On 15 May 2019, at 17:41, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same thing as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all domains followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?
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From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:Incompleteness disproves nominalism. Arithmetical truth was proven not only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.(This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/"Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):The final slides:----The Continuum Hypothesis is settledOn the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how theCH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how thesemodels are connected and how one may reach them from eachother while preserving or omitting certain features.Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but themost important essential facts are known.Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just onemathematical world or many----Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) and semantics!If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible theories on that reality.It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many mathematical worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere with realism, on the contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, on which everybody agree. The standard arithmetical truth is definable with a bit of set theory, on which most people agree (as it is the intersection of all models of the theories RA or PA). That is as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, Analysis, and physics, remains full of sense, but have became phenomenological.There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) and false in another.That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of choice or the continuum hypotheses.Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much more than RA.Bruno@philipthrift--
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On 21 May 2019, at 12:04, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:What about color red ?
On Friday, 17 May 2019 21:36:50 UTC+3, spudb...@aol.com wrote:With mechanism, what exists are the numbers.
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On 22 May 2019, at 12:19, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:Derive here from addition and multiplication the color red.
On Tuesday, 21 May 2019 17:40:43 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 21 May 2019, at 12:04, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:What about color red ?As I just explained they belong to the phenomenology of numbers, which is derivable from the addition and multiplication laws, which lead already to Turing universality, and to the theology of the Löbian numbers (like PA) that a weaker theory (RA) emulates integrally.
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On 23 May 2019, at 11:14, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:Are you able to discuss without insulting people every email you're writing ? What do you expect to gain being rude ?
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Aaron Sloman absolves Turing of —
The Mythical Turing Test
On 25 May 2019, at 12:12, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:I told you: The definition of a number is: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc. If you start seeing number as being alive, then you have a problem.
On Thursday, 23 May 2019 19:39:42 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:Cosmin, ask question, it is simpler that way. You can read the papers also.Bruno
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computation
On 27 May 2019, at 22:27, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:Are you aware of Roger Penrose writings about non-computable phenomena ?
On Monday, 27 May 2019 13:02:24 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:computation
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On 27 May 2019, at 22:32, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:I'm not necessarily smarter as I am honest. When I look at the phenomenology of consciousness and I see certain things, I cannot then lie to myself that I haven't seen those things. If I had countless telepathies and precognitions especially in relations to loved ones, I cannot then lie that they were only "coincidences". Maybe you simply never loved anyone. This is the best explanation that I can find. Otherwise, you would have known that the experiences that you would have had in relation to the loved ones were not merely "coincidences". You cannot lie to yourself when you have a dream with your parents in hospital and then next morning find out that they were hospitalized, that it was only just a "coincidence".
So all I can say to you is: go out-there and love people. Stop playing the "serious materialist dude" card. It's pitiful.
On Sunday, 26 May 2019 18:56:17 UTC+3, howardmarks wrote:You are smarter than all of us, Cosmin!
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On 27 May 2019, at 22:39, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:Also, another question would be: What is your view on time ? Do computations happen in time or does time emerges out of atemporal computations ?
On Monday, 27 May 2019 13:02:24 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:Ask any question for more explanation,
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