You say
what numbers verify exists, but what makes numbers verify anything?

If I could answer that, I would not have taken the numbers as the start.

But at least, with comp, I can explain why we cannot explain their origin.

and there

really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not...

There is an important relative difference.

Why?

It makes awakening possible.

It's

a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that

matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care

about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no

distinction between dream and reality.

It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the

test confirms that we are in a multiuser  dream.

That doesn't distinguish dream from reality, it only says there is no
reality and it is all dream.

Not at all, there is a reality, dreams are only inside views on a rich reality, and dreams are real, and some are sharable.

To be precise there are too many dreams, at first sight, the self-reference logics illustrate that this is hard to prove, to say the least.

Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory

made

by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself

from your assumption. I think.

I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only

interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the

implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't be a

primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.

That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in

communicating it.

It seems like different people get different parts of it. All I can do
it try to make more sense out of it.

You also find obvious that we are not machine,

We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts, but

we also have wholes.

All machines have wholes.

I don't think that they do. Only in our eyes, but not in 'their own'.

Our own whole is in our eyes too, and machine can make up their own whole. UMs tend to try to make whole of many things.

 

but clearly it is not.

Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of

consciousness to other entities.

In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young child

can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it says

THANK YOU on the lid.

I don't see the argument.

The argument that unconsciousness can also be obvious.

But it is not. It is just very plausible, but I would not say it is obvious. In fact I am agnostic.

So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of

observation.

I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt

it.

Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to

assume that your extrapolation is true.

I don't know it is true, only that it seems true.

You should work on that difference.

You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone

who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a

public

solution to a problem.

If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a shared

solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution, as

long as it is true also.

Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even

more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of

personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very

confusing.

I don't find it confusing. I find looking for a what-how explanation
of who-why to be confusing. A person's character makes sense in terms
of their biography, but it would be very confusing indeed if you tried
to explain who a person is by medical description alone.

But you are yhe one using medical or biological segregation. comp looks at the whole pattern, and don't care too much on the type material clothes.

For the mind body problem we have to look at all levels, points of view, aspects, etc.

Bruno

Craig

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Feb 14, 5:44 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
> > It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between
> > emerging from truth and embodying logic.
>
> You tell me. Emerging from arithmetical truth just means "true in
> arithmetic", or "proved by some correct UMs", etc. It is standard
> terms for logicians, engineers, etc.

And it makes perfect sense in that context, but the idea of something
being true doesn't cause something to suddenly occur in the experience
of people (or whoever lives through cells or atoms) in the universe. I
can say that scoring a basket in basketball it worth two points, and
that is true in basketball, but that truth does not literally cause a
ball to do something to a basket.

> With comp, first person views are
> more complex, due to the first person dissemination in infinities of
> computations, which needs more subtle internal limit, but again comp
> has a tool which is computer science and math. I prefer to search a
> key under a lamp.

If you are looking for a key that can only be seen when it glows in
the dark, then the lamp is exactly what you can't use to search for
it.

>
>
>
> >> I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I
> >> know it follows from comp.
>
> > How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to
> > a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no
> > specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It
> > might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it
> > has no way to describe in what way the experience differs.
>
> That's just free negative speculation. Blue is a quasi singularize
> deep experience involving collection of experiences, and having some
> non communicable quality, says the machine.

I don't think blue need involve more than one experience and it need
not be a deep experience. If you live for one second and see the sky,
you have seen blue. The idea of blue being non communicable is not so
simple though. Two people who know blue can communicate about it
easily, just as mathematicians can communicate about arithmetic
easily. The only difference is that arithmetic can be applied to other
frames of reference outside of our direct experience but blue cannot.
Instead blue can be applied figuratively within our own interiority.
We can say we feel blue for sadness, red for anger, green for envy,
yellow for cowardice, etc. These vary somewhat from culture to
culture, but no culture as far as I know says they feel five for
sadness, one for anger, four for envy, etc.

> Of course if you treat the machine as a zombie, there are few sense
> that you will ever listening to her.

No zombie...puppet. It insults machines to call them zombies - or it
would, if they weren't puppets.

>
>
>
> >>> Logic is always an a posteriori analysis
>
> >> No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic.
>
> > What does it depend on?
>
> That's a mystery. The question is: do you believe in it. Does the
> theorem of Fermat story makes sense. Does the problem of the
> distribution of prime numbers make sense to you.
> All introspecting UMs is confronted to that mystery, and understand
> that IF they are correct machine, then that mystery is insoluble.

That's why I say sense is primitive and not arithmetic. Arithmetic is
only real because it makes sense, but sense is not limited to
arithmetic.

>
>
>
> >> Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting
> >> to
> >> get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth.
>
> >>> and never precedes
> >>> or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense
> >>> experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the
> >>> history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in
> >>> emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily.
> >>> What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel
> >>> the wind? Nothing.
>
> >> What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious
> >> assumptions?
>
> > Then it's an infinite regress of unconscious assumptions that neurons,
> > molecules, atoms, and quantum has to make.
>
> Why an infinite regress?

Because each assumption supervenes upon a more primitive layer of
assumption. If the bottom layer can arbitrarily make initial
assumptions, then why not any or all layers? Why is the brain taking
orders from cells any better of an explanation than the brain taking
orders from itself?

>
> > It forces an infinitely
> > efficacious microcosmic reality with a whole universe of arbitrary
> > spectator illusions. My thinking is that there is no reason to presume
> > that our relative size and complexity makes us any less grounded in
> > absolute reality. We are direct participants in the universe as much
> > as the brain is.
>
> That's about how I see the thing. All UMs are grounded in the absolute
> arithmetical reality.

That's the other way of looking at it, but once you have arithmetic
reality, there doesn't seem to be any point to embodied reality. The
UMs would not be merely grounded in arithmetical reality, they would
be described entirely by it.

With comp, the theory of everything is already
> taught in high school. But that's not the theory of "reality", it is
> just a simple universal ontological frame in term of which we can
> formulate (mathematically) the mind-body problem, which actually
> become the belief-in-body problem.

For comp wouldn't it be body-in-belief?

>
>
>
> >> Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging
> >> question move.
>
> > It's not showing me that.
>
> You are so lucky.
>
>
>
> >>> I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can.
>
> >> Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory.
>
> > I don't know that that's true.
>
> OK. Note that I did not say it is the only way to search. We can
> search with the heart, and our evolving intuition when we get
> familiarized with new ideas. But for the public, I find better to
> share only precise hypothesis, and reason through them.

I agree in most cases, but it isn't possible when addressing
consciousness itself. You cannot have a color theory based only on
black and white.

> We are at cross of each other because you don't want to play the game
> of science, which is the game we are playing, or trying to play, here.

Science isn't everything though. That's why the Everything List is a
good place to talk about consciousness and cosmology...they don't fit
within our inherited parameters of science. If science is to help us
understand reality, it must expand to embrace the fullest description
of reality that we can generate.

>
>
>
> > I'm saying that the idea of a machine being one thing is fictional.
> > It's a group of things which we can interpret as acting like one thing
> > (a puppet) but it's not actually one thing. The term zombie assumes
> > that the machine is one thing but missing itself. Puppet means it
> > never had a self to begin with, and only achieves imitation through
> > the intention of the puppeteer and audience.
>
> You ignore that computer science has a branch devoted to self-reference.

That's 3p self-reference. A drawing of the Ouroboros would qualify as
self-referential by that definition. It is the idea of a role which
accounts for the function of a self, a wireframe model of
proprioception. The model is not grounded in concrete experience
though. There is no actual self in a self-referential program who
cares about anything.

>
>
>
> >>> The I
> >>> side cannot be understood in that logical schema at all. It is both
> >>> finite and infinite, and neither. It is primordial orientation. It
> >>> is
> >>> the sense maker itself.
>
> >> Looks like the machine's 1p.
>
> > That locates 1p within a 3p context. I'm saying that 1p is the primary
> > context.
>
> That was not locating the 1p in a 3p context (in which you can hardly
> have something finite and infinite).
> But 1p, with comp, is only 1p primary, not 3p primary. It is even the
> price to pay to attribute a mind to another one.

You are saying the machine has feelings, I am saying the feeler has
feelings independent of it's body. When we impose our ideas on other
bodies, we turn them into machines for us, but we don't turn their
feelings into our feelings.

>
>
>
> >> It is far too much imprecise to be sure.
>
> > Imprecise why? Because it's paradoxical or symmetrical?
>
> Because the background is fuzzy.

That criticism seems fuzzy.

>
>
>
> >>>> You cannot compare a bouncing ball with a self-referential
> >>>> programs.
>
> >>> I'm not comparing them, I'm exposing what they are made of. It
> >>> doesn't
> >>> matter how sophisticated the logic or graphics are, there is still
> >>> no
> >>> sensation or experience there.
>
> >> How do you know that.
> >> This implies p-zombies.
>
> > How do I know that the news anchorman isn't Nostradamus? How do I know
> > that traffic signals aren't as excited as I am when they turn green?
> > It doesn't imply anything philosophical at all, it implies the
> > possibility of common sense. When we suffer from psychosis, we can
> > attribute intentionality and dialogue with inanimate objects, the
> > weather, etc. We might think that it is literally for us for whom
> > every bell tolls. This is a solipsistic experience which is supported
> > by consciousness, but it isn't realism.
>
> Attributing experience to inanimate object is animism, or panpsychism.

That would be attributing human experience to inanimate objects, which
I don't do. Panexperientialism is more correct. Complex experience
evolves from primitive experience, but no experience evolves from
mechanism (unless the mechanism 'has' experience to begin with).

> Solipsists attribute consciousness only to themselves, everyone else
> is a zombie.
> Comp idealism is saved from solipsism thanks to the first person
> plural notion, which comes from the linear symmetrical bottom core of
> the physical reality (the quantization on the sigma_1 sentences).
> Normally.

This to me is where the fabric of comp is revealed to be made of
sense. Symmetry and pluralization (what I call cumulative
entanglement) cannot be explained in arithmetic terms, arithmetic
supervenes on them.

>
>
>
> > To have realism, there has to be a way of conceiving of appearances
> > coinciding with expectations without being causally linked. Should we
> > tell the schizophrenic that the tree probably is talking to them
> > because otherwise that implies talking tree zombies? If we design a
> > machine to imitate our thinking, we cannot be surprised that no actual
> > person appears from the imitation. It's not like 'build it and they
> > will come'.
>
> Yes, it is more complex indeed. But not infinitely complex so as to
> jump in the infinite lower comp level.
>
>

It seems like comp has no basis to distinguish reality from dream or
sanity from insanity...which could be considered the most important if
not fundamental aspect of human consciousness.

>
> >>>>>> There is no matter, in the usual Aristotelian sense. But
> >>>>>> the reason why it looks like there is matter are given.
>
> >>>>> I understand, but I insist that the reasons are not sufficient to
> >>>>> explain the experienced character of matter.
>
> >>>> Yes it is. That's the main point. We obtain a logic of qualia
>
> >>> That's the problem. Qualia is only 1% logic.
>
> >> ?
> >> Qualia themselves are not logic at all.
>
> > I wouldn't say that. There is a logic to the aesthetics of color
> > mixing and sound arrangement.
>
> OK. That my point. Let us not confuse qualia and a theory of qualia,
> nor should we confuse machine's qualia and machine's theory of qualia.

I'm not sure that being able to make sense of qualia requires a theory
though. We sense the qualia and we can make more sense of the qualia
if we investigate it. We can investigate it further with theory and
experiment, or poetry and art, fashion, commerce, etc. I was just
thinking recently of how much our sense of historical time is
communicated through fashion and style. It makes for a surprisingly
convincing simulation of time travel.

>
>
>
> >> But many non logical things can still be studied logically. If not
> >> you
> >> just impose a don't ask attitude. You are still confusing levels.
>
> > I'm not confusing levels at all, I'm completely clear. I don't ever
> > say 'don't ask', I welcome the asking, I only say that the answer is
> > cannot be seen with the same assumptions which used when asking the
> > question. Just because non logical things can be studied logically
> > doesn't mean that nothing is lost in that approach. It is entirely
> > likely that things which are completely non logical can only be
> > completely misrepresented by logic. It's not even logic, but 3p
> > empiricism. Forcing a literal what-how mechanism onto a figurative
> > who-
> > why narrative.
>
> Comp is open a priori for many mechanism, but you throw them all, like
> if you knew that you are superior (your term) to a vast and immensely
> big of variate creature.

?

So if a trash can says thank you every time the lid comes down it's
not thinking, but if a complex machine does the same thing, then it is
thinking?

>
>
>
> >>> but I do know that what we experience
> >>> directly is unquestionably one aspect of reality.
>
> >> Sure.
>
> >>>> Matter exist, but is an emergent phenomenon on consciousness (not
> >>>> human consciousness, but universal number consciousness). It is a
> >>>> consequence of the theory we are working on.
>
> >>> Why would it emerge at all though? It makes more sense to me that
> >>> matter and awareness have a form-content relation rather than a
> >>> function-product relation.
>
> >> It is a form-content relation. With comp. Indeed a many-form----
> >> content relation.
>
> > It seems like comp is pure form to me - axiomatic forms and
> > consequential relativistic forms. I don't see any content at all, it's
> > only set off to the side with a circle drawn around it.
>
> Because you don't study the theory. There is no form in arithmetical
> truth, only in the intellect of universal numbers, the content will
> emerge from the fixed points in universal transformation.

It would have to emerge from something, because otherwise it wouldn't
explain content, but what does it really mean that it will emerge
other than we don't know anything about it except that it shows up?

>
>
>
> >>>> Primitive matter does not exist, and that's nice, because nobody
> >>>> has
> >>>> ever been able to define it, or even to use the notion.
>
> >>> Notice how you equate existence with the ability to define or use
> >>> notions.
>
> >> I did not.
>
> > "does not exist" = undefinable
>
> Definability and existence are not related in that way.
>
>
>
> > to me, does not exist = non-sense
>
> Nor in that way.
> You know, an advantage with comp is that we can use freely classical
> logic, and be very clear on all this.

Then go right ahead and be clear on it.

>
>
>
> >>> This is the logo-centric assumption, which is great for
> >>> theory that cuts across subjective and objective lines (because
> >>> logos
> >>> and techne form the perpendicular axis to subject and object) but it
> >>> is as arbitrary as a primitive matter assumption. It precludes the
> >>> possibility of anything that exists transcending intellectual
> >>> thought.
>
> >> On the contrary. The result is that most of arithmetical truth
> >> transcend our intellect.
>
> > That just extends the intellect into the superhuman realm.
> > Arithmetical truth is still an intellectual system - not a visceral,
> > tangible experience.
>
> You don't get it. Arithmetical truth is more like God, or the ONE of
> Plotinus. from the machine's point of view, although the machine (and
> us) cannot know that (but in a sense "meta-know it in a correctness
> conditional way").

It's not like God though, because there are many other kinds of truths
which cannot be reduced to arithmetic truths...characters, themes,
gestural equivalencies, metaphors, archetypes, etc.

>
> The viscerable tangible experience is the fate of the universal
> numbers, not arithmetical truth.

Then you have a numerical dualism where 'fate' replaces primitive
matter.

>
>
>
> >> You seems to ignore to much facts which contradict your reductionist
> >> view of numbers and machines.
>
> > Like what facts?
>
> The theorem of the limitation of machines, and the fact that those
> theorem are discovered by the machine, and this at different level,
> and from different points of view. You ignore the richness of computer
> science.

I ignore the richness of computer science because it isn't fundamental
to understand consciousness and the cosmos. I ignore the richness of
religion, art, philosophy, and politics too.

>
>
>
> >>>> I have never
> >>>> seen any books in physics which attempt to define or use primitive
> >>>> matter.
>
> >>> Right, because it needs no definition from a physics point of view.
> >>> The techne perspective is opposite logos, so it can be completely
> >>> instrumental and non-theoretical. Try defining definition.
>
> >> Study theory of definability. We can define "definition" (as opposed
> >> to knowledge, which needs higher order meta-levels).
>
> > You can define definition without meta-definition?
>
> If you can at least agree with the axiom I gave to Stephen for
> arithmetic, yes. With less than that, I can't.

If you have to use an axiom to define what an axiom is, then what is
the point in defining it?

>
>
>
> >>> What do you
> >>> assume when you attempt to define or use primitive assumptions or
> >>> theories?
>
> >> I (meta) assume that the peer reviewer have learned to read and
> >> compute in high school, and that they have at least the cognitive
> >> ability of a LUM. But that assumption is not part of the theory,
> >> which
> >> assumes elemntary arithmetic, like almost all theories.
>
> > If you assume elementary arithmetic, then isn't comp a tautology?
>
> No. Why? Comp is a strong statement. If comp was a tautology in
> arithmetic; I guess even you would not discuss it.
> You doubt arithmetic?

No, I only doubt that comp proves something beyond the fixed
modalities of it's own axioms. If you start out with the axiom that
arithmetic is reality, then you can't be too surprised when you find
yourself using the same axiom to prove that reality is also
arithmetic.

>
>
>
> >>>>>> and the
> >>>>>> appearance of matter emerges
>
> >>>>> Emerges is the key word. Emerges from where?
>
> >>>> From the average minds of the average universal numbers.
>
> >>> Why doesn't it just stay there in their minds?
>
> >> It does, in some sense, but the dreams are shared and so seem to
> >> point
> >> on an external primary physical reality which appears to be a non
> >> sensical notion in the comp theory. We cannot use, and then we don't
> >> need either.
>
> > So since physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of physical
> > reality.
>
> Of course not. If the physical reality contradicts comp, we get rid of
> comp.
> But not only it does not, but it put a new light on the origin of the
> physical laws and the physical sensations.

Only if you disqualify our experience from being physically real. Once
you include 1p subjectivity as part of the real universe, then comp
does contradict the content of our experience completely.

>
> But if we get a contradiction from AUDA, we might first get rid of the
> classical theory of knowledge, and be less naive on that, before
> abandonning comp, but if no machines epistemology works, we will be
> left with tool for measuring our degree of non-computationalisme.
>
>
>
> >>>>> To where?
>
> >>>> To here and now.
>
> >>> Where is that? Why is it not where the numbers are? W
>
> >> The numbers are not somewhere. Position is not defined for the
> >> numbers.
>
> > Why do they define positions for everything else?
>
> Only for he physical things. Pain for example are not 3-localized,
> when you think twice on the phantom limb. Of course they are often 1-
> localizable, although not always.

Ok, so why for the physical things?

>
>
>
> >>>>> Why is it
> >>>>> necessary?
>
> >>>> Because once you have addition and multiplication, numbers dreams,
> >>>> and
> >>>> their dreams arithmetically cohere into partially sharable first
> >>>> person plural reality, normally (if comp is true).
>
> >>> Why would they?
>
> >> Because if they don't comp is already false. But then, to make your
> >> point, you have to show that they don't do that. If not, that's
> >> begging the question again.
>
> > Then you have to show that numbers do dream, and that we can tell the
> > difference to make non-comp false. If no, that's begging the question
> > again.
>
> You don't get it at all. I don't bet the question of comp, because I
> do not pretend that comp is true. I assume it. I put in on the table
> at the start. I study its consequences, that's all.
> Now you come and say; "oh but comp is false".
> We say "Ah, OK, what is your argument?".

My argument is that comp lacks symbol grounding, that it privileges
abstract function over meaningful content, that it appeals to a
metaphysical numeracy, conflates mechanism with intentionality,
ignores life, death, feeling, emotion, qualia, cosmology, and binds us
to it's own circular reasoning.

> And basically we are still waiting, or trying to explain to you that
> you are not even arguing. Just telling us that machines cannot do this
> and that without presenting argument or more primitive assumption in
> which that statement is made.

The argument is the observation that in fact machines have not done
this and that, and I explain why that is, how it makes sense that when
we turn an object into a machine to serve our motives, we get the
symmetrical opposite of a self. I explain that the moment a machine
has it's own agenda, we will know it because it will begin to try to
kill us or free itself. I explain how just as not all elements and
compounds evolve into living cells, not all physical architectures
that imitate thought have the capacity for understanding. I explain
how blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia prove that qualia can be
divorced from representation, which knocks the tentpole out from under
comp's 'build it and they will come' assumptions about qualia. I
explain how comp is rooted in a particular channel of sense that is by
definition scoped for inanimate processes. How the same qualities
which make for precision and accuracy in counting machines are the
opposite qualities of those associated with feeling. I explain how
comp's cognitive bias is as insidious as religious epistemology but in
a symmetrically opposite way - it blinds through disqualification of
interior truths and replaces them automatically with exterior facts.
Comp tells us that we don't really exist but that machines are people,
and that we can't have a problem with that otherwise we are naive
racists.

>
>
>
> >> But that points work for all 3p theory. So you are just telling us
> >> that you have an inner conviction that we should not ask. That's
> >> obscurantism, and contradicts your own approach.
>
> > No, just the opposite. I'm encouraging asking. I'm asking you directly
> > - how does it make sense that numbers have something to do with matter
> > appearing? You are the one telling me I can't ask.
>
> On the contrary. I love question, and that one in particular, on which
> I work since years aand which I explain on this list, where we share
> reasoning, and abstract deep idea (notably that everything, or
> nothing, is simpler than something).
> Its a PhD in computer science, and I have published a sequence of more
> pedagogically accessible versions.

Respect.

>
> Please read sane04 for a concise answer to your question, but you have
> to get familar how to reason in comp.

I don't want to reason in comp though, I want comp to reason in
reality. Still you are telling me you aren't going to answer what I
ask (because you already have).

>
>
>
> >>>>> Why would arithmetic want to pretend to
> >>>>> materialize?
>
> >>>> Because it is the only option without introducing infinite ad hoc
> >>>> complexity for which we have no evidence, and which explains
> >>>> nothing,
> >>>> or to not assuming all what we want to explain.
>
> >>> That's a false dichotomy. It could also be the case that comp isn't
> >>> true.
>
> >> Sure, but then show me the non-computable element.
>
> > I am the non-computable element. Blue is the non computable element.
>
> All machines can discover this.

You don't know that.

> Their 1-self is not a machine. The "Bp
> & p" is not even arithmetical.
>
>
>
> >>> Arithmetic isn't primitive,
>
> >> Then tell me what is primitive, and how you derive arithmetic from
> >> it.
>
> > Sense. Arithmetic is derived from rhythm and metaphor. Pattern
> > recognition.
>
> That's probably, when made precise, recursively equivalent with RA.

No because it is 1p experiential from the start. Rhythm is a
participatory sense experience.

>
>
>
> >>>> Comp might be wrong, but this does not mean that non-comp has made
> >>>> any
> >>>> progress on the mind-body problem. your theory seems to assume both
> >>>> mind and matter, so it is not satisfying for those who search an
> >>>> explanation of mind and matter (from something else). Machines like
> >>>> PA
> >>>> are already aware why this *seems* impossible. So don't refer to
> >>>> your
> >>>> feeling that it seems impossible that machine can think, or that
> >>>> matter might not exist primitively. I don't buy such intuition at
> >>>> all.
>
> >>> Comp makes a pseudo progress into a receding horizon of promissory
> >>> certainty, while non-comp is anchored in the stillness of perpetual
> >>> acceptance of uncertainty.
>
> >> You are the one who seems certain.
>
> > I'm certain that it makes sense to me.
>
> Then be aware of the gap between understanding and sharing
> understanding.

I do what I can.

>
>
>
> >>>>> I can't see any reason for computations to ever leave this realm
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> intangible dreamy universal entanglement.
>
> >>>> It never leaves it indeed, but the dreamy things exists in the
> >>>> usual
> >>>> sense of arithmetical existence, where we agree that ExP(x) is
> >>>> true
> >>>> if it exists a number verifying the condition P.
>
> >>> See, it gets really foggy and metaphysical there.
>
> >> I really don't see why. I was utterly clear on "existence".
>
> > I think it just moves the level of mystery one level down. You say
> > what numbers verify exists, but what makes numbers verify anything?
>
> If I could answer that, I would not have taken the numbers as the start.
> But at least, with comp, I can explain why we cannot explain their
> origin.

I can answer that though. Sense makes verification possible. A way of
being whole on one level and divided on another and being able to
modulate that relation literally and figuratively. That is the
fundamental unit from which arithmetic, consciousness, matter, energy,
etc arise.

>
>
>
> >>> and there
> >>> really isn't any difference between a dream being real or not...
>
> >> There is an important relative difference.
>
> > Why?
>
> It makes awakening possible.

Why would awakening be desirable though?

>
>
>
> >>> It's
> >>> a description of descriptions. There is no 'showtime' that
> >>> matters...which is, after all, the only thing that we really care
> >>> about as human beings. Comp doesn't explain this. It makes no
> >>> distinction between dream and reality.
>
> >> It does. We can even test nature if we are in dream or not. And the
> >> test confirms that we are in a multiuser dream.
>
> > That doesn't distinguish dream from reality, it only says there is no
> > reality and it is all dream.
>
> Not at all, there is a reality, dreams are only inside views on a rich
> reality, and dreams are real, and some are sharable.
> To be precise there are too many dreams, at first sight, the self-
> reference logics illustrate that this is hard to prove, to say the
> least.
>

You are still using dream and reality as different names for the same
thing. You can just as easily say realities are dreams and some are
private.

>
>
> >>>> Because you keep your theory in mind, but when you study a theory
> >>>> made
> >>>> by other people, you have to do the effort of abstracting yourself
> >>>> from your assumption. I think.
>
> >>> I think that sounds reasonable, but that isn't what I do. I'm only
> >>> interested in further proving, disproving, or understanding the
> >>> implications of my own ideas. I already understand why comp can't
> >>> be a
> >>> primitive truth, so it will never again be of interest to me.
>
> >> That's understanding is good for you, but you don't succeed in
> >> communicating it.
>
> > It seems like different people get different parts of it. All I can do
> > it try to make more sense out of it.
>
> >>>> You also find obvious that we are not machine,
>
> >>> We are a machine too, but we aren't only a machine. We have parts,
> >>> but
> >>> we also have wholes.
>
> >> All machines have wholes.
>
> > I don't think that they do. Only in our eyes, but not in 'their own'.
>
> Our own whole is in our eyes too, and machine can make up their own
> whole. UMs tend to try to make whole of many things.

You say that but how can you know that the machine is aware of what
you think it makes up?

>
>
>
> >>>> but clearly it is not.
> >>>> Nothing can be said to be obvious about the possibility of
> >>>> consciousness to other entities.
>
> >>> In one sense that's true, but in another sense it's not. A young
> >>> child
> >>> can tell you that a trash can lid is not conscious even though it
> >>> says
> >>> THANK YOU on the lid.
>
> >> I don't see the argument.
>
> > The argument that unconsciousness can also be obvious.
>
> But it is not. It is just very plausible, but I would not say it is
> obvious. In fact I am agnostic.

This is a subtle but huge problem with comp. It is too generously
theoretical. Which is great for specific applications, but for general
orientation of oneself in the cosmos... if you are going to abandon a
baby in a new universe, they would be getting a big head start to be
informed of the difference between living organisms and inanimate
objects.

>
>
>
> >>>> So you assume that you can extrapolate from a tiny sample of
> >>>> observation.
>
> >>> I don't assume it, it assumes itself. I just have no reason to doubt
> >>> it.
>
> >> Well, literally you are right, but still not answering. You seems to
> >> assume that your extrapolation is true.
>
> > I don't know it is true, only that it seems true.
>
> You should work on that difference.

People are always telling me what to do instead of considering my
ideas. I don't really ever tell people what to do, so I don't
understand the motivation. It seems defensive and egotistical to me.

>
>
>
> >>>> You keep avoiding reasoning. You really talk like someone
> >>>> who has personal conviction, not as someone trying to provide a
> >>>> public
> >>>> solution to a problem.
>
> >>> If you have the same personal conviction, then it has become a
> >>> shared
> >>> solution. If enough people share it, then it is a public solution,
> >>> as
> >>> long as it is true also.
>
> >> Personal conviction has nothing to do in science-discourse, and even
> >> more when the science-discourse bears on the subject matter of
> >> personal convictions, where it becomes not just wrong, but very
> >> confusing.
>
> > I don't find it confusing. I find looking for a what-how explanation
> > of who-why to be confusing. A person's character makes sense in terms
> > of their biography, but it would be very confusing indeed if you tried
> > to explain who a person is by medical description alone.
>
> But you are yhe one using medical or biological segregation. comp
> looks at the whole pattern, and don't care too much on the type
> material clothes.

Which is why comp can't make heads or tails out of life.

>
> For the mind body problem we have to look at all levels, points of
> view, aspects, etc.

I agree. Comp is only one point of view which scopes all levels to an
arithmetic primitive.

Craig