Forgive my .o2$ but is this not a discussion of the non-bijection
of that representations and referents? We forget that what we think of
as real and objective comes to use from the filter of our senses,
reality is not presented raw to us.
>>>> reality. They donï¿½t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a theory.
>>>> but we must stop, qualophiles say, because, .... ï¿½Because what?ï¿½
>>> It's not qualia that must rise to the challenge of science, it is the
>>> other way around.
>> So science can't explain this special Qualia of yours - and mine. Ok,
>> game over then. You've got your story right there.
> Is science so pathetic and feeble that it cannot stretch and expand
> it's intelligence to accommodate ordianry reality? An infant
> understands subjectivity, an insect. Subjectivity isn't complicated,
> it's just hard to work with because of the problems of ubiquity,
> disorientation, etc. (it's in my multisense intro)
>>>> I ask. ï¿½Because the what-it-is-likeness of qualiaï¿½ most of them will
>>>> respond. And believe me that is the whole argument from which they
>>>> sprout all of the other awkward deductions and misconstrued axioms if
>>>> we are to succinctly resume their rigorous, inner-gut, ï¿½aprioristic
>>>> analysisï¿½. I'll try to expose the absurdity of their stance by making
>> thereï¿½s in the voltages on your network wire, in the logical gates of
>> almost all of your computerï¿½s integrated circuits, in you hard-disk
>> stored as magnetic patterns, on your processor stored in micro-
>> circuits with the width of only a few tens of atoms.
> No 1s or 0s anywhere in there at all. No more than there are dogs and
> cats. Not literally. Figuratively, yes, 1s and 0s are an excellent way
> for us to make sense of how these technologies work together. We
> design them to be that way specifically, going to great lengths to
> research and refine materials to behave in this way. Not so easy to
> run the internet on a cheeseburger.
>> If zeros and ones
>> are real, physical things,
> They aren't real in the sense that I assume you mean - that physics
> would mean. To be real in that sense they would have to be found on
> the periodic table of elements, the electromagnetic spectrum, or in
> field equations for quantum physics. They aren't though. They are real
> in the sense that color and odor are real but at the opposite end of
> the sensorimotive continuum. They are thought-feelings which are
> intended to represent 'information' evacuated of feeling.
>> then in what sense would you use the term
>> ï¿½abstractï¿½ when referring to Turing machines?
> In the sense that a Turing machine is an ideal mechanism that can be
> enacted in any physical substance which supports mechanical physics -
> i.e. you probably need something that is solid at room temperature,
> some source of mechanical energy, etc. You could probably enact a
> Turing machine in Coke bottles or foam rubber as well as
> microelectronics, but it wouldn't be easy. The machine itself though
> is conceptual. The Coke bottles don't know that they are acting like a
> Turing machine, and neither does an electronic computer, despite
> appearances to the contrary.
>> I donï¿½t know, but
>> whatever you mean is bound to failure because between Turing machines
>> and computer programs, on the one hand, and brains and minds on the
>> other hand there is absolutely no difference in how their prowess come
>> to existence, at least we have no reason to believe otherwise if we a
>> priori consider that their systemic architecture, their functionality
>> is all that matters; thatï¿½s what gives off their talent.
> That's not the case at all. The brain and mind absolutely do use
> computation, but only in the service of the user. Computer programs
> have no user of their own. They have no need for a presentation layer
> within their logic. It's actually functionalism that is a dead end
> since everything that the consciousness does would be better served by
> unconscious processes (like digestion or immune response). There is no
> purely functional explanation for the existence of any kind of
> experience or awareness. Function matters, but it wouldn't if not for
> the more primitive reality of sense making.
>> For one to
>> say that there is another story to be told besides the story of how
>> the bigger parts of the brain are build upon its most bottom parts and
>> how those sub-modules are integrated to each other is to fail at
>> Science; why should you possible want to postulate another mystery
>> that also needs an explanation when youï¿½re trying to explain all there
>> is to explain about a phenomenon?
> Because that story is utterly meaningless if not for the other half of
> the story of how owners of the brain use it to make sense of
> themselves and the universe and to participate in them significantly.
> It needs no explanation. 'I' only need to be what and who I am. What
> needs to be explained is why the rest of the universe is not me, which
> is relatively straightforward.
>> My belief is that deniers of the strong AI thesis fail in two regards.
>> On the one hand their mistake the physical states of 1s and 0s with
>> the arbitrary tokens of 0 and 1 that we apply to them. The fact that 1
>> and 0 are what we call numbers this doesnï¿½t mean that what they really
>> zeros and ones even though they didnï¿½t provide any reason for it. So,
>> for some reason, unbeknownst to some of the thinkers that brainstormed
>> all of these issues in detail, we can apparently have a mind build out
>> of ion pumps, synapses and axon hillocks but we cannot have one made
>> out of CMOS gate arrays, emitter-coupled logic (ECL) gate arrays,
>> index registers, and pad transceiver circuits.
> You can't build a human mind out of orange peels and catalytic
> converters either. We don't even know how to reconnect a severed
> spinal cord to itself much make a motherboard feel romantic. Your
> reasoning is sound, but your assumptions are exactly antithetical to
> concrete reality. They are perfectly suited to developing technology
> and information theory, but they take us in exactly the wrong
> direction to understanding subjectivity and qualia.
>> Of course I donï¿½t
>> believe that at all because there is no reason to. Again, as Iï¿½ve said
>> above, why should you possible want to presuppose, for no scientific
>> reason at all, that the micro-parts that make the meat of your brain
>> have some extra stuff (mindality perhaps?)
> They don't need any extra stuff. Human consciousness is just orders of
> magnitude more elaborate than the sense that inorganic molecules make,
> but it's essentially the same thing. What you don't realize is that if
> you say that the mind is nothing but ones and zeros, then ones and
> zeros *must* inherently have the potential to develop feeling and
> thinking, in which case calling them ones and zeros would be
> profoundly misleading.
>> that will also need an
>> explanation if we are to follow the rules of science, whereas the
>> chunks of silicon, silver, plastics, etc that make up your computer
>> donï¿½t posses it, when all youï¿½ve got as an argument is your intuition
>>>> a particular point-of-view (POV ï¿½ or point of reference, call it how
>>>> you will). Camera objects simulate still-image, motion picture, or
>>>> video cameras in the real world and have the same usage here. The
>>>> benefit of cameras is that you can position them anywhere within a
>>>> scene to offer a custom view. You can imagine that camera not only as
>>>> a point of view but also as an area point of view (all the light
>>>> reflected from the objects in your particular world model enter the
>>>> lens of the camera), but for our particular mental exercise this
>>>> doesn't matter. What you need to know is that our virtual cameras can
>>>> perfectly simulate real world cameras and all the optical science of
>>>> the lens is integrated in the program making the simulated models
>>>> similar to the ones that are found real life. Weï¿½ll use POVs and CPOVs
>>>> interchangeably from now on; they mean the same thing in the logic of
>>>> our argumentation.
>>>> The point-of-view (POV) of the camera is obviously completely
>>>> traceable and mathematically deducible from the third-person
>>>> perspective of the current model we are simulating and from the
>>>> physical characteristics of the virtual lens built into the camera
>>>> through which the light reflected of the objects in the model is
>>>> projected (Bare in mind that the physical properties and optics of the
>>>> lens are also simulated by the computer model). Of course, the
>>>> software does all that calculation and drawing for you. But if you had
>>>> the ambition you could practically do all that work for yourself by
>>>> taking the 3D-modelï¿½s mathematical and geometric data from the saved
>>>> computer file containing your particular model description and
>>>> calculate on sheets of paper how objects from it would look and behave
>>>> from a particular CPOV, and more to that, you could literally draw
>>>> those objects yourself by using the widely known techniques of
>>>> descriptive geometry (the same as the ones used by the 3D modeling
>>>> software). But what point would that make when we already have
>>>> computers that achieve this arduous task for us? Maybe living in a
>>>> period of time without computers would make this easily relentless
>>>> task one worth considering.
>>>> So, we can basically take a virtual trip to whatever part of Rome we
>>>> want by just jumping inside a CPOV provided to us by the software. We
>>>> can see, experience what it is like to be in Rome by adopting whatever
>>>> CPOV which will be calculated and drawn to us by this complex but 100%
>>>> describable and understandable computer program. The software would be
>>>> no mystery to us if we were sufficiently trained programmers,
>>>> architects and mathematicians. The WIIL of experiencing Rome will
>>>> never be a mystery to us also if weï¿½ll let the 3D design software do
>>>> the job of calculating and drawing the CPOV for us.
>>> Imagine how absurd that would sound to someone who is blind and lives
>>> in Rome. Do they have no WIIL of experiencing Rome?
>> Again, this does not refute what i was trying to prove.
> I'm just pointing out how narrow it is to conceive of 3D computer
> graphics as a viable thought experiment for virtualizing subjectivity.
>>>> No need to squander
>>>> energy contriving not-worth-considering meanings because of this
>>>> relatedness. The WIIL is the intentional interpretation of the
>>>> mathematical description of the physical objects' properties and
>>>> relationships to each other which the POV describes; it is the
>>>> richness and detail of the description of the POV taken as a whole by
>>>> whatever is on the other side of the lens. On the other hand the POV
>>>> can be accounted for by its mathematical and geometrical description;
>>>> itï¿½s all data, 0s and 1s.
> On Dec 22, 7:18 am, alexalex <alexmka...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> Hello, Everythinglisters!
>> The below text is a philosophical essay on what qualia may represent.
>> I doubt you'll manage to finish reading it (it's kind of long, and
>> translated from anoter language), but if you do I'll be happy to hear
>> your opinion about what it says.
>> <<<A simpler model of the world with different points of view>>>
>> It can often get quite amusing watching qualophiles' self-confidence,
>> mutual assurance and agreement when they talk about something a
>> defined as inherently private and un-accessible to third-party
>> analysis (i.e. qualia), so they say, but they somehow agree on what
>> they're discussing
> I feel the same way about quantophiles' confidence in theoretical
> abstraction and endless capacity to deny the existence of the very
> subjectivity that they use to deny it with.
You are quite unfair. the whole point of the UDA (and MGA) consists in
taking as important, and even fundamental (in the sense of "key", not
in the sense of "primary") the first person experience, and thus
> Agreement is not a
> contradiction to the privacy of qualia because the privacy of qualia
> is specific to groups of subjects as well as individuals. Human beings
> experience universal levels of qualia (physics, chemistry), organic
> levels (biology, zoology, neurology), anthropomorphic levels
> (psychology, sociology), and individual levels which are relatively
> unique or idiosyncratic.
But this, on the contrary, is only a succession of Aristotelian dogma.
In my opinion biology is more universal than physics. psychology (of
numbers) is more universal than biology. The picture is rational and
almost upside down with aristotle ontology.
> We are both human so we share the broader
> levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have
> different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia
> narrows and deepens toward individuality.
>> about even though as far as I've been able to
>> understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence which
>> would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that could
>> bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) of
>> personal experience and the scientific, objective descriptions of
>> reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a theory.
> My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if you
> have a chance: http://s33light.org/SEEES
>> How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we can't
>> subject it to what science has been and will always be?
> By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not shivering
> in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who ask
> about subjectivity.
>> Third-party analysis.
> If science will always be limited to third-party analysis, then it
> will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since it is by
> definition subjective.
This is wrong.
The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I would
add) limited to third person parties.
But the object of science is everything including consciousness,
qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as
axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.
> Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
> science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.
Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice, since
about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are
reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the science,
will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers,
not member of some club).
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The UD argument is an argument based on the weaker version of
mechanism (and this makes its consequences valid for all stronger form
> actually wasn't thinking of your work here which to me is more of a
> arithmetic theology than a Dennett style quantitative mechanism.
Dennett uses the same comp hypothesis. Being rather rigorous, and
because he want to keep materialism, he is literally condemned to
eliminate consciousness away. I think most here (me and you in
particular) agree that it forget the most key data on consciousness,
that we cannot doubt it without lying to oneself.
>>> Agreement is not a
>>> contradiction to the privacy of qualia because the privacy of qualia
>>> is specific to groups of subjects as well as individuals. Human
>>> experience universal levels of qualia (physics, chemistry), organic
>>> levels (biology, zoology, neurology), anthropomorphic levels
>>> (psychology, sociology), and individual levels which are relatively
>>> unique or idiosyncratic.
>> But this, on the contrary, is only a succession of Aristotelian
>> In my opinion biology is more universal than physics.
> Interesting. How so? If something dies, it still survives as a
> physical process.
In the dream of some numbers. Physical process, including time,
belongs to number's imagination (and this is not necessarily true, but
is a theorem in the comp theory).
> Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
> matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
> Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion
> years, right?
Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple,
both conceptually and technically.
>> psychology (of
>> numbers) is more universal than biology.
> I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
> vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers
> an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
> quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia of
> their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
> experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).
You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
computation (as can appear in a cartoon).
That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first
> The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
> is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts, or,
> I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
> systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as
> discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
> flattened by externalization.
By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds
and different persons.
>>> Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
>>> science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.
>> Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice, since
>> about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are
>> reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the
>> will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers,
>> not member of some club).
> We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of my
> ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.
I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a
way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or
You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive
matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the
argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition
already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of the
universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is
unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like
electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some
hard to understand ways.
> They seem to have no
> opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology,
> physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
> suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science.
> It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are
> born out of thought experiments and not academic training.
Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is non
sense, and it hides the real honest researches.
I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological.
Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers, the
programs, the digital machines, )
I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of
biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of self-
reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc.
>>> Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
>>> matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
>>> Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion
>>> years, right?
>> Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple,
>> both conceptually and technically.
> How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of the
relations are not biological.
But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the
infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on.
>>>> psychology (of
>>>> numbers) is more universal than biology.
>>> I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
>>> vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers
>>> an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
>>> quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia
>>> their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
>>> experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).
>> You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
>> arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
>> computation (as can appear in a cartoon).
> I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic
This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be discovered
in arithmetic. The question of the existence of computations in nature
is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis.
> or physics,
> any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs.
Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable
> Computation is
> felt directly as a sensorimotive experience,
I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a bit
my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be
felt. Pain and pleasure, smell and taste, touch and vision can be
felt, but not the underlying software and hardware (if that exists).
Now an expression like "felt directly as a sensorimotive experience"
has no meaning for me. Sorry.
> or it is inferred in a
> physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless something
> physical thinks it appears.
I think this view is a gross extrapolation from our animal instinct to
reify the indexicals. I belief that here and now and "I" and this and
that is more real than beyond.
Where does any place and time come from?
As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a person,
than the illusion of person to matter.
We don't see a physical primitive universe. Layman and babies do
instinctively what physicist do all the time: they measure numbers and
they infer relations between numbers, themselves compactified in
Consciousness and other ineffable things comes from the fact that
those numbers are related to theoretical number truth which are far
beyond, of what they can proof or justified, as the numbers can
justified in some conditional way already by themselves,
> The universe is not haunted by arithmetic
It is the arithmetical realm which is haunted by universal numbers, of
> it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory
> through sense and motive.
All universal numbers discover and elaborate arithmetic as new
territory through sense and motive.
> Sense and motive may well be guided by non-
> local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be
> manifested through physical description and it's not only to do with
> arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc. Many
> kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive.
> Numbers have no independent realism.
In that case your theory might be just not interesting, in the sense
that for most humans, numbers are the most possibly independent thing
they can conceive of. It needs only the common part to classical
(Plato, Hilbert) and constructive (Aristotle, Brouwer) philosophy. But
just can't dispense of them or their recursive equivalent in any theory.
We need numbers (or equivalent) to give sense to the word "theory",
"proof", "deduction", "valid", etc. All civilisation discovered
surprising property of numbers.
Notably on numbers.
> You can't talk to a
> congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective
> agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we
> consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more
> universally scoped).
I agree. That's even why I do not take a physical universe for
granted. Yet, physical realities will reappear as partial first person
plural agreement. This involves indirectly many universe, something
confirmed by the literal interpretation of Everett's formulation of QM.
>>> The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
>>> is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts,
>>> I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
>>> systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as
>>> discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
>>> flattened by externalization.
>> By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
>> notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds
>> and different persons.
> What's wrong with blurring the notion of person?
Nothing wrong, but you are fusing two persons into ine persons. One
day this will be a practice, and nature already does that when
building brain, which are really two UMs in front of each other, or
two brains in front of each others. Dissociative drugs permit self-
experimentation of that kind.
> I think that would be
> the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify as a
> person in the first place.
Yes. That's interesting.
> Once you can join nervous systems, then you
> could make appliances that could step down the process to any level so
> that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and feel
> how it is to be them,
No, you can't. You would diffract yourself. Only by chance can you
have less wrong feelings about that.
> then plug large molecules into the cells to see
> what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to feel on
> an interstellar scale even.
Interstellar is already infinitesimal compared to the arithmetical
scale on which our consciousness already supervene on.
But this does not diminish the interest of fusing and duplicating in
the quest for truth.
Then the 8 hypostases can be seen as multisense realism, except that
the primitive are given by the laws of addition and multiplication on
numbers, and that the theory is testable by the fact that physics is
given by such hypostase-modality-modulation.
> Both are real in some
> sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real nor
> unreal in some sense.
"it exists" and "for all" has indeed different meaning according to
> The realism arises from the symmetry - the very
> sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many
> figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a monosense
> view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to make
> it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD create
Because the modality Bp & p defines an arithmetical indexical knower.
Bp is the usual self-referential ideally correct assertive mode of the
machine. "Bp & p" provides an innefable, unnameable self, which plays
the role of the subject building its personal mental mindscape.
But to get this you should read the second part of the sane04 paper,
at least (and ask question).
> - which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in
> others, both and neither in others.
> My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical
> continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective feeling is
> experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and
> there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we get
Hmm... I would say we get the indeterminism. Like in the UD, where we
look indeed at the subjective through the lens of the objective.
> Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get
Superstition, but also "the boss is right" and the ten thousand
possible wounds we do to ourselves.
> If we take these perspectives too literally, we get
> pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/14722448115) in
> the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism too if
> taken to it's literal extreme.
Less sure. Computationalism is a vaccine against reductionism. There,
we can quickly see reductionism cannot work.
> If we take these profound perspectives
> too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and
> neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday.
> Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the profound
> meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and lowest
> ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic
> contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching
> meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of
> hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of material
> objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the anti-
> poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity.
Hmm... That's very well said, but I feel it as rather feminine :)
> you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some
> powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like any
> other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place
> along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to
> universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem with it
> is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience, and
> then defensively denies it.
It does not. On the contrary, I am the one who say "looks the numbers
are already dreaming, and not only that, they chat in their sleep, and
we can listen to what they say.
You are the one who seems to dismiss their many concrete experiences.
> That's what all sufficiently progressed
> points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and progress.
> My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly have
> it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes
> subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the
> sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further
> removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language) but I
> think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to us,
> which is really all that I'm after.
We might be closer than you think, except that for some unknown reason
you don't want the machines to be part of it.
You might have good reasons, but you don't succeed in communicating
them, and, I am not sure, you might just wasting your time with that
position (to be frank).
>>> They seem to have no
>>> opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology,
>>> physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
>>> suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science.
>>> It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are
>>> born out of thought experiments and not academic training.
>> Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
>> academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
>> The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is
>> sense, and it hides the real honest researches.
> I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my hypothesis
> out there?
By writing text to convince other people, academic or not.
> Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic
> cred? ;)
Not sure this would really help you, to be honest.
Also, I should first understand what you say, and all my work starts
from the fact that I am interested in explaining the physical, and the
spiritual, without assuming them at the start.
I buy everything in Aristotle, except his metaphysics. Plotinus and
many mystics got it right, I think.
We might depart greatly on mechanism: my real test for a theory is
"try to explain you theory to a universal machine, and if she can
explain it to me after, I will be convinced". Put in another way, you
have to convince me that you can formalize you theory in PA, or ZF, or
any not to complex or eccentric Löbian machine language. Or, (but it
is more complex) explain it to a Löbian non-machine entity, if you
really believe that you are not Turing emulable. I doubt this will add
any new observable effects, though.
You might try to explain to younger people, but the idea of explaining
does consists in explaining new notion from older one. It is always
relative. All what I know about "sensorimotive" is that it is non
Turing emulable, which is close to being magical, when seen as an
I might be more incline to help you when you will accept to give some
food, in your restaurant, to my sun-in-law, you know, the one who
lost its biological brain ...
> On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?
>> I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological.
>> Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers,
>> programs, the digital machines, )
> Why would numbers differ in quality when they already differ precisely
> in quantity? Seems superfluous.
It is not a matter of choice. Relatively to each other universal
number does discover those quality, and develop all the mind-body
problem discourses. You can call them zombie, but you can also do that
with humans. After all emiminativist does talk about consciousness as
been causally superfluous. But in the case of nulbers, at least we can
show that those who begins to bet on their nown consistency/
consciousness develop self-speeding up ability relatively to their
most probable universal number/environment, so it is not superfluous.
A number, when seen relatively to some universal number is really a
machine or a program.
>> I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of
>> biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of self-
>> reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc.
> I see recursion as just one defining exterior behavior of biology. I
> don't see pain and pleasure being an inevitable arithmetic product of
> recursion but they are an equally definitive biological quality.
This is because we are forbidden to do that. If we could access the
functional level of pain and pleasure, we would no more evolved and
disappear. Our "not seeing pain and pleasure being inevitably
arithmetic (or even physics)" is programmed at the start. Indeed some
people fears "drugs" because they believe it can gives us such an
access, but such an idea is a myth. It can only be superficially true
(and at that level, the brain already is a big "drug dealer").
>>>>> Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
>>>>> matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
>>>>> Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four
>>>>> years, right?
>>>> Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more
>>>> both conceptually and technically.
>>> How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
>> Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of
>> relations are not biological.
>> But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the
>> infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on.
> Would you say that the infinity of biological number relations is as
> large as the infinity of physical relations?
I would say, without thinking too much, that the biological relations
are far more numerous. The physical relations are first person
constructs of the Löbian machines relations, most plausibly related to
deep (necessary long) computations, and which are relatively rare,
despite their continuum of consistent extensions.
>>>>>> psychology (of
>>>>>> numbers) is more universal than biology.
>>>>> I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
>>>>> vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of
>>>>> an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
>>>>> quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia
>>>>> their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
>>>>> experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).
>>>> You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
>>>> arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
>>>> computation (as can appear in a cartoon).
>>> I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic
>> This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be
>> in arithmetic.
> Discovered by mathematicians, but does arithmetic itself know whether
> or not it is discovering computation?
Some numbers can know that. Arithmetic (arithmetical truth) is
plausibly not a person (or only in some non Löbian weak sense). But
its "inhabitants" can make the discovery, and indeed do it. Machines
can discover their own hypostases. Correct machines cannot miss them
>> The question of the existence of computations in nature
>> is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis.
>>> or physics,
>>> any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs.
>> Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable
> How so? If all you have is a tree but no light source, you can't have
> a shadow. If all you have is a light bulb but no surfaces to
> illuminate, you can't have a shadow either. The realism of a shadow is
> in the the visual sense relation between light source, obstacle, and
I agree. But those things exist in the relevant relative sense.
Likewise with the numbers.
>>> Computation is
>>> felt directly as a sensorimotive experience,
>> I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a
>> my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be
> If you are trying to solve an equation, you are feeling computation.
In a weak superficial sense. I am not feeling the computation done by
my brain for me to be aware that I am solving an equation, and that's
what I meant. If not you are confusing level of descriptions. I don't
feel my neurons either.