On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 10:25, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:Isn’t that what Many Worlds says? The entangled particles are correlated because they are in the same world.
The mysterious instantaneous interaction appears that way because of apparent randomness due to the impossibility of the observer knowing which world he is in.
The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
On 7 Nov 2019, at 02:50, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 12:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 10:25, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:Isn’t that what Many Worlds says? The entangled particles are correlated because they are in the same world.That isn't an explanation of the correlation. That is just the fact of the correlation.The mysterious instantaneous interaction appears that way because of apparent randomness due to the impossibility of the observer knowing which world he is in.That makes no sense.The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.Super determinism works only in single world models. There can be no true or apparent randomness in a super deterministic setting. So many-worlds, since it encompasses apparent randomness in every branch, is ruled out.
Likewise, EPR correlations are observed in every branch of the wave function, so ignorance as to which branch you are on can form no part of the explanation of those correlations.
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On 7 Nov 2019, at 09:21, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:--On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.Stathis PapaioannouThat's what Many Worlds implies.The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
Superdeterminism - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism - though apparently is a "One World" theory.
@philipthrift
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On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
--
On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
Stathis Papaioannou
That's what Many Worlds implies.
The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
--On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
Stathis Papaioannou
That's what Many Worlds implies.
The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
Because it treats measurement as just another physical interaction of quantum systems obeying the same evolution equations as other interactions.
But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring instruments, and everything else are basically quantum mechanical) without adopting the "many worlds" philosophy.
Most contemporary physicists adopt such a view of the quantum origin of everything without taking Bohr's "primacy of the classical" seriously. So this is not a sound reason for adopting many worlds.
Bruce
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On 11/7/2019 1:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
--On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
Stathis Papaioannou
That's what Many Worlds implies.
The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
Because it treats measurement as just another physical interaction of quantum systems obeying the same evolution equations as other interactions.
But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring instruments, and everything else are basically quantum mechanical) without adopting the "many worlds" philosophy.
ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why have them there?
Bruce
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On 11/7/2019 1:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
Because it treats measurement as just another physical interaction of quantum systems obeying the same evolution equations as other interactions.
But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring instruments, and everything else are basically quantum mechanical) without adopting the "many worlds" philosophy.
ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
Brent
On 11/7/2019 1:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 11/7/2019 1:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
--On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
The universe as a whole is determined in every detail, and random choice of the observer in measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in choice of measurement is required for the apparent nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
Stathis Papaioannou
That's what Many Worlds implies.
The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea, according to the author).
Because it treats measurement as just another physical interaction of quantum systems obeying the same evolution equations as other interactions.
But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring instruments, and everything else are basically quantum mechanical) without adopting the "many worlds" philosophy.
ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.
You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction.
Yeah, I like Omnes' dictum, "It's a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What more do you want?"
But it still leaves that gap between the density matrix becoming diagonal FAPP and one subspace becoming actual FR (for real), not just FAPP. If you take a purely epistemic view the gap is just in your belief changing. But if you keep an ontological view the matrix is only diagonal in some preferred basis and it's not necessarily even approximately diagonal in some other basis. It seems the other bases are an inconvenient fiction. :-) It seems to come down to explaining that Zurek's quantum Darwinism necessarily picks out the basis in which our brains will form beliefs and they will agree on that belief as to what "really happened".
I've always been a propensitist [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/#ProInt ].
Fine. But my point is that to connect beliefs, predictions, mathematical theory, observations,...you need to be able to transfer one meaning of probability to another.
A sample space implies statistics and a frequentist interpretation of probability.
A probability space consists of three parts:
On Thursday, November 7, 2019 at 6:16:45 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
A sample space implies statistics and a frequentist interpretation of probability.No.
...
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Brent
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On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why have them there?How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non unitary collapse of some sort?
There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact locally in between us.
On 10 Nov 2019, at 22:24, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why have them there?How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non unitary collapse of some sort?I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role in explaining our experience.
If you can point to any such role, then fine. But I doubt that you can do this.
There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact locally in between us.Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis -- the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.
Bruce--
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On 10 Nov 2019, at 22:24, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why have them there?How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non unitary collapse of some sort?I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role in explaining our experience.Then you agree with the, or some, form of the Many-Histories/World theory.If you can point to any such role, then fine. But I doubt that you can do this.That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can personally observe.There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact locally in between us.Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis -- the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.For exactly the same reason that when I am duplicated in Washington and Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.The linearity of the evolution of the wave + the linearity of the tensor product entails that if a robot observe a cat in the state a + d, and this with a ad-measuring device, he ends up into a robot observing the evolution of a cat which is alive, and a robot observing the evolution of a cat which is dead.Once we have a body, evolution has chosen the “preferred base”, but it does not play a fundamental role in the fundamental equation. We need some base to have a perspective, like in Mechanist philosophy of mind we need some universal machinery to be able to talk on all of them.Bruno
On 10 Nov 2019, at 22:24, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why have them there?How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non unitary collapse of some sort?I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role in explaining our experience.Then you agree with the, or some, form of the Many-Histories/World theory.If you can point to any such role, then fine. But I doubt that you can do this.That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can personally observe.
There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact locally in between us.Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis -- the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.For exactly the same reason that when I am duplicated in Washington and Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.
The linearity of the evolution of the wave + the linearity of the tensor product entails that if a robot observe a cat in the state a + d, and this with a ad-measuring device, he ends up into a robot observing the evolution of a cat which is alive, and a robot observing the evolution of a cat which is dead.
Once we have a body, evolution has chosen the “preferred base”, but it does not play a fundamental role in the fundamental equation.
On Monday, November 11, 2019 at 5:45:45 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is determined by quantum Darwinism acting on the normal physical interactions between quantum objects. Being human or sentient is totally irrelevant.. The preferred basis plays a fundamental role in the explanation of the world as we perceive it -- we do not directly perceive Hilbert space. And explaining our experience is the aim of science -- other things fall into the realm of metaphysics, which is not science.Bruce
Journal of Quantum Information Science
No Quantum Process Can Explain the Existence of the Preferred Basis:Decoherence Is Not UniversalHitoshi InamoriEnvironment induced decoherence, and other quantum processes, have been proposed in the literature to explain the apparent spontaneous selection―out of the many mathematically eligible bases―of a privileged measurement basis that corresponds to what we actually observe. This paper describes such processes, and demonstrates that―contrary to common belief―no such process can actually lead to a preferred basis in general.The key observation is that environment induced decoherence implicitly assumes a prior independence of the observed system, the observer and the environment. However, such independence cannot be guaranteed, and we show that environment induced decoherence does not succeed in establishing a preferred measurement basis in general.We conclude that the existence of the preferred basis must be postulated in quantum mechanics, and that changing the basis for a measurement is, and must be, described as an actual physical process.
> when I am duplicated in Washington and Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.
On 11 Nov 2019, at 14:59, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 4:18 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:> when I am duplicated in Washington and Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.Then what one and only one city do "you" personally feel to be in?
If you can not clearly answer that question,
and the history of this list provides overwhelming evidence that you cannot, then the statement "I don’t personally feel to be in both cities at once" has no meaning.
The personal pronoun "I" that you're in the habit of using without thinking has no meaning due to the fact that a "I" duplication machine is a key part of the thought exparament. So what we end up with is a thought exparament that lacks any thought.
John K Clark
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>> Then what one and only one city do "you" personally feel to be in?
> In the third person view on the first person view, you can say [...]
>> If you can not clearly answer that question,
> The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, I will [...]
> [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among Washington and Moscow.
On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 8:14 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:>> Then what one and only one city do "you" personally feel to be in?> In the third person view on the first person view, you can say [...]What about the first person view of the third person view of the first person view? And what about the third person view of the first person view of the third person view of the first person view? And what about....>> If you can not clearly answer that question,> The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, I will [...]By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment that contains a "I" duplicating machine you have already demonstrated you are unable to clearly answer the question.> [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among Washington and Moscow.Forget prediction!! Even AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can not answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?"
and the reason you can't answer it is because it contains the personal pronoun "you"; and if personal pronoun duplicating machines are involved that means it is not a question at all, it's just gibberish with a question mark at the end.If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have had been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday about what would happen the next day.John K Clark
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>>Forget prediction!! Even AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can not answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?"> Wait... what ? Sure you can, if you are the one who ended up in moscow... you answer moscow and write it in the diary... if you're the one who end up in washington, you answer washington. Easy.
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On 28 Nov 2019, at 15:49, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 8:14 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:>> Then what one and only one city do "you" personally feel to be in?> In the third person view on the first person view, you can say [...]
What about the first person view of the third person view of the first person view? And what about the third person view of the first person view of the third person view of the first person view? And what about….
>> If you can not clearly answer that question,> The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, I will [...]By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment that contains a "I" duplicating machine you have already demonstrated you are unable to clearly answer the question.
> [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among Washington and Moscow.Forget prediction!! Even AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can not answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?" and the reason you can't answer it is because it contains the personal pronoun "you"; and if personal pronoun duplicating machines are involved that means it is not a question at all, it's just gibberish with a question mark at the end.If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have had been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday about what would happen the next day.
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But if all is matter, then there cannot be Many Worlds - or Many "You”s.
@philipthrift
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On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 10 Nov 2019, at 22:24, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Nov 10, 2019 at 11:22 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 7 Nov 2019, at 22:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this too, but I see the attraction.You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other branches" as a convenient fiction. If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our experience, then why have them there?How could some terms in a wave expansion disappear without assuming some non unitary collapse of some sort?I did not say that they disappeared: merely that they do not play any role in explaining our experience.Then you agree with the, or some, form of the Many-Histories/World theory.If you can point to any such role, then fine. But I doubt that you can do this.That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can personally observe.That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.
There is no preferred basis, only personal basis to be able to interact locally in between us.Again you appear to ignore the primary role of science is in explaining our experience. In our experience, there most certainly is a preferred basis -- the world around us has not dissolved into the "mush" that Schroedinger feared so much. If there is only a "personal basis", explain to me why your personal basis does not include superpositions of live and dead cats.For exactly the same reason that when I am duplicated in Washington and Moscow, I don’t feel personally to be in both cities at once.So you are in the Washington/Moscow basis -- not the( W+/- M) basis. That is a preferred basis.The linearity of the evolution of the wave + the linearity of the tensor product entails that if a robot observe a cat in the state a + d, and this with a ad-measuring device, he ends up into a robot observing the evolution of a cat which is alive, and a robot observing the evolution of a cat which is dead.That is exactly the definition of a preferred basis -- which you appear to want to deny even exists.Once we have a body, evolution has chosen the “preferred base”, but it does not play a fundamental role in the fundamental equation.Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is determined by quantum Darwinism
acting on the normal physical interactions between quantum objects. Being human or sentient is totally irrelevant.. The preferred basis plays a fundamental role in the explanation of the world as we perceive it -- we do not directly perceive Hilbert space. And explaining our experience is the aim of science -- other things fall into the realm of metaphysics, which is not science.
BruceWe need some base to have a perspective, like in Mechanist philosophy of mind we need some universal machinery to be able to talk on all of them.Bruno
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On 11 Nov 2019, at 10:58, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:If reality is pure "information" (as a lot of physicists today seem to believe, and that belief is required for Many Worlds), than copying (branching) is free.But many physicists who claim that there is only information usually think about quantum information, and they takes this (physical) notion for granted. It is still a form of materialism, as it assumes some quantum formalism, instead of deriving it from arithmetic (or from any universal machinery) as it should.
Bruno
On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can personally observe.That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation of physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this version of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist assumption.
Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is determined by quantum DarwinismYou can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you explain why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by the self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main ideas without delving too much in the provability logics).
Path integrals represent a powerful route to quantization: they calculate probabilities by summing over classical configurations of variables such as fields, assigning each configuration a phase equal to the action of that configuration. This paper defines a universal path integral, which sums over all computable structures. This path integral contains as sub-integrals all possible computable path integrals, including those of field theory, the standard model of elementary particles, discrete models of quantum gravity, string theory, etc. The universal path integral possesses a well-defined measure that guarantees its finiteness, together with a method for extracting probabilities for observable quantities. The universal path integral supports a quantum theory of the universe in which the world that we see around us arises out of the interference between all computable structures.
Comments: | 10 pages, plain TeX |
Subjects: | Quantum Physics (quant-ph) |
Cite as: | arXiv:1302.2850 [quant-ph] |
(or arXiv:1302.2850v1 [quant-ph] for this version) |
On 4 Dec 2019, at 23:43, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 10:48 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can personally observe.That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism.Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation of physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this version of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist assumption.It is not a metaphysical to believe in the existence of a physical brain underlying our conscious minds -- it is the result of solid scientific evidence.
If it is incompatible with the mechanist assumption, then that is because the mechanist assumption is useless rubbish.
Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is determined by quantum DarwinismYou can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you explain why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by the self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main ideas without delving too much in the provability logics).I can invoke quantum mechanics when doing physics. The trouble with your rubric "the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations seen from the inside..." is that is precisely meaningless. You have never given any indication of what "The statistics on all computations" might mean. How do you select "all computations", and what "statistics" do you use on them? And what might that give you, if anything?
Your grand promises have never actually delivered anything, Bruno.
You seem to think that you can lay down the law about quantum mechanics, but you have no idea how to get even the Schroedinger equation from your "statistics over computations”.
Until you can actually produce something that even vaguely approaches an account of the physical world we see around us, you can be safely ignored.
Bruce
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Comments: 10 pages, plain TeX Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Cite as: arXiv:1302.2850 [quant-ph] (or arXiv:1302.2850v1 [quant-ph] for this version) @philipthrift
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>>what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you" end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow?
> Almost.
> Mechanism predicts [...]
> that you will see only one city,
> What you cannot predict in Helsinki is the particular city you will feel to end in.
> The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, I will [...]
> You have claim this without ever saying what is unclear,
> > [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among Washington and Moscow.
On 5 Dec 2019, at 18:30, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:>>what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you" end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow?> Almost.Almost my ass, that's all that's going on and it's pretty damn banal.> Mechanism predicts [...]Translation from the original Brunospeak: A very silly theory predicts.> that you will see only one city,And that very silly theory can not say who that shadowy mysterious person called Mr.You is,
nor can it say what the correct answer to a obvious question turned out to be, "what one and only one city did Mr.You end up seeing??”
. It can't say what the correct answer was EVEN AFTER the "experiment" is long over.
And that means it was not an experiment at all,
and it also shows that a question mark does not possess magical powers, it shows that no punctuation mark can turn gibberish into a question, not even if is placed at the very end.> What you cannot predict in Helsinki is the particular city you will feel to end in.It can not be pre-dicted and it can not be post-dicted either because Bruno Marchal does not know what "it" is, or know what exactly the question was, or know who the hell Mr. You is.> The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, I will [...]
By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment that contains a "I" duplicating machine Bruno has already demonstrated that Bruno is unable to clearly ask the question much less answer it.> You have claim this without ever saying what is unclear,
WHAT THE HELL?! For over 5 years I have been asking the same question, the most recent time was just a few days ago in the very post you're responding to! I asked and I quote "what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you" end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow?". You claim to have derived all sorts of cosmic significant things from the fact that BEFORE the event it can not be predicted what some mysterious person named Mr. You will see, but EVEN AFTER the event nobody knows anything more than what was known BEFORE the event.
So the outcome of the "experiment" has produced precisely ZERO bits of new information because everybody already know the man who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the man who say Washington would become the Washington Man.
> > [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among Washington and Moscow.
Forget prediction!! EVEN AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can not answer the question "what one and only one city did you turn out to see, Washington or Moscow?”
and the reason you can't answer it is because it contains the personal pronoun "you"; and if personal pronoun duplicating machines are involved that means it is not a question at all, it's just gibberish with a question mark at the end.If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have had been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday about what would happen the next day.John K Clark
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>> that very silly theory can not say who that shadowy mysterious person called Mr.You is,> The mechanist hypothesis assures that both copy have the right to be qualified as you.
>> nor can it say what the correct answer to a obvious question turned out to be, "what one and only one city did Mr.You end up seeing??”> Indeed. That is the point. That is the first person indeterminacy,
> that you are using each time you defend Everett.
>> It can't say what the correct answer was EVEN AFTER the "experiment" is long over.> That is where you forget to put yourself in the shoes of the guy making the experience.
> After the experiment, it is easy to understand that both know very well the answer,
>> So the outcome of the "experiment" has produced precisely ZERO bits of new information because everybody already know the man who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the man who say Washington would become the Washington Man.> But that is tautological.
> After the experience, each copy get one bit of information.
> Your use of matter is similar to the pseudo-explanation “God did it”.
On 7 Dec 2019, at 18:56, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 8:43 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:>> that very silly theory can not say who that shadowy mysterious person called Mr.You is,> The mechanist hypothesis assures that both copy have the right to be qualified as you.So yesterday before the duplication when there was only one it would be idiotic to ask which one of the one will see Moscow!
>> nor can it say what the correct answer to a obvious question turned out to be, "what one and only one city did Mr.You end up seeing??”> Indeed. That is the point. That is the first person indeterminacy,I agree that is the point, and that's exactly why first person indeterminacy is complete gibberish,
as rational a concept as asking " How many blitzphits will a klogknee have tomorrow?"> that you are using each time you defend Everett.Yes, with Everett if you ask me which version of me will be the man that sees the coin come up heads when the coin is tossed tomorrow I will say it will be the version of me that sees heads. And yes the answer is banal, but then it was a banal question.
>> It can't say what the correct answer was EVEN AFTER the "experiment" is long over.> That is where you forget to put yourself in the shoes of the guy making the experience.It's physically impossible to put myself in the shoes of the guys having the experiences because 4 feet are involved and I only have 2, there are 2 guys having A first person experience.
> After the experiment, it is easy to understand that both know very well the answer,Forget the answer, both before and after the "experiment" nobody even knew what the hell the question was!
>> So the outcome of the "experiment" has produced precisely ZERO bits of new information because everybody already know the man who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the man who say Washington would become the Washington Man.> But that is tautological.DUH, I KNOW! But it's your scenario not mine,
something that is not an experiment and something that contains very little thought.> After the experience, each copy get one bit of information.Before the experience everybody and everything already knew that the man who saw Moscow would be the Moscow Man and the man who saw Washington would become the Washington Man,
so after the experience everybody received precisely ZERO bits of new information.
> Your use of matter is similar to the pseudo-explanation “God did it”.And that is my cue to say goodnight because i know from experience you never say anything of interest after you invoke that word.John K Clark
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> the question is on the first person experience,
> he cannot have any certainty if he will live personally the experience “I see M” or the experience “I see W”.
Yes, with Everett if you ask me which version of me will be the man that sees the coin come up heads when the coin is tossed tomorrow I will say it will be the version of me that sees heads. And yes the answer is banal, but then it was a banal question.> That makes my point.
It's physically impossible to put myself in the shoes of the guys having the experiences because 4 feet are involved and I only have 2, there are 2 guys having A first person experience.
> In the 3p description. But that is not what is asked.
> The question was “where do you expect to survive”.
> The sewer is plain, simple and banal: I expect to [...]
> FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information.
> the description of the protocol [...]
> You just keep moving from what is asked, which concerns the 1p [...]
On 9 Dec 2019, at 18:58, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Dec 8, 2019 at 6:20 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:> the question is on the first person experience,For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person experience duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as THE first person experience;
so if the "question" is about THE first person then the "question" is about absolutely positively nothing.
> he cannot have any certainty if he will live personally the experience “I see M” or the experience “I see W”.That's 4 personal pronouns with no referent in just 21 words,
and that rate is not unusual, such flagrant use of personal pronouns is typical in Bruno's entire thought "experiment" even though the entire purpose of the thing is to discover new stuff about personal identity and forms the foundation of the entire "proof". And yet you ask with a straight face why I stopped reading it!Yes, with Everett if you ask me which version of me will be the man that sees the coin come up heads when the coin is tossed tomorrow I will say it will be the version of me that sees heads. And yes the answer is banal, but then it was a banal question.> That makes my point.Then we agree, when your conclusions are not dead wrong they are banal.
It's physically impossible to put myself in the shoes of the guys having the experiences because 4 feet are involved and I only have 2, there are 2 guys having A first person experience.> In the 3p description. But that is not what is asked.It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t.
> The question was “where do you expect to survive”.And my question is who exactly is the referent to the personal pronoun "you" in the above?
If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December 9 then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody will be experiencing H on December 9.
But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody who remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in December 10.
And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you" as used in the above is ambiguous
and any question involving it that demands a single answer is ridiculous.
> The sewer is plain, simple and banal: I expect to [...]And that word "expect" is irrelevant. Who knows what Mr.You expects to happen, perhaps Mr.You expects to end up in Santa Claus's workshop, I neither know or care. I'm interested in what will happen not what somebody expects to happen, and basing personal identity on expectations of the future is nuts.
> FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information.And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got?
That he ended up seeing W.
And what is the referent to the personal pronoun "he" in the above?
"He" refers to the W Man.
And what is the W man?
The man who sees W.
And who is the man who sees W?
The W man.
And yesterday did the H man already know that all tautologies are true?
Yes.So how many new bits of information were learned from this "experiment?
Zero bits.
Are you sure?
Yes, I counted them twice.> the description of the protocol [...]Wow protocol, that sounds sooo oficial and scientific, but the reality is to call it amateurish would be to unfairly categorize amateurs.> You just keep moving from what is asked, which concerns the 1p [...]For the 999th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a 1p duplicating machine is involved there is no such thing THE 1p, there is only A 1p. The fact is I have no idea what exactly is asked and you know even less about it than I do.John K Clark
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>> For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person experience duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as THE first person experience;> There is. It is what you can expect to feel when doing the experience.
> In Helsinki, you believe that you will survive (because [...]
> you know that it is impossible in Helsinki to write its name in the first person [...]
> The first “he” is the guy, when unique, in Helsinki.
> The second “he” refers to each copies’ first person experience accessible
> So now, move to step 4
>> It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t.> The question is simple,
> and most people get the answer by themselves
>> If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December 9 then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody will be experiencing H on December 9.> Nobody has ever considered such useless identity criterion.
>> But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody who remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in December 10.
> That’s far better.
>> And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you" as used in the above is ambiguous> No it is not. We have agreed that both copies have the right identity.
> It is just that the prediction is impossible to make.
>>> FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information.
>> And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got?That he ended up seeing W.
> Yes,
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> the indexical first person self, which know very well who he is,
> You talk like if the guy could feel to be in the two places at once, which is pure nonsense.
> in H, he is unable to write down in its diary (taken with him in the duplication experience) the particular outcome he can expect,
@philipthrift
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On 15 Dec 2019, at 19:43, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:On Sun, Dec 15, 2019 at 7:06 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:> the indexical first person self, which know very well who he is,Yes indeed, Mr.He knows who he is, Mr.He knows he is the man who saw W and also knows that the man who sees W is the W man, and both those things could be predicted long ago back in H.
> You talk like if the guy could feel to be in the two places at once, which is pure nonsense.THE guy can't even be at one place at once because the entire concept of "THE guy" becomes pure nonsense in a world that has guy duplicating machines.
> in H, he is unable to write down in its diary (taken with him in the duplication experience) the particular outcome he can expect,Bruno.... I don't know or care what Mr.He expects
but I do know one thing, there can not be a "particular outcome" because Mr.He HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what the word "duplicated" means.
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>> Yes indeed, Mr.He knows who he is, Mr.He knows he is the man who saw W and also knows that the man who sees W is the W man, and both those things could be predicted long ago back in H.
> But in H, it was still impossible to predict any of the two outcomes.
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> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
> imagine you in front of the button,
> what do you expect after pushing it...
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M Man's?
> imagine you in front of the button,
OK> what do you expect after pushing it..
If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
If "you" means the M Man I expect to be experiencing M. If "you" means the H Man I expect to be experiencing nothing at all because after that button is pushed nobody will be in H. Any other questions?
John K Clark
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On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M Man's?
> imagine you in front of the button,
OK> what do you expect after pushing it..
If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man. And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future. So the question is clear enough.
Bruce
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Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> a écrit :On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M Man's?
> imagine you in front of the button,
OK> what do you expect after pushing it..
If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man. And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future. So the question is clear enough.But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what does he expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the next moment after pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki man to himself... Wilk he vanish from existence ? Will he see m or w ? Will he see m and w ? The question is clear, has been for more than twenty years now, only bad faith has make it go through 2019 again... And will through 2029.
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> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man.
> And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future.
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> John Clark is not human and [...]
> he is unable to ask expectation questions about the next moment of his own live without proper pronouns...
John K Clark
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> i'm as able to talk about my future expectations as I am now, duplication or not change absolutely nothing about that,
--John K Clark
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On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man.
OK, but the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is experiencing Helsinki right now today. Or at least that's the definition on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, but on other days of the week the definition is the man who REMEMBERS experiencing Helsinki today, and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
>> I can accept the fact that you are going to be duplicated but that will not change your expectations. And perhaps your expectation is to see Santa Claus's workshop but I really don't care. I don't care about what you expect to happen, I'm interested it what actually turned out to have happened.> But as I see it, I must be superhuman to be able to do what you can't.
--John K Clark
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>> OK, but the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is experiencing Helsinki right now today. Or at least that's the definition on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, but on other days of the week the definition is the man who REMEMBERS experiencing Helsinki today, and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
> I did use proper nouns. So what is John Clark's answer to the question what did the Helsinki man expect regarding his future just before he pushed the button?
> My guess would be that he expected to experience being in either Moscow or in Washington,
On 17 Dec 2019, at 04:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M Man's?
> imagine you in front of the button,
OK> what do you expect after pushing it..
If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man.
And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future. So the question is clear enough.
Brent
--If "you" means the M Man I expect to be experiencing M. If "you" means the H Man I expect to be experiencing nothing at all because after that button is pushed nobody will be in H. Any other questions?
John K Clark
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On 17 Dec 2019, at 07:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 12/16/2019 10:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 5:01 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> a écrit :
On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M Man's?
> imagine you in front of the button,
OK> what do you expect after pushing it..
If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man. And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future. So the question is clear enough.
But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.
No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what does he expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the next moment after pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki man to himself... Wilk he vanish from existence ? Will he see m or w ? Will he see m and w ? The question is clear, has been for more than twenty years now, only bad faith has make it go through 2019 again... And will through 2029.
H-man will not see anything after pushing the button -- according to the protocol he will be eliminated. He can have no particular expectations for what his subsequent experiences will be because the probabilities of future experiences are not well defined. The only rational account is that since he is eliminated, two new persons are created, one seeing M and one seeing W. These are new persons -- maybe sharing some memories with H-man, but neither can claim uniquely to BE H-man.
But each can claim to be H-man.
And each could report what the H-man was thinking just before he pushed the button. I don't know what JKC thinks he's proving by pretending this question can't be answered.
Brent
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Bruce
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On 17 Dec 2019, at 07:01, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:Le mar. 17 déc. 2019 à 04:54, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> a écrit :On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 12/16/2019 6:31 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> You're so absurd after so many years... Just put your shoes in the experiment,
Who's shoes should I put my feet into, the H Man's the W Man's, or the M Man's?
> imagine you in front of the button,
OK> what do you expect after pushing it..
If "you" means the W Man I expect to be experiencing W.
Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man. And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future. So the question is clear enough.But Quentin did say "expect AFTER pushing it". Not BEFORE pushing it. So after pushing the button, H-man is duplicated to both W and M: So the W copy expects Washington, and the M copy expects Moscow.No I mean is in front of the button ready to be pushing it, what does he expect will happen, what does he expect he will see the next moment after pushingit, the question is asked by the Helsinki man to himself... Wilk he vanish from existence ? Will he see m or w ? Will he see m and w ? The question is clear, has been for more than twenty years now, only bad faith has make it go through 2019 again... And will through 2029.
Bruce--
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John K Clark--
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On 17 Dec 2019, at 12:54, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 10:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:> Expecting what you will experience after pushing the button must refer to thoughts before the button is pushed, so "you" must refer to the Helsinki man.OK, but the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is experiencing Helsinki right now today.
Or at least that's the definition on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, but on other days of the week the definition is the man who REMEMBERS experiencing Helsinki today,
and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
> And the answer is not "Nothing" because the Helsinki man exists before the button is pushed. "Expecting" is having a thought about the future.Right, and John Clark expects that tomorrow nobody will be experiencing Helsinki today.
It may seem like John Clark is being overly pedantic but Brent Meeker needs to be that way too if the conversation is about the nature of personal identity and personal identity duplicating machines are involved.But all this confusion could be totally avoided if people on this list would simply STOP USING PERSONAL PRONOUNS and replace them with their proper noun referent;
they don't need to do this all the time, only when personal pronoun duplicating machines are thrown into the hypothetical mix. The very fact that nobody, absolutely positively nobody on this list except for John Clark is able to stop themselves from continuing to use them is clear indication to John Clark that they cannot because personal pronouns are being used to cover up multiple holes in the logical structure of their argument.
John K Clark--
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>> the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is experiencing Helsinki right now today.
> That definition has never been adopted by anyone,
> he can predict, when still in Helsinki (as always since day one), that he will [...]
> the “I” pronoun, lost all its ambiguity
> you assume telepathy.
and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
Yet, he can predict, when still in Helsinki (as always since day one), that he will feel to live being in only one city.
Both copies confirms that fact. If he was just asked “do you predict that you will feel to be in W and in M, or do you predict that you will feel to be in M or in M, but not in both at once”, the obvious correct (with resect to mechanism) is the first one.
On 18 Dec 2019, at 20:57, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 10:44 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:>> the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is experiencing Helsinki right now today.> That definition has never been adopted by anyone,You use it in the very post I'm responding to! See the next line!:> he can predict, when still in Helsinki (as always since day one), that he will [...]John Clark doesn't think there is any way Bruno Marchal can ever be weaned off of personal pronouns. Is Mr.He the same Mr.He that is "still in Helsinki”?
If it is then today Mr.He is experiencing nothing at all because today nobody is "still in Helsinki”.
But if Mr.He is somebody who remembers being in Helsinki yesterday then today 2 people in 2 different cities fit that description.
So yesterday it would be logical to say Mr.He will either experience zero cities
or two cities depending on who the hell Mr.He is.
And upon this ridiculous mismash you have built your entire philosophy.> the “I” pronoun, lost all its ambiguityIf that were true Bruno could prove it by simply replacing the personal pronoun "I" with its referent, but John Clark knows that will never happen because then the gaping logical holes in the argument would stand out like a sore thumb.
> you assume telepathy.And that bit of silliness is my cue to say goodnight.
John K Clark--
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On 18 Dec 2019, at 23:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 12/18/2019 7:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
Yet, he can predict, when still in Helsinki (as always since day one), that he will feel to live being in only one city.
That's where you introduce amibiguities. "he...when still in Helsinki", i.e. H-man can predict many things. H-man might predict he will feel being in both cites.
Whether that will be borne out depends on how consciousness works and what "he" refers to in "he will feel”.
If it he=whom ever remembers being H-man I think that it is likely true that he will feel being in both cities. If he=either M-man or W-man, then he will either experience M or experience W.
Both copies confirms that fact. If he was just asked “do you predict that you will feel to be in W and in M, or do you predict that you will feel to be in M or in M, but not in both at once”, the obvious correct (with resect to mechanism) is the first one.
That's far from obvious to me.
It's possible, but the second answer, "...you predict that you will feel to be in M or in M, but not in both at once." seems more likely.
Brent
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Philip Ball, in his recent book "Beyond Weird" (2018) addresses a similar issue of personal duplication in a quantum many-worlds setting.
... Is 'that' a meaningful concept of probability? ...Bruce
On 22 Dec 2019, at 07:52, Bruce Kellett <bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 6:32 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:On 12/17/2019 3:54 AM, John Clark wrote:
OK, but the very definition of "The Helsinki Man" is the man who is experiencing Helsinki right now today. Or at least that's the definition on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, but on other days of the week the definition is the man who REMEMBERS experiencing Helsinki today, and on those days the Helsinki Man would be a fool to expect that the Helsinki Man would experience one and only one thing tomorrow.
I did use proper nouns. So what is John Clark's answer to the question what did the Helsinki man expect regarding his future just before he pushed the button? My guess would be that he expected to experience being in either Moscow or in Washington, just as if H-man were going to be anesthetized and flown to one or the other city.Philip Ball, in his recent book "Beyond Weird" (2018) addresses a similar issue of personal duplication in a quantum many-worlds setting. He remains unconvinced by the rhetoric...."Imagine that our observer, Alice, is playing a quantum version of a simple coin-toss gambling game ... that hinges on measurement of the spin state of an atom prepared in a 50:50 superposition of 'up' and 'down'. If the measurement elicits 'up', she doubles her money. If it's 'down', she loses it all."If the MWI is correct, the game seems pointless -- for Alice will, with certainty, both win and lose.
And there's no point in her saying 'Yes, but which world will I end up in?' Both of the two Alices that exist once the measurement is made are in some sense present in the 'her' before the toss.
"But now let's do the sleeping trick. Alice is put to sleep before the measurement is made, knowing she will be wheeled into one of two identical rooms depending on the outcome. Both rooms contain a chest -- but inside one is twice her stake, while the other is empty. When she wakes, she has no way of telling, without opening the chest, whether it contains the winning money. But she can then meaningfully say that there is a 50% probability that it does.
What's more, she can say 'before the experiment' that when she wakes, these will be the odds deduced by her awakened self as she contemplates the still-closed chest. Is 'that' a meaningful concept of probability?
"The notion here is that quantum events that occur for certain in the MWI can still elicit probabalistic beliefs in observers simply because of their ignorance of which branch they are on.
"But it won't work. Suppose Alice says, with scrupulous care, 'The experience I will have is that I will wake up in a room containing a chest that has a 100% chance of being empty.' The Everettian must accept this statement as a true and rational belief too, for the initial 'I' here must apply to both Alices in the future.
"In other words, Alice-Before can't use quantum mechanics to predict what will happen to her in a way that can be articulated -- because there is no logical way to talk about 'her' at any moment except the conscious present (which, in a frantically splitting universe, doesn't exist).
Because it is logically impossible to connect the perceptions of Alice-Before to Alice-After, 'Alice' has disappeared. You can't invoke an 'observer' to make your argument when you have denied pronouns any continuity." (Beyond Weird, pp 301-2)
Ball concludes, "What the MWI really denies is the existence of facts at all.
It replaces them with experience of pseudo-facts (we 'think' that this happened, even though that happened too). In so doing, it eliminates any coherent notion of what we can experience, or have experienced, or are experiencing right now. We might reasonably wonder if there is any value -- any meaning -- in what remains, and whether the sacrifice has been worth it.”
Bruce
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On 30 Dec 2019, at 19:26, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:For whatever stupid reason, I tended to agree with the late US philosopher, Nozick, on whomever lands in DC or Moscow, or yeah, and afterlife, it's the closest continuer. Is it disputable, sure go ahead. But as we say in the US, 'close enough for government work!' It's how much accurate data the copy or clone contains? Thus, I am willing to consider the clone (screw the no-cloning theorem), the "soul" because the dude is alive in MOCKBA drinking piva (beer) while the DC version is smoked. In Helsinki? Again, The difference between a rock and a rabbit, is the information it contains-that was from Claude Shannon.
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everyth...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Dec 30, 2019 10:54 am
Subject: Re: Superdeterminism in comics
> On 28 Dec 2019, at 06:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/20/2019 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> But the question is about the prediction of his future 1p-experience. Here the guy can assert that he (in Helsinki) can predict with certainty that he will feel to be in only one place, but he cannot, for obvious reason, write dow which one in his diary.
>
> How can he be certain of that? Maybe he will experience both places. Would it make any difference if he predicted that?
If the Helsinki guy predicts that he will experience both places 5washington and Moscow), and that indeed both copies claim and show that indeed they are in both place, that would entail a form of telepathy which is logically impossible with (Indexical Digital) Mechanism.
I think that both Moscow and Washington will be interested as this will give a new efficacious way of spying!
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
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On 31 Dec 2019, at 20:29, spudboy100 via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:My only reply Bruno, is using information in biologicals like ourselves (what else is there?) and the practices of computer science going back decades. Unix forking is a means of protecting information, as well as checksum. The universe may not work this way at all with information, but I guess it might.
If one produces a continuer with virtually the same info as the original, and we would need to discuss this intensely, on what constitutes a genuine Bob or Alice? We have seen people on this forum, reject the continuer or simulation, as axiomatically wrong, rather than consider this, which for me indicates that I am dealing with the part of the brain called the amygdala, and not the part of the brain that deals with math. If the original species, turns into smoke, and there are two nearly identical copies in Moscow or Bruges, let them fight over the inheritance. Have a jolly New Year.
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