subjective reality
John M
subject phrase. Does it make sense?
Reality is supposed to be something independent from
our personal manipulations (=1st person
interpretation) and so it has got to be objective,
untouched by our experience and emotions. Eo ipso it
is not subjective.
Once we 'subject' it to our personal 'mind' and its
own distortions it is "subjective", not objective
anymore.
So it looks like "subjective reality" is an oxymoron.
I understand if you (all) use the phrase as the
'imagined' and 'acceptable' version of something we
CAN handle in our feeble minds. I would not call THAT
a 'reality'. It seems to be a 'virtuality' as
generated (even if only in modifications if you
insist) WITHIN our mind, subject to our personal
mental structure and content.
I am not ashamed to say: I dunno, but it seems to
me...
in wich case I separated 'it' from any 'reality'.
John M
(the bartender, talking into the patrons' discussion)
Bruno Marchal
Le 07-août-05, à 21:24, John M a écrit :
> Dear Bruno, you (and as I guess: others, too) use the
> subject phrase. Does it make sense?
What do you mean by "use the subject phrase"?
> Reality is supposed to be something independent from
> our personal manipulations
Srtictly speaking I do not agree. Some satellites of Earth are human
made, and local "physical reality" can depends, at least locally, on
us. Now, with comp, I am saying something bigger than that, which is
that the whole of physical reality is an (atemporal) construction made
by "us". Not "us" the human, but "us" the Lobian Machines ....
Absolute non relative reality is giving by number theory and is
supposed to be independent of what Lobian machines proves ciorrectly
(or incorrectly) about it.
> (=1st person
> interpretation) and so it has got to be objective,
> untouched by our experience and emotions. Eo ipso it
> is not subjective.
Why? I don't see why subjective and objective cannot have an objective
overlap, and a subjective overlap too.
> Once we 'subject' it to our personal 'mind' and its
> own distortions it is "subjective", not objective
> anymore.
> So it looks like "subjective reality" is an oxymoron.
I'm afraid you do some category error. "subjectivity" is not anything
you want to be true. The simplest example is "Mister X suffered from
headache (that day)". It could be a subjective reality, for Mister X,
independently of our current ability to verify that fact.
More generally, in the context of some hypothesis and definitions, the
"subjective reality" can obey to objective (relatively provable in that
theory) relations.
>
> I understand if you (all) use the phrase as the
> 'imagined' and 'acceptable' version of something we
> CAN handle in our feeble minds. I would not call THAT
> a 'reality'.
In that case, assuming the comp hyp, reality *is* number theory. Given
that any physical truth must emerged from Lobian machine dreams and
observer-moments (to be short).
I prefer to include in "reality" all the possible internal views. If
only for not running the risk of eliminating persons and universes
(world views) from reality.
Bruno
> It seems to be a 'virtuality' as
> generated (even if only in modifications if you
> insist) WITHIN our mind, subject to our personal
> mental structure and content.
>
> I am not ashamed to say: I dunno, but it seems to
> me...
> in wich case I separated 'it' from any 'reality'.
>
> John M
> (the bartender, talking into the patrons' discussion)
>
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Lee Corbin
> Le 07-août-05, à 21:24, John M a écrit :
> > Reality is supposed to be something independent from
> > our personal manipulations
>
> Srtictly speaking I do not agree. Some satellites of Earth are human
> made, and local "physical reality" can depends, at least locally, on
> us.
Sure, but maybe John didn't really mean that. After all, any
action I take affects the physical world.
> > Once we 'subject' it to our personal 'mind' and its
> > own distortions it is "subjective", not objective anymore.
> > So it looks like "subjective reality" is an oxymoron.
>
> I'm afraid you do some category error.
Oh, come on. It's clear that he just wants to use words in
this way :-)
> "subjectivity" is not anything you want to be true. The simplest
> example is "Mister X suffered from headache (that day)". It could
> be a subjective reality, for Mister X, independently of our current
> ability to verify that fact.
That is one way to speak, and an efficient one for daily use,
but in a careful discussion, it's more productive to focus on
the objective facts of the situation: Mister X complains of a
headache, and there are undoubtedly physical processes going
on in his brain that account for this.
(True, we can also extend sympathy by believing it to be utterly
true that he is experiencing pain, but I think that John and I
(and many) are simply not comfortable with introducing a "reality",
namely, "subjective reality" to cover this simple situation.)
Lee
John M
I will interject a few remarks
John M
--- Lee Corbin <lco...@tsoft.com> wrote:
> Bruno writes
>
> > Le 07-août-05, à 21:24, John M a écrit :
>
> > > Reality is supposed to be something independent
> from
> > > our personal manipulations
> >
> > Strictly speaking I do not agree. Some satellites
> of Earth are human
> > made, and local "physical reality" can depends, at
> least locally, on
> > us.
[JM]:
I had this controversy with people who spoke about MIR
(=Mind Independent Reality) When I fought for "the
mind IS part of that reality, so nothing can be
independent of reality, only our knowledge base is
subjective and ever growing in the epistemic
enrichment. The discussions were published on the Karl
Jaspers Forum.
>
> Sure, but maybe John didn't really mean that. After
> all, any
> action I take affects the physical world.
>
> > > Once we 'subject' it to our personal 'mind' and
> its
> > > own distortions it is "subjective", not
> objective anymore.
> > > So it looks like "subjective reality" is an
> oxymoron.
> >
> > I'm afraid you do some category error.
>
> Oh, come on. It's clear that he just wants to use
> words in
> this way :-)
[JM]:
I think I did not differentiate between reality and
our perception of reality. I take "our perception" as
a "subjective mindset" ABOUT a really unknowable
reality
>
> > "subjectivity" is not anything you want to be
> true. The simplest
> > example is "Mister X suffered from headache (that
> day)". It could
> > be a subjective reality, for Mister X,
> independently of our current
> > ability to verify that fact.
[JM]:
I take the 'subjective' in a general meaning: whatever
is assignable and adjusted to the "subject" (us) .
Objective on the other side pertains to the 'object'
to which we have no direct access except for our
information (I would leave alone Mr X's headache).
I see a hard-to-adjust dichotomy in calling Mr. X's
subjective headache (not the 'causal background Lee
mentioned) an (objective?) reality.
>
> That is one way to speak, and an efficient one for
> daily use,
> but in a careful discussion, it's more productive to
> focus on
> the objective facts of the situation: Mister X
> complains of a
> headache, and there are undoubtedly physical
> processes going
> on in his brain that account for this.
>
> (True, we can also extend sympathy by believing it
> to be utterly
> true that he is experiencing pain, but I think that
> John and I
> (and many) are simply not comfortable with
> introducing a "reality",
> namely, "subjective reality" to cover this simple
> situation.)
>
> Lee
Thanks
John
>
>
Bruno Marchal
Le 08-août-05, à 17:49, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> (True, we can also extend sympathy by believing it to be utterly
> true that he is experiencing pain, but I think that John and I
> (and many) are simply not comfortable with introducing a "reality",
> namely, "subjective reality" to cover this simple situation.)
This amounts to dismissing the first person. I am sure you did have
known to be living some "subjective reality".
What exactly makes you not comfortable with the "other mind" reality?
Is it the fact that it is not verifiable?
In that case again, incompleteness theorem can be used as a cure,
because it makes utterly clear that for the sound machine there are
many truth which are guess-able but unprovable.
Is it the fact that once you accept the reality of the first person
experiences, then we are led to that first person indeterminacy from
which the physical laws emerges, assuming comp (which you accept)?
You are neither a zombie, nor a solipsist, so what is the origin of you
dismissing the reality of first person experiences. I am very curious,
because, as you say, you are not the only one.
Is it because you do feel some inconsistency with your physicalist
assumptions, once we take seriously the "assumption" that others can
feel genuine pleasures and pains.
Anyway. We are not supposed to search comfort, but to reason from facts
and assumptions, isn't it?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
John M
I hope not to affront Lee when I imply that "both of
us" may well accept the 1st person "impression of
reality" as interpreted by the 1st person mind, only
the "objective" encompassing reality - which is not
accesible in its uninterpreted format - is the
problem. Interpreted used as subjectivised.
There is a fine line separating solipsism from
craziness and to 'verify' the existence of an
uninterpreted reality would go beyond our lifetimes -
unless we resort to beliefs of convenience.
John M
daddy...@aol.com
reality is doing the same epistemic move as Bruno's belief in
arithmetic realism and Godel's Platonism. Isn't belief in "objective
reality" really by definition simply saying that there's something
CAUSING ALL of our subjective observations? If there is no objective
reality, then it begs the question, "Where do all our subjective
observations come FROM?" Surely not from other subjective observations,
by definition. If you don't believe in objective reality, then your
alternatives are: 1) try to explain repeatability of observations in
some weird indirect way and go crazy, or 2) just throw up your hands
and be agnostic and give up any motivation for science other than
pragmatism, which results in a pretty dismal outcome, the same outcome
as the 20th century philosophers: despair.
Tom Caylor
Russell Standish
> It seems to me (oh no, subjectivity!) that believing in an objective
> reality is doing the same epistemic move as Bruno's belief in
> arithmetic realism and Godel's Platonism. Isn't belief in "objective
> reality" really by definition simply saying that there's something
> CAUSING ALL of our subjective observations? If there is no objective
> reality, then it begs the question, "Where do all our subjective
> observations come FROM?" Surely not from other subjective observations,
> by definition. If you don't believe in objective reality, then your
> alternatives are: 1) try to explain repeatability of observations in
> some weird indirect way and go crazy, or 2) just throw up your hands
> and be agnostic and give up any motivation for science other than
> pragmatism, which results in a pretty dismal outcome, the same outcome
> as the 20th century philosophers: despair.
>
> Tom Caylor
>
or 3) explain repeatability as due to the constraints of the Anthropic
Principle. The AP capture what is necessary about an "objective
reality" without acknowledging an actual "objective reality".
I believe the reason behind the AP will come to light with a more
mature theory of consciousness.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
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(via) Reality vs. Perception of Reality
In answer to Bruno’s recent comments on the old post:
* Thanks for helping me sort out my ‘Nagels’! I had them mixed up in EndNote.
* Young? 49 years young. Getting young and seemingly knowing less and less every day. :-) This I seem to have to conclude is progress of a sort.
---------------------------
I’ve caught up with the ‘subjective reality’ thread and am finding the usual linguistic blurs, wondering how to resolve them. Part of the process is to ensure we are all talking about the same things. It seems there is room for some work in this regard. In going through the posts it seems to me there is an overlap in the word ‘subjective’ in a very specific way.
a) Firstly there is ‘subjective’ in the sense of experiential content (the ‘now’ of our experiential fields vision, haptic, emotion etc)). This is implemented in brain material in some way. What the brain feels.
b) Secondly there is knowledge derived from that experience. This is devoid of experiential qualities and is reported as a belief. “Mr X had a headache on that day” is the example used here. What the brain does. This is a belief whose truth may or may not be supported by empirical evidence. This is formed by a separate brain mechanism.
There seems to be a tendency for these two to get mixed up. You can see evidence in the thread: the interpretive mismatch actually caused discussion to occur. Both of these constructs a) and b) can be characterised as ‘virtual’. In case (a) the brain makes the outside natural world have an appearance ‘as if it were like that’. In case b) the belief is a ‘truth’ about the natural world and the holder of the belief acts (behaves) ‘as if’ it were true.
Both are subjective in that they are properties of a subject (a brain) and the result of that subject’s view of the natural world (=not the brain) as an object. This leads is into the next potential confusion c) subject in contrast to d) object. This too has been in the possibly confused mixture and was well recognised by Lee.
This may be a confusion of word subject/object vs subjective/objective. Don’t know.
Then there is the final confusion (? Not sure) e) that ‘measurement’ in the quantum mechanical sense of a so-called ‘observer moment’ and its relationship to a), b) c) and d). For I do not think they are the same thing. The quantum mechanical ‘observer moments’ happen continually at all places, scales and times where the natural processes taking place demand that resolution of position/velocity some other pair be resolved to a certain state. This is the massive collection of falling trees in the unobserved forest. They still fall in the sense that Schrödinger’s cat ‘fall’. This form of ‘observation’ may actually occur in a brain and be relevant to a), b), c) , d) but it does not necessarily _define_ a), b), c) d). I believe this to be an accidental cultural mis-interpretation that seems to continue unchallenged. Or am I seeing something that is not there?
There seems to sometimes be a tacit assumption that QM observation and observation by a cognitive agent inclusive of a phenomenal consciousness are literally the same thing or necessarily related or that QM is necessarily causal in phenomenal consciousness. A corollary of this is that if you do a QM depiction of the universe unfolding that somehow phenomenality has been depicted. This is not necessarily the case. To me they seem to be two completely separate aspects of the natural world that may or may not be connected and the confusion that they are seems to be in place here.
So here we are all thinking we are talking about the same thing whereas there seem to be at least 5 separable aspects to the discussion (a,b,c,d,e above). They appear very distinct to me, anyway, and in order to have any meaningful discussion it would seem that these 5 things be very clearly defined. Or have I just done that?
Cheers
Colin Hales
Lee Corbin
> Le 08-août-05, à 17:49, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>
> > (True, we can also extend sympathy by believing it to be utterly
> > true that he is experiencing pain, but I think that John and I
> > (and many) are simply not comfortable with introducing a "reality",
> > namely, "subjective reality" to cover this simple situation.)
>
> This amounts to dismissing the first person.
As anything scientific, yes. I agreed with John's statement:
"Interpreted used as subjectivised. There is a fine line separating
solipsism from craziness..." at least insofar as I may read that
to mean that our subjective impressions actually turn out to be
less reliable than our efforts to understand things objectively
(3rd person).
So I dismiss the 1st person, remarking that it's "existence" is
but only to be expected. If an ape or a parrot could talk, it
could yak on about it's impressions. And they'd be of little
but therapeutic value.
> I am sure you did have known to be living some "subjective reality".
Well, by that you mean what I'd call my own 1st person impressions
of the world. Yes.
> What exactly makes you not comfortable with the "other mind" reality?
I don't want to ascribe "reality" either to *my* 1st person whacked
out drug-mediated experiences, or anyone else's. I prefer to reserve
"reality" for 3rd person accounts. "the highest mountain in the world
is located in Tibet" or some similar conjecture.
> Is it the fact that it is not verifiable?
> In that case again, incompleteness theorem can be used as a cure,
> because it makes utterly clear that for the sound machine there are
> many truth which are guess-able but unprovable.
So you say. And I confess I haven't the energy (and probably not
the preparation) to study your thesis. So I'll wait for the experts
to acclaim you. No one will cheer louder: "I knew him *before*
the world saw the truth to COMP! He even knows who I am!".
> Is it the fact that once you accept the reality of the first person
> experiences, then we are led to that first person indeterminacy from
> which the physical laws emerges, assuming comp (which you accept)?
This might be a good time to ask what is meant by that word you
just used. Hal explained "computationalist hypothesis" as used
by philosophers, e.g., that a robot (that was just CPU driven)
could be conscious. I have believed that since 1966 when I used
to argue about it with people in high school. *Lots* of people
believe that. I have taken "COMP" to be Bruno's Thesis, in which
practically everything can be derived fundamentally from the
integers alone, using Gödel's results, and other rather recently
discovered truths.
> You are neither a zombie, nor a solipsist, so what is the origin of you
> dismissing the reality of first person experiences. I am very curious,
> because, as you say, you are not the only one.
Well, maybe some of the above helped to explain it. Basing stuff
on "1st person" has a long history. That's what everyone, it seems
to me, did before the scientific era (about 1600?). Even William
James, I think, did some of that. So far as I know, nothing
has ever come of it.
My friends and I (and probably Daniel Dennett and so on) believe
that people who demand a 1st person "account of the world" (e.g.
Chalmers) will never get anywhere. That the "hard problem" or
whatever is just a horrible consequence of the way sense impressions
traveling on neurons give rise to people thinking that their
own perceptions are a sort of reality independent of the physical
reality. We think that this is a sort of delusion, although the
very #?!&$@! structure of our language hideously leads from that
to "who or what is being deluded?".
That's it in a nutshell.
> Is it because you do feel some inconsistency with your physicalist
> assumptions, once we take seriously the "assumption" that others can
> feel genuine pleasures and pains.
Hmm? Well, what you write here doesn't seem at all wrong to me.
I regard the "assumption" (as you call it) that others can feel
pain and pleasure to be about as accurate as a statement as "less
light gets to the ground during the night". That is, pretty basic.
> Anyway. We are not supposed to search comfort, but to reason from facts
> and assumptions, isn't it?
It was just a figure of speech. You are free, of course, to use
the word "reality" any way you want. I'm not comfortable for using
it to describes one's subjective impressions, feelings, etc.
Lee
Bruno Marchal
Hi Lee ,
> It was just a figure of speech. You are free, of course, to use
> the word "reality" any way you want. I'm not comfortable for using
> it to describes one's subjective impressions, feelings, etc.
But I am not using the word "reality" to *describe* one's subjective
impression, it seems to me I am just acknowledging the existence of
those subjective impression in many persons.
To acknowledge something is to admit that something has some kind of
"reality", it seems to me.
And it seems you did acknowledge those experiences too). To describe
them, in the limit, I can only point you to great poets and artists,
and they will hardly mention the word "reality".
You just seems to want those experiences are just an unnecessary
epiphenomenon, and you would like that science never adresses what they
really are and where they came from.
For you it looks like "consciousness" is just a sort of subjective
mirror partially reflecting an objective third person describable
reality in which we are embedded. And science should never leave the
third person discourse. All right?
Now, please understand that I agree (100%) with the last sentences:
science should never leave the third person discourse.
But this does not prohibit science of looking to herself, and to try
theories (hypotheses) about third person discourses, and even to
*discover* sort of first person discourse canonically associated to
some mathematical object.
By taking the comp hyp enough seriously it just happens that
"consciousness", or just the "ability to guess the existence of one (at
least) world" is not a little detail. Or it is a little detail but then
remember that the devil is hidden in the little details. Why? Because
if I am correct in my derivation it makes the physical law emerging
from number theory.
> So you say. And I confess I haven't the energy (and probably not
> the preparation) to study your thesis. So I'll wait for the experts
> to acclaim you. No one will cheer louder: "I knew him *before*
> the world saw the truth to COMP! He even knows who I am!".
My heart appreciates very much. My poor brain, or some reasoner who
appears to succeed to manifest himself through it, relatively to you,
is a little bit astonished: you are amazingly honest and confess you
could give a weight to authoritative argument. Ah la la.
I think it would be better to get the understanding by yourself, then
you could say " I thought it", but perhaps you do get some
understanding, I think :-)
Actually my work is "the work" which people should understand by
themselves, if only to understand the second part where they must
understand that machine can understand it by themselves, in some
precise sense.
You could also be disappointed. Although the conclusion is startling,
technically my contribution is modest and leads quickly to soluble but
intractable questions.
A paper entitled "Theoretical Computer Science and the Natural
Sciences" should appear soon, though.
> My friends and I (and probably Daniel Dennett and so on) believe
> that people who demand a 1st person "account of the world" (e.g.
> Chalmers) will never get anywhere.
Actually, this is one of the main point where I differ from George Levy
(OK George?), although I could make sense of it. The point is, and
Dennett agrees on this, that, in cognitive *science*, we need to
develop some third person discourse on the first person discourses.
OK, strictly speaking the quantum and physical discourses appears at
some first person (plural) level.
Chalmers is not getting anywhere(*), ok. Perhaps we agree on this.
(*) Using Everett to defend dualism! See the quite good explanation how
Everett is deeply monist in the book:
PRIMAS H., 1981, Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin (second, corrected edition : 1983)
> That the "hard problem" or
> whatever is just a horrible consequence of the way sense impressions
> traveling on neurons give rise to people thinking that their
> own perceptions are a sort of reality independent of the physical
> reality. We think that this is a sort of delusion, although the
> very #?!&$@! structure of our language hideously leads from that
> to "who or what is being deluded?".
Mmhh....
> This might be a good time to ask what is meant by that word you
> just used. Hal explained "computationalist hypothesis" as used
> by philosophers, e.g., that a robot (that was just CPU driven)
> could be conscious.
Actually this is the strong AI thesis. Logically comp is stronger,
because comp is the thesis that "I" am a machine (I, You, ...). Comp is
stronger because the fact that machine could think does not entails
that only machine could think! (despite Occam!).
Now comp is weaker than most functionalism in the philosophy of mind,
because comp asserts only the existence of a level of substitution at
which we are Turing-emulable. Functionalist reason like if the level
was known, but that's impossible.
> have believed that since 1966 when I used
> to argue about it with people in high school. *Lots* of people
> believe that. I have taken "COMP" to be Bruno's Thesis, in which
> practically everything can be derived fundamentally from the
> integers alone, using Gödel's results, and other rather recently
> discovered truths.
No no. That's the theorem. Comp is precisely the conjonction of Church
Thesis, of some amount of belief in arithmetic, + the act of faith
saying "yes" to *some* digitalist surgeon.
All what I say, I derive it (hopefully correctly) from comp.
It is also different from Schmidhuber (and many others) who makes the
thesis that there is a "physical universe" and that it is computable
(programmable). I think that comp is quasi-incompatible with this.
> So I dismiss the 1st person, remarking that it's "existence" is
> but only to be expected. If an ape or a parrot could talk, it
> could yak on about it's impressions. And they'd be of little
> but therapeutic value.
Thanks for acknowledging the therapy! With comp, this would mean the
appearance of the physical world originates in some intrinsic universal
machine self-therapy. It makes sense when you realize that Lob formula
(B(Bp->p)->Bp), the main axiom of the modal logic of self-reference (G)
can be interpreted as showing that some form of honest placebo effect
works! But this is something I am still taking with some grain of salt.
See the book "Forever Undecided" to see Smullyan exploiting the working
of some self-fulfilling beliefs.
> As anything scientific, yes. I agreed with John's statement:
> "Interpreted used as subjectivised. There is a fine line separating
> solipsism from craziness..." at least insofar as I may read that
> to mean that our subjective impressions actually turn out to be
> less reliable than our efforts to understand things objectively
> (3rd person).
But I agree too! This does not prevent us the study of first person
discourse, by use of all the possible scientific way to tackle
problems.
I must go now. Apology for not having respected the order of your
paragraphs, but my computer take some initiative apparently!
Best regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi Everythingers,
Though I am new to the list I have been reading your fascinating posts
on this troubling issue of "reality" and subjectivity
so please pardon if I skip the protocol and delve into the discussion
right away. I have a background in computer
and cognitive science if you want to know, but little chance to
engage in exchanges on philosophical matters
such as the ones in which you guys are involved in. Forgive me if I
misunderstand some of the finer details (yes I know,
the devil is there...)
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
To: lco...@tsoft.com
Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 10 Aug 2005 18:35:18 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality
Hi Lee ,
> It was just a figure of speech. You are free, of course, to use
> the word "reality" any way you want. I'm not comfortable for using
> it to describes one's subjective impressions, feelings, etc.
Bruno says:
But I am not using the word "reality" to *describe* one's subjective
impression, it seems to me I am just acknowledging the existence of
those subjective impression in many persons.
To acknowledge something is to admit that something has some kind of
"reality", it seems to me.
And it seems you did acknowledge those experiences too). To describe
them, in the limit, I can only point you to great poets and artists,
and they will hardly mention the word "reality".
[GK]
Well, astists will probably argue that they are quite concerned with
reality in their own way. You don't want to confuse your
subjective impressions (qualia) with the fact that you have them or
report them. The later are the subject of scientific inquiry while the
former may not qualify. Scientific Reality is definitely more specific
than reality in general. There is also much that
one can aknowledge without admiting to its reality. I have heard of,
say, alien abductions but would not swear to their reality,
though others may differ.
[BM]
You just seems to want those experiences are just an unnecessary
epiphenomenon, and you would like that science never adresses what they
really are and where they came from.
For you it looks like "consciousness" is just a sort of subjective
mirror partially reflecting an objective third person describable
reality in which we are embedded. And science should never leave the
third person discourse. All right?
Now, please understand that I agree (100%) with the last sentences:
science should never leave the third person discourse.
But this does not prohibit science of looking to herself, and to try
theories (hypotheses) about third person discourses, and even to
*discover* sort of first person discourse canonically associated to
some mathematical object.
By taking the comp hyp enough seriously it just happens that
"consciousness", or just the "ability to guess the existence of one (at
least) world" is not a little detail. Or it is a little detail but then
remember that the devil is hidden in the little details. Why? Because
if I am correct in my derivation it makes the physical law emerging
from number theory.
[GK]
I would argue that numbers are rather objective, perhaps even more than
physical laws and surely so if you are right, no?
If that derivation is just a piece of your subjectivity that may dash
your hopes to convey it to others...
There is also an "animal" called *self-delusion* that inhabits this
realm between the subjective and the objective and amounts
to taking for real what isn't quite so. But why bring it into this
already confusing and confused exchanged.
[LC]
> So you say. And I confess I haven't the energy (and probably not
> the preparation) to study your thesis. So I'll wait for the experts
> to acclaim you. No one will cheer louder: "I knew him *before*
> the world saw the truth to COMP! He even knows who I am!".
[BM]
My heart appreciates very much. My poor brain, or some reasoner who
appears to succeed to manifest himself through it, relatively to you,
is a little bit astonished: you are amazingly honest and confess you
could give a weight to authoritative argument. Ah la la.
I think it would be better to get the understanding by yourself, then
you could say " I thought it", but perhaps you do get some
understanding, I think :-)
Actually my work is "the work" which people should understand by
themselves, if only to understand the second part where they must
understand that machine can understand it by themselves, in some
precise sense.
You could also be disappointed. Although the conclusion is startling,
technically my contribution is modest and leads quickly to soluble but
intractable questions.
A paper entitled "Theoretical Computer Science and the Natural
Sciences" should appear soon, though.
[GK]
Oh, it seems you agree than! "The Work" goes well with your
theological inclinations, seems to me though I am as hopeless
about understandiing it as Lee is...
[LC]
> My friends and I (and probably Daniel Dennett and so on) believe
> that people who demand a 1st person "account of the world" (e.g.
> Chalmers) will never get anywhere.
[BM]
Actually, this is one of the main point where I differ from George
Levy (OK George?), although I could make sense of it. The point is, and
Dennett agrees on this, that, in cognitive *science*, we need to
develop some third person discourse on the first person discourses.
OK, strictly speaking the quantum and physical discourses appears at
some first person (plural) level.
Chalmers is not getting anywhere(*), ok. Perhaps we agree on this.
[GK]
Dennett might have evolved in his position but the whole effort behind
cognitive science has long been that of "unpacking"
the notion of "qualia" out of the philosophical discourse. But that is
hardly the same as explaining the 1st person discourse in
3rd person language. Explaining what elation or sadness correspond to
in terms of neural processes does not help me find
out why I am elated today and sad tomorrow. Usually those experience
are much easier to explain and in objective terms.
[BM]
Mmhh....
[GK]
Quasi-incompatible, indeed! Thanks for clearing this out. It is
understandable why you need a 1st person belief statement
if your hypothesis is that You (Bruno) are a machine. I will grant you
that straight away, as it occurred to me already while
noticing that most of your interventions "loop" around that COMP thing.
You, Bruno Machinal are a machine! I will even grant
you that I am a machine and will say "yes" to your digitalist, if he
hasn't replaced all my parts yet. But let me ask you: doesn't
everybody have to believe you for your hypothesis to be true? And if
everyone does so, doesn't it automatically cease to
be an hypothesis and become the universal religion of happy machines?
Mmmmmh!
[LC]
> So I dismiss the 1st person, remarking that it's "existence" is
> but only to be expected. If an ape or a parrot could talk, it
> could yak on about it's impressions. And they'd be of little
> but therapeutic value.
[BM]
Thanks for acknowledging the therapy! With comp, this would mean the
appearance of the physical world originates in some intrinsic universal
machine self-therapy. It makes sense...
..
I must go now. Apology for not having respected the order of your
paragraphs, but my computer take some initiative apparently!
Best regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
[GK]
Funny, mine just did the same!!! It erased something about Bip Bip or
some such thing. Oh well... It may just need some
good self-therapy. God knows what will come out of that...
Best wishes with ... "the Work",
Godfrey
________________________________________________________________________
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Lee Corbin
> You just seems to want those [1st person] experiences to be just an unnecessary
> epiphenomenon, and you would like that science never address what they
> really are and where they came from.
> For you it looks like "consciousness" is just a sort of subjective
> mirror partially reflecting an objective third person describable
> reality in which we are embedded. And science should never leave the
> third person discourse. All right?
Yes, you've phrased it quite well. True, the various experiences
of a human being (as a function of brain chemistry or lesions or
working "fine") or animal, etc., are all worthy of study. But
it's just that I am extremely skeptical that anything will *ever*
come from the 1st person account.
I also agree with many of the following paragraphs....
Then comes:
> > This might be a good time to ask what is meant by that word you
> > just used. Hal explained "computationalist hypothesis" as used
> > by philosophers, e.g., that a robot (that was just CPU driven)
> > could be conscious.
>
> Actually this is the strong AI thesis. Logically comp is stronger,
> because comp is the thesis that "I" am a machine (I, You, ...). Comp is
> stronger because the fact that machine could think does not entails
> that only machine could think! (despite Occam!).
> Now comp is weaker than most functionalism in the philosophy of mind,
> because comp asserts only the existence of a level of substitution at
> which we are Turing-emulable. Functionalist reason like if the level
> was known, but that's impossible.
Okay, but two questions:
1. by "comp" do you mean the "computationalist hypothesis" as apparently
used by philosophers? Is "comp" just an abbreviation for that?
2. By "Turing-emulable" do you mean that we can be imitated by a
physical Turing machine (or, what amounts to the same thing),
by a computer? Or, instead, are you going to the Pure Platonism,
with no separate existence of a physical reality required?
> Comp is precisely the conjunction of Church
> Thesis, of some amount of belief in arithmetic, + the act of faith
> saying "yes" to *some* digitalist surgeon.
And this is the same as saying yes to being uploaded, say, into
a computer? (I will, for the sake of other readers, even extend
this by stipulating a computer that provides a fully Earth like virtual
reality and which allows multiple mobile sensors on the Earth's
surface so that folks can both feel at home, and also not lose
contact with the actual world.)
Best regards,
Lee
Lee Corbin
> Hi Everythingers,
>
> Though I am new to the list I have been reading your fascinating posts
> on this troubling issue of "reality" and subjectivity
> so please pardon if I skip the protocol and delve into the discussion
> right away. I have a background in computer
> and cognitive science if you want to know, but little chance to
> engage in exchanges on philosophical matters
> such as the ones in which you guys are involved in. Forgive me if I
> misunderstand some of the finer details (yes I know,
> the devil is there...)
Welcome! But there's no pecking order here, we're all equal! :-)
> Scientific Reality is definitely more specific
> than reality in general. There is also much that
> one can aknowledge without admitting to its reality. I have heard of,
> say, alien abductions but would not swear to their reality,
> though others may differ.
Is that so? So the Saucerians exist in their reality, but not
mine. I guess we're all, like I said, equal? How can anyone
be crazy? After all, their reality is as good as anyone's,
right?
(As you see, we are not equal in our capacity for sarcasm, and
I'm currently the most irascible frequent poster on this list.
Bill Taylor is on vacation, I guess. It's a tough job, but
someone has to do it.)
> [GK]
> I would argue that numbers are rather objective, perhaps even more than
> physical laws and surely so if you [Bruno] are right, no?
Yes, quite a few here are what we call (and maybe you do too)
mathematical Platonists. When "Platonist" is used, it's always
in the sense of *mathematical* Platonism. IMO.
Sorry I don't have time to comment on the rest of your 23 kilo-byte
post. Thanks for joining and contributing!
Sincerely,
Lee
> If that derivation is just a piece of your subjectivity that may dash
> your hopes to convey it to others...
>
> There is also an "animal" called *self-delusion* that inhabits this
> realm between the subjective and the objective and amounts
> to taking for real what isn't quite so. But why bring it into this
> already confusing and confused exchanged.
Actually, thanks for bringing this up. I'm almost sorry I wrote
what I wrote above, but I love everything I write and so won't
delete it.
> ...
Eric Cavalcanti
On 8/11/05, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
I am having a problem understanding this axiom:
> (...) Lob formula (B(Bp->p)->Bp), the main axiom of the modal logic
> of self-reference (G)
> can be interpreted as showing that some form of honest placebo effect
> works! But this is something I am still taking with some grain of salt.
> See the book "Forever Undecided" to see Smullyan exploiting the working
> of some self-fulfilling beliefs.
Suppose p = "it is raining today"
B(Bp->p) is true because I believe that if I believe it is raining today
it IS raining today, since If I believe it is raining today it is because
I have gone outside and seen that it is raining today, or I believe my
source of information for that matter.
But it doesn't follow from that that I do believe that it is raining today.
It happens by the way that I don't believe it is raining today, because
I can see a beutiful sun outside.
What's wrong?
Eric.
George Levy
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi Lee,
Lee Corbin writes:
Godfrey writes
> Hi Everythingers,
>
> Though I am new to the list I have been reading your fascinating
posts
> on this troubling issue of "reality" and subjectivity
> so please pardon if I skip the protocol and delve into the discussion
> right away. I have a background in computer
> and cognitive science if you want to know, but little chance to
> engage in exchanges on philosophical matters
> such as the ones in which you guys are involved in. Forgive me if I
> misunderstand some of the finer details (yes I know,
> the devil is there...)
[LC]
Welcome! But there's no pecking order here, we're all equal! :-)
[GK]
Thanks for your welcome.
> Scientific Reality is definitely more specific
> than reality in general. There is also much that
> one can acknowledge without admitting to its reality. I have heard
of,
> say, alien abductions but would not swear to their reality,
> though others may differ.
[LC]
Is that so? So the Saucerians exist in their reality, but not
mine. I guess we're all, like I said, equal? How can anyone
be crazy? After all, their reality is as good as anyone's,
right?
[GK]
I was, of course, being sarcastic (or trying to be) but maybe there is
a tinge
of this "politically correct" presumption floating around, no? " To
each his own
reality" is becoming the current day equivalent of Heraclitus "to each
one his
own poison". That is to say: I appreciate your point which I believe
is that
there is still a still a consensual or naive level which we understand
the term
to mean. Not so sure that Bruno is not already... in a reality of his
own! ;-)
[LC]
(As you see, we are not equal in our capacity for sarcasm, and
I'm currently the most irascible frequent poster on this list.
Bill Taylor is on vacation, I guess. It's a tough job, but
someone has to do it.)
[GK]
Fair enough! I am all for righteous indignation and you do express it
well...
> [GK]
> I would argue that numbers are rather objective, perhaps even more
than
> physical laws and surely so if you [Bruno] are right, no?
[LC]
Yes, quite a few here are what we call (and maybe you do too)
mathematical Platonists. When "Platonist" is used, it's always
in the sense of *mathematical* Platonism. IMO.
Sorry I don't have time to comment on the rest of your 23 kilo-byte
post. Thanks for joining and contributing!
[GK]
Sorry for those "kilos"! No problem. I think the rest of my barbs were
directed at
Bruno anyway. I am not as sure about his Platonism as about yours and
mine. I also
feel that same shortness in my span of attention...
Till next time,
Godfrey
Sincerely,
Lee
--------------------
Godfrey Kurtz
New Brunswick NJ
kurtl...@aim.com
Lee,
Bruno may not be very articulate and I may never forgive myself
for trying to answer for him but I think he is clear enough about
this:
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin <lco...@tsoft.com>
To: everyth...@eskimo.com
Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 10 Aug 2005 15:55:51 -0700
Subject: RE: subjective reality
Okay, but two questions:
1. by "comp" do you mean the "computationalist hypothesis" as
apparently
used by philosophers? Is "comp" just an abbreviation for that?
[GK]
No! What he calls COMP is NOT what you call the "computationalist
hypothesis",
i.e. that computers MAY acquire conscious thought. What he calls COMP
is
apparently the notion that HE is already a machine (and who am "I" to
disagree?) or more specifically a program that enumerates it.
Moreover he wants you and I and George and everyone else to be THAT
SAME
program, the same I!
Me? Not so much...
[LC]
2. By "Turing-emulable" do you mean that we can be imitated by a
physical Turing machine (or, what amounts to the same thing),
by a computer? Or, instead, are you going to the Pure Platonism,
with no separate existence of a physical reality required?
[GK]
Not sure here but I think he is going WAY-WAY beyond Pure Platonism.
Remember that even Plato had some regard for the world of appearance
and that his souls had to migrate from it a some point...
> Comp is precisely the conjunction of Church
> Thesis, of some amount of belief in arithmetic, + the act of faith
> saying "yes" to *some* digitalist surgeon.
[LC]
And this is the same as saying yes to being uploaded, say, into
a computer? (I will, for the sake of other readers, even extend
this by stipulating a computer that provides a fully Earth like virtual
reality and which allows multiple mobile sensors on the Earth's
surface so that folks can both feel at home, and also not lose
contact with the actual world.)
[GK]
No, again. He is not being uploaded but we are all uploaded already:
He is not IN the Matrix! He is WITH the machines! He is
that architect guy with the white outfit and the beard! Keanu help us
all!!!
:-)
Best regards,
Lee
Same to you
Godfrey
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi George,
I see your point. Brandon Carter expressed recently the same idea, it
seams, when noting that Quantum Mechanics
suggests to him that "objective reality is NOT a realistic objective".
Perhaps, but that hardly implies that "subjective
reality" is any more realistic as an scientific objective, I am
afraid! If the "I" maps the world than it is also likely to map
the quantum quandary, don't you think? Subjectivity and mentality are
surely much bigger scientific problems
than all of the paradoxes of QM and GR can even hope to compare!
I also have some trouble with the idea that we "share an I", as you
put it, as I don't know to what extent
I do share mine with anyone! My notion is, instead, that the "I" is
exactly what we DO NOT SHARE, what makes us different,
while Reality is all the rest: what we DO share in a very obvious
sense. Otherwise, why would we disagree? Do we slice
the Plenitude in parallel?
I also do not join you and Bruno in that eagerness for a
"self-centered science" as the solution to everything.
Maybe it is an unfair comparison but isn't that, the demand for a
science that caters to ones believes and feelings,
what the Kansas Board of "Education" is about to enshrine in its
classrooms with the whole notion of parity between
Evolution and "Intelligent Design"? Don't tax payers have the right to
science that caters to their beliefs and biases,
a school that, instead of teaching their children, reinforces their
conviction that they already know what's true?
Please tell me I am wrong.
Only half joking,
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: George Levy <gl...@quantics.net>
...
Hi Bruno and Lee,
I would invert Dennett's point to increase its emphasis: "we need to
develop some first person discourses on the third person discourse." In
other words, I believe that the foundation is first person, and that
third person is a consequence of anthropically determined constraints
that we must share.
I have been quiet recently in part because of the sheer volume of this
list. As you know Bruno I am an extreme believer in first person. I
have acquired this position mainly by looking at two seemingly opposite
trends in science. Scientific theories have become less and less
anthropocentric removing the earth and man as the center of the
universe. (Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Michelson-Morley). The Earth
does not occupy a priviledged position. There is no Ether. There is no
absolute. Paradoxically, the observer has acquired greater importance
through the work (Relativity Theory, Quantum Theory with the MWI,
Shannon's communication theory). Relativity of the observer seems to be
pervasive, not just with regards "Relativity Theory" but also with
regards Quantum Theroy. It is not a coincidence that Everett called his
paper "Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics." Everything is
relative to the observer. So why not go all the way.... and take the
first person as the base. This approach tackles the Mind-Body problem
up-front rather than after the fact. "I" becomes fundamental: the
starting assumption as well as an observable fact. "I" exists in the
Plenitude and is constrained to see a slice of the Plenitude - the
world it sees - by Anthropic constraints. Thus "I" and the world it
sees share the same structure and logic whatever that logic may be.
There are probably more than one I's/worlds/logics that satisfy this
requirement. Bruno, you are the expert in logic. Subjective reality is
fundamental. Objective reality arises because we share the same "I" and
therefore the same world (slice view of the plenitude).
George
chris peck
>>on "1st person" has a long history. That's what everyone, it seems
>>has ever come of it.
Its been the cornerstone of modern philosophy since the 1600's. It defines
the moment the 'scientific era' begins. In the realm of indubitable facts,
that I exist is one of them. It is established to me, for myself if not you,
just by the fact I have 1st person experiences going on. No doubt you know
this, perhaps it will incur your ire that Im reminding you of it, but this
subjective fact unfalsifiable though it is, has more certainty than any
'objective' scientific truth. Why not build from this certainty?
wrt sarcasm, because it is common amungst scientific realists and their ilk.
It isnt really sarcasm at all, its exasperation - directed at themselves. It
stems from the fact that they cant marry third person descriptions with
first person descriptions. They cant reduce the one to the other in any
appreciable way. To employ realist form to a non realist position one might
sigh, and go 'Oh come on! how can a description of cells, chemicals and
compounds ever match up with the feeling that corresponds to being apart
from a lover, or whatever'.
To be sure, psychological facts might ultimately be found to reduce to to
phisiological facts, but right now, phisiological language simply has not
accrued the explanatory or descriptive power, for all the Daniel Dennets, to
do the same to psychological language. I cant see that the latter reduces to
the former at all.
Ofcourse, linguistically trained goats might yak on about their perceptions,
as Lee points out, but is that reason to ignore 'subjective experience'? The
perjorative nature of words like 'yak' do not change the fact the goats are
yakking about something certain to them, whilst all else they yakked about
would be to a greater or lesser degree uncertain. Its true, we should expect
them to yak on as they might, but im not sure that gets us anywhere, because
Newton was not suprised when the apple fell. There are suprising results in
science but they are reached by a consideration of what is normal and
expected.
Realism is the philosophical equivolent to Ebenezer Scrooges dictum 'Bah
Humbug!'. The intractability of phenomenology leads realists to ignore it
entirely. Notice that the argument is weaker than a complete denial of
phenomenology - sometimes it gets that absurd - but rather a conclusion that
it is 'irrelevent' to any meaningful description of the world. 'Meaningfull'
no doubt has a pragmatic definition in such arguments, and 'pragmatic'
implies some sense of 'ability to manipulate the world'. Whatever, I think
the feeling that definitions are being pushed on us is natural. Knowledge is
being limited semantically, through narrower and narrower definitions.
Even here its odd, mental abberations like blind sight help us moderate our
third person descriptions of how brains operate only by recourse to 1st
person accounts of what has been perceived. So, these useless things have
some use. Perhaps this is evidence for quantum mind theories? the existance
of a phenomenological use/useless duality. Perhaps Realism is just a bit
inconsistant.
Private subjective experiences exist more certainly than the objective and
public world. It requires a satisfactory explanation, it isnt that
convincing to watch it continually ignored . Futhermore, in ignoring it,
disciplines that have every right to be described as scientific, rational
and illuminating suddenly become 'soft' and suspect.
Regards
Chris.
_________________________________________________________________
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Lee Corbin
> >>Well, maybe some of the above helped to explain it. Basing stuff
> >>on "1st person" has a long history. That's what everyone, it seems
> >>to me, did before the scientific era (about 1600?). So far as I know,
> >>nothing has ever come of it.
>
> Its been the cornerstone of modern philosophy since the 1600's. It defines
> the moment the 'scientific era' begins. In the realm of indubitable facts,
> that I exist is one of them.
Name even *one* other indubitable fact. I don't even think that *that*
so-called fact is indubitable, because you could be an AI, or I'm just
imagining having read something from you.
The first thing to get past is the yearning for *certainty*. It doesn't
exist.
> It is established to me, for myself if not you,
> just by the fact I have 1st person experiences going on. No doubt you know
> this, perhaps it will incur your ire that Im reminding you of it, but this
> subjective fact unfalsifiable though it is, has more certainty than any
> 'objective' scientific truth. Why not build from this certainty?
Well, the ball is in your corner, and as I say, no one has produced *anything*
of value (except to the lone eccentric who proclaims it now and then).
Lee
George Levy
I also have some trouble with the idea that we "share an I", as you put it, as I don't know to what extent
I do share mine with anyone! My notion is, instead, that the "I" is exactly what we DO NOT SHARE, what makes us different,
while Reality is all the rest: what we DO share in a very obvious sense. Otherwise, why would we disagree? Do we slice
the Plenitude in parallel?
The "I" that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and coincides with the physical system that the "I" inhabits. Thus the world (the slice of the plenitude that we can observe) is anthropically constrained by the "I."
A first consequence is that physics is perfectly rational and understandable since it matches the "I." (This is a response to Einstein's question of why is the world subject to rational analysis)
A second consequence is that your logical system is the same as mine, - we share the same "I," - hence your world is the same as mine - we share the same world or perspective of the plenitude. Therefore, you and me appear to share an objective reality.
Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different slices of the plenitude.
George
chris peck
In what way dont I have experience of myself? Who am I experiencing now?
Someone else?
>b) experiences are not more certain that every scientific truth.
>Experiences are often misleading or outright illusions.
That I exist is more certain than any scientific truth. This is what I said.
We can argue about experiences, illusions and being misled by perception if
you like, the argument that will come back is that the very fact I am being
misled by perception or undergoing an illusion proves beyond doubt to me
that I exist.
>Experiences are one source of knowledge, but their coherence with other
>knowledge is important too.
The point is that given the certainty of 'I exist' subjective experience can
not just be dismissed by the realist. Given its certainty, it demands some
kind of explanation, but the realist recoils from providing any because
marrying objective language with subjective language has been an intractable
problem. If they are going to do that, they should admit how certain and
central subjective experiences are, how the enlightenment was forged by
those who dealt with them, and the poverty of their own theories in being
unable to explain them.
>They may be basic, but they're not certain.
Its not that beliefs are true through being had. Thats not a position Im
interested in. Thats relativism, that truth is subjective. I dont see many
people defending that. The unfalsifiable but nevertheless absolutely certain
fact that i exist is just derived from the fact there are experiences, it
doesnt derive from the content of those experiences - however 'deluded' they
may be. I want to ask what is a delusion? what is a dream? Nuerons firing?
I suppose it is hard to build from the cogito. Descartes didnt manage it.
However, to ignore it altogether is just lazy and is hardly a argument
against those who dont.
regards.
Chris.
>From: Brent Meeker <meek...@rain.org>
>To: chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com>
>Subject: Re: subjective reality
>Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2005 14:13:21 -0700
>
>chris peck wrote:
>>>>Well, maybe some of the above helped to explain it. Basing stuff
>>>>on "1st person" has a long history. That's what everyone, it seems
>>>>to me, did before the scientific era (about 1600?). So far as I know,
>>>>nothing
>>>>has ever come of it.
>>
>>
>>Its been the cornerstone of modern philosophy since the 1600's. It defines
>>the moment the 'scientific era' begins. In the realm of indubitable facts,
>>that I exist is one of them. It is established to me, for myself if not
>>you, just by the fact I have 1st person experiences going on. No doubt you
>>know this, perhaps it will incur your ire that Im reminding you of it, but
>>this subjective fact unfalsifiable though it is, has more certainty than
>>any 'objective' scientific truth. Why not build from this certainty?
>
>Because a) you have experiences but not experiences of yourself and b)
>experiences are not more certain that every scientific truth. Experiences
>are often misleading or outright illusions. Experiences are one source of
>knowledge, but their coherence with other knowledge is important too. They
>may be basic, but they're not certain.
>
>Brent Meeker
>
>
_________________________________________________________________
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Aditya Varun Chadha
> In what way dont I have experience of myself? Who am I experiencing now?
> Someone else?
You have no guarantee of "whom" you are "experiencing". it is your
belief that you are experiencing something that is "yourself".
> That I exist is more certain than any scientific truth. This is what I said.
> We can argue about experiences, illusions and being misled by perception if
> you like, the argument that will come back is that the very fact I am being
> misled by perception or undergoing an illusion proves beyond doubt to me
> that I exist.
you have no guarantee whether you exist in any one ELSE's reality.
That you are sure that you exist in YOUR reality is a useless idea to
the ME that is seperate from YOU. To ME it is no more than a belief.
Any statement that is not verifiable is usually not taken as "fact".
anything that is not known to be a "fact" is not "completely certain".
Descartes tried to describe one such verification in "I think
therefore I am", but this is also just a "thought", so it is more
accurate to say "I think I think, therefore I think I am" [
www.cs.iitm.ernet.in/~swamy ]. Descartes was wrong in thinking that
his statement was the final verification of self-existance.
I admit that truth and provability are not the same thing, but by the
same token, "something is not disproven, or not disprovable" is not
necessarily true.
Ofcourse you CAN say that your body exists, your brain exists, even
probably that the software in your brain exists, these even a realist
would admit, because now you are in the realm of VERIFIABLE
statements.
notice that I am not disproving your claim, because you qualify it as
being true if and only if YOU think you have verified it as true. So
basically going by your own claim that subjectivity is "more certain"
than science, I can have my "subjective truth" that you don't exist. I
can be morbid enough to take "I exist if and only if your self does
not exist" as my subjective reality. What if I believe "I don't exist"
(most times I really do believe that), can you disprove it?
As soon as you say something that is not universally verifiable (note
that verifiability is different from provability, Godel sentences are
trivially verified to be true, but unprovable) you are stating a
belief, something "certain" for you, but maybe not for others. you
accept it on faith because you cannot prove it to yourself if you
honestly treat yourself in the third person for a second.
Faith MAY be true, there's no denying that. but till it is verified as
such, it should not be classified as that. and science DOES deal with
this issue, refining its axioms based on verifiable facts that aught
to be derivable from the axiomatic system. realists don't pack it away
in "laziness", they just don't presume to assign truth values to such
statements until verification.
> Given its certainty, it demands some kind of explanation
Verifiability is a prerequisite for certainty. If we don't agree on
the definition of "verifiability", then there can be no reconciliation
between us, because you can never convince ME that you exist, I can
always think you are a figment of my imagination with no personal
experiences of your own, and therefore you don't experience anything,
and your non-existence is subject only to a reconfiguration of my mind
(your deletion from it). Ofcourse this is my subjective "truth" which
you yourself are allowing me to have. But my whole point is that
assuming things that are "unverifiable universally" as true leads to
these conflicting "truths".
This is what a realist begs: "please admit only LOGICALLY verifiable
things are true or false". A realist is even humbler: he knows that
even the logic we use is open to questioning, in other words
verifiable. true/false applies only to verifiable things. in not
assigning truth values to such statement a realist is not being lazy,
only being cautious (or realistic if you may).
--
Aditya Varun Chadha
adichad AT gmail.com
http://www.adichad.com
Bruno Marchal
Le 10-aoūt-05, ą 21:27, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
>
> Hi Everythingers,
>
> Though I am new to the list I have been reading your fascinating posts
> on this troubling issue of "reality" and subjectivity
> so please pardon if I skip the protocol and delve into the discussion
> right away. I have a background in computer
> and cognitive science if you want to know, but little chance to
> engage in exchanges on philosophical matters
> such as the ones in which you guys are involved in.
I don't think there is a clear-cut frontier between Science and
Philosophy, except those artificial frontiers introduced by academic
for "financial purposes" (to be short).
Actually I don't believe there are scientific field and non scientific
field. I believe in scientific attitudes, which is a mixture of modesty
and willingness to share questions with other.
Scientists who pretends not doing philosophy are just taking some
philosophy for granted, like the naturalist assumptions of Aristotle.
And in ALL fields, passion and emotion *can* mislead our scientific
attitude. This is human, and even *machine*.
> Forgive me if I misunderstand some of the finer details (yes I know,
> the devil is there...) Bruno says:
>
> But I am not using the word "reality" to *describe* one's subjective
> impression, it seems to me I am just acknowledging the existence of
> those subjective impression in many persons.
> To acknowledge something is to admit that something has some kind of
> "reality", it seems to me.
> And it seems you did acknowledge those experiences too). To describe
> them, in the limit, I can only point you to great poets and artists,
> and they will hardly mention the word "reality".
>
> [GK]
> Well, astists will probably argue that they are quite concerned with
> reality in their own way. You don't want to confuse your
> subjective impressions (qualia) with the fact that you have them or
> report them. The later are the subject of scientific inquiry while the
> former may not qualify. Scientific Reality is definitely more specific
> than reality in general.
But scientific "reality" is not bounded. The shape of earth was a
matter of philosophy and theology at some time. My personal qualia and
first person views cannot be used in a scientific paper, of course. But
qualia and first person view can be addressed in third person way. For
this we build theories, which are just hypothetical world view
constructions.
> There is also much that
> one can aknowledge without admiting to its reality. I have heard of,
> say, alien abductions but would not swear to their reality,
> though others may differ.
This is just ignorance. Science is *the* most efficacious way to accept
that we are ignorant.
It is the motor of science. If you have a scientific interest in alien
abduction you can always search for a piece of unknown metal, or for
tackling the plausibility problem of the account. Etc. As I mentionned
before one of my favorite text to illustrate what is the scientific
attitude is given in a book of parapsychology (the "In search of the
light' by S. Blackmore). Of course the whishfull thinkers in
parapsychology doesn't like it because it is negative (She shows the
protocol errors in most parapsychologists experiments).
>
> [BM]
> You just seems to want those experiences are just an unnecessary
> epiphenomenon, and you would like that science never adresses what
> they really are and where they came from.
> For you it looks like "consciousness" is just a sort of subjective
> mirror partially reflecting an objective third person describable
> reality in which we are embedded. And science should never leave the
> third person discourse. All right?
>
> Now, please understand that I agree (100%) with the last sentences:
> science should never leave the third person discourse.
> But this does not prohibit science of looking to herself, and to try
> theories (hypotheses) about third person discourses, and even to
> *discover* sort of first person discourse canonically associated to
> some mathematical object.
>
> By taking the comp hyp enough seriously it just happens that
> "consciousness", or just the "ability to guess the existence of one
> (at least) world" is not a little detail. Or it is a little detail but
> then remember that the devil is hidden in the little details. Why?
> Because if I am correct in my derivation it makes the physical law
> emerging from number theory.
>
> [GK]
> I would argue that numbers are rather objective, perhaps even more
> than physical laws and surely so if you are right, no?
Yes. I find personally that the fact that 17 is prime is less doubtful
than any third person materialist ontological commitment. But I am
perhaps wrong and I don't really care. As a logician I am mainly
interested in the consistency of sets of beliefs, and validity of
arguments. My point is that materialism and digital mechanism (comp)
are just incompatible.
> If that derivation is just a piece of your subjectivity that may dash
> your hopes to convey it to others...
By derivation I really mean "demonstration". It is valid for anyone
(accepting classical logic applies on the elementary arithmetical
truth). Sorry if this looks contemptuous.
OK. This means you are serious like Lee. I certainly don't expect
people to understand it quickly! The people in this list does not know
(I think) that they are one century in advance!
(and then they doesn't know I'm two centuries in advance ;-)
(Don't infer I'm some sort of genius: it is just years and years and
years of work + open mindedness).
Anyway, the matter subject is not so easy. It crosses many hard fields,
and leads to many hard to swallow conclusions. Bohr said that if you
understand quantum mechanics, it means you are missing something. The
comp hyp is like that. The more you understand the more you realize
truth is beyond fiction. Now, feel free to read my argumentation and
ask question if you are interested.
My point (and I want to be short but some people in the list get
similar points, even if when we discuss it between us we insist on the
differences of course), so my point is just that if we make the comp
hypothesis in the cognitive science (including some amount of
mathematical platonism, and Church thesis), then, literally, physics
*is* a branch of computer science. And so the comp hyp is testable:
derive physics from computer science and compare it to empirical
physics. I have done a piece of that, and currently comp passed already
non trivial tests.
>
> [LC]
> > My friends and I (and probably Daniel Dennett and so on) believe
> > that people who demand a 1st person "account of the world" (e.g.
> > Chalmers) will never get anywhere.
>
> [BM]
> Actually, this is one of the main point where I differ from George
> Levy (OK George?), although I could make sense of it. The point is,
> and Dennett agrees on this, that, in cognitive *science*, we need to
> develop some third person discourse on the first person discourses.
> OK, strictly speaking the quantum and physical discourses appears at
> some first person (plural) level.
>
> Chalmers is not getting anywhere(*), ok. Perhaps we agree on this.
>
> [GK]
> Dennett might have evolved in his position but the whole effort behind
> cognitive science has long been that of "unpacking"
> the notion of "qualia" out of the philosophical discourse. But that is
> hardly the same as explaining the 1st person discourse in
> 3rd person language.
Indeed.
> Explaining what elation or sadness correspond to in terms of neural
> processes does not help me find
> out why I am elated today and sad tomorrow. Usually those experience
> are much easier to explain and in objective terms.
I'm not sure I understand. I think no "experiences" can be easily
explained in 3-person terms.
remember that if comp and my derivation is correct, eventually the very
brain itself emerges from first person experiences (and here I agree
with George Levy).
Now, (and here George Levy disagrees), first person experiences emerges
from third person sharable relation between numbers. Please, take this
with some grain of salt until you have your personal evidence for a
plausible explanation of what I am saying here.
Pun or lapsus? I could have define comp by saying that human are
machine. I prefer say "I", because comp can justified why, if true, it
is not provable (like the consistency statement in Godel's second
incompleteness theorem). Need some act of faith.
> I will even grant
> you that I am a machine and will say "yes" to your digitalist, if he
> hasn't replaced all my parts yet. But let me ask you: doesn't
> everybody have to believe you for your hypothesis to be true? And if
> everyone does so, doesn't it automatically cease to
> be an hypothesis and become the universal religion of happy machines?
>
> Mmmmmh!
All what I say is that if me, you or X says "yes" to the mechanist
doctor, then "the universal religion of machine" are given by a
mathematical theory which is testable because, as a religious theology,
it provided a 100% precise cosmogony. If from comp you deduce that
electron have no weight, then comp is refuted. That could be
problematical in case you have already say "yes" to the doctor!
>
> [LC]
> > So I dismiss the 1st person, remarking that it's "existence" is
> > but only to be expected. If an ape or a parrot could talk, it
> > could yak on about it's impressions. And they'd be of little
> > but therapeutic value.
>
> [BM]
> Thanks for acknowledging the therapy! With comp, this would mean the
> appearance of the physical world originates in some intrinsic
> universal machine self-therapy. It makes sense...
>
> ...
>
> I must go now. Apology for not having respected the order of your
> paragraphs, but my computer take some initiative apparently!
>
>
> Best regards,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> [GK]
> Funny, mine just did the same!!! It erased something about Bip Bip or
> some such thing. Oh well... It may just need some
> good self-therapy. God knows what will come out of that...
>
> Best wishes with ... "the Work",
Many thanks. "the works", as you say, is divided into two parts. An
informal, but (hopefully) rigorous and complete, argument showing that
physics is derivable from comp. That argument is not constructive. Its
easyness comes from the fact that it does not really explained how to
make the derivation. The second part is a translation of that argument
in the language of the "universal machine itself". This, by the
constraints of theoretical ccomputer science, makes the proof
constructive, so that it gives the complete derivation of physics from
computer science. Of course God is a little malicious, apparently, and
we are led to hard intractable purely mathematical questions.
You are welcome,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
Le 11-août-05, à 01:34, Eric Cavalcanti a écrit :
Literaly, it means you are less modest than a Lobian machine!
If B(Bp -> p) was true, it would mean that whatever the poof you have
that p is true, then p is true. What about dreaming that you have look
through the window and see it rains?
(Remember B is not the "incorrigible" first person. B is really for a
scientific third person sharable justification). Of course it makes
things still more unbelievable, given that you will tell me that in
case you have a proof, it is even more amazing you can be wrong. But
then it is like that by incompleteness.
Now, another remark is that I don't think the B can be used at all for
everyday belief which are much more complex due to the long social
interaction between us. The everyday beliefs are probably mixture of
the logics I described in comp, and which concerns sound machines. But
to get physics, this is enough.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi George,
Still trying to understand you but having trouble holding my
disbelieve...
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
Hi Godfrey
The "I" that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and
coincides with the physical system that the "I" inhabits. Thus the
world (the slice of the plenitude that we can observe) is anthropically
constrained by the "I."
[GK]
So the "I" is (1) a logical system (2) a physical system inhabited (1)
and (3) the set of anthropic constraints which delimits
the whole of the (non-"I") universe (?) where (I am guessing) (1) and
(2) find themselves! Is this what you are saying?
So the "I" is coextensive with what I would call my body (including my
brain) but not my mind (including my reasoning)?
Not sure I follow you here...
[GL]
A first consequence is that physics is perfectly rational and
understandable since it matches the "I." (This is a response to
Einstein's question of why is the world subject to rational analysis)
A second consequence is that your logical system is the same as mine,
- we share the same "I," - hence your world is the same as mine - we
share the same world or perspective of the plenitude. Therefore, you
and me appear to share an objective reality.
[GK]
Hold on there! If all physics is reducible to "a logical system" why
would there need be physics at all ? Why would you have
to be the one answering Enstein's quandary? Wouldn't his "I", being
the same as yours be able to answer himself?
In other words: maybe your explanation of knowledge is incapable of
explaining... ignorance?
Also, if I remember it correctly, logical systems have the nasty
habit, once they take on the minimal complexity, to have to
opt between remaining consistent or aiming for completion. This, of
course, would exempt your "I" from having to be
consistent, but would also invalidate your claim that "the I physics
is perfectly rational is understandable" which, by the
way, is a much bigger claim than what Einstein had in mind...
[GL]
Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ
in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist
when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent
fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a lot of
difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different slices
of the plenitude.
George
[GK]
Is that right? "...disappears when observers differ in their frame of
reference."? But the "strangeness" of relativistic physics
is that observers can actually compare and agree on their observations
even when they have entirely different deployments
in their different frames of reference! The correct physics is
identifiable from these apparently orthogonal sets of data...
Isn't your metaphor a bit upside down or "am "I" not intersecting your
slice of plenitude?
Again, I am not trying to be entirely fascicious. You may be onto
something( at least worth shooting down which is more than
I can say for a lot of today's physics).
Godfrey
Bruno Marchal
Le 11-août-05, à 00:55, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> Okay, but two questions:
>
> 1. by "comp" do you mean the "computationalist hypothesis" as
> apparently
> used by philosophers? Is "comp" just an abbreviation for that?
Strictly speaking: yes. It happens now that many people implicitly
conceive comp in the materialist framework, and I take it as a result
that this does not work. So I (re)define comp, to be sure, in term of
the conjonction of the "yes" doctor, arithmetical realism, and Church's
thesis.
>
> 2. By "Turing-emulable" do you mean that we can be imitated by a
> physical Turing machine (or, what amounts to the same thing),
> by a computer? Or, instead, are you going to the Pure Platonism,
> with no separate existence of a physical reality required?
It is part of the argument that if you are Turing emulable, then a
"physical Turing machine" is part of what emerges from the relation
between numbers. This is not so easy to understand, it needs all the
UDA (Universal Doevetailer Argument) including either some form of
OCCAM and the assesment that a non trivial part of physics has been
derived, or, for the "pure proof" without OCCAM, it needs the "movie
graph" argument, which is what Maudlin rediscovered with his Olympia
and Klara. We will certainly come back on this.
>
>> Comp is precisely the conjunction of Church
>> Thesis, of some amount of belief in arithmetic, + the act of faith
>> saying "yes" to *some* digitalist surgeon.
>
> And this is the same as saying yes to being uploaded, say, into
> a computer?
Yes.
> (I will, for the sake of other readers, even extend
> this by stipulating a computer that provides a fully Earth like virtual
> reality and which allows multiple mobile sensors on the Earth's
> surface so that folks can both feel at home, and also not lose
> contact with the actual world.)
Good idea :)
Kind regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
Le 12-août-05, à 02:29, George Levy a écrit :
> Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers
> differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does
> not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely
> consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a
> lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different
> slices of the plenitude.
I would say, almost like a physicalist, that "objective reality" is
what is common to all frame of reference. I would even say that "the
physical laws" are exactly what is true in all observer-moment,
relative state/worlds, etc.
I could challenge you for giving me two entirely consistent logics
having nothing in common, and sufficiently rich to keep natural numbers
(but perhaps you don't put weight on arithmetical truth, in which case
I could imagine some solution in a non comp framework).
Bruno
Lee Corbin
> The point is that given the certainty of 'I exist' subjective experience can
> not just be dismissed by the realist. Given its certainty, it demands some
> kind of explanation,
Of course it does. But I imagine that you are looking at the phenonmenon
from inside the system. I warn you: no explanation will ever be forthcoming
that you find satisfactory. Such has eluded *everyone* from Plato to Chalmers.
And that's because you are examining it from the wrong perspective.
Don't think of your own. Think of the subjective experience of a monkey
or rabbit who is on the laboratory bench. Examine the nervous impulses
that make up its brain and entire nervous system. Understand (or along
with the rest of us, try as best we can with 21st century medicine) to
understand how the representations of the world are generated inside
that machine.
> but the realist recoils from providing any because
> marrying objective language with subjective language has been an intractable
> problem.
The kind of "marrying" you want will always be an intractable problem.
> If they are going to do that, they should admit how certain and
> central subjective experiences are, how the enlightenment was forged by
> those who dealt with them, and the poverty of their own theories in being
> unable to explain them.
No one has yet suggested exactly what "enlightenment" has been provided.
What can anyone say about subjective experiences qua subjective experiences
that was unknown to Plato and Aristotle?
A "subjectivist" here mentioned a week or two ago the way that even though
the visual image that impinges on the brain is upside down, the brain
reorients them back right side up.
This is an almost laughable idea, once you keep in mind the monkey on
the bench. The brain does no such thing. I should have satirically
remarked "oh, no, you see: the brain is itself upside down, and so
that's why things seem right side up", just to try to employ comedy
to illustrate the error.
Please understand: images on the retina (upside down, left to right,
at an angle, whatever) are converted into series of complicated
nerve impulses. (Yes, in V1 there is a more-or-less 1-1 mapping
that exists geometrically, but if you want, then think of the what
happens to the impulses when they leave the visual cortex.)
And those nerve impulses that finally leave the eye (or V1)?
What happens to them? How do they get uprighted? No, sorry.
The nerve impulses cause other nerve impulses to fire, which
causes other nerve impulses to fire which....
It's nerve impulses all the way down.
Lee
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi Bruno
Thanks for your detailed answer. I will wipe some of the previous
exchanges below to unclutter the post:
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
I don't think there is a clear-cut frontier between Science and
Philosophy, except those artificial frontiers introduced by academic
for "financial purposes" (to be short).
Actually I don't believe there are scientific field and non scientific
field. I believe in scientific attitudes, which is a mixture of modesty
and willingness to share questions with other.
Scientists who pretends not doing philosophy are just taking some
philosophy for granted, like the naturalist assumptions of Aristotle.
And in ALL fields, passion and emotion *can* mislead our scientific
attitude. This is human, and even *machine*.
[GK]
Could not agree with you more...
>
> [GK]
> Well, astists will probably argue that they are quite concerned with
> reality in their own way. You don't want to confuse your
> subjective impressions (qualia) with the fact that you have them or
> report them. The later are the subject of scientific inquiry while
the > former may not qualify. Scientific Reality is definitely more
specific > than reality in general.
[BM]
But scientific "reality" is not bounded. The shape of earth was a
matter of philosophy and theology at some time. My personal qualia and
first person views cannot be used in a scientific paper, of course. But
qualia and first person view can be addressed in third person way. For
this we build theories, which are just hypothetical world view
constructions.
[GK]
Again I fully agree, though I am sure you are aware that "mentality"
and "identity" are among the most difficult problems that
science has tried to tackle and that what we think we know about such
matters pales in comparison with what we are sure we
don't know! Even just building theories may be more forthcoming in
some domains than others, irrespective of testing them.
> There is also much that
> one can acknowledge without admitting to its reality. I have heard
of, > say, alien abductions but would not swear to their reality,
> though others may differ.
[BM]
This is just ignorance. Science is *the* most efficacious way to
accept that we are ignorant.
It is the motor of science. If you have a scientific interest in alien
abduction you can always search for a piece of unknown metal, or for
tackling the plausibility problem of the account. Etc. As I mentioned
before one of my favorite text to illustrate what is the scientific
attitude is given in a book of parapsychology (the "In search of the
light' by S. Blackmore). Of course the whishfull thinkers in
parapsychology doesn't like it because it is negative (She shows the
protocol errors in most parapsychologists experiments).
[GK]
That is a wonderful point you make above! But my own was that
acknowledging something may not exactly be the same as admiting its
reality; it can in fact be just the oposite when what is acknowledge is
someone else's belief for instance. How
(consensual) reality is acquired is a pretty complicated and still
mysterious process. I would venture that a lot of what we
would count as "subjective reality" is just that! (more below)
> [GK]
> I would argue that numbers are rather objective, perhaps even more >
than physical laws and surely so if you are right, no?
[BM]
Yes. I find personally that the fact that 17 is prime is less doubtful
than any third person materialist ontological commitment. But I am
perhaps wrong and I don't really care. As a logician I am mainly
interested in the consistency of sets of beliefs, and validity of
arguments. My point is that materialism and digital mechanism (comp)
are just incompatible.
[GK]
In this we agree.
> If that derivation is just a piece of your subjectivity that may
dash > your hopes to convey it to others...
[BM]
By derivation I really mean "demonstration". It is valid for anyone
(accepting classical logic applies on the elementary arithmetical
truth). Sorry if this looks contemptuous.
[GK]
It may very well be contemptuous but I cannot fault your
"demonstration" since I see no reason why materialism would
be compatible with your hypothesis! If I understand it correctly this
is that one materially supported conscious entity could
be entirely (and analytically) replaced by a digitally constructed one
without it even being conscious of it. Am I right? Is
this what you COMP ? If so you are right in one thing: it is one hell
of a stronger contention than the strongest AI hyp
(and that much more unlikely).
> [GK]
> Oh, it seems you agree than! "The Work" goes well with your >
theological inclinations, seems to me though I am as hopeless
> about understanding it as Lee is...
[BM]
OK. This means you are serious like Lee. I certainly don't expect
people to understand it quickly! The people in this list does not know
(I think) that they are one century in advance!
(and then they doesn't know I'm two centuries in advance ;-)
(Don't infer I'm some sort of genius: it is just years and years and
years of work + open mindedness).
[GK]
Oh don't worry about that! There is genius in knowing that your are
not! And since you are a machine your years and years
and years may surely add to two centuries! No wonder you outrun your
modesty...
[BM]
Anyway, the matter subject is not so easy. It crosses many hard
fields, and leads to many hard to swallow conclusions. Bohr said that
if you understand quantum mechanics, it means you are missing
something. The comp hyp is like that. The more you understand the more
you realize truth is beyond fiction. Now, feel free to read my
argumentation and ask question if you are interested.
My point (and I want to be short but some people in the list get
similar points, even if when we discuss it between us we insist on the
differences of course), so my point is just that if we make the comp
hypothesis in the cognitive science (including some amount of
mathematical platonism, and Church thesis), then, literally, physics
*is* a branch of computer science. And so the comp hyp is testable:
derive physics from computer science and compare it to empirical
physics. I have done a piece of that, and currently comp passed already
non trivial tests.
[GK]
Oh but you make it sound so easy! See: its is the "derive physics from
computer science" that I have my first problem with!
Easier said than done, I'm afraid. Stephen Wolfram sent me his huge
book but I remain as unconvinced by it as everyone
else who has read it about his "tinker bell" version of Quantum
Mechanics. I heard Ed Fredkin a number of times and,
though he is quite charming, I don't think he has any better answer to
that question...
More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any non-quantum
mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things, Bruno.
Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
to be.
Incidentally, the reverse reduction of computer science to physics
seems to be a lot more hopeful specially since most
computations seem to run a lot faster in physical computers than on...
(what are the alternatives again?). OK, no one
has built a truly quantum computer just yet but a lot of people think
they are about to do it!
> Explaining what elation or sadness correspond to in terms of neural
> processes does not help me find
> out why I am elated today and sad tomorrow. Usually those experience
> are much easier to explain and in objective terms.
[BM]
I'm not sure I understand. I think no "experiences" can be easily
explained in 3-person terms.
remember that if comp and my derivation is correct, eventually the
very brain itself emerges from first person experiences (and here I
agree with George Levy).
Now, (and here George Levy disagrees), first person experiences
emerges from third person sharable relation between numbers. Please,
take this with some grain of salt until you have your personal evidence
for a plausible explanation of what I am saying here.
[GK]
Sure will (take it with and entire salt mine)! My point is that we
already have ways of explaining other people's experiences
on the basis of empathy or antipathy and in terms of direct causation.
Bill Clinton was found of saying "I feel your pain" and
no one called him on that obvious lie! I can think of some numbers
that would tell me about the pain others are feeling
(checked the price of gas today? $2.59 a gallon!!! That hurts!!!)
....
[BM]
All what I say is that if me, you or X says "yes" to the mechanist
doctor, then "the universal religion of machine" are given by a
mathematical theory which is testable because, as a religious theology,
it provided a 100% precise cosmogony. If from comp you deduce that
electron have no weight, then comp is refuted. That could be
problematical in case you have already say "yes" to the doctor!
[GK]
Ooops! Sure would be problematic, wouldn't it? I better think a bit
about that "yes" again.
Seriously, I see nothing wrong with what you saying as long as you
couch it in that "faith-based" argumentation.
Your argument is cute and may very well be defensible that way. This
day and and age it may actually be better supported
that way than as hard clad science, who knows?
> [GK]
...
> Best wishes with ... "the Work",
Many thanks. "the works", as you say, is divided into two parts. An
informal, but (hopefully) rigorous and complete, argument showing that
physics is derivable from comp. That argument is not constructive. Its
easyness comes from the fact that it does not really explained how to
make the derivation.
[GK]
Oh, what a pity! I was kind of bracing to see that derivation! I am
sure it would drive your point across a lot quicker.
Oh well, I could probably give you a couple of other outrageous
hypothesis from which you could derive the whole
of physics, not constructively of course! You are the logician but
isn't it the case that from an assuredly false premise
you can derive anything?
[BM]
The second part is a translation of that argument in the language of
the "universal machine itself". This, by the constraints of theoretical
computer science, makes the proof constructive, so that it gives the
complete derivation of physics from computer science. Of course God is
a little malicious, apparently, and we are led to hard intractable
purely mathematical questions.
You are welcome,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
[GK]
Oh gosh! Another let down! Well maybe those pesky Quantum Computer
builders can rescue you after all one day. As
I heard that you plan to become immortal (after a little digital
plastic surgery) you will have the time to wait for it!
Bruno: you seem to hold quite estimable principles about the
fundamentals of scientific practice and you seem much less
threatening than your digitalist surgeon. When I have a chance I'll
check your papers out and see what I can make out
of them. Thanks for the summary, though.
Don't work too hard,
Godfrey Kurtz
Norman Samish
You speak of "God." Could you define what you, as a logician, mean?
Thanks,
Norman
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Saibal Mitra
> More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any non-quantum
> mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
> don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things, Bruno.
> Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
> to be.
There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't Hooft.
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080
Saibal
George Levy
The "I" that I consider consists of a logical system that defines and coincides with the physical system that the "I" inhabits. Thus the world (the slice of the plenitude that we can observe) is anthropically constrained by the "I."
So the "I" is (1) a logical system (2) a physical system inhabited (1) and (3) the set of anthropic constraints which delimits
the whole of the (non-"I") universe (?) where (I am guessing) (1) and (2) find themselves! Is this what you are saying?
I am sorry I was sloppy in my explanation. Let me try to be clearer. "I" is the kernel of consciousness. It does not include memories which are different for everyone and change as a person ages. I agree with you that since "I" is based on a logical system it must follow Goedel's theorem, perhaps at the border between incompleteness and inconsistency. It seems that is precisely what consciousness "feels" like.
I am not saying that "I" is a physical system or is the world. Rather that the world that "I" perceive is anthropically constrained by the "I" and that the physical laws have the same limitations as the "I" including the incompleteness/inconsistency requirement.
[GK]
Hold on there! If all physics is reducible to "a logical system" why would there need be physics at all ? Why would you have
to be the one answering Enstein's quandary? Wouldn't his "I", being the same as yours be able to answer himself?
In other words: maybe your explanation of knowledge is incapable of explaining... ignorance?
[GL]
is that observers can actually compare and agree on their observations even when they have entirely different deployments
in their different frames of reference!
Before relativity, one might have argued that different observers experienced different laws of physics. For example, I might experience a gravitational field while you may experience an acceleration. Relativity is a set of far ranging laws that unified under the same umbrella what were deemed smaller ranging laws experienced by different observers. I am saying exactly the same thing. Different frames of reference will generate different perceived laws. Since the frames of reference I am discussing include logical systems, the perceived worlds will be different.
[GL]
Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers would have a lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different slices of the plenitude.
I would say, almost like a physicalist, that "objective reality" is what is common to all frame of reference. I would even say that "the physical laws" are exactly what is true in all observer-moment, relative state/worlds, etc.
Einstein has demonstrated that under different state of motion and acceleration the old objective reality breaks down and a new objective reality must take its place. Objective reality depends on the range of the laws. Newton's laws are not true in all frame of reference in various kinds of motion, but Relativity provides unified laws that cover all frames of reference that differ according to their motion and their acceleration. QT/MWI offers a different kind of relativism. Shannon offers yet another kind of relativism. Why not just go all the way - no more objective reality. Each "I" has his own reality. If your accept this as a law then we have objective reality. :-)
[BM]
I could challenge you for giving me two entirely consistent logics having nothing in common, and sufficiently rich to keep natural numbers (but perhaps you don't put weight on arithmetical truth, in which case I could imagine some solution in a non comp framework)
I am not sure what you mean by your statement in parenthesis. Bruno, I am not an expert in logic. Perhaps you can help. Is it possible that "I" (and the anthropically derived world) may include all the (logical) systems "I" can imagine, and therefore it would be impossible for "I" to provide you with a system that "I" cannot imagine? So it is impossible for us to see beyond our slice of the plenitude.
George
kurtl...@aim.com
You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
QFTh.
But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in which
non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet). Understandably
't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
Physics).
So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
which one
can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no way
bypasses
the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an thus
classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
That much I will grant you...
(Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )
Best regards
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Saibal Mitra <smi...@zeelandnet.nl>
To: kurtl...@aim.com; mar...@ulb.ac.be
Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 21:11:30 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality
Godfrey Kurtz wrote
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219
http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080
Saibal
kurtl...@aim.com
Thanks for the clarifications. Let me see if I understand you better.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: George Levy <gl...@quantics.net>
[GL]
> I am sorry I was sloppy in my explanation. Let me try to be clearer.
"I" is the kernel of consciousness. It does not include >memories which
are different for everyone and change as a person ages. I agree with
you that since "I" is based on a logical >system it must follow
Goedel's theorem, perhaps at the border between incompleteness and
inconsistency. It seems that is >precisely what consciousness "feels"
like.
[GK]
That is lovely! That may be how your consciousness feels: mine feels
like something at the border between dazed and
confused ;-) Now, seriously, I wish I was as sure as you that there is
such kernel once you strip away all the memories.
(Does this include biological memories, by the way? If so which ones?)
But just in any case: do you have an idea on how to formalize that
logical system or in any way, explicate it?
[GL]
>I am not saying that "I" is a physical system or is the world. Rather
that the world that "I" perceive is anthropically constrained >by the
"I" and that the physical laws have the same limitations as the "I"
including the incompleteness/inconsistency >requirement.
[GK]
No problem here though I am trying to understand you as saying that it
is the existence of such a logical kernel of
consciousness that places anthropical constraints on physical laws.
The way people usually refer to anthropic constraints
is as obvious restictions on observation not on the laws! In fact the
copernician view is that our *observations* are just
as accidental as we believe ouselves to be. I hope you understand that
your using "anthropic constraint" in a very
oblique way...
[GL]
>I think that a TOE would have to include an explanation of
consciousness. In explaining the world we'll have to explain
> ourselves.
[GK]
I surely agree with you that this would be desirable but constraining
physics on having to evolve consciousness
deterministically is not an explanation, in my book. Accidents happen
after all.
[GL]
>> Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers
differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does >>
not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely
consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers >> would have a
lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different
slices of the plenitude.
[GK]
>the "strangeness" of relativistic physics
>is that observers can actually compare and agree on their
observations even when they have entirely different deployments
>in their different frames of reference!
[GL]
> Before relativity, one might have argued that different observers
experienced different laws of physics. For example, I might >experience
a gravitational field while you may experience an acceleration.
Relativity is a set of far ranging laws that unified >under the same
umbrella what were deemed smaller ranging laws experienced by different
observers. I am saying exactly the >same thing. Different frames of
reference will generate different perceived laws. Since the frames of
reference I am discussing >include logical systems, the perceived
worlds will be different.
[GK]
I think you wrong in what you say above. Relativity did not change
your experience of gravity or acceleration: it changed
the way you interpret it. The Equivalence Principle is just as valid
within Newtonian gravity as in GR (and Carton showed
that the same is the case for the Principle of Covariance). Einstein's
genius was that of "cross breeding" two apparently
ancilliary principles into a more general theory of Gravity, general
enough to apply to the whole cosmos, etc...
I don't quite see why you insist in this by the way!? If the "I" is
commonly shared and is mapped to a shared physical
system why different physical laws for different people?
(Are we still in Kansas, Toto?)
On this I am sticking with Bruno. I don't think you answer him any
better below...
[GL]
> Objective reality is an illusion that disappears when observers
differ in their frame of reference. In this particular case, it does
>not exist when observers operate according to different but entirely
consistent fundamental logics. In fact, such observers >would have a
lot of difficulty communicating since their worlds would be different
slices of the plenitude.
[BM]
>I would say, almost like a physicalist, that "objective reality" is
what is common to all frame of reference. I would even say that >"the
physical laws" are exactly what is true in all observer-moment,
relative state/worlds, etc.
[GL]
> Einstein has demonstrated that under different state of motion and
acceleration the old objective reality breaks down and a >new objective
reality must take its place. Objective reality depends on the range of
the laws. Newton's laws are not true in all >frame of reference in
various kinds of motion, but Relativity provides unified laws that
cover all frames of reference that differ >according to their motion
and their acceleration. QT/MWI offers a different kind of relativism.
Shannon offers yet another kind >of relativism. Why not just go all the
way - no more objective reality. Each "I" has his own reality. If your
accept this as a law >then we have objective reality. :-)
[GK]
Kansas, oh yes!
[BM]
> I could challenge you for giving me two entirely consistent logics
having nothing in common, and sufficiently rich to keep >natural
numbers (but perhaps you don't put weight on arithmetical truth, in
which case I could imagine some solution in a non >comp framework)
[GL
> I am not sure what you mean by your statement in parenthesis. Bruno,
I am not an expert in logic. Perhaps you can help. Is it >possible that
"I" (and the anthropically derived world) may include all the (logical)
systems "I" can imagine, and therefore it >would be impossible for "I"
to provide you with a system that "I" cannot imagine? So it is
impossible for us to see beyond our
> slice of the plenitude.
George
Saibal Mitra
't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists working on
''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such bold
assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.
As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models. It
seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any serious
work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say that
anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One could
imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could yield
the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists, then
you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.
Saibal
Eric Cavalcanti
From: Eric Cavalcanti <eric.ca...@gmail.com>
Date: Aug 13, 2005 4:38 PM
Subject: Re: Modal Logic
To: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
Hi Bruno,
On 8/13/05, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Hi Eric,
> > I am having a problem understanding this axiom:
> >
> >> (...) Lob formula (B(Bp->p)->Bp), the main axiom of the modal logic
> >
> > Suppose p = "it is raining today"
> >
> > B(Bp->p) is true because I believe that if I believe it is raining
> > today
> > it IS raining today, since If I believe it is raining today it is
> > because
> > I have gone outside and seen that it is raining today, or I believe my
> > source of information for that matter.
> >
> > But it doesn't follow from that that I do believe that it is raining
> > today.
> > It happens by the way that I don't believe it is raining today, because
> > I can see a beutiful sun outside.
> >
> > What's wrong?
>
> Literaly, it means you are less modest than a Lobian machine!
> If B(Bp -> p) was true, it would mean that whatever the poof you have
> that p is true, then p is true. What about dreaming that you have look
> through the window and see it rains?
OK, I grant that I might have false beliefs. In fact, I strongly
believe that I do have many false beliefs.
> (Remember B is not the "incorrigible" first person. B is really for a
> scientific third person sharable justification). Of course it makes
> things still more unbelievable, given that you will tell me that in
> case you have a proof, it is even more amazing you can be wrong. But
> then it is like that by incompleteness.
OK, so we shouldn't read Bx as "I believe x", but as
"It is believable that x". Is that right?
But B(Bp -> p) is very different from Bp -> p.
The first is "It is believable that p is believable only if p is true".
The second is "It is believable that p only if p is true".
But if we are talking about third person justifiable beliefs,
how can we ever say B(Bp->p) is true? Couldn't we always
be sceptical about the truth of any belief?
Can you give a particular example of a sentence p such that
B(Bp->p) is true?
Eric.
Bruno Marchal
Le 12-août-05, à 20:47, Norman Samish a écrit :
> Bruno,
> You speak of "God." Could you define what you, as a logician,
> mean?
>
Usually I try to avoid the name, especially when I propose "theology"
for naming the study of all observer-moments from all possible angles
(angles = (plural) person point of views).
As a logician, or as a mathematician, I can only adopt their axiomatic
methodology.
As a "theologian" I can only give you my favorite first axiom for
"God", which is that it has no name. It is a common axiom in many
actual religion. It is made rather explicit by the Chinese Taoist for
giving just one example.
A natural question, then, is: "Is there something the lobian machine
cannot name"
Logicians are generally using the word "name" in an apparent restricted
way, as being not a pointer but some explicit formal description. It
happens that "truth", as a predicate applied *on* machine cannot have
such a description *for* the machine. A sound lobian machine cannot
already named its own *truth* predicate. [Tarski Theorem, in the
literature]
(And now Theaetetus defines the knower (the first person) by an
explicit link between provability and truth, and this, by above, will
entail that the knower (the first person) has no name, too.)
Of course, below, I was not using the name of God seriously, I was
alluding to some statement made by Einstein about some possible
maliciousness of the Lord (as he said from time to time).
Bruno
> BM: An informal, but (hopefully) rigorous and complete, argument
> showing that
> physics is derivable from comp. That argument is not constructive. Its
> e
> asyness comes from the fact that it does not really explained how to
> make
> the derivation. The second part is a translation of that argument in
> the
> language of the "universal machine itself". This, by the constraints
> of
> theoretical ccomputer science, makes the proof constructive, so that it
> gives the complete derivation of physics from computer science. Of
> course
> God is a little malicious, apparently, and we are led to hard
> intractable
> purely mathematical questions. You are welcome, Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Eric Cavalcanti
> > Can you give a particular example of a sentence p such that
> > B(Bp->p) is true?
> Take any proposition you can prove, for example the tautology
> (p -> p), or t.
(...)
> So once you have prove t, all the proposition of the shape
>
> <anyproposition> -> t
>
> is easily deducible, by applying modus ponens and the a fortiori axiom.
>
> In particular Bt -> t is justified.
>
> And thus B(Bt -> t) is true. (or, by necessitation B(Bt -> t)
> follows).
>
> So an example of such a p making B(Bp -> p) true, is p = t.
But then any proposition of the form
B(q->p)->Bp
would be true as well. Why is that not an axiom?
Further, by your explanation above it seems that the
axiom should be more like Bp->B(q->p). Since as I
understood it, if you can justify p, then you can justify
any sentence of the form q->p.
On the other direction, suppose it is justifiable that
~p. That is, B(~p) and I suppose ~Bp with the excluded
middle. So it is true that Bp->q for any q, and in particular
for q=p. So B(Bp->p). But Bp is false by assumption so
B(Bp->p)->Bp is false. What's wrong?
Eric.
kurtl...@aim.com
Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our
cis-plankian
one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go
theorems of
quantum physics are "in small print" is because his "reading glasses"
are no
longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of
simple
deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his
little
examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree.
However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth
looking
into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world
we know
and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some
discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and
all
indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models
alone.
't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and
he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less
than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for
non-abelian gauge
theories in his youth I suspect "god's dice" are loaded against him
this time.
However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard
this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous
animations...
Bruno Marchal
I see we agree on many things. I comment only where we take distance.
Le 12-août-05, à 19:33, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> [GK]
> Again I fully agree, though I am sure you are aware that "mentality"
> and "identity" are among the most difficult problems that
> science has tried to tackle and that what we think we know about such
> matters pales in comparison with what we are sure we
> don't know! Even just building theories may be more forthcoming in
> some domains than others, irrespective of testing them.
BM: That is exactly why I have concentrate on a testable theory of the
mind. Actually the testability is my first and most basic concern. I
will say more in a reply to Lee.
Mentality and identity are difficult, sure. But the question of what is
time, matter, space, etc. are difficult too. Modern physics has even
made them more difficult.
> [BM]
> This is just ignorance. Science is *the* most efficacious way to
> accept that we are ignorant.
> It is the motor of science. If you have a scientific interest in
> alien abduction you can always search for a piece of unknown metal, or
> for tackling the plausibility problem of the account. Etc. As I
> mentioned before one of my favorite text to illustrate what is the
> scientific attitude is given in a book of parapsychology (the "In
> search of the light' by S. Blackmore). Of course the whishfull
> thinkers in parapsychology doesn't like it because it is negative (She
> shows the protocol errors in most parapsychologists experiments).
>
> [GK]
> That is a wonderful point you make above! But my own was that
> acknowledging something may not exactly be the same as admiting its
> reality; it can in fact be just the oposite when what is acknowledge
> is someone else's belief for instance. How
> (consensual) reality is acquired is a pretty complicated and still
> mysterious process. I would venture that a lot of what we
> would count as "subjective reality" is just that! (more below)
I am not sure I understand you, and pêrhaps it is just a question of
vocabulary. If I acknowledge a belief of someone, it seems to me that I
take as real (or very plausible) that that someone has a belief, not
that the belief is true.
Altough the subjective reality is just that, I guess, subjective. I
take as objective the existence of "subjective reality", or at least I
take as objective the existence of the discourse and silence on
subjective reality, and what I am searching an explanation on is
exactly that, how to explain in objective term the subjective
discourse, including the fact that we know we acnnot make objective
that subjectivity. This is part of the so-called mind-body problem.
Saying, like Lee, that my subjective view is neurons firing is just
false. To say that it is the sult of neurons firing is much more
interesting but actually makes the problem worse (as serious
philosopher of mind know very well). The reason is that if neurons
firing explains all my behavior, it is just more enigmatic that
something like consciousness has ever evolved.
The explanation is more subtle and demanding and eventually forces us
to revised our oldest prejudices about the nature of reality.
> > If that derivation is just a piece of your subjectivity that may
> dash > your hopes to convey it to others...
>
> [BM]
> By derivation I really mean "demonstration". It is valid for anyone
> (accepting classical logic applies on the elementary arithmetical
> truth). Sorry if this looks contemptuous.
>
> [GK]
> It may very well be contemptuous but I cannot fault your
> "demonstration" since I see no reason why materialism would
> be compatible with your hypothesis!
Good! Many people still confuse comp and materialism.
> If I understand it correctly this is that one materially supported
> conscious entity could
> be entirely (and analytically) replaced by a digitally constructed
> one without it even being conscious of it. Am I right? Is
> this what you COMP ? If so you are right in one thing: it is one hell
> of a stronger contention than the strongest AI hyp
> (and that much more unlikely).
OK. But please note that 99,9% of the scientists take it for granted.
Actually I know only Penrose postulating explicitly the negation of
comp. This forces him to speculate about the falsity of both quantum
mechanics and general relativity.
> [BM]
> OK. This means you are serious like Lee. I certainly don't expect
> people to understand it quickly! The people in this list does not know
> (I think) that they are one century in advance!
> (and then they doesn't know I'm two centuries in advance ;-)
> (Don't infer I'm some sort of genius: it is just years and years and
> years of work + open mindedness).
>
> [GK]
> Oh don't worry about that! There is genius in knowing that your are
> not!
I didn't say that either. I don't know if I am a genious, but I don't
know if I am not a genious either ;-)
> And since you are a machine your years and years
> and years may surely add to two centuries! No wonder you outrun your
> modesty...
I have never said that I am a machine. I have not the slightest idea if
comp is true. But I am sure that if comp is true then physics emerges
from the arithmetical relations, well, as sure as I am sure of the
irrationality of the square root of 2. I give a proof.
> [GK]
> Oh but you make it sound so easy! See: its is the "derive physics
> from computer science" that I have my first problem with!
That is the object of the proof I gave. The proof is 100% third person
accessible, like any proof. What is hard, perhaps, is that the proof is
done in a field which is in the intersection of theoretical physics,
theoretical computer science and theoretical cognitive science.
> Easier said than done, I'm afraid. Stephen Wolfram sent me his huge
> book but I remain as unconvinced by it as everyone
> else who has read it about his "tinker bell" version of Quantum
> Mechanics. I heard Ed Fredkin a number of times and,
> though he is quite charming, I don't think he has any better answer
> to that question...
Wolfram, like Schmidhuber, entirely dismiss the 1/3 distinction. The
proof I gave shows that Wolfram is just wrong on those matter. I am
nearer Svozil and Chaitin (but well beyond, probably).
>
> More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any
> non-quantum mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
> don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things,
> Bruno. Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
> to be.
It does not seem contemptuous, it seems just circular. If you have the
two following axioms:
1) There is a physical world
2) The physical world is described by QM
Then it seems obvious to me that "QM puts a big kabosh into any
non-quantum mechanistic view of the physical world".
Now don't worry, I believe more in the quantum than in comp! I thought,
in the past, that I would quickly refute comp with quantum mechanics.
But the fact are there, comp, as far as it has been tested implies
everything we can deduce from the quantum. Comp is not yet refuted, and
evidences add up that the quantum is derivable from comp (or from
numbers through comp).
Of course, I believe in the quantum, but if comp is correct, I can no
more believe in "1)", i.e. I must abandon the existence of a physical
world, and the quantum describes only the way machine dreams
interference generate the stable illusion of solidity and time from
arithmetical truth (under the form of confirmable bets, the Lobian Bp &
Dp).
>
> Incidentally, the reverse reduction of computer science to physics
> seems to be a lot more hopeful specially since most
> computations seem to run a lot faster in physical computers than
> on... (what are the alternatives again?).
If you study the Universal Dovetailer Argument, you will see that any
machine betting correctly and consistently on any piece of "observable"
reality, will bet that to simulate that piece of reality exactly, there
is a need of simulating an infinity of computations. Remember we don't
know in which computations "we are", and the "physical" appearances
emerge from some probabilistic interference among all the possible
computations. Without QM, for example, with just a Newtonian World I
would directly interpret my proof as a refutation of comp.
> OK, no one
> has built a truly quantum computer just yet but a lot of people think
> they are about to do it!
I'm quasi sure they will!
And I'm quasi sure me or someone else will extract the existence of a
quantum computer in the neighborhood of any "conscious" lobian machine,
or refute comp. comp will provide really solid foundations for the
quantum, if it is correct. In particular physical *laws* will be real
general laws pertaining on all possible observers.
> [GK]
> Sure will (take it with and entire salt mine)! My point is that we
> already have ways of explaining other people's experiences
> on the basis of empathy or antipathy and in terms of direct causation.
Causation? Sorry but I consider such a notion as very vague (and very
interesting).
There are ten thousands notion of causality, and a lot of them can be
studied as necessary implication: B(p->q) in some modal logic. So I
consider they are at least as many notion of "causation" than there are
modal logics. And there is an infinity of modal logics ...
> Bill Clinton was found of saying "I feel your pain" and
> no one called him on that obvious lie! I can think of some numbers
> that would tell me about the pain others are feeling
> (checked the price of gas today? $2.59 a gallon!!! That hurts!!!)
Quite cheap from here!
> Seriously, I see nothing wrong with what you saying as long as you
> couch it in that "faith-based" argumentation.
I think all theories are faith-based. But, yes, comp, is not only faith
based, but it justifies why some part of it are necessarily
faith-based, if true.
> Your argument is cute and may very well be defensible that way. This
> day and and age it may actually be better supported
> that way than as hard clad science, who knows?
It is hard clad science. I know of course that it could look
"philosophical" because I indeed tackle a "philosophical problem". But
I did actually chose purposefully special hypotheses for making the
conclusion 100% testable, as it makes testable many variant of comp
(like some weakening or strengthening).
Many people, including Bohr, qualified the Einstein Podolski Rosen
paper as "philosophical". But then (30 years later) Bell shows it to be
testable (and Deutch: exploitable). My work is like EPR+BELL, although
it bears on the mind body problem. The UDA part corresponds to EPR and
the translation of the UDA in the language of a sufficiently rich
machine theorem prover is the BELL part: I arrive to propositions as
vulnerable as it is possible to be.
> [GK]
> Oh, what a pity! I was kind of bracing to see that derivation! I am
> sure it would drive your point across a lot quicker.
> Oh well, I could probably give you a couple of other outrageous
> hypothesis from which you could derive the whole
> of physics, not constructively of course! You are the logician but
> isn't it the case that from an assuredly false premise
> you can derive anything?
Oh please! If you don't know the premise is false, then by deriving
anything from the premise gives in any circumstances interesting
information. Take the case where I would derive the false from comp,
then I would have derive a refutation of comp. (p -> f is the same as
~p). That would be something!
So non constructive proof can be interesting and informative!
Anyway, my proof *is* constructive.
>
> [BM]
> The second part is a translation of that argument in the language of
> the "universal machine itself". This, by the constraints of
> theoretical computer science, makes the proof constructive, so that it
> gives the complete derivation of physics from computer science. Of
> course God is a little malicious, apparently, and we are led to hard
> intractable purely mathematical questions.
>
>
> You are welcome,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> [GK]
> Oh gosh! Another let down! Well maybe those pesky Quantum Computer
> builders can rescue you after all one day.
Here you are right. This is actually predictable from comp. One of the
quantum logics should be quantum tractable, and not classically
tractable.
Also, I said to much when I say the questions are intractable. I should
insist on the fact that I did solve one of the main decisive question
(and comp succeed the test), and that, concerning many others, I have
not yet really try to solve them, but professional logician does not
find them easy, so I doubt I will get them. Now, I could prove that all
of them are tractable in the sense that less than a CETI project could
solve them (like you can simulate a <few-bits>-quantum computer with
enough classical bits.
> As
> I heard that you plan to become immortal (after a little digital
> plastic surgery) you will have the time to wait for it!
It is the contrary. I plan to be mortal, but with comp this seems
extremely hard if not impossible. This is the feature I dislike the
most in comp. It is not clear there could be any hope of finding a way
to get out. There could be a whole arithmetical Bardo Thodol.
(This is already true with Everett QM). That's another reason to think
about using the word "theology", perhaps.
>
> Bruno: you seem to hold quite estimable principles about the
> fundamentals of scientific practice and you seem much less
> threatening than your digitalist surgeon.
Thanks.
> When I have a chance I'll check your papers out and see what I can
> make out
> of them. Thanks for the summary, though.
Take it easy,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
Sorry for being late,
Le 10-août-05, à 02:51, cha...@bigpond.net.au a écrit :
> Hi,
>
> (via) Reality vs. Perception of Reality
> In answer to Bruno’s recent comments on the old post:
> * Thanks for helping me sort out my ‘Nagels’! I had them mixed up in
> EndNote.
You are welcome. I did that confusion too.
> * Young? 49 years young. Getting young and seemingly knowing less and
> less every day. :-) This I seem to have to conclude is progress of a
> sort.
Ah! You are also born the year (1955) Einstein died ? Before all, it is
the year Lob answered to the problem of Mister Henkin!
.. and, sure, it is a progress to discover we know less. Glad to hear
that, because comp literaly forces us to realize we are much more
ignorant than most physicalist approaches could imagine!
> ---------------------------
>
> I’ve caught up with the ‘subjective reality’ thread and am finding the
> usual linguistic blurs, wondering how to resolve them. Part of the
> process is to ensure we are all talking about the same things. It
> seems there is room for some work in this regard. In going through the
> posts it seems to me there is an overlap in the word ‘subjective’ in a
> very specific way.
>
>
>
> a) Firstly there is ‘subjective’ in the sense of experiential content
> (the ‘now’ of our experiential fields vision, haptic, emotion etc)).
> This is implemented in brain material in some way. What the brain
> feels.
I agree the experiential content is related to some "brain activity".
But I don't think my brain is thinking at all. I think (well, I hope).
To say the brain think is to make a confusion of level. I think,
through my brain, body, universes ...
>
> b) Secondly there is knowledge derived from that experience. This is
> devoid of experiential qualities and is reported as a belief. “Mr X
> had a headache on that day” is the example used here. What the brain
> does. This is a belief whose truth may or may not be supported by
> empirical evidence. This is formed by a separate brain mechanism.
>
> There seems to be a tendency for these two to get mixed up. You can
> see evidence in the thread: the interpretive mismatch actually caused
> discussion to occur. Both of these constructs a) and b) can be
> characterised as ‘virtual’. In case (a) the brain makes the outside
> natural world have an appearance ‘as if it were like that’. In case b)
> the belief is a ‘truth’ about the natural world and the holder of the
> belief acts (behaves) ‘as if’ it were true.
>
> Both are subjective in that they are properties of a subject (a brain)
> and the result of that subject’s view of the natural world (=not the
> brain) as an object. This leads is into the next potential confusion
> c) subject in contrast to d) object. This too has been in the possibly
> confused mixture and was well recognised by Lee.
>
> This may be a confusion of word subject/object vs
> subjective/objective. Don’t know.
>
> Then there is the final confusion (? Not sure) e) that ‘measurement’
> in the quantum mechanical sense of a so-called ‘observer moment’ and
> its relationship to a), b) c) and d). For I do not think they are the
> same thing. The quantum mechanical ‘observer moments’ happen
> continually at all places, scales and times where the natural
> processes taking place demand that resolution of position/velocity
> some other pair be resolved to a certain state. This is the massive
> collection of falling trees in the unobserved forest. They still fall
> in the sense that Schrödinger’s cat ‘fall’. This form of ‘observation’
> may actually occur in a brain and be relevant to a), b), c) , d) but
> it does not necessarily _define_ a), b), c) d). I believe this to be
> an accidental cultural mis-interpretation that seems to continue
> unchallenged. Or am I seeing something that is not there?
>
> There seems to sometimes be a tacit assumption that QM observation and
> observation by a cognitive agent inclusive of a phenomenal
> consciousness are literally the same thing or necessarily related or
> that QM is necessarily causal in phenomenal consciousness. A corollary
> of this is that if you do a QM depiction of the universe unfolding
> that somehow phenomenality has been depicted. This is not necessarily
> the case. To me they seem to be two completely separate aspects of the
> natural world that may or may not be connected and the confusion that
> they are seems to be in place here.
>
> So here we are all thinking we are talking about the same thing
> whereas there seem to be at least 5 separable aspects to the
> discussion (a,b,c,d,e above). They appear very distinct to me, anyway,
> and in order to have any meaningful discussion it would seem that
> these 5 things be very clearly defined. Or have I just done that?
I am not sure. I do agree with your distinction, but I am not sure all
distinctions does not depend on different set of assumptions, and if
those sets are compatible with each other.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
kurtl...@aim.com
Thanks for your answers. I follow you in passing on our points of
agreement (and erasing them).
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
...
Hi Godfrey,
I see we agree on many things. I comment only where we take distance.
Le 12-août-05, à 19:33, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> [GK]
> That is a wonderful point you make above! But my own was that >
acknowledging something may not exactly be the same as admitting its >
reality; it can in fact be just the opposite when what is acknowledge >
is someone else's belief for instance. How
> (consensual) reality is acquired is a pretty complicated and still >
mysterious process. I would venture that a lot of what we
> would count as "subjective reality" is just that! (more below)
[BM]
I am not sure I understand you, and pêrhaps it is just a question of
vocabulary. If I acknowledge a belief of someone, it seems to me that I
take as real (or very plausible) that that someone has a belief, not
that the belief is true.
Altough the subjective reality is just that, I guess, subjective. I
take as objective the existence of "subjective reality", or at least I
take as objective the existence of the discourse and silence on
subjective reality, and what I am searching an explanation on is
exactly that, how to explain in objective term the subjective
discourse, including the fact that we know we cannot make objective
that subjectivity. This is part of the so-called mind-body problem.
Saying, like Lee, that my subjective view is neurons firing is just
false. To say that it is the sult of neurons firing is much more
interesting but actually makes the problem worse (as serious
philosopher of mind know very well). The reason is that if neurons
firing explains all my behavior, it is just more enigmatic that
something like consciousness has ever evolved.
The explanation is more subtle and demanding and eventually forces us
to revised our oldest prejudices about the nature of reality.
[GK]
The point I am trying to make is that a lot of your back and forth
discourse on the 1st versus the 3rd person misses the
2nd person in between them! More specifically: I am quite convinced
that one good part of what we call "the Mind" or
"the Self" and perhaps even "Consciousness" is generated by social
interaction rather than by any "inner realm of subjectivity".
I suspect this is true about all of what we call "symbolic" or
"meaningful" including a lot of the support for mathematical
understanding though I guess I am a platonist to the extent that I
think of mathematical objects as existing independently
of any of our semantics in a realm of their own.
As for consciousness I do agree with you that whatever explains it may
seriously require a revision of our oldest and,
very possibly, some of our newest prejudices about reality but
certainly most of outr old prejudices about... consciousness-
yours (and mine) included! ;-)
... skipped
> If I understand it correctly this is that one materially supported >
conscious entity could
> be entirely (and analytically) replaced by a digitally constructed >
one without it even being conscious of it. Am I right? Is
> this what you COMP ? If so you are right in one thing: it is one
hell > of a stronger contention than the strongest AI hyp
> (and that much more unlikely).
[BM]
OK. But please note that 99,9% of the scientists take it for granted.
Actually I know only Penrose postulating explicitly the negation of
comp. This forces him to speculate about the falsity of both quantum
mechanics and general relativity.
[GK]
I would rather not bring Penrose to this discussion though he is
someone I much appreciate and will not easily dismiss. Unfortunately I
can't claim I understand his Byzantine time-asymmetric proposals as
alternatives for QM and GR enough
to criticize them, and I am not alone in this.
But I thought about your COMP and such over the weekend and I realized
I have to take back what I said above! I can
perfectly well imagine a world in which no one has yet built a
conscious machine from scratch but someone has found a
procedure for replacing one's consciousness by a digital one in the
way you describe. Why should one imply the other?
...
[BM]
I didn't say that either. I don't know if I am a genious, but I don't
know if I am not a genious either ;-)
[GK]
Oh, Bruno, don't be so bashful ...
> And since you are a machine your years and years
> and years may surely add to two centuries! No wonder you outrun your
> modesty...
I have never said that I am a machine. I have not the slightest idea
if comp is true. But I am sure that if comp is true then physics
emerges from the arithmetical relations, well, as sure as I am sure of
the irrationality of the square root of 2. I give a proof.
[GK]
Oh, I am sorry, than! As you speak so much of acts-of-faith I
concluded, too soon I gather, that you took all those years of toil
as a consequence of your beliefs. Silly me!
> [GK]
> Oh but you make it sound so easy! See: its is the "derive physics >
from computer science" that I have my first problem with!
That is the object of the proof I gave. The proof is 100% third person
accessible, like any proof. What is hard, perhaps, is that the proof is
done in a field which is in the intersection of theoretical physics,
theoretical computer science and theoretical cognitive science.
[GK]
And just how sure are you that there is such an intersection? Or is
that also an article of faith?
> Easier said than done, I'm afraid. Stephen Wolfram sent me his huge
> book but I remain as unconvinced by it as everyone
> else who has read it about his "tinker bell" version of Quantum >
Mechanics. I heard Ed Fredkin a number of times and,
> though he is quite charming, I don't think he has any better answer
> to that question...
Wolfram, like Schmidhuber, entirely dismiss the 1/3 distinction. The
proof I gave shows that Wolfram is just wrong on those matter. I am
nearer Svozil and Chaitin (but well beyond, probably).
[GK]
If I thought Svozil and Chaitin were near at all I might understand
you better. At least we agree that Wolfram is wrong!
>
> More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any >
non-quantum mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
> don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things, >
Bruno. Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
> to be.
[BM]
It does not seem contemptuous, it seems just circular. If you have the
two following axioms:
1) There is a physical world
2) The physical world is described by QM
Then it seems obvious to me that "QM puts a big kabosh into any
non-quantum mechanistic view of the physical world".
Now don't worry, I believe more in the quantum than in comp! I
thought, in the past, that I would quickly refute comp with quantum
mechanics. But the fact are there, comp, as far as it has been tested
implies everything we can deduce from the quantum. Comp is not yet
refuted, and evidences add up that the quantum is derivable from comp
(or from numbers through comp).
Of course, I believe in the quantum, but if comp is correct, I can no
more believe in "1)", i.e. I must abandon the existence of a physical
world, and the quantum describes only the way machine dreams
interference generate the stable illusion of solidity and time from
arithmetical truth (under the form of confirmable bets, the Lobian Bp &
Dp).
[GK]
Lots of "ifs" in there! Since you found me circular let me just ask
you this:
If the physical world does not exist (you say that COMP implies this)
why even bother deriving physics? Can't machines
dream just like we do, about lovely, terrifying and yet unphysical
things?
Also, I suspect that I can with just a bit of work, show you that QM
invalidates your COMP hyp if I actually understand it.
Would you be so kind as to state it out for me in one full sentence so
I have a clear" line-of-sight"?
>
> Incidentally, the reverse reduction of computer science to physics >
seems to be a lot more hopeful specially since most
> computations seem to run a lot faster in physical computers than >
on... (what are the alternatives again?).
[BM]
If you study the Universal Dovetailer Argument, you will see that any
machine betting correctly and consistently on any piece of "observable"
reality, will bet that to simulate that piece of reality exactly, there
is a need of simulating an infinity of computations. Remember we don't
know in which computations "we are", and the "physical" appearances
emerge from some probabilistic interference among all the possible
computations. Without QM, for example, with just a Newtonian World I
would directly interpret my proof as a refutation of comp.
[GK]
Maybe there is a typo in what you say above because if that argument
actually says that "any machine betting correctly and consistently on
any piece of "observable" reality, will bet that to simulate that piece
of reality exactly, there is a need of simulating an infinity of
computations" than I would not take it to Vegas (;-) ! This is because
we can in fact, not just bet but,
predict, with certainty, and simulate with arbitrary precision, the
behavior of a good number "pieces of observed reality" by
themselves and even verify the certainty of those predictions with a
finite collection of finite algorithms which is what we
do call physics (classical or quantum, theoretical or empirical) ).
What we cannot do is to reproduce by any finite set of algorithms worth
betting on the type of persistent built-in correlations that pairs (and
trios, etc..) of these pieces of
observable reality manifestly carry between them once they have been,
once, part of the same piece! Even coins
don't toss that way! That is where the "kabosh" is! There is no
dovetailing out of it...
Also if Newtonian physics is enough to shoot down your hypothesis than
it must be dead already since Newtonian physics
is the correspondence limit of QM and QM is right!!! I really don't
follow you here...
> OK, no one
> has built a truly quantum computer just yet but a lot of people
think > they are about to do it!
[BM]
I'm quasi sure they will!
And I'm quasi sure me or someone else will extract the existence of a
quantum computer in the neighborhood of any "conscious" lobian machine,
or refute comp. comp will provide really solid foundations for the
quantum, if it is correct. In particular physical *laws* will be real
general laws pertaining on all possible observers.
[GK]
Well, again, I would much like to know what these "solid foundations
for the quantum" are but am happy in my believe
that particular(?) physical laws are *already* real general laws and
indeed apply to all possible observers even without
your help or George Levy's opposition!!! If I stop believing in
gravity can I fly? (:-)
> [GK]
> Sure will (take it with and entire salt mine)! My point is that we >
already have ways of explaining other people's experiences
> on the basis of empathy or antipathy and in terms of direct
causation.
[BM]
Causation? Sorry but I consider such a notion as very vague (and very
interesting).
There are ten thousands notion of causality, and a lot of them can be
studied as necessary implication: B(p->q) in some modal logic. So I
consider they are at least as many notion of "causation" than there are
modal logics. And there is an infinity of modal logics ...
[GK]
My fault I am sorry, I should have written "interaction" instead of
causation. I fully agree with you about the latter.
>[GK]
> Bill Clinton was found of saying "I feel your pain" and
> no one called him on that obvious lie! I can think of some numbers >
that would tell me about the pain others are feeling
> (checked the price of gas today? $2.59 a gallon!!! That hurts!!!)
Quite cheap from here!
[GK]
Sorry again! I feel your *bigger* pain (even if I don't own a car!)
> Seriously, I see nothing wrong with what you saying as long as you >
couch it in that "faith-based" argumentation.
[BM]
I think all theories are faith-based. But, yes, comp, is not only
faith based, but it justifies why some part of it are necessarily
faith-based, if true.
[GK]
Some more than others, I would add. I catch your point but again I
think this is a bit of a cop out.
> Your argument is cute and may very well be defensible that way. This
> day and and age it may actually be better supported
> that way than as hard clad science, who knows?
[BM]
It is hard clad science. I know of course that it could look
"philosophical" because I indeed tackle a "philosophical problem". But
I did actually chose purposefully special hypotheses for making the
conclusion 100% testable, as it makes testable many variant of comp
(like some weakening or strengthening).
Many people, including Bohr, qualified the Einstein Podolski Rosen
paper as "philosophical". But then (30 years later) Bell shows it to be
testable (and Deutch: exploitable). My work is like EPR+BELL, although
it bears on the mind body problem. The UDA part corresponds to EPR and
the translation of the UDA in the language of a sufficiently rich
machine theorem prover is the BELL part: I arrive to propositions as
vulnerable as it is possible to be.
[GK]
Again your modesty precedes you. The Bell argument, thanks largely to
Clauser, Horn, Shimony and Holt, Aspect et all
became an item of "experimental metaphysics" and is soon to become a
major industry! And this without anyone having to sell their soul or
body to a digitalist surgeon. May you be so blessed...
> [GK]
> Oh, what a pity! I was kind of bracing to see that derivation! I am
> sure it would drive your point across a lot quicker.
> Oh well, I could probably give you a couple of other outrageous >
hypothesis from which you could derive the whole
> of physics, not constructively of course! You are the logician but >
isn't it the case that from an assuredly false premise
> you can derive anything?
[BM]
Oh please! If you don't know the premise is false, then by deriving
anything from the premise gives in any circumstances interesting
information. Take the case where I would derive the false from comp,
then I would have derive a refutation of comp. (p -> f is the same as
~p). That would be something!
So non constructive proof can be interesting and informative!
Anyway, my proof *is* constructive.
[GK]
I thing you got my point. The false tends to be more interesting than
the true... and more heartbreaking too.
> [BM]
> The second part is a translation of that argument in the language of
> the "universal machine itself". This, by the constraints of >
theoretical computer science, makes the proof constructive, so that it
> gives the complete derivation of physics from computer science. Of >
course God is a little malicious, apparently, and we are led to hard >
intractable purely mathematical questions.
>
>
> You are welcome,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> [GK]
> Oh gosh! Another let down! Well maybe those pesky Quantum Computer
builders can rescue you after all one day.
Here you are right. This is actually predictable from comp. One of the
quantum logics should be quantum tractable, and not classically
tractable.
Also, I said to much when I say the questions are intractable. I
should insist on the fact that I did solve one of the main decisive
question (and comp succeed the test), and that, concerning many others,
I have not yet really try to solve them, but professional logician does
not find them easy, so I doubt I will get them. Now, I could prove that
all of them are tractable in the sense that less than a CETI project
could solve them (like you can simulate a <few-bits>-quantum computer
with enough classical bits.
[GK]
You lost me here. Are they tractable or not? I wasn't aware that the
CETI project can solve intractable problems !!!
> As
> I heard that you plan to become immortal (after a little digital >
plastic surgery) you will have the time to wait for it!
[BM]
It is the contrary. I plan to be mortal, but with comp this seems
extremely hard if not impossible. This is the feature I dislike the
most in comp. It is not clear there could be any hope of finding a way
to get out. There could be a whole arithmetical Bardo Thodol.
(This is already true with Everett QM). That's another reason to think
about using the word "theology", perhaps.
[GK]
Poor Bruno, imortel malgre soi!! And presumably "imortel qui mal y
pense, aussi !" , no? Gosh, I wasn't counting on that
in my retirement plans... (;-)
Seriously for a second: I doubt that I know enough to understand all
your demonstrations and arguments or judge their
correctness in detail, and I am no Dr. Phil, but I have the distinct
impression that you are too enamoured with your COMP
hyp to let it go. Is this possible?
Take it easy,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
You too,
Godfrey
chris peck
>As Bertrand Russell pointed out long ago, the existence of a "self" who
>"has" the experiences is an inference.
grrr! It doesnt matter how long ago anyone pointed anything out! Things do
not get truer or falser as they get older. They come in and out of vogue.
Russell's (wasnt it Bernard Williams'?) criticism of the cogito is just to
say that Descartes added non certainties to his certainty. The assumption of
an 'I' to recieve the 'Thoughts'. Nevertheless, with regards to the hardcore
'realist', this isnt going to be much comfort. As much as possible he wants
the world to be as it seems to be, so he side steps problems about
perception and subjectivity and very much wants to avoid any introspection
whatsoever. But, one would think that the existance of a self at every
space/time crosshair of 'here' by 'now' was most likely one 'reality' he
could swallow about introspection. But, sure enough, the 'I' is assumed. It
isnt certain. The realist should start banging his drum again.
But subjectivity is certain. That right here and right now, bang in the
center of my universe at least, thoughts are occuring, sensations are being
felt. And the rest of the world - to whatever degree it exists at all - is
blind to that. These happenings belong to this (pointing at me) linguisticly
conventional 'I'. Any of the thoughts experienced whose content infers a
public and objective space are after this fact.
>English demands a subject/object sentence construction which makes it
>impossible to grammatically express the occurence of experiences without
>something "having" the experiences. But as the Navajo just say "raining"
>instead of "it is raining", they would say "experiencing!".
Language itself is inherently dualistic in a sense, just in so far as it
categorises the world into here and there, us and them, dog and cat. Still,
maybe that makes alot of sense? Isnt matter supposed to coagulate into
chunks of qualitatively different things? What kind of analysis are the
Navajo going to give 'experiencing' without recourse to some kind of notion
of subjectivity? - if not personal identity. I'ld like to see it, though I
imagine, in truth, their conceptual scheme and ours are utterly
incommensurable - we only ever get a grip on what we think they think.
Besides, as the reference to the Navajo makes clear denying a self is more
commonly part of mysticism than "realism", surely. Which is not at all meant
perjoritively. I mean they get there without atom smashers I understand.
>How, you might ask, could the existence of a "self" who "has" the
>experiences be false.
maybe the self is like a snowflake, an order out of entropy that crystalises
into existance and then evapourates from it into thin air. A pattern. Most
Platonists would be happy about that. But what is important here is that
*subjectivity* is certain. That it is experience, whether that entails an
'I' or not, that is immediate.
>I'm a realist and I certainly don't dismiss them (nor do I know any
>realists who do).
Lee is someone who does. ( at least when harranging platonists).
>But it is a problem of language - not of reality. I see it as just two
>ways of talking about the same thing. Just as to my computer the preceding
>sentence is just a string of one's and zero's, but to me it expresses a
>thought - which from another point of view is a complex of neurons firing.
The computer simply doesnt care. Its not even ones and zeros, its flip flop
transistors. On or offs. Depending on where the data is sent, or how it is
cast, it will be interpreted differently. Send the ons and offs to a sound
card and you will get some sound or other. cast the string "He's gone
chicken oriental!" as an integer, and you can happily multiply it by 10. It
has no conception about the data. We do when we encounter it through some
peripheral or other, or manipulate it in code.
With regards to neurons firing. Whats pain? Neurons firing. Whats pleasure?
Neurons firing. Whats the idea that electrons are little balls? Neurons
firing. These qualitively disparate experiences are in fact just the same
thing? What then is the difference between a pain and a pleasure and
theoretical physics - which is of course both these things and more? These
qualitative differences derive from different patterns?, different syntax?
That alone?
I dont believe that.
>We could invent a word that meant both equally, but that hasn't been useful
>because we don't know much about the complex of neurons firing.
Yes. We have not succeeded in doing it. So why accept it? And if a realist
can accept what he has no evidence for, or can not really do, what then is
the problem with other theories that for the moment seem unfalsifiable?
Mathematical Platonism for instance.
>Suppose we built a conscious robot (see John McCarthy's website), then
>experience would be transistor gates switching.
what about if we just built a robot, and then ask ourselves whether it is
conscious. We dont want to put the cart before the horse. Im not so sure
about Turing tests myself. I dont buy it. I can accept I might be fooled by
a dead machine, I wouldnt know whether I was playing Kasperov or CrayBox 13
for instance, but I'ld assume everytime I was playing a master. I dont think
the chess computer has any concept of what it is doing.
But I can see this very clearly:
I think, therefore I am.
Now, if realists are prepared to accept inferences from perception about an
uncertain - at least indirectly witnessed - external realm, why cant they
accept an inference about mentality that is no less certain than that? What
do I have to choose between platonism and realism here? It seems to me we
are all picking and choosing theories we ought to be agnostic about.
Best Regards
Chris.
>Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 12:56:29 -0700
>
>chris peck wrote:
>>>Because a) you have experiences but not experiences of yourself and
>>
>>
>>In what way dont I have experience of myself? Who am I experiencing now?
>>Someone else?
>>
>>>b) experiences are not more certain that every scientific truth.
>>>Experiences are often misleading or outright illusions.
>>
>>
>>That I exist is more certain than any scientific truth. This is what I
>>said. We can argue about experiences, illusions and being misled by
>>perception if you like, the argument that will come back is that the very
>>fact I am being misled by perception or undergoing an illusion proves
>>beyond doubt to me that I exist.
>
>As Bertrand Russell pointed out long ago, the existence of a "self" who
>"has" the experiences is an inference. English demands a subject/object
>sentence construction which makes it impossible to grammatically express
>the occurence of experiences without something "having" the experiences.
>But as the Navajo just say "raining" instead of "it is raining", they would
>say "experiencing!".
>
>How, you might ask, could the existence of a "self" who "has" the
>experiences be false. The construct of a self depends on continuity and
>congruity of experiences over time. If "your" experiences were incongruous
>over time, as they can be when you're hallucinating, would "you" still
>exist? This isn't just hypothetical; it's what happens in multiple
>personality disorder.
>
>>
>>>Experiences are one source of knowledge, but their coherence with other
>>>knowledge is important too.
>>
>>
>>The point is that given the certainty of 'I exist' subjective experience
>>can not just be dismissed by the realist.
>
>I'm a realist and I certainly don't dismiss them (nor do I know any
>realists who do). Subjective experience is epistemologically basic - but
>it can still be ontologically derivative.
>
>>Given its certainty, it demands some kind of explanation, but the realist
>>recoils from providing any because marrying objective language with
>>subjective language has been an intractable problem.
>
>But it is a problem of language - not of reality. I see it as just two
>ways of talking about the same thing. Just as to my computer the preceding
>sentence is just a string of one's and zero's, but to me it expresses a
>thought - which from another point of view is a complex of neurons firing.
>We could invent a word that meant both equally, but that hasn't been useful
>because we don't know much about the complex of neurons firing.
>
>>If they are going to do that, they should admit how certain and central
>>subjective experiences are, how the enlightenment was forged by those who
>>dealt with them, and the poverty of their own theories in being unable to
>>explain them.
>>
>>>They may be basic, but they're not certain.
>>
>>
>>Its not that beliefs are true through being had. Thats not a position Im
>>interested in. Thats relativism, that truth is subjective. I dont see many
>>people defending that. The unfalsifiable but nevertheless absolutely
>>certain fact that i exist is just derived from the fact there are
>>experiences, it doesnt derive from the content of those experiences -
>>however 'deluded' they may be. I want to ask what is a delusion? what is a
>>dream? Nuerons firing?
>
>All human experience is (I think) neurons firing - in a certain physical
>context. Suppose we built a conscious robot (see John McCarthy's website),
>then experience would be transistor gates switching.
>
>>
>>I suppose it is hard to build from the cogito. Descartes didnt manage it.
>>However, to ignore it altogether is just lazy and is hardly a argument
>>against those who dont.
>
>I don't know what you mean. Physics is just common sense pursued rigoursly
>and common sense in built on perceptions.
>
>Brent Meeker
>
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John M
To: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>,
everyth...@eskimo.com
In-Reply-To:
<192cbce8ed47e288...@ulb.ac.be>
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Bruno, your postulate of testability is falling into
obsolescence. Proof within the model can be applied
to testable events within the model. If the model
proves too narrow, you have to 'assume' beyond and
'theorize' beyond the in-model testability. Then,
later on, you may find indications whether your
assumed novelty is 'solid' or discardable.
Most of the discussions on this list since the early
90s are non-testable. I cannot measure the blood
pressure of the white rabbit or the length of all the
universes. Hal Ruhl (and myself, not far from his)
presented some worldview without testable origins.
We should not 'wall in' ourselves into the existing
framework of a testable ambiance if we want to think
further. Justifiability is another question, but it
can be raised later on.
The same may apply to the 'screening' by human logic
(formal or not) and we have plenty of examples on this
list when human logic was not applied as a liiting
model. I would not restrict nature (te wholeness) to
anything we can muster in our capabilities.
Just a thought
John Mikes
Lee Corbin
> Russell's (wasnt it Bernard Williams'?) criticism of the cogito is just to
> say that Descartes added non certainties to his certainty. The assumption of
> an 'I' to recieve the 'Thoughts'. Nevertheless, with regards to the hardcore
> 'realist', this isnt going to be much comfort. As much as possible he wants
> the world to be as it seems to be, so he side steps problems about
> perception and subjectivity and very much wants to avoid any introspection
> whatsoever. But, one would think that the existance of a self at every
> space/time crosshair of 'here' by 'now' was most likely one 'reality' he
> could swallow about introspection. But, sure enough, the 'I' is assumed. It
> isnt certain. The realist should start banging his drum again.
Well, okay, since I have a little time, I'll do so.
The realist does *not* want the world to be "as it seems to be". No,
the realist focuses on the fact that a wholly independent world "out
there" exists and existed before he did. In fact, it is the subjectivists
who start calling their own unassailable introspections "reality".
The only real problems about perception and subjectivity are scientific
ones, having to do with the way that brains create models of (outside)
reality and also of themselves in it, and also---often to the point of
diminishing returns---models of themselves thinking about their
perceptions.
> But subjectivity is certain.
Since the only thing that is certain is "I think therefore I am" or
"...I am thinking", it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile
knowledge is certain. All knowledge is conjectural. To be fair,
you should google for "Pan Critical Rationalism" if you have not
already read up on it.
Lee
Stephen Paul King
Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist
accept that "a wholly independent world "out there" exists and existed
before he did" and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
"independent world" are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
particular observational context?
I am claiming that we should not conflate *existence* with *property
definiteness*.
Onward!
Stephen
----- Original Message -----
From: "Lee Corbin" <lco...@tsoft.com>
To: "EverythingList" <everyth...@eskimo.com>
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 11:28 PM
Subject: RE: subjective reality
snip
Lee Corbin
> Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist
> accept that "a wholly independent world "out there" exists and existed
> before he did" and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
> "independent world" are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
> particular observational context?
My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum
physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the "independent
world" are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational
context (as you write).
For example, if today I ascertain certain properties of, oh, say, the
relative sizes and populations of a number of North American cities,
then it is best to regard those as entirely fixed. That is, that they
are *completely* unaffected by measurement. (Which is entirely true
up to bone-picking.) Evolution in fact did not at all prepare me to
deal with things whose properties emerge only upon measurement, as
witnessed by the absolute and dumbfounded astonishment of early 20th
century physicists.
My bottom line: the specification of a particular observational context
makes a difference *only* on the microscopic level. Now yes, it's true
that solid objects---according to our best theories---retain their
integrity only because of quantum effects, but in this and all normal
macroscopic effects, stability emerges as a statistical and overwhelmingly
probable phenomenon.
> I am claiming that we should not conflate *existence* with *property
> definiteness*.
What is the harm for other than microscopic phenomena?
Lee
John M
since we have only our subjective access to "out
there" does it make any difference if it is "REALLY?"
like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
different?
Provided that there IS indeed something - not 'out
there' because we are IN IT as well. We assume so.
Then again Descart has been updated to:
"I am thinking therefore I think I am"
All the rest of this thread is up to our model we
chose to abide by, including quantum science or the
soul.
Happy solipsism! - your own one, not Google's.
John Mikes
--- Lee Corbin <lco...@tsoft.com> wrote:
>....SNIP
Lee Corbin
> Lee and Stephen:
> since we have only our subjective access to "out
> there" does it make any difference if it is "REALLY?"
> like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
> different?
You write "we have only our subjective access to
[what is out there]". Yes, and from that we have
two choices: we can focus on the *appearances* of
the outside world, and try to formulate and understand
how it seems to us and how it looks to us
OR
We can formulate theories about what is really out
there, constantly trying to compensate for the errors
and partial understandings those theories will have.
To do the latter means keeping firmly in mind that
the best understandings will come from objective
scientific study of neurons, physics, people, and
things.
So you ask, "does it make any difference if it is "REALLY?"
like we interpret it?"
It is a scientific fact that it *cannot be* "like we
interpret it", except in the most wonderful and marvelous
way that evolution has provided: namely, the myriad ways
that one has an extremely good idea of about where
visible objects "really are" in relation to oneself,
amazing sensitivity to motions "out there" via sound
waves, and so on. We must constantly bow to the utter
marvelousness of how accurate on the whole the mappings
are.
> Provided that there IS indeed something - not 'out
> there' because we are IN IT as well. We assume so.
Well, I don't assume so. WHAT is not 'out there'?
That which Bruno (and I) call the ineffable impressions
we get of that which is out there? Yes---but so what?
The machine *must* have (or rather *be*) a map of what
is out there, or it doesn't work right.
Lee
daddy...@aol.com
Perhaps I'm intruding since you didn't address this to me, regarding
your rhetorical question:
> since we have only our subjective access to "out
> there" does it make any difference if it is "REALLY?"
> like we interpret it, or in an untraceable manner:
> different?
Didn't you practically give the answer in your recent
"memory-prediction" post?
You wrote:
> I hate to include my solution, but I think I ought to:
> since the (undefined) mind is a-temporal and
> a-spatial, we can go back to the event to be
> remembered and take a second look. And a 3rd one. What
> we see NOW is not entirely identical to what we saw
> with the past mindset earlier, so our recollection is
> not machine-like.
In other words, if we take only one instance of subjective access to
"reality" and note that there is a difference between what we observe
and the "true" reality, even though we don't know what the difference
is, how do we know we won't be able to ascertain some (if not all) of
that difference by (possibly later in time, but not necessarily)
looking at is from a different perspective, ad infinitum? A belief in
an "objective" reality gives us motivation to keep going back and
looking at things from a different perspective. Otherwise we would end
up in one of the other camps I've mentioned before: insanity or
despair. (By the way, Russell, I think that using the anthropic
principle is a cop out at this point.)
Tom Caylor
Stephen Paul King
First I would like to thank you for working hard on this question. In
doing this you are challenging me to refine my ideas and explanations and
thus you are helping me a great deal. That being said, I would like to
refute your "common sense Realism" and show that it is missing the most
salient point of Realism: that it not have any "cracks" through which
anything "unreal" might slip.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Lee Corbin" <lco...@tsoft.com>
To: "EverythingList" <everyth...@eskimo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 1:37 AM
Subject: RE: subjective reality
> Stephen writes
>
>> Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a
>> Realist
>> accept that "a wholly independent world "out there" exists and existed
>> before he did" and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
>> "independent world" are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
>> particular observational context?
> [LC]
> My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum
> physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the "independent
> world" are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational
> context (as you write).
[SPK]
If we are to be consistent with the dictum "all is amplitudes that add"
we must admit that such assertions are a posteriori and not a priori, thus
the problem of explaining the appearance of *definiteness*.
It can be unassailably proven that one cannot embed a quantum universe
inside a classical universe and that one can embed *at least one* classical
universe within a quantum universe. What does this imply? It implies that
the *property definiteness* that comes along with classical universes is
something that cannot be taken as *existing prior to the specification" of
an observational context!
All of the claims that "many macroscopic properties of the "independent
world" are indeed *definite* before specification..." are ignoring that that
entire "independent world" is knowable AFTER the fact of comparing the
observations of many observers. When we assume the contrary we are ignoring
the fact that "what we know" - the content of our OMs as it where- was
specified after the act of having the experience.
We can point to the idea that Numbers and their relationships exist as
such without any dependence on some mathematician's scribbles on a
blackboard, and I would say that that is true, but the notion of the
"meaningfulness" of the concept of numbers, here a case of *property
definiteness*, requires that at least one mathematician scribble on a
blackboard somewhere AND that that scribbling "means" something to some
other mathematician.
A skeptic could point out that chickens scratching in the dirt could
reproduce exactly the same arrangements of points, lines, etc. that make up
"2+2 = 4", but does it mean anything to the chickens? No! Meaningfulness
requires something *to whom it has meaning* and the same applies here to our
idea of an "independent world".
> [LC]
> For example, if today I ascertain certain properties of, oh, say, the
> relative sizes and populations of a number of North American cities,
> then it is best to regard those as entirely fixed. That is, that they
> are *completely* unaffected by measurement. (Which is entirely true
> up to bone-picking.) Evolution in fact did not at all prepare me to
> deal with things whose properties emerge only upon measurement, as
> witnessed by the absolute and dumbfounded astonishment of early 20th
> century physicists.
[SPK]
I strip and fall headlong over your use of the phrase "...then it is
best to regard those as..."! This is what convinces me that you are arguing
for a "common sense realism" and not a realism that can be used without such
caveats!
I have tried many times to talk to you on the phone about the problem in
Einstein's quip, in reaction to Bohr's ideas, that "the Moon does not top
existing just because he is not looking at it", or something along those
lines. The problem is that Common Sense Realist, like yourself and Einstein,
neglect the simple fact that while they are not looking at the moon
directly, the particular world that they are contemplating includes causal
relations that include the moon with its particular properties.
The problem is that if we are going to be consistent with our claim that
the properties of the world or anything in it are *fixed* and "*completely*
unaffected by measurement" then one must be sure to remove each and every
aspect of their actuality that goes into the act of fixing that
definiteness. Here, again, is that "crack" that through which "unreality" is
oozing.
I do not like this unreality one bit and thus am trying to patch up
Realism so it does not have this problem.
> [LC]
> My bottom line: the specification of a particular observational context
> makes a difference *only* on the microscopic level. Now yes, it's true
> that solid objects---according to our best theories---retain their
> integrity only because of quantum effects, but in this and all normal
> macroscopic effects, stability emerges as a statistical and overwhelmingly
> probable phenomenon.
[SPK]
"*ONLY*"! I'm sorry Lee, but that does not cut it! Your argument is just
too positivist for me... If we are going to be consistent then we have to
own up to the REAL implications of your last sentence here:
> solid objects---according to our best theories---retain their
> integrity only because of quantum effects, but in this and all normal
> macroscopic effects, stability emerges as a statistical and overwhelmingly
> probable phenomenon.
> > [SPK]
>> I am claiming that we should not conflate *existence* with *property
>> definiteness*.
> [LC]
> What is the harm for other than microscopic phenomena?
[SPK]
Oh my! Are we not expecting our models of the world to be consistent?
This is like in the theory superstrings where everything is neatly explained
and accounted for except for the pesky little things about not being
background independent, no evidence of superpartners, etc.
I am, working on an idea as to how the appearance of "property
definiteness" comes to be, such that Common Sense Realism works *when we
ignore little details*, but that is for another post. First I need to get
you to admit that the assumption of a priori property definiteness is an
obstacle to the advance of physics.
Onward!
Stephen
chris peck
>I'm sure that more than one philosopher has made this criticism.
Including yourself. I agree with the criticism, but I don’t see its
relevance with regards to the importance of subjectivity and introspection
with regards to knowledge. I admire Descartes as a man, not so much as a
philosopher. I admire his method more than his results, he looked inwards.
Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless others. These people were the
forefathers of science, not the resistance to it. Europe, having been freed
from the authority of dogma by commerce and free enterprise, these people
voiced a challenge that had been long suppressed.
>I think you are attacking a straw man "realist".
Im challenging comments and attitudes I saw on this board. Introspection was
deemed an archaic relic of pre 16th century superstition, when in fact the
cogito was the cornerstone of the enlightenment and has been important ever
since. Not just in substance but in method too. People might not be happy
about 'souls' and worse 'soul stuff', but really Descartes participated in
putting thinking and rationalising back on the map.
I doubt very much for instance that there would be cognitive psychology were
it not for the work of Descartes filtered through Chomskian Linguistics. Our
‘conscious’ robot is a product of the idea that there are innate mental
structures. It’s the pattern and/or process – computable function - that has
become important in philosophy of mind - even if its at the most basic level
of a stimulated neural nets, weighted sums et al. We have reached this point
because in a subjective sense we all experience these intractable
‘processes’ first hand, like finding a word once lost at the tip of your
tongue. How do we know about that? Because we experience it!
It’s the method that’s worth saving, not the indivisible soul languishing
somewhere near the penal gland. Its not even whether souls provide a good
account of identity, it’s the method that Im defending, and the method that
I saw attacked. So far, I’m still convinced Im right, which is very rare.
Best Regards
Chris.
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Lee Corbin
> I would like to refute your [Lee's] "common sense Realism" and
> show that it is missing the most salient point of Realism: that
> it not have any "cracks" through which anything "unreal" might
> slip.
An interestingly stated goal: it *sounds* as though you've written
as preamble to the rest of your post that we need to abandon any
system that keeps out the unreal. Well, to each his own!
> > Stephen writes
> >> Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist
> >> accept that "a wholly independent world "out there" exists and existed
> >> before he did" and yet can admit that the particular properties of this
> >> "independent world" are not *definite* prior to the specification of a
> >> particular observational context?
> > [LC]
> > My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum
> > physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the "independent
> > world" are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational
> > context (as you write).
>
> If we are to be consistent with the dictum "all is amplitudes that add"
Well, my phrasing of that observation of what QM really boils down to is:
"At the basis of things are amplitudes that add".
> we must admit that such assertions are a posteriori and not a priori, thus
> the problem of explaining the appearance of *definiteness*.
They are epistemologically later (as our knowledge of objects came first),
but ontologically prior. That is, we believe that QM provides a theoretical
basis to most of physics.
> It can be unassailably proven that one cannot embed a quantum universe
> inside a classical universe and that one can embed *at least one* classical
> universe within a quantum universe. What does this imply? It implies that
> the *property definiteness* that comes along with classical universes is
> something that cannot be taken as *existing prior to the specification* of
> an observational context!
I'm not too sure what you mean by "to embed". If we are seeking to *explain*
---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical physics,
but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to
be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating in---*explaining*.)
You speak of A existing prior to B. I'm not real clear what that means.
Ontologically or epistemologically?
> All of the claims that "many macroscopic properties of the "independent
> world" are indeed *definite* before specification..." are ignoring that that
> entire "independent world" is knowable AFTER the fact of comparing the
> observations of many observers. When we assume the contrary we are ignoring
> the fact that "what we know" - the content of our OMs as it were- was
> specified after the act of having the experience.
It seems rather false to me that the entire independent world is knowable
only AFTER the fact of comparing observations. Indeed no. The tiger, for
example, is a device for ascertaining the most important aspects of its
existence. Robinson Crusoe also makes hypotheses and conjectures (and
refutes many of them!) with help from no one. His primate nervous system
is pretty good at it. So a single "observer" can know quite a bit.
You say that what we know is specified (or becomes definite) only after
the act of having an experience. I submit that 99% of the knowledge of
a particular human does not work this way: the knowledge implantation
occurs at the same time that the experience occurs. It would have been
a costly mistake for nature to wait around for the "internal philosopher"
to ponder the importance of his experience before some knowledge generated
and some actions taken.
Time and space compel me to ignore the remainder of your long post, sorry.
Lee
Lee Corbin
> I admire Descartes as a man [I would have said scientist and mathematician],
> not so much as a philosopher. I admire his method more than his results,
> he looked inwards.
He also did a tremendous amount of good work in science and math.
> Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless others. These people were the
> forefathers of science, not the resistance to it. Europe, having been freed
> from the authority of dogma by commerce and free enterprise, these people
> voiced a challenge that had been long suppressed.
Yes
> Brent wrote
>
> > I think you are attacking a straw man "realist".
>
> Im challenging comments and attitudes I saw on this board. Introspection was
> deemed an archaic relic of pre 16th century superstition, when in fact the
> cogito was the cornerstone of the enlightenment and has been important ever
> since.
Interesting that you denigrate the guy's philosophy (so do I), but
then say this. Yes, he did contribute to the foundations of rationalism.
> Not just in substance but in method too. People might not be happy
> about 'souls' and worse 'soul stuff', but really Descartes participated in
> putting thinking and rationalising back on the map.
Yes.
> I doubt very much for instance that there would be cognitive psychology were
> it not for the work of Descartes filtered through Chomskian Linguistics. Our
> ‘conscious’ robot is a product of the idea that there are innate mental
> structures. It’s the pattern and/or process – computable function - that has
> become important in philosophy of mind - even if its at the most basic level
> of a stimulated neural nets, weighted sums et al. We have reached this point
> because in a subjective sense we all experience these intractable
> ‘processes’ first hand, like finding a word once lost at the tip of your
> tongue. How do we know about that? Because we experience it!
Yes, that's right. That's how we first knew something was going on
in humans. So far as I know, the best way to then investigate the
phenomenon is not through further introspection---however helpful
that may be in suggesting hypotheses---but by actual lab work in
psychology.
> It’s the method that’s worth saving, not the indivisible soul languishing
> somewhere near the penal gland. Its not even whether souls provide a good
> account of identity, it’s the method that Im defending, and the method that
> I saw attacked. So far, I’m still convinced Im right, which is very rare.
Might you say a few more words about the method you refer to?
I know that I may be asking a lot with the following so please ignore
it if inconvenient: about this "method": is there a body of work
based upon this method? Is it at all falsifiable? (perhaps an
unfair question---I don't know.) What other practitioners have
there been?
Lee
Stathis Papaioannou
>The realist does *not* want the world to be "as it seems to be". No,
>the realist focuses on the fact that a wholly independent world "out
>there" exists and existed before he did. In fact, it is the subjectivists
>who start calling their own unassailable introspections "reality".
>
>The only real problems about perception and subjectivity are scientific
>ones, having to do with the way that brains create models of (outside)
>reality and also of themselves in it, and also---often to the point of
>diminishing returns---models of themselves thinking about their
>perceptions.
>
> > But subjectivity is certain.
>
>Since the only thing that is certain is "I think therefore I am" or
>"...I am thinking", it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile
>knowledge is certain. All knowledge is conjectural. To be fair,
>you should google for "Pan Critical Rationalism" if you have not
>already read up on it.
From: http://clublet.com/c/c/why?PanCriticalRationalism
"Currently, Pancritical Rationalists are people who believe that there is an
external reality but that they will never be sure they know it, that no
position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one, (or
some) will turn out to be better (closer to reality) than others in the
light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all
its positions and propositions open to criticism."
In other words, you believe that there is a real physical world (because
this theory has great explanatory power and is absolutely consistent with
every experience you have ever had, as well as the fact that it is obvious
and intuitive), but if evidence should come to light showing that the theory
is wrong, then you'll change your mind. Is this correct? I can't see much
that could be found objectionable in this position.
--Stathis Papaioannou
_________________________________________________________________
Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search!
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
John M
*I'm using the term "concrete reality" to refer to
what some people
call "common sense reality", that there is stuff out
there,
independent of us as observers. Sometimes I might use
"objective
reality"
for the 1st person plural reality that the AP
guarantees for subsets
of observers.
Isn't this what was called earlier the perception of
reality?
John M
--- Russell Standish <r.sta...@unsw.edu.au> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 16, 2005 at 01:08:12PM -0400,
> daddy...@aol.com wrote:
SNIP
kurtl...@aim.com
As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive
realism
and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits of introspection
I have to take issue with half of what you say below:
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin <lco...@tsoft.com>
...
>I'm not too sure what you mean by "to embed". If we are seeking to
*explain*
>---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical
physics,
>but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary
activity to
>be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating
in---*explaining*.)
...
Lee
Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics but NEITHER can we
explain
from QM the classical world we know and love with its well defined and
assigned elements of (naive) physical reality that you so much
cherish, I am afraid!
If we did there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky
long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger Cat's around to
haunt us...
You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply and square!
I hope this does not add to your grumpiness. The miracle of experience
you talk about is still there, of course. Even more so, perhaps.
Regards,
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
________________________________________________________________________
Bruno Marchal
Le 15-aoūt-05, ą 21:14, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> [GK]
> The point I am trying to make is that a lot of your back and forth
> discourse on the 1st versus the 3rd person misses the
> 2nd person in between them! More specifically: I am quite convinced
> that one good part of what we call "the Mind" or
> "the Self" and perhaps even "Consciousness" is generated by social
> interaction rather than by any "inner realm of subjectivity".
> I suspect this is true about all of what we call "symbolic" or
> "meaningful" including a lot of the support for mathematical
> understanding though I guess I am a platonist to the extent that I
> think of mathematical objects as existing independently
> of any of our semantics in a realm of their own.
Nice your platonism. Although it is not entirely relevant, I do not
believe consciousness is generated by social interactions. I think
consciousness has evolved with the ability of self-moving by the need
to anticipate collisions (thus consciousness evolved from interaction
but not necessarily social interaction (unless you call the invention
of the "cables" by amoebas a social interaction). Self-consciousness is
perhaps due to social interaction. I will give you a "definition" of
consciousness below.
>
> As for consciousness I do agree with you that whatever explains it
> may seriously require a revision of our oldest and,
> very possibly, some of our newest prejudices about reality but
> certainly most of outr old prejudices about... consciousness-
> yours (and mine) included! ;-)
Consciousness can be defined by the first person high level description
of the result of an unconscious (totally automated) *guess* that there
is at least one observer-moment (world, state, etc.). More simply:
consciousness is the belief in a world.
With such a definition it is possible to explain both
1) why consciousness has a role and which one: the role consists in
giving us the ability of self-speeding up ourself relatively to our
most probable (Turing) universal environment.
2) why consciousness is ineffable (not justifiable).
But then it explains also how the physical laws are generated logically
by the Lobian machine's dream (in that verifiable way described in my
papers).
See also the work by Helmholtz on perception.
> I would rather not bring Penrose to this discussion though he is
> someone I much appreciate and will not easily dismiss. Unfortunately I
> can't claim I understand his Byzantine time-asymmetric proposals as
> alternatives for QM and GR enough
> to criticize them, and I am not alone in this.
In the "emperor new clothes" Penrose is wrong in its use of Godel's
theorem. In "the shadows of the mind" Penrose made the necessary
correction, but he puts it into parentheses and does not take it really
into account. But I find Penrose very courageous to tackle the
fundamental questions. Godel's incompleteness cannot be used to show
that we are not machine, just that we cannot known which machine we are
(and thus which computations support us). This is related to the
mathematical form of the first person comp indeterminacy. The physical
laws emerge from the border of machine's intrinsic ignorance; a measure
on or of incompleteness.
>
> But I thought about your COMP and such over the weekend and I
> realized I have to take back what I said above! I can
> perfectly well imagine a world in which no one has yet built a
> conscious machine from scratch but someone has found a
> procedure for replacing one's consciousness by a digital one in the
> way you describe. Why should one imply the other?
To make a conscious machine (if that can be tested!) from scratch does
not logically imply we are machine (machine think does not entail that
only machine think (no OCCAM in logic or math).
And to be able to copy a human machine (assuming comp) does not imply
we can build a conscious machine from scratch).
None of the implications exist.
>
> [GK]
> Oh, I am sorry, than! As you speak so much of acts-of-faith I
> concluded, too soon I gather, that you took all those years of toil
> as a consequence of your beliefs. Silly me!
No problem. Some people would like to think I am a defenser of comp.
But I am not. I am a defenser of the idea that we can do philosophy or
theology still keeping the modesty of the scientific attitude. It needs
just courage if only to acknowledge that we are just at the very
beginning, and that until now many fundamental questions are just tabu.
>
> > [GK]
> > Oh but you make it sound so easy! See: its is the "derive physics >
> from computer science" that I have my first problem with!
>
> That is the object of the proof I gave. The proof is 100% third
> person accessible, like any proof. What is hard, perhaps, is that the
> proof is done in a field which is in the intersection of theoretical
> physics, theoretical computer science and theoretical cognitive
> science.
>
> [GK]
> And just how sure are you that there is such an intersection? Or is
> that also an article of faith?
Not at all. I know it can sound weird, but once you take seriously the
comp hyp (and the existence of the first person subjectivity), then
physics and cognitive science are reduced to computer science (itself
reducible to number theory).
Logically you can still believe in a material world, but this one will
have zero explanation power, even for explaining the appearance of
matter. So with OCCAM ...
> [GK]
> If I thought Svozil and Chaitin were near at all I might understand
> you better. At least we agree that Wolfram is wrong!
It is a key point. Perhaps you could read my presentation of the steep
by step Universal Dovetailer Argument (the proof that comp entails the
reversal between theoretical computer science and natural sciences) I
have made online for Joel (a defender of Wolfram and cellular automata
approach in physics). The links are: ... mmh the net is sleeping: see
the link "UDA step by step" in my webpage.
> Now don't worry, I believe more in the quantum than in comp! I
> thought, in the past, that I would quickly refute comp with quantum
> mechanics. But the fact are there, comp, as far as it has been tested
> implies everything we can deduce from the quantum. Comp is not yet
> refuted, and evidences add up that the quantum is derivable from comp
> (or from numbers through comp).
>
> Of course, I believe in the quantum, but if comp is correct, I can no
> more believe in "1)", i.e. I must abandon the existence of a physical
> world, and the quantum describes only the way machine dreams
> interference generate the stable illusion of solidity and time from
> arithmetical truth (under the form of confirmable bets, the Lobian Bp
> & Dp).
>
> [GK]
> Lots of "ifs" in there!
I count just one. IF comp.
> Since you found me circular let me just ask you this:
>
> If the physical world does not exist (you say that COMP implies this)
> why even bother deriving physics? Can't machines
> dream just like we do, about lovely, terrifying and yet unphysical
> things?
Alas, "normal" machines get trapped in deep interfering computations
making their most probable histories looking completely physical.
Actually it is the the vanishing of a primitive substancial universe
which forces us to retrieve the appearances of the physical laws (in a
verifiable way).
> [GK]
> Maybe there is a typo in what you say above because if that argument
> actually says that "any machine betting correctly and consistently on
> any piece of "observable" reality, will bet that to simulate that
> piece of reality exactly, there is a need of simulating an infinity of
> computations" than I would not take it to Vegas (;-) ! This is because
> we can in fact, not just bet but,
> predict, with certainty, and simulate with arbitrary precision, the
> behavior of a good number "pieces of observed reality" by
> themselves and even verify the certainty of those predictions with a
> finite collection of finite algorithms which is what we
> do call physics (classical or quantum, theoretical or empirical) ).
> What we cannot do is to reproduce by any finite set of algorithms
> worth betting on the type of persistent built-in correlations that
> pairs (and trios, etc..) of these pieces of
> observable reality manifestly carry between them once they have been,
> once, part of the same piece! Even coins
> don't toss that way! That is where the "kabosh" is! There is no
> dovetailing out of it...
Remember that quantum computer does not violate Church thesis, and that
complete indeterminacy can be simulated by iterated self-duplications.
Again, see the Universal Dovetailer Argument.
>
> Also if Newtonian physics is enough to shoot down your hypothesis
> than it must be dead already since Newtonian physics
> is the correspondence limit of QM and QM is right!!! I really don't
> follow you here...
Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be extracted
from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman integral (see
my paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf
for a little summary.
> [GK]
> Well, again, I would much like to know what these "solid foundations
> for the quantum" are but am happy in my believe
> that particular(?) physical laws are *already* real general laws and
> indeed apply to all possible observers even without
> your help or George Levy's opposition!!!
The advantage of deriving physics from comp is that it gives at once
the (comp)-correct physical laws. They are solid because they rely only
on number-theoretical relations. Physicists have not that chance, they
can hope having find the last theory, and as Lee says, it is only
conjectural. If you derive Schroedinger Equation from Machines'
introspection, well, if you believe in comp you don't need to even look
at nature. You need to look at nature only to test comp.
> If I stop believing in gravity can I fly? (:-)
It is probably more correct to say that if you begin believing in
gravity that you might fly.
(Sorry for looking as if you were serious :-)
>
> [GK]
> My fault I am sorry, I should have written "interaction" instead of
> causation. I fully agree with you about the latter.
OK. Now "interaction" is the most difficult part to correctly get from
comp. Here quantum physics has made impressive progresses. Logicians
have themselves made progress, mainly through the rather interesting
"geometry of interaction" by J. Y. Girard. We can come back on this
later.
[...]
> Now, I could prove that all of them are tractable in the sense that
> less than a CETI project could solve them (like you can simulate a
> <few-bits>-quantum computer with enough classical bits.
>
> [GK]
> You lost me here. Are they tractable or not? I wasn't aware that the
> CETI project can solve intractable problems !!!
Come on. "intractable" problems can be tractable by brute force when
the number of arguments is not too big. Think about the truth-table
method for deciding tautologies. 2^n does not grow so quickly. Now the
quantum tautologies are not so big. The problem is that I am not
finding, nor really searching, a good cheap and not too heavy Lisp
Interpreter. I have also find ways to simplify some of them. We will
see. It is true that O prefer to concentrate myself on the enunciation
of the problem than on its solutions ...
It is perhaps time I begin to (re)-awake my programs for G, G* ...
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/G.html
> Seriously for a second: I doubt that I know enough to understand all
> your demonstrations and arguments or judge their
> correctness in detail, and I am no Dr. Phil, but I have the distinct
> impression that you are too enamoured with your COMP
> hyp to let it go. Is this possible?
I am not enamoured with comp. I am just overblashed (if that is the
term) by the infinitely fascinating consequences of comp.
You could say I am a little bit enamoured with the Lobian Machine,
though. She is a very sensible person. If you ask her just if she is
conscious, or if she beliefs in one (at least) observer-moment (see
above my definition of consciousness), then she crash!
Actually she crash in front of most interesting questions!
Thanks to Solovay's logics G and G* you can now resume infinite
conversations with her without crashing, and even figure out why she is
so sensible, and why she seems to be forever unsatisfied and so
demanding in space time information and memory, and so error prone, if
not lying (or joking!) in front of fears and/or contrarieties.
You can read "Forever Undecided" by Raymond Smullyan for a gentle
introduction to the theorems of Godel, Lob and Solovay, and to the
modal logic G.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
> Chris Peck:
>> But subjectivity is certain.
>
> Lee: Since the only thing that is certain is "I think therefore I am"
> or
> "...I am thinking", it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile
> knowledge is certain. All knowledge is conjectural. To be fair,
> you should google for "Pan Critical Rationalism" if you have not
> already read up on it.
>
>
Only scientific knowledge is conjectural.
Only third person communicable knowledge is conjectural.
You did acknowledge the ineffable knowledge of what is is like having a
friend putting a needle in your finger.
And, of course, I would not be happy if when I complain about headache
to my Doctor if he tells me "your headache? Pure conjecture!"
First person knowledge is not conjectural, at least not consciously so,
nor consistently so.
It is Descartes fixed point of its systematic doubting procedure, when
you doubt that you doubt making up an unavoidable place for an
indubitable reality, though ineffable.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal
Le 16-août-05, à 04:59, John M a écrit :
> (The original went only to Bruno's addressw)
> To: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>,
> everyth...@eskimo.com
> In-Reply-To:
> <192cbce8ed47e288...@ulb.ac.be>
> MIME-Version: 1.0
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
>
> Bruno, your postulate of testability is falling into
> obsolescence.
Thanks John! (I agree that testability should not be an obsession, but
once you get it in a field traditionnally considered has making
untestable propositions , it is hard to resist pointing on the feature,
and also, it is the best way to attract people for many other
scientific community, among the contemplators, for example.
> Proof within the model can be applied
> to testable events within the model.
Logicians make jumps back and forth between theories and models (note
the plural).
> If the model
> proves too narrow, you have to 'assume' beyond and
> 'theorize' beyond the in-model testability. Then,
> later on, you may find indications whether your
> assumed novelty is 'solid' or discardable.
OK.
> Most of the discussions on this list since the early
> 90s are non-testable.
I would add many nuances. Thay are degree of non-testability. Tests can
be indirect, or on some horizon. Tests can address matter of
consistency or necessity.
> I cannot measure the blood
> pressure of the white rabbit or the length of all the
> universes. Hal Ruhl (and myself, not far from his)
> presented some worldview without testable origins.
But it is very hard to prove something is not testable. You need to
anticipate many conclusions of your saying before.
> We should not 'wall in' ourselves into the existing
> framework of a testable ambiance if we want to think
> further.
We should not wall ourself. Comma.
> Justifiability is another question, but it
> can be raised later on.
> The same may apply to the 'screening' by human logic
> (formal or not) and we have plenty of examples on this
> list when human logic was not applied as a liiting
> model.
Take Lobian logics. (I am joking, partially ;)
> I would not restrict nature (te wholeness) to
> anything we can muster in our capabilities.
No. But my point is that if we just take digital mechanism seriously
enough then, necessarily, the observable wholeness emerges from what
lobian machines can dream about their capacities.
The beauty of it, is that, continuing assuming comp after that
reversal, it can be shown that it is NOT a restriction of Nature or of
Whatever. By incompleteness, to believe it is a restriction, is a lack
of modesty in front of the unknown (assuming comp!!!).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi Bruno,
Thanks for indulging my skepticism. I think I am getting a clearer
picture of what you are up to. There is only one
point in our exchange below to which I would like to respond and than
I have some unrelated comments. I will
erase the rest of the conversation to which I don't have much to add.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
Hi Godfrey,
Le 15-aoūt-05, ą 21:14, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
>
> Also if Newtonian physics is enough to shoot down your hypothesis >
than it must be dead already since Newtonian physics
> is the correspondence limit of QM and QM is right!!! I really don't
> follow you here...
[BM]
Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be
extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman
integral (see my paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf
for a little summary.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
[GK]
I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the "classical
world" from QM, as I pointed out to Lee, but one can surely object to a
"third party" theory from the fact that it does not reproduce a
classical world any better than quantum
mechanics. This is a complicated issue because:
(a) Classical physics does not explain the "classical world" either as
it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance,
which only QM explains.
(b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena
that we do observe as part of the "classical world"
i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum
etc...
In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a way
that would not obviously violate the correspondence
limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above.
But do not worry because I think you are a lot better
shot by QM.
Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP:
I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a
full statement of your hypothesis since you were not
kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read
French that well and your English paper is somewhat
sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page :
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to
the following sentence:
"Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical
Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following
three sub-hypotheses:"
after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and
will just short as 1) YD for "Yes-doctor", 2) CT for
Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism.
My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be
called an hypothesis! CT, as the name indicates,
is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable but favored by
overwhelming heuristic support. I know that there are
some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation
could produce a counterexample to
shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is
unlikely. And AR is a metaphysical position which I
happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove or
empirically test (nor do I have any idea
on how to do it! Do you?)
Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the
rest of your argument to go. But I find that
it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to
have to stand in company of the other two to assert
its merits!!! In other words as
(1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR
(2) CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we
both like them that way, which is the same).
(3) No one that we know has been able to extract conclusions such as
yours from CT & AR without YD (right)
would you have any objections to us concentrating, from here on, on
your "YD hypothesis"?
I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real
interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not
need those two other huge "body guards" which I happen to be friends
with. OK?
If you agree with this I may have something interesting to tell you
about your idea that you have not anticipated!
Please,don't COMP out! Say "yes", Doctor Bruno!
-Godfrey
Bruno Marchal
Hi Godfray,
I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of
your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having
skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses.
> I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real
> interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not
> need those two other huge "body guards" which I happen to be friends
> with. OK?
I can say yes. Nevertheless, the "bodyguards" will appear necessary
when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer
scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of
my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the
Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it!
Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough).
None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out.
But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just print
it now.
A demain,
Bruno
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi Bruno,
Thanks for your assent on this. I am sure that CT and AR are needed,
at some point, for your really outrageous
conclusions. But I am sure you agree that they cannot save them if the
"Yes doctor" presumption can be shot
down by itself. Right? This would save me from having to read through
your Dovetail-Lob etc... argument which
is probably way above my head!
We obviously move in very different circles because I was taught by
very stubborn old strong AI types and cognoscendi
cognitivists and I have never heard anyone argue for something like
that YD hypothesis! But as you have conceded no one
needs it to defend the old-fashioned materialist functionalism credo
that you (and I) do not subscribe to anyway.
But I will wait for your other comments.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
To: kurtl...@aim.com
Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 19:48:35 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfray,
A demain,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
________________________________________________________________________
Lee Corbin
> As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive
> realism
Good heavens! How many times must it be said? What is going on
with people? There is a *clear* definition of "naive realism".
Try the almost always extremely reliable wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naive_realism
If one is very clear that information about events outside
the skin is conveyed to one's brain by layers of intermediate
processes, (usually beginning with emissions of photons or by
vibrations imparted to air), then you are *not* a naive realist.
Since this has come up so many times before---and not just on this
list---I'm really starting to wonder what the explanation is. You
can even find links on the web that confuse realism and naive
realism.
The acid test of what to call something is "do the adherents of
the view themselves use the term?". Then, in cases like this,
we see it for what it is: name calling.
> and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits
> of introspection. I have to take issue with half of
> what you say below:
Of course. Anyone who understands and believes in
PCR always invites criticism, as least as much as
he has time for.
> > I'm not too sure what you mean by "to embed".
> > If we are seeking to *explain*---if that is
> > what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by
> > classical physics, but we *can* explain classical
> > physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to
> > be---and the activity I'm most interesting in
> > participating in---*explaining*.)
>
> Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics
> but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical
> world we know and love with its well defined and
> assigned elements of (naive) physical reality
> that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did
> there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky
> long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger
> Cat's around to haunt us...
Quantum mechanics' greatest successes have included
explanations for what you cite. That is why QM is
accepted.
But you seem to be saying that the *correct* results
of classical physics cannot be obtained from QM. Surely
you don't mean that. Of course they can! If they could
not, then they'd be wrong!
True, classical physics *cannot* explain many phenomena,
such as why black bodies radiate the way that they do,
and this bothered 19th century physicist a great deal.
Planck was *forced* to come up with the concept of the
quantum, if he was to be able to explain.
> You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply
> and square!
Why, of course. Just how innocent of QM do you suppose
that I am? I invented the phrase "at the basis of things
are amplitudes that add" after a thorough study of Feynman's
volume 3. The multiplication obtains---at the very beginning
---simply from concatenating paths: you multiply amplitudes
to get a total amplitude for one path.
Your point about the squared modulus is well taken. Just why
*probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't
tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many
this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though
Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of
everything, though).
Lee
Russell Standish
>
> Your point about the squared modulus is well taken. Just why
> *probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't
> tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many
> this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though
> Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of
> everything, though).
>
> Lee
This is simply the Born rule - I give a derivation of the Born rule in
my paper "Why Occam's Razor". Some other people on this list have
asserted prior derivations of the Born rule also, which wouldn't
overly surprise me as its not that mysterious.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 R.Sta...@unsw.edu.au
Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
cha...@bigpond.net.au
>
> Colin writes
>
> > ACCURACY
> > Extent to which a measurement matches an international standard.
> >
> > REPEATABILITY
> > Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement.
> >
> > For example the SICK DME 2000 laser distance measurement instrument
> > has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm
> >
> > Why does this matter?
> >
> > Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not
> > matter what the accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are
> > repeatable, the systems behaviour will be repeatable...
>
> Sounds reasonable. And indeed, matches the *reliability* vs.
> *validity* of statistical measurements and performance. Does
> this distinction between accuracy and repeatability get the
> same kind of press that reliability vs. validity does?
>
I’m just talking about data sheets. Reliability is a 'mean time between failure' number in hours. 'Validity'? Dunno what that is. 'Availability'.... is another figure like reliability a %uptime, if you like, more to do with how much time is spent with the instrument out of service being calibrated.
When you buy instruments you have to understand the use to which it will be put. ‘Repeatability’ is an Ockham’s razor solution for instrumentation: it costs less! If the measurement’s accuracy matters outside the system being measured you must go for accuracy and get out your cheque book. All else equal it stands to reason that the cheaper option (repeatability) is what will be used by nature it will be selected.
> > So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion,
> > but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable
> > illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where
> > its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the
> > observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic
> > presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to
> > the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally
> > standardized RED #12398765).
> >
> > This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT
> > and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not
> > have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be
> > completely different and as long as the experience is
> > consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will
> > be the same "OUCH".
>
> Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to
> be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would
> not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an
> extremely important function for our survival as animals.
Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the measurement probe), is that our brain literally becomes hot? I don;t know about you, but to me very cold things feel like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to different thermal behaviour in the world.
Also this is not what is found in any experimental tests. The transduction at your fingertip (in the candle flame) makes use of the thermal effects on cell excitability in your finger nerves. Thinking the way you suggest is like saying that the voltmeter indicates voltage by altering the voltage of the volt meter chassis, as opposed to altering the display. A fairly agricultural analogy but descriptive enough.
There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none! That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves.
We simply don't have to have the argment: it's over.
>
> > Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your red'?
> > Haven't we all concluded that we'd never be able to
> > ascertain the difference because it really does not
> > matter?
>
> No, only the philosophically inclined ever ask that. And
> yes, they conclude (or should conclude) that it doesn't
> matter and is actually a wrong question. It's analogously
> bad to "What is it like to be a bat?" another question
> that only a philosopher would ask, and which just derails
> thinking into unproductive channels IMO.
>
I was trying to instill an understanding of the implications of repeatability vs accuracy from the point of view of ‘being’ the instrument.
The last thing I need to do is get philosophical! :-)
> > ...we all point to the object and agree its red....
> > repeatability.... meanwhile the actual physical reality
> > of 'redness' is simply irrelevant and may not represent
> > any real quality of the observed system at all...
>
> That's *possible*, of course. Sometimes brains malfunction from
> the viewpoint of evolution. It was, after all, "actual physical
> reality of redness"
>
> ****WARNING WARNING WARNING PHILOSOPHICAL DANGER ALERT USE OF
> COLOR IN PHILOSOPHY EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS****
>
> okay, okay, It was, after all, properties of objects conveyed
> by the wavelengths of photons they reflected that gave a survival
> advantage to some species while other species (e.g. canines) found
> that information to be irrelevant to survival.
Yeah. Measure the right properties _for you_ and paint the world with paint made from it and you get to live. A brilliant programming technique. Brutal but it works!
>
> > I really wish mathematicians and philosophers and theoreticians
> > would get out and get dirty in the real world some times.....
> > half of the damned wordfest would disappear immediately.
>
> Hear! Hear!
>
> > Grumpy today.... sorry.
>
> You ain't seen 'nothin. Wait until you are in your late fifties, pal.
>
> Lee
<marge simpson chuckle> :-) col
Lee Corbin
> > > So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion,
> > > but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable
> > > illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where
> > > its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the
> > > observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic
> > > presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to
> > > the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally
> > > standardized RED #12398765).
> > >
> > > This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT
> > > and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not
> > > have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be
> > > completely different and as long as the experience is
> > > consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will
> > > be the same "OUCH".
> >
> > Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to
> > be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would
> > not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an
> > extremely important function for our survival as animals.
>
> Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are
> saying is that the experiential quality of HOT,
> which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the
> meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the
> measurement probe), is that our brain literally
> becomes hot?
You think that I am saying that when one has an
experience of something being hot, the brain is
hot? What kind of a fool do you take me for,
anyway? How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F
where you went to elementary school?
So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion
above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns
out to be in your use of the word "intimately",
which I failed to infer correctly what you meant
by it.
I took you to mean "intimately related" in the sense
that there is a tight *causal* connection in the nervous
systems of animals between outside objects and "inside"
readings, and of course, it is *generally* true that
there is such a tight causal connection. But you meant
something a bit different, and I should have picked up
on it, sorry.
> I don't know about you, but to me very cold things feel
> like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to
> different thermal behaviour in the world.
Yes, I've heard of that before. Doesn't happen to me,
though. In any case, we easily see what is happening
here (we know all the facts). Evolution programmed
you to remove your hand post haste from anything
extreme in temperature either way, and I guess it didn't
affect the survival rates of our ancestors, as the idea
was just to bring the dangerous phenomenon to the
attention of your higher centers.
> There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences
> do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb!
> An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none!
> That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain
> material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves.
You are quite correct, but the statement "the experiences
do not match the physics of the real world" is really
misleading. Of course they have to match---to a certain
fidelity---the physics of the real world, or our ancestors
would have been unable to propagate as well. I needn't give
you countless examples of how, for example, your hand
reaches out rather unerringly for door handles when you
approach them. My reading of "experiences matching the
physics of the real world" include those numerous examples.
But I hope that you don't think that I'm ignorant of how
phantom limbs work (the very best book is Ramachandran's
"Phantoms of the Brain", which I highly recommend). But
after assuming that I thought that brains get hot, I just
don't know.
> We simply don't have to have the argument: it's over.
If you say so! (I did agree with the remaining parts of
your email.)
Lee
Lee Corbin
> > why *probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't
> > tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many
> > this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though
> > Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of
> > everything, though).
>
> This is simply the Born rule - I give a derivation of the Born rule in
> my paper "Why Occam's Razor". Some other people on this list have
> asserted prior derivations of the Born rule also, which wouldn't
> overly surprise me as its not that mysterious.
Is it in the part of http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/occam.html
that begins
QUANTUM MECHANICS
In the previous sections, I demonstrate that formal
mathematical systems are the most compressible, and
have highest measure amongst all members of the
Schmidhuber ensemble.
or if not, just where?
Lee
cha...@bigpond.net.au
Sloppy me. Yes you are right. Gazzumpt by the language again.
I was actually going to quote Ramachandran. Glad you did, for the rest of the list... there's a didactic role here...
Back to the measurement thing, just to be very clear....
The _event_ of the expression of the experiential quality in the brain is directly causally connected to the act of measurement(peripheral sensory neurons behaving appropriately). The experience itself (the detail of the quality thereof) could be anything (you could make sensing heat a sound if you wanted - synthesthesia, Ramachandran again). Exactly what experiential quality is selected for representation of hotness will be something for future biophysics to work out. My 'hot' and you 'hot' could be different.
In terms of brain operation as long as the resultant behaviour is appropriate and consistently used the quality of the experience is irrelevant.
The result is that an assumption that one can necessarily claim similarity of the physics of the real world and the brain physics of the behind experience is simply not justified. This does not mean that the physics of the distal world is not in some conformally mapped/useful way _similar_ to the physics of the experience. It just means that you cannot assume that the relationship.
Exactly what 'ism this is I don’t know. Indirect realism? It doesn’t matter much. Naïve realism is out. The philosophers of perception can retrofit the actual nomenclature situation after it’s sorted out by the biophysicists.
I think this encapsulates the position.
I declare you the winner of today's grumpy old guy contest.. :-)
Colin
chris peck
sure. Its known as doubt.
>I know that I may be asking a lot with the following so please ignore
>it if inconvenient: about this "method": is there a body of work
>based upon this method?
Yes. Science.
>>Is it at all falsifiable?
is anything?
>>What other practitioners have
>there been?
Anyone who has thought, "hmmm. Maybe its just me!" or "Goodness! That cant
be right".
Think of Descartes. On the way down he employs his method. Doubt, born of
subjectivity. THis part of his journey is successful. Its when he abandones
it and tries to re-establish the 'objective' realm that things go wrong.
Chris. ;)
_________________________________________________________________
Bruno Marchal
Le 17-aoūt-05, ą 19:20, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> [BM]
> Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be
> extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman
> integral (see my paper:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf
> for a little summary.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> [GK]
> I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the "classical
> world" from QM, as I pointed out to Lee,
OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists
that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a
"solution of the measurement problem". All measurements are just
interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to
me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where
F = ma can be deduced from the "sum on all histories". But this is
going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the
comp derivation. We can come back on this latter.
> but one can surely object to a "third party" theory from the fact that
> it does not reproduce a classical world any better than quantum
> mechanics. This is a complicated issue because:
>
> (a) Classical physics does not explain the "classical world" either
> as it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance,
> which only QM explains.
> (b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena
> that we do observe as part of the "classical world"
> i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum
> etc...
OK.
>
> In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a
> way that would not obviously violate the correspondence
> limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above.
> But do not worry because I think you are a lot better
> shot by QM.
To anticipate a little bit, I think this will be hard. From comp you
can deduce quickly the qualitative "many-relative state/worlds"
feature, the no-cloning theorem, the appearance of indeterminacy. I
told you Newtonian physics (with a single universe-history) would cause
much more problem to my approach.
>
>
> Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP:
>
> I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a
> full statement of your hypothesis since you were not
> kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read
> French that well and your English paper is somewhat
> sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page :
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
>
> where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to
> the following sentence:
>
> "Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical
> Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following
> three sub-hypotheses:"
>
> after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and
> will just short as 1) YD for "Yes-doctor", 2) CT for
> Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism.
>
> My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be
> called an hypothesis!
Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise
definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the
term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", "assumptions",
"hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way.
> CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable
> but favored by overwhelming heuristic support.
Not only overwhelming supports: there is the deep conceptual argument
that Kleene has discovered when he failed to refute Church's
"definition" of the computable functions. The argument is the closure
of the set of partial computable functions for the most transcendental
mathematical operation: diagonalization. Kleene invented the vocable
"Church thesis". The first to get Church's thesis is Emil Post (in the
early 19-twenties).
See (perhaps later) the diagonalization posts in this list (mentionned
in my web page).
> I know that there are
> some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation
> could produce a counterexample to
> shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is
> unlikely.
OK.
> And AR is a metaphysical position which I
> happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove
> or empirically test (nor do I have any idea
> on how to do it! Do you?)
Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a
platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a
sort of "cop out". Now, although 99,99999999 % of the mathematician are
platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the
week-end!).
>
> Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the
> rest of your argument to go. But I find that
> it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to
> have to stand in company of the other two to assert
> its merits!!! In other words as
>
> (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR
'course.
> (2) CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we
> both like them that way, which is the same).
I give the opportunity to make comp false in more than one way. If you
read the Maudlin paper, you will see that he consider the YD doctor (or
equivalent) as tautologically true (unlike the functionnalist
hypothesis). This is due to the fact that, unlike many older
computationalist or mechanist, I put no bound on the low-levelness of
the substitution level.
I can say yes to the doctor provided that he simulates my brain at the
chromodynamical level, including all partiocles having interacted with
any other particles in the past (in which case my brain is the
"physical universe" itself. My brain could be a quantum computer,
without violating comp. The no-cloning theorem does not interfere.
> (3) No one that we know has been able to extract conclusions such as
> yours from CT & AR without YD (right)
This is a subtle question. The *necessity* of the reversal is hardly
understandable without the YD assumption. But once you grasp the
necessity of the reversal, then the very derivation of natural science
from computer science does not use it at all. Indeed the cognitive
science's "grand-mother" is completely substituted by the Lobian
Machine at this stage. So, with OCCAM razor, once enough of physics is
derived, you can eliminate the grand-mother and the whole YD
assumption. Some mathematician asked me to put the UDA argument under
the form: motivation", and to state that my real "scientific"
hypothesis are CT and AR. I find that dishonest and misleading,
because, without understanding the necessity of the reversal, the
interview of the Lobian machine would resemble to nothing but a little
piece of pure mathematics, especially given that I have until now
extracted to few real physics to really call OCCAM. All my papers
introduce the grandmother (and YD), and then translate the argument in
the Lobian language.
But then if the logics of the observables that I have derived from
comp (at the necessary place) appears to be von Neumann Quantum logics,
I know people will eliminate the grandmother and the YD, for bad
reasons (They want pure math, they hate cognitive science, etc.). My
fear is that people take the epistemological elimination of the
grand-mother (and the YD assumtion) as an ontological elimination of
the first person, and nothing could be more wrong than that.
See the footnote 3. in the SANE paper, and the text
>
> would you have any objections to us concentrating, from here on, on
> your "YD hypothesis"?
I have no problem with that. I am willing taking full responsability
for the YD hypothesis, even if at some points we can forget it, as I
explain above.
>
> I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real
> interesting and original part of your proposal
Actually I agree. But the YD hypothesis with fixed (high) level of
substitution is the everyday bread of cognitive science since Plato.
> and it does not
> need those two other huge "body guards" which I happen to be friends
> with. OK?
OK.
>
> If you agree with this I may have something interesting to tell you
> about your idea that you have not anticipated!
I'm very curious!
>
> Please,don't COMP out! Say "yes", Doctor Bruno!
Well, the real Doctor is Stathis Papanoiannou, in this list ;-)
Let me comment your last post also.
> Thanks for your assent on this. I am sure that CT and AR are needed,
> at some point, for your really outrageous
> conclusions. But I am sure you agree that they cannot save them if
> the "Yes doctor" presumption can be shot down by itself. Right?
So, I repeat because it is a difficult point. Strictly speaking I don't
need the YD (Yes Doctor) hypothesis to get physics from comp, because I
just interview a lobian machine on its consistent extension. But I need
it to explain why it must be so, and make explicit the link with
cognitive science, psychology, theology ....
> This would save me from having to read through your Dovetail-Lob
> etc... argument which
> is probably way above my head!
Please don't feel obliged to follow the argument. Do it if you really
want to find what is wrong in the path toward the "outrageous
conclusion". I mean that the Universal Dovetailer Argument is much more
simple than some people imagine, although many remain unaware that the
real difficulty is in the "movie graph" part. OK: cognitive science is
not easy.
For the second part, the interview of the universal lobian machine, the
difficulty resides in understanding some amount of computer science,
logic and logics, and quantum physics.
I prefer the slow but sure path, take your time, I'm patient: you can
ask me questions in my next life ;-)
> We obviously move in very different circles because I was taught by
> very stubborn old strong AI types and cognoscendi
> cognitivists and I have never heard anyone argue for something like
> that YD hypothesis!
Glad you notice. although the idea is defended and attacked since
Plato, I am perhaps the first to tackle it in a hypothetico-deductive
way. But then I'm lucky being born after Godel and Lob. (Which "I"? I
don't know).
> But as you have conceded no one
> needs it to defend the old-fashioned materialist functionalism credo
> that you (and I) do not subscribe to anyway.
OK,
Now tell me what I didn't anticipate from YD, I'm very curious :)
And please feel free to shot down my work in any way. It is the best
way for me to illustrate the solidity of my argumentation :)
.. and who knows ? perhaps you will find an error or some awkwardness.
I would appreciate and acknowledge.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
kurtl...@aim.com
From: Lee Corbin <lco...@tsoft.com>
Godfrey writes
> As much as I sympathize with your call for preservation of naive
> realism
[LC]
Good heavens! How many times must it be said? What is going on
with people? There is a *clear* definition of "naive realism".
Try the almost always extremely reliable wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naive_realism
If one is very clear that information about events outside
the skin is conveyed to one's brain by layers of intermediate
processes, (usually beginning with emissions of photons or by
vibrations imparted to air), then you are *not* a naive realist.
[GK]
My, are prickly today!!! In this is when I was still sympathizing with
you! (;-)
[LC]
Since this has come up so many times before---and not just on this
list---I'm really starting to wonder what the explanation is. You
can even find links on the web that confuse realism and naive
realism.
The acid test of what to call something is "do the adherents of
the view themselves use the term?". Then, in cases like this,
we see it for what it is: name calling.
[GK]
Hold on! I don't believe I have even called you a "naive realist"!
> and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits
> of introspection. I have to take issue with half of
> what you say below:
[LC]
Of course. Anyone who understands and believes in
PCR always invites criticism, as least as much as
he has time for.
> > I'm not too sure what you mean by "to embed".
> > If we are seeking to *explain*---if that is
> > what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by
> > classical physics, but we *can* explain classical
> > physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to
> > be---and the activity I'm most interesting in
> > participating in---*explaining*.)
>
> Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics
> but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical
> world we know and love with its well defined and
> assigned elements of (naive) physical reality
> that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did
> there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky
> long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger
> Cat's around to haunt us...
Quantum mechanics' greatest successes have included
explanations for what you cite. That is why QM is
accepted.
[GK]
My point is that it does NOT include explanations for
any of the items I cite and that is why I cite them
and that is why they are called "problems".
From Bruno's message I take it that you subscribe to the
Everett Interpretation which indeed "avoids" some of these
problems but has some more of its own and
surely does a number on your "naive reality"!
What is it then: many worlds or one?
[LC]
But you seem to be saying that the *correct* results
of classical physics cannot be obtained from QM. Surely
you don't mean that. Of course they can! If they could
not, then they'd be wrong!
True, classical physics *cannot* explain many phenomena,
such as why black bodies radiate the way that they do,
and this bothered 19th century physicist a great deal.
Planck was *forced* to come up with the concept of the
quantum, if he was to be able to explain.
[GK]
No, I am not saying that QM does not reproduce much of
the classical results given the appropriate limits. Indeed it can
and it, furthermore, predicts and explains a number of
macroscopic (thus part of the world of direct experience)
phenomena that Classical Physics does not.
What I am saying above (and this is the clincher of the EPR argument
as is that of the Everett interpretation) is that QM does not provide
you with a picture of a reality where objects naively have their
well defined properties associated with assignable elements
of physical reality.
> You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply
> and square!
[LC]
Why, of course. Just how innocent of QM do you suppose
that I am? I invented the phrase "at the basis of things
are amplitudes that add" after a thorough study of Feynman's
volume 3. The multiplication obtains---at the very beginning
---simply from concatenating paths: you multiply amplitudes
to get a total amplitude for one path.
[GK]
If that sentence is any measure of your "guilt" that you will
be doing "quantum time", Lee (:-) What you want to say
is "at the basis of QM there are amplitudes that add, multiply
and square". Notice the absence of "things"! It is the
"things" that ain't there!!!
[LC]
Your point about the squared modulus is well taken. Just why
*probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't
tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many
this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though
Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of
everything, though).
Lee
[GK]
Wouldn't that be nice! Unfortunately they are wrong about
that. Decoherence is promising but still in need of major
patching. Check out the paper by Bassi and Ghiraridi:
http://arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9912031
There is some newer work on this by Adrian Kent but I
don't have the reference handy. As to why the amplitudes
square to give probabilities I agree with you that no one knows!
Regards,
Godfrey
kurtl...@aim.com
It is maybe time to change the name of the thread. But I'll get to
that below.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
To: kurtl...@aim.com
Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 15:41:12 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality
(skipped)
...
[BM]
OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists
that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a
"solution of the measurement problem". All measurements are just
interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to
me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where
F = ma can be deduced from the "sum on all histories". But this is
going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the
comp derivation. We can come back on this latter.
[GK]
Here we part company. MWI (I prefer to call it Everett's
Interpretation or EQM) is NOT a solution to the measurement
problem of QM but an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that does not
lead to that problem! It does however have
a tripartite problem of its own that, in my opinion, is just the
measurement problem blown up. In any case what you say
afterwords does not follow (from EQM or QM). There are non-interactive
measurements that people have been looking
into for a while now (Dicke, Elitzur-Vaidman, etc...). I am sure you
guys touched on these sometime ago...
But all of this is irrelevant for my purpose at hand which is for you
to commit to the proposition that "No-YD: no Bruno"!
It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite care
if you take refuge in another Everett World. That
would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I
digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!
(skip)
> In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a >
way that would not obviously violate the correspondence
> limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting
above. > But do not worry because I think you are a lot better
> shot by QM.
[BM]
To anticipate a little bit, I think this will be hard. From comp you
can deduce quickly the qualitative "many-relative state/worlds"
feature, the no-cloning theorem, the appearance of indeterminacy. I
told you Newtonian physics (with a single universe-history) would cause
much more problem to my approach.
[GK]
I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that
COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my non-existence
if YD is false.
(skipped)
>
> "Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical >
Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following >
three sub-hypotheses:"
>
> after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and
> will just short as 1) YD for "Yes-doctor", 2) CT for
> Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism.
>
> My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be
> called an hypothesis!
Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise
definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the
term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", "assumptions",
"hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way.
[GK]
I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am
pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses
tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic
status and it is misleading to call them the same.
If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your
point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising
either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore
below:
[BM]
> CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely
unprovable > but favored by overwhelming heuristic support.
Not only overwhelming supports: there is the deep conceptual argument
that Kleene has discovered when he failed to refute Church's
"definition" of the computable functions. The argument is the closure
of the set of partial computable functions for the most transcendental
mathematical operation: diagonalization. Kleene invented the vocable
"Church thesis". The first to get Church's thesis is Emil Post (in the
early 19-twenties).
See (perhaps later) the diagonalization posts in this list (mentionned
in my web page).
> I know that there are
> some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation >
could produce a counterexample to
> shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is
> unlikely.
OK.
[GK]
Agreed, than . In any case one unassailable counterexample would shoot
down CT, deep and " Kleene" as it is (:-)
> And AR is a metaphysical position which I
> happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove
> or empirically test (nor do I have any idea
> on how to do it! Do you?)
[BM]
Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a
platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a
sort of "cop out". Now, although 99,99999999 % of the mathematician are
platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the
week-end!).
[GK]
Ditto.
>
(skiip)
>
> (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR
'course.
[GK]
Good!
> (2) CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we
> both like them that way, which is the same).
[BM]
I give the opportunity to make comp false in more than one way. If you
read the Maudlin paper, you will see that he consider the YD doctor (or
equivalent) as tautologically true (unlike the functionnalist
hypothesis). This is due to the fact that, unlike many older
computationalist or mechanist, I put no bound on the low-levelness of
the substitution level.
I can say yes to the doctor provided that he simulates my brain at the
chromodynamical level, including all partiocles having interacted with
any other particles in the past (in which case my brain is the
"physical universe" itself. My brain could be a quantum computer,
without violating comp. The no-cloning theorem does not interfere.
[GK]
That is actually where it gets interesting. I will have to sharpen up
a bit of your YD but in ways that would not invalidate
your general use of it. More about that later.
[GK]
Bruno, you are weaseling out again, here! Let me ask you this in clear
terms again:
Can you, Yes or No, derive your whole "grand manege" from CT and AR
alone?
Because if it is a "yes" here I will give you the Oscar (and the
Nobel) and let you go. I can than concentrate on
being a good machine for the rest of my existence since I don't want
to loose my platonic allegiances or my
heuristic acquiescence to CT.
>
> would you have any objections to us concentrating, from here on, on
> your "YD hypothesis"?
[BM]
I have no problem with that. I am willing taking full responsability
for the YD hypothesis, even if at some points we can forget it, as I
explain above.
[GK]
Now we are talking (:-)!
>
> I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real >
interesting and original part of your proposal
[BM]
Actually I agree. But the YD hypothesis with fixed (high) level of
substitution is the everyday bread of cognitive science since Plato.
[GK]
So much the better, than! This way there is no chance that you can
take it personally (:-)
(skipped)
Well, the real Doctor is Stathis Papanoiannou, in this list ;-)
[GK]
Good! In that case there is a place for him a place in my story, too...
[BM]
OK,
... and who knows ? perhaps you will find an error or some
awkwardness. I would appreciate and acknowledge.
Bruno
[GK]
Thanks for the vote of confidence (;-) If I may add a personal note:
Bruno, I am sure more knowledgeable people than
myself have pointed out that it is hard to get accross to you because
you seem so wrapped up in your "demonstration"
that you express yourself in the language you develop to devise it !
That is one of the reasons I would rather take you up
on your premise rather than having to read and judge the rest of your
paper which I am not even confident I could. I think this is a more
constructive use of my time and your patience.
What I would like to do next is the following:
1) State the YD hypothesis in a way that is both consistent with your
statement and useful for my purposes. I will
do that in a separate thread shortly. I need you to agree on that
version, of course.
2) Once you agree I will tell you a little parable (allegory is more
platonic, I guess) that illustrates the strict use of that
statement and the contradition that obtains from it.
3) After that I will tell you what that contradiction may be useful in
settling a certain dispute on the question of
whether QM has anything to say about consciousness or not.
OK? What do you say?
scerir
> [...] "at the basis of QM there are amplitudes
> of "things"! It is the "things" that ain't there!!!
Not sure I understand. But the usual rule of addition
of probabilities does not apply to quantum probabilities.
This does not mean that the usual rule is wrong.
It means (or it might mean) that quantum systems evolve
via transitions through indeterminate states,
which are different from occurrences of events.
Regards,
serafino
kurtl...@aim.com
Hi Serafino,
I did not even mention probabilities and you are very right
that they do not operate under the same algebraic rules
as classical probabilities.
My point, if I can break it down a bit, is that the amplitudes
correspond, not to "things" but to processes and that what
the amplitudes let you compute are relative probabilities for
the occurrences of such processes.
QM by itself does not describe the world in terms of "things"
i.e. distinct separable objects such as the ones we see and
manipulate with in our everyday.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
________________________________________________________________________
scerir
> My point, if I can break it down a bit,
> is that the amplitudes correspond,
> not to "things" but to processes
> and that what the amplitudes let you
> compute are relative probabilities for
> the occurrences of such processes.
Maybe. Amplitudes of (whatever) waves
satisfy linear equations. So, amplitudes
combine linearly when several paths are -
in principle - possible. On the contrary,
the intensity of waves, that is to say
the energy flux, is quadratic in the field
amplitudes. So, intensities do not combine
linearly. If we imagine there is a relation
between the energy flux and the number of
particles crossing a given (unit) area (this
can be the quantum principle, or the quantum
postulate) we also imagine there is a relation
between the energy flux - quadratic in the
field amplitudes - and the probability for
those particles crossing that (unit) area.
We can also imagine now there is only one
particle flying ....
Regards,
serafino
Hal Ruhl
of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral locations
arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is confined to a region
of discrete locations that surround its neutral location in the grid. I
like this grid because its symmetries appear to allow a set of first order
oscillations of the points within their regions in a unit cell consisting
of 12 points around one with all triples being on straight lines that pass
through the central point to represent the basic particles of the Standard
Model. I call such oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move
through the grid but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a
SAS) consist of semi "stable" associations of nearby [small] dances.
The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region
asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its
region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA].
At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all.
The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of universal
computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the "done
effectively" part] since large dances can be self interactive.
The other things that are in my model which is derived from my "is" "is
not" definitional approach is that the imbedding system:
1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist [multi
world and the model's link to AR],
2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of
reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the
accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of the
noise] recently observed),
3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality that
overlap [the flow of consciousness].
In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp.
I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some degree
convergent.
Hal Ruhl
Hal Ruhl
In my last post the sentence:
"At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all."
of course should be:
"At this level YD seems straight forward since there is no change at all."
Hal Ruhl
Bruno Marchal
Le 18-aoūt-05, ą 20:27, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> [BM]
> OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything
> lists that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a
> "solution of the measurement problem". All measurements are just
> interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to
> me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM
> where F = ma can be deduced from the "sum on all histories". But this
> is going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand
> the comp derivation. We can come back on this latter.
>
> [GK]
> Here we part company. MWI (I prefer to call it Everett's
> Interpretation or EQM) is NOT a solution to the measurement
> problem of QM but an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that does
> not lead to that problem! It does however have
> a tripartite problem of its own that, in my opinion, is just the
> measurement problem blown up. In any case what you say
> afterwords does not follow (from EQM or QM). There are
> non-interactive measurements that people have been looking
> into for a while now (Dicke, Elitzur-Vaidman, etc...). I am sure you
> guys touched on these sometime ago...
>
> But all of this is irrelevant for my purpose at hand which is for you
> to commit to the proposition that "No-YD: no Bruno"!
We agree it is not relevant for our purpose! Just two words: As a
logician I don't consider Everett proposed a new interpretation of
quantum mechanics, but a new formulation of quantum mechanics. It is
really SWE + comp. (as opposed to the Copenhagen formulation which is
SWE + "an unintelligible dualist theory of mind". Then what I say can
be sum up like this: Everett theory is redundant: SWE follows from
comp. But this is another thread, and we can come back on Everett
later.
"No YD, no Bruno"!?! You make me anxious :)
SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation
YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital
"generalized brain". First axiom of comp.
(Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them
once by mail).
> It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite
> care if you take refuge in another Everett World.
> That
> would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I
> digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!
Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really
the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD).
> [GK]
> I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that
> COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
> shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my
> non-existence if YD is false.
Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from
the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if
SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here!
> BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more
> precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can
> use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises",
> "assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way.
>
> [GK]
> I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am
> pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses
> tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic
> status and it is misleading to call them the same.
> If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your
> point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising
> either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore
> below:
Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most people
to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist).
>
> [GK]
> Agreed, than . In any case one unassailable counterexample would
> shoot down CT, deep and " Kleene" as it is (:-)
Exactly!
> [BM]
> Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my
> reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a
> platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a
> sort of "cop out". Now, although 99,99999999 % of the mathematician
> are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the
> week-end!).
>
> [GK]
>
> Ditto.
Hope you are not serious!
> >
> (skiip)
> >
> > (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR
>
> 'course.
>
> [GK]
> Good!
Well, you will perhaps accuse me of weaseling out again, but thinking
twice, I believe I have answer too quickly in the sense that for saying
yes for an artificial *digital* brain to a Doctor you need to know a
bit what "digital" means, and for this you need CT (Church Thesis), and
for this, I think, you need AR (Arithmetical Realism). But as you say,
CT and AR are mainly bodyguards of YD.
>
> > (2) GK: CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically
> (or we
>> both like them that way, which is the same).
>
> [BM]
> I give the opportunity to make comp false in more than one way. If
> you read the Maudlin paper, you will see that he consider the YD
> doctor (or equivalent) as tautologically true (unlike the
> functionnalist hypothesis). This is due to the fact that, unlike many
> older computationalist or mechanist, I put no bound on the
> low-levelness of the substitution level.
> I can say yes to the doctor provided that he simulates my brain at
> the chromodynamical level, including all partiocles having interacted
> with any other particles in the past (in which case my brain is the
> "physical universe" itself. My brain could be a quantum computer,
> without violating comp. The no-cloning theorem does not interfere.
>
> [GK]
> That is actually where it gets interesting. I will have to sharpen up
> a bit of your YD but in ways that would not invalidate
> your general use of it. More about that later.
OK
If by "grand manege" you mean the physical laws: the answer is YES !
(Thanks for the Oscar and Nobel :).
If by "grand manege" you mean deriving the physical laws and
understanding why it is necessarily so, the answer is probably NO. (Nor
could Everett derive the Wave Collapse appearance without something
equivalent to the YD).
[skip]
> [GK]
> Thanks for the vote of confidence (;-) If I may add a personal note:
> Bruno, I am sure more knowledgeable people than
> myself have pointed out that it is hard to get accross to you because
> you seem so wrapped up in your "demonstration"
> that you express yourself in the language you develop to devise it !
With the YD, perhaps. But then that is why I take 20 years to translate
the argument in pure arithmetics and I have use that translation to
show that comp is 100% testable.
> That is one of the reasons I would rather take you up
> on your premise rather than having to read and judge the rest of your
> paper which I am not even confident I could. I think this is a more
> constructive use of my time and your patience.
But this is just fair! For refuting a proof in applied logic it is
sufficient to show the inconsistency of the premises. If you succeed
not only you really don't need to follow the UDA steps (UDA= Universal
Dovetalier Argument), but nobody will ever need to do that!
Actually the two or three first steps of UDA are just there to make the
premises clearer.
Please note that in the UDA I generally add supplementary hypotheses
which I eliminate later with the Universal Dovetailer.
>
> What I would like to do next is the following:
>
> 1) State the YD hypothesis in a way that is both consistent with your
> statement and useful for my purposes. I will
> do that in a separate thread shortly. I need you to agree on that
> version, of course.
Careful: your statement should not just be consistent with YD, but
equivalent to it or at least imply by it to derive something ...
>
> 2) Once you agree I will tell you a little parable (allegory is more
> platonic, I guess) that illustrates the strict use of that
> statement and the contradition that obtains from it.
>
> 3) After that I will tell you what that contradiction may be useful
> in settling a certain dispute on the question of
> whether QM has anything to say about consciousness or not.
>
> OK? What do you say?
I am very interested, Godfrey. Please go and shoot comp. You would be
the first.
But remember that in YD there is a use of folk-psychology or
grand-mother psychology (a fundamental concept of theoretical cognitive
science/philosophy of mind), and then I translate the argument in
arithmetic, and the grandmother will be substituted by the
introspective universal machine (which I call also the "Lobian Machine"
in honor of Lob).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
kurtl...@aim.com
Serafino,
I think I get the gist of what you are saying but it is not quite
the case. There is no energy flux directly associated with
wave-functions (like with electomagnetic or mechanical waves)
but is a probability density and a probability flux associated with
the square of linear functionals of the wave-function. The physical
quantities (observables) pertaining to any physical system described
by the WF typically do not have fixed values assigned by the theory
but only "expectation values", i.e. probabilities of being found in
one among many of their possible eigenvalues. Quantum Mechanics
tells you how to compute these expectation values but only
specific experiments assign one among them to a specific system.
If I understand what you are trying to say below there is indeed
a way of, a posteriori, trying to build a more or less classical
picture of a propagation of a beam or even a single particle
(represented by a wave packet or something like it).
That is what is called a local hidden variable model for QM
and it works fairly well for a single isolated degree of freedom.
But, as it turns out, none of these clever "cartoons" can be
used to fully interpret the quantum description; this is
not merely the result of a theorem but something which has been
verified empirically numerous times by now.
Come to think of it, even my correction to Lee is in need of
correction because QM is not just about amplitudes! The
phase relations between wave functions play a very
central role in the non local phenomena (i.e. Berry and
Aharonov-Bohm effects) so the myth of "just amplitudes"
should be dispelled by now.
Best regards,
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: scerir <sce...@libero.it>
To: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 22:55:51 +0200
Subject: Re: "Naive Realism" and QM
________________________________________________________________________
kurtl...@aim.com
From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model
is identical or
distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let
me ask you:
Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still "dance" if
that is the case?
I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less
interesting than
falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand....
Best regards,
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Hal Ruhl <Hal...@alum.syracuse.edu>
To: everyth...@eskimo.com
Hal Ruhl
Quentin Anciaux
english native but I find very insulting your way to "discuss" with people...
Either you have an argument to the YD hypothesis, either you haven't... stop
turning around the hole...
Quentin
Saibal Mitra
As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be ruled
out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than that
of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may be proved
wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local models
can reproduce QM.
Saibal
----- Original Message -----
From: <kurtl...@aim.com>
To: <smi...@zeelandnet.nl>; <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
Cc: <everyth...@eskimo.com>
Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality
> Hi Saibal,
>
> Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our
> cis-plankian
> one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go
> theorems of
> quantum physics are "in small print" is because his "reading glasses"
> are no
> longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of
> simple
> deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his
> little
> examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree.
>
> However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth
> looking
> into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world
> we know
> and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some
> discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and
> all
> indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models
> alone.
> 't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and
> he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less
> than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for
> non-abelian gauge
> theories in his youth I suspect "god's dice" are loaded against him
> this time.
>
> However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard
> this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous
> animations...
>
> Godfrey Kurtz
> (New Brunswick, NJ)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Saibal Mitra <smi...@zeelandnet.nl>
> To: kurtl...@aim.com; mar...@ulb.ac.be
> Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
> Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200
> Subject: Re: subjective reality
>
> Hi Godfrey,
>
> 't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
> physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
> deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists
> working on
> ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such
> bold
> assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.
>
> As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models.
> It
> seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any
> serious
> work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say
> that
> anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One
> could
> imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could
> yield
> the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
> fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists,
> then
> you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.
>
> Saibal
>
>
>
> > Hi Saibal,
> >
> > You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
> > QFTh.
> > But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in
> which
> > non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet).
> Understandably
> > 't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
> > very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
> > slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
> > Physics).
> >
> > So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
> > which one
> > can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no
> way
> > bypasses
> > the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
> >
> > He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an
> thus
> > classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
> > just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
> > That much I will grant you...
> >
> > (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
> > you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )
> >
> > Best regards
> >
> > Godfrey Kurtz
> > (New Brunswick, NJ)
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Saibal Mitra <smi...@zeelandnet.nl>
> > To: kurtl...@aim.com; mar...@ulb.ac.be
> > Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
> > Sent: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 21:11:30 +0200
> > Subject: Re: subjective reality
> >
> > Godfrey Kurtz wrote
> >
> > > More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any
> > non-quantum
> > > mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
> > > don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things,
> > Bruno.
> > > Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
> > > to be.
> >
> >
> > There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't
> > Hooft.
> >
> >
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021
> >
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084
> >
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095
> >
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105
> >
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219
> >
> >
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Saibal
kurtl...@aim.com
OK. I think we are making progress. I will start the other thread
after this message
as I don't really have more obvious divergences from you and you are
kind enough
to indulge me in this little diversion. As before I will erase the
obvious points of
agreement below...
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
To: kurtl...@aim.com
Cc: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 11:48:06 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey,
Le 18-aoūt-05, ą 20:27, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
(skipped)
[BM]
"No YD, no Bruno"!?! You make me anxious :)
[GK]
I am sorry! That was very callous of me! I really did not mean to
imply that you would be "eliminated"
by my argument! Much on the contrary, I am hoping you will be...
illuminated (;-) !!!
[BM]
SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation
YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital
"generalized brain". First axiom of comp.
(Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them
once by mail).
> It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite >
care if you take refuge in another Everett World.
> That
> would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I >
digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies!
[BM]
Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really
the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD).
[GK]
I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those would
actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into
a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is
amiss in your world!
> [GK]
> I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that
> COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would
> shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my >
non-existence if YD is false.
Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from
the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if
SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here!
[GK]
What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false.
That allows me to dismiss anything you say based
on that premise. That is actually not general at all but extremely
specific. From here on I will make no comment on
any sentence you preface with "But from COMP (or YD) I can prove
that..." . Nothing personal, please understand.
> BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more >
precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can >
use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", >
"assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way.
>
> [GK]
> I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am
> pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses
> tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic
> status and it is misleading to call them the same.
> If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your >
point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising >
either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore >
below:
[BM]
Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most
people to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist).
[GK]
Oh I would not worry! Computer scientists are by, now, used to have
their hopes dashed (;-). And you strike me as a "real
grown-up" since you are not afraid of facing up to empirical testing!
(skipped)
> [BM]
> Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my >
reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a >
platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a >
sort of "cop out". Now, although 99,99999999 % of the mathematician >
are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the
> week-end!).
>
> [GK]
>
> Ditto.
Hope you are not serious!
[GK]
Sorry! "Ditto" over here in the States is used as a note of agreement.
(skipped)
[BM]
Well, you will perhaps accuse me of weaseling out again, but thinking
twice, I believe I have answer too quickly in the sense that for saying
yes for an artificial *digital* brain to a Doctor you need to know a
bit what "digital" means, and for this you need CT (Church Thesis), and
for this, I think, you need AR (Arithmetical Realism). But as you say,
CT and AR are mainly bodyguards of YD.
[GK]
Oh. No problem there. Maybe I did not make it clear enough. What I am
suggesting is that we (you and I) agree implicitly
that CT and AR are unassailably true for the purposes of my argument!
I will in fact need that to be the case at the very least
for CT. As for "digital brain" I am sure we can reach some agreement
on that.
(skipped)
>
> [GK]
> Bruno, you are weaseling out again, here! Let me ask you this in >
clear terms again:
>
> Can you, Yes or No, derive your whole "grand manege" from CT and AR
> alone?
>
> Because if it is a "yes" here I will give you the Oscar (and the >
Nobel) and let you go. I can than concentrate on
> being a good machine for the rest of my existence since I don't want
> to loose my platonic allegiances or my
> heuristic acquiescence to CT.
[BM]
If by "grand manege" you mean the physical laws: the answer is YES !
(Thanks for the Oscar and Nobel :).
If by "grand manege" you mean deriving the physical laws and
understanding why it is necessarily so, the answer is probably NO. (Nor
could Everett derive the Wave Collapse appearance without something
equivalent to the YD).
[GK]
In that case enjoy the prize! If you derived the laws of physics from
CT and AR alone you surely deserve the recognition you
will enjoy because that is a remarkable accomplishment!
Congratulations!
I feel like saying: my work here is done! Without even trying I have
let you relinquish one of your hypothesis!
I hope you give me a note of recognition when you re-write your proof
and take that pesky YD from the set of
hypothesis! (:-)
(skipped)
[BM]
But this is just fair! For refuting a proof in applied logic it is
sufficient to show the inconsistency of the premises. If you succeed
not only you really don't need to follow the UDA steps (UDA= Universal
Dovetalier Argument), but nobody will ever need to do that!
Actually the two or three first steps of UDA are just there to make
the premises clearer.
Please note that in the UDA I generally add supplementary hypotheses
which I eliminate later with the Universal Dovetailer.
[GK]
See, now you put me in a really tricky position! People in this list
are already claiming that I am acting coy or trying to bluff
my way out of giving them what I promised!!! That is what is NOT fair!
On one hand you want to see my cards, on the
other you don't want to risk anything and you are now saying that YD
is worth nothing and that you just include it to
make computer scientists happy! That is not cool! Right when I was
taking you for a "grown up"!...
>
> What I would like to do next is the following:
>
> 1) State the YD hypothesis in a way that is both consistent with
your > statement and useful for my purposes. I will
> do that in a separate thread shortly. I need you to agree on that >
version, of course.
[BM]
Careful: your statement should not just be consistent with YD, but
equivalent to it or at least imply by it to derive something ...
[GK]
Well, YD is so secondary to your purposes, why do you care? I am
almost sure you would approve my version but I am not
putting it down until you give me a good reason to do it!!!
>
> 2) Once you agree I will tell you a little parable (allegory is more
> platonic, I guess) that illustrates the strict use of that
> statement and the contradition that obtains from it.
>
> 3) After that I will tell you what that contradiction may be useful
> in settling a certain dispute on the question of
> whether QM has anything to say about consciousness or not.
>
> OK? What do you say?
[BM]
I am very interested, Godfrey. Please go and shoot comp. You would be
the first.
But remember that in YD there is a use of folk-psychology or
grand-mother psychology (a fundamental concept of theoretical cognitive
science/philosophy of mind), and then I translate the argument in
arithmetic, and the grandmother will be substituted by the
introspective universal machine (which I call also the "Lobian Machine"
in honor of Lob).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
[GK]
I am sorry, Bruno, but I see no glory in disappointing a few computer
scientists(and their grand-mothers)
since, you and I agree that their physics stinks! You are the one that
claims to derive the true physics so you are the one I would like to
shoot down! If you really only need CT and AR I really have no other
choice but to worship at your altar (;-) since I really don't want to
have to go through your proof and I am no match for CT or AR. It is a
pity because it is a cute little argument I have up my sleeve ....
So long,
kurtl...@aim.com
Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you
since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you
personally!
I have used some irony in discussing with Bruno but meant no harm by
it.
My feeling from reading the different posts is that people in this
list have
some sense of humor and do not take their theories so
seriously that any play around is taken in personal terms!
I take "turning around the hole" to mean something like "beating around
the bush". In that case, I am afraid I cannot comply just yet. Please
see my
last message to Bruno. I am not bluffing, just hoping to break his
bluff and I
don't think he is insulted (Bruno?)
-------
To the rest of the crowd: if this is a generalized feeling, please let
me know,
and I will withdraw from the list. I surely don't want to ruffle any
feathers!
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Quentin Anciaux <quentin...@advalvas.be>
To: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 17:15:47 +0200
Subject: Re: subjective reality
kurtl...@aim.com
You are entirely correct about that. Non-local models can indeed
reproduce QM. No surprise than that all the remaining approaches to
the unification of physical theories still fighting it out (string/M
theories,
loop quantum gravity, twistor theory) are non-loca,l unlike the old
QFTs.
That is not the case with 't Hooft's CA models, of course. But he has
later began to play with (deterministic) M-brane type ideas (since he
started teaching string theory) and those may hold better promise.
He is also no longer insisting on the pre-determinism loophole notion
(at least the last time I heard him this year). Maybe he realized that
made him sound a bit foolish...
His web site is always entertaining:
http://www.phys.uu.nl/~thooft/
Quentin Anciaux
Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 18:27, vous avez écrit :
> Dear Quentin,
>
> Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you
> since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you
> personally!
No, none directed to me... I don't know if it's my poor comprehension of
english... but anyway I don't really like when people just want to "show" by
acting as if they knew "the real knowledge"... I apologize for feeling it
like that... But as it was not your intention.
I would feel shame to ask you to unsubscribe, it wasn't at all my intention,
just let the discussion stay sane (with a message like mine, I understand it
's not the better way for it to stay sane ;).
Quentin
kurtl...@aim.com
No harm done. I think I understand your comment and I fully
agree that I sound like I am bluffing. But I still have hope that
Bruno will come to his senses and accept my bargain (which is
much less risky than the one his Doctor proposes, by the way!)
I take it that French is your native language from your reply header.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Quentin Anciaux <quentin...@advalvas.be>
Dear,
Quentin
________________________________________________________________________
Hal Ruhl
My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable definition - of the All
and [simultaneously] the Nothing.
Any definition defines a pair of two objects. The target object such as a
flower [the "is" part of the pair] and an object that has the remainder of
the list of all properties etc. of all possible objects [the "is not" part
of the pair]. Generally the "is not" part of the pair is of little
use. The All and the Nothing are an interesting "is", "is not"
definitional pair. The All is the entire list and the Nothing is the
absence of the entire list.
The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this results in the dynamic.
This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this model before as it has
developed.
Now the All part contains all possible states of all possible
universes. This should include the one I believe represents
ours. Therefore my All seems to contain universes that support YD and thus
comp if Bruno is correct.
To answer your questions as best I currently can:
My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if Bruno's follow on
reasoning is correct and if in fact my model contains YD, CT, and AR then
it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it would embed comp.
Is my model falsifiable? I will have to think about that - after all I
just recently got to where it supports a flow of consciousness. Since the
model does not say exactly what is on the list that is the All and the
'instantation of reality" dynamic is random then what indeed is the scope
of "all possible states of all possible universes" and the resulting
actually implemented evolving universes?
In any event it would be interesting to see if YD can be shown to be
false. I think that might start to constrain the All and that would be
interesting - [why that constraint and what others are there?].
Hal
Stephen Paul King
It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof that a
Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about falsifying YD not a
requirement that we prove a negative proposition?
Onward!
Stephen
----- Original Message -----
From: <kurtl...@aim.com>
snip
John M
Hi, Hal,
I wrote lately that 'our' (two but distinct and
different) theories started from a somewuat similar
way
of thinking. That startup was more than a decade ago.
Since then you transformed yours in its aspects and I
did so as well. You went the theoretical way, I
followed a practical thinking acceptable (?) to human
logic as an inevitable origination of the Multiverse.
I had to add this remark, because I don't want to
'ride' the theoretical merits of your theory in any
sense. My "narrative" is by now completely different
from your theory.
Please forgive me my superficial words.
John Mikes
Bruno Marchal
Le 19-août-05, à 22:47, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
> It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof
> that a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about
> falsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition?
Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a
machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine
have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism:
machine can behave *like* if they had phenomenal qualia.
To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note
one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis,
you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences
(or subjective, first person, private, etc.).
To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show
that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be
turing emulable.
Logically (that is, without OCCAM) we have
comp ==> STRONG AI ==> MEC-BEH
Note that STRONG AI does not entail comp, because "machine could think"
does not entail "only machine could think" (of course if "machine can
think" then with OCCAM, it is reasonable to suppose comp. But given I
propose a proof it is important to keep in mind we cannotI use OCCAM. I
mean I doen't propose any original theory, I take the oldest one and
show it is incompatible with another old prejudice:
materialisme/naturalism/physicalism).
So comp is the strongest hypothesis. Now, comp is weaker than any
theory which fixe a level of description. In that sense comp is very
weak. Indeed comp is weaker that quantum mechanics (without collapse),
or any actual theory except Penrose one (despite defect in Penrose
reasoning, the conclusion are similar: comp and materialism are
incompatible.
Regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal
Le 19-aoūt-05, ą 20:00, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> No harm done. I think I understand your comment and I fully
> agree that I sound like I am bluffing.
To say the less ... :-)
> But I still have hope that
> Bruno will come to his senses
Well thanks Godfrey. I also hope I will come to my senses. Actually I
hope I am in my senses.
And I hope you are in your senses too, or, if not, that you will come
to your senses, too.
> and accept my bargain (which is
> much less risky than the one his Doctor proposes, by the way!)
Yes but some will think that accepting an artificial part of the brain
is much less risky when the alternative is dying and suffering
quasi-surely the next month.
Technology has already invaded the brain. Comp is already practiced.
I show that comp is falsifiable.
You pretend that the YD is already false! I can understand Quentin's
impatience.
I know already you can't be serious, because you pretend talking about
something I would not have anticipated, but you acknowledge not having
the need to read what I wrote (!?).
And at the same time you are saying something very big. To refute YD
you need to show that there are no level of description of ourselves
capable of being Turing-emulable.
You would refute my reasoning at step 0! Go ahead. You are the first
one who tries this. In general people try at least at step 3!
(I follow the numbering (8 steps) of the Universal Dovetailer Argument
like in this pdf slides:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf
Explanations are in the SANE paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/
SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html)
Oh I see you have another post still without your argument! I will
answer it quickly because I indulge your little diversions but it is
probably a weakness of my part.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
scerir
> There is no energy flux directly associated with
> wave-functions (like with electomagnetic or
> mechanical waves) but is a probability density
> and a probability flux associated with the square
> of linear functionals of the wave-function.
The question, at this point, should be:
probability of what? Because, leaving
aside those who think (Weinberg, Dyson, etc.)
that only fields exist and are real,
there are at least a couple of solutions.
There are physicists (followers of Bohr [1],
more or less) who think [2][3][4] that quantum
physics is about 'correlations without correlata',
or about 'fotuitousness and clicks'. There are
physicists (followers of Einstein, and his idea
of Gespensterfeld, etc.) like Born [5], Fock [6],
Barut [7], etc., who think that a 'probability' wave,
even in 3n-dimensional space, is a real thing,
much more than a mathematical tool, and who also
think that physics is not just about apparata,
or clicks.
s.
[1[ Niels Bohr:
'However, since the discovery of the quantum of action,
we know that the classical ideal cannot be attained in the
description of atomic phenomena. In particular, any attempt
at an ordering in space-time leads to a break in the causal
chain, since such an attempt is bound up with an essential
exchange of momentum and energy between the individuals and
the measuring rods and clocks used for observation; and just
this exchange cannot be taken into account if the measuring
instruments are to fulfil their purpose. Conversely, any
conclusion, based in an unambiguous manner upon the strict
conservation of energy and momentum, with regard to the dynamical
behaviour of the individual units obviously necessitates
a complete renunciation of following their course in space
and time.'
[2] Carlo Rovelli
Relational Quantum Mechanics
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609002
[3] David Mermin
What is quantum mechanics trying to tell us?
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9801057
[4] Aage Bohr
http://www.physicstoday.org/vol-57/iss-10/p15.html
[5] Max Born:
'Quite generally, how could we rely on probability
predictions if by this notion we do not refer to
something real and objective?'
[6] V.A.Fock
'Disskussija S Nilsom Borom', in 'Voprosy Filosofii',
1964 (a memorandum, about the interpretation of QM
and the meaning of wavefunction, he gave to Bohr,
in Copenhagen, 1957, who read it and changed his mind
about several points, but not all).
[7] A.O.Barut
http://streaming.ictp.trieste.it/preprints/P/87/157.pdf
Bruno Marchal
Le 19-aoūt-05, ą 18:13, kurtl...@aim.com a écrit :
> [GK]
> I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those
> would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into
> a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is
> amiss in your world!
OK if it is a temporary interdiction. The YD will entail that we are
duplicable in a weak sense (which does not contravene the no-cloning
theorem (but here I anticipate the reasoning)).
You pretend YD is false, show the proof.
> [GK]
> What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false.
> That allows me to dismiss anything you say based
> on that premise.
Of course. But of course, everything I say from CT and AR alone will
survive. I hope you see this clearly.
> That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From here
> on I will make no comment on
> any sentence you preface with "But from COMP (or YD) I can prove
> that..." . Nothing personal, please understand.
Sure. Except that in a second round (the "interview" of the lobian
machine) I translate "comp" in arithmetic, and I extract *a* physics
from that COMP. To understand that translation YD is very useful, but
no more. Then if the physics that is extracted from the arithmetical
COMP corresponds to the empirical physics, your proof of the falsity of
the YD would show that a falsity has helped in discovering the origin
of the physical laws. Funny but not entirely impossible. Except that,
without wanting to discourage you in advance, it is very hard for me to
believe you have find a proof or an argument showing comp is wrong. But
that makes me just more curious.
> Now, although 99,99999999 % of the mathematician > are platonist
> during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the
>> week-end!).
> >
> > [GK]
> >
> > Ditto.
>
> Hope you are not serious!
>
> [GK]
> Sorry! "Ditto" over here in the States is used as a note of agreement.
I take it like that.
You are telling me you are platonist the week and not platonist the
week-end?
Or "ditto" means you agree with *me*, I guess.
> [GK]
> In that case enjoy the prize! If you derived the laws of physics from
> CT and AR alone you surely deserve the recognition you
> will enjoy because that is a remarkable accomplishment!
> Congratulations!
But there is a derivation of a physics from CT and AR. Just to
understand *that* intuitively you need YD. I have done two things the
universal dovetailer argument (UDA) which shows that YD + CT + AR
entails that physics emerges necessary from a web of machine dreams
(say, dream being entirely defined in term of computer science or
number theory).
But then in the second part, called sometime the arithmetical universal
dovetailer argument (AUDA), or more simply the "interview of the lobian
machine", I translate (UDA) in arithmetic (because comp makes it
possible and necessary). YD disappears or is translated in arithmetic
(by Godel-like devices). The derivation of physics is purely
mathematical of course, I am not a magician extracting the galaxies
from someone saying "yes" to a doctor.
It looks like it disappoints you, but there is two parts in my work:
UDA: an argument that YD + CT + AR implies physics is necessarily a
branch of computer science.
AUDA: a translation of the argument in arithmetic, with the (modest)
result that the logic of the observable proposition is given by the
composition of three mathematical transformations operating on a
"well-known" modal logic (G). And it already looks enough like some
quantum logics to encourage further research. Alas the math are not
easy and not well known.
> I feel like saying: my work here is done!
But it is done. Yes of course.And if YD is false (which I doubt), UDA
will be dead, ok, but it will make the AUDA much more enigmatic!
> Without even trying I have let you relinquish one of your hypothesis!
It looks your goal is shooting me completely: the UDA and AUDA!
I have absolutely no worry about YD, but it is a logical fact you ask
me to make clear: even if that were true (that YD is false), that would
kill one halve only, the one some people ask me sometimes to drop out,
but I prefer to keep it for preventing positivistic interpretation of
machine's discourses.
> [GK]
> Well, YD is so secondary to your purposes, why do you care?
Because many people take YD for granted, already. Because it makes the
comp-physics obligatory making the whole of comp testable. YD is
secondary for the extraction of physics, but it is necessary for having
an understanding why it is a derivation of physics. I am anormaly
patient, you could understand this by reading the UDA, and the
beginning of the AUDA.
> I am almost sure you would approve my version but I am not
> putting it down until you give me a good reason to do it!!!
Because that would kill the first half of my PhD thesis and makes the
second part enigmatic.
But many in this list find YD plausible and if you can show it false,
please do it.
> I am sorry, Bruno, but I see no glory in disappointing a few computer
> scientists(and their grand-mothers)
Only?
> since, you and I agree that their physics stinks! You are the one
> that claims to derive the true physics
Assuming comp in UDA, and assuming COMP (as I wrote it sometimes) for
the translation of comp in the language of a lobian machine
(arithmetic, if you want). The result of the transformation is just a
purely mathematical formula (sorry!).
> so you are the one I would like to shoot down! If you really only need
> CT and AR I really have no other choice but to worship at your altar
> (;-) since I really don't want to have to go through your proof and I
> am no match for CT or AR. It is a pity because it is a cute little
> argument I have up my sleeve ....
My senses detect some arrogance here. Do you mean you would not give
the argument once you realize that strictly speaking it could only
wound my work without killing it completely? You could have first take
a look at the table of content.
Either you give the argument in the next post, or I will give you the
everything-list-prize of arrogance Godfray.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Lee Corbin
> > > Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics
> > > but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical
> > > world we know and love with its well defined and
> > > assigned elements of (naive) physical reality
> > > that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did
> > > there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky
> > > long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger
> > > Cat's around to haunt us...
>
> > Quantum mechanics' greatest successes have included
> > explanations for what you cite. That is why QM is
> > accepted.
>
> My point is that it does NOT include explanations for
> any of the items I cite and that is why I cite them
> and that is why they are called "problems".
We are using the term *explain* in different ways.
Look, would you have disagreed (were you living in 1800)
with the Marquis Pierre Simon de LaPlace when he would
assert that Newton's theory of gravity explained all
celestial movements?
I guess so! YOU probably would have said, "Mais non,
it does not explain how an influence can instantaneously
reach out through space. It does not even explain what
gravity *is*!" (And by the way, no fair using Mercury's
orbit, the details of which were not discovered at that
time.)
LaPlace would have looked down his nose at you and replied
that "the *theory* explains the movements, you fool. C'est
facile de voir that you, Monsieur, wish to know what explains
the theory. I have no need of your hypothesis, or of you."
So likewise, I will say to you, we cannot explain quantum
mechanics, but QUANTUM MECHANICS DELIVERS AN UNPRECEDENTED
FIFTEEN DECIMAL PLACES OF ACCURACY and so explains incredibly
perfectly the result of our laboratory experiments!
YOU seem to want an explanation of (or a satisfactory interpretation
of) the *theory*. The theory does not provide that! No theory---
not Newton's, not Einstein's, and not QM, can do that, can explain
*itself*.
> From Bruno's message I take it that you subscribe to the
> Everett Interpretation which indeed "avoids" some of these
> problems but has some more of its own and
> surely does a number on your "naive reality"!
> What is it then: many worlds or one?
Many worlds of course. Have you or have you not read "Fabric
of Reality" by David Deutsch?
As for a number on my "naive reality"... For Christ's sake,
I give up with you. You are hopeless. You are probably one
of those people who calls "fascist" everyone who has political
disagreements with you, whether or not they themselves adopt
the term.
I give up. I hereby grant permission for the incredible
Godfrey Kurt Lee to call me a "naive realist" --- but him
only! Nobody else better try it!
Lee
P.S. I will reply to the rest of your post when I am less
exercised :-)
kurtl...@aim.com
Thanks for your pointers. You obvious know your
physics quite well and I think you got my point
precisely!
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: scerir <sce...@libero.it>
To: everyth...@eskimo.com
Sent: Sat, 20 Aug 2005 19:22:10 +0200
Subject: Re: "Naive Realism" and QM
Godfrey:
> There is no energy flux directly associated with
> wave-functions (like with electomagnetic or
> mechanical waves) but is a probability density
> and a probability flux associated with the square
> of linear functionals of the wave-function.
[Scerir]
The question, at this point, should be:
probability of what?
[GK]
Exactly!
[Scerir]
Because, leaving
aside those who think (Weinberg, Dyson, etc.)
that only fields exist and are real,
there are at least a couple of solutions.
There are physicists (followers of Bohr [1],
more or less) who think [2][3][4] that quantum
physics is about 'correlations without correlata',
or about 'fotuitousness and clicks'. There are
physicists (followers of Einstein, and his idea
of Gespensterfeld, etc.) like Born [5], Fock [6],
Barut [7], etc., who think that a 'probability' wave,
even in 3n-dimensional space, is a real thing,
much more than a mathematical tool, and who also
think that physics is not just about apparata,
or clicks.
s.
[GK]
Maybe I would not divide things exactly that way but,
yes, that is basically the choices you have! Either you
keep looking for an ultimate ontological category on
which quantum information is predicated, or you
try and build some understanding of probability as
a "material" of sorts (that was not Bohr, but actually
Schrodinger and Madelung on the latter side.)
There are however some possible ontological grey areas
between these two positions that can be explored and
Heiseinberg tried that at some point. Bohr's position
(the infamous Copnehagen Interpretations)
was a bit more complicated than what the sentence you
quote expresses, I would say, so it is hard to know where
to place him...
-Godfrey
[7] A.O.Barut
http://streaming.ictp.trieste.it/preprints/P/87/157.pdf
________________________________________________________________________
kurtl...@aim.com
I am not sure this is the reply you mentioned in the
previous post. If so I guess you decided to make it
public. That is alright with me too.
Godfrey Kurtz
(New Brunswick, NJ)
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin <lco...@tsoft.com>
To: everyth...@eskimo.com
Godfrey writes
[GK]
Far from me to disagree with you, or Laplace! QM produces indeed
the most impressive numerical predictions of any theory ever conceived
by humans!
[LC]
YOU seem to want an explanation of (or a satisfactory interpretation
of) the *theory*. The theory does not provide that! No theory---
not Newton's, not Einstein's, and not QM, can do that, can explain
*itself*.
[GK]
Not exactly, and I have not expressed such demands of QM in any
of my statements. What I stated, and you have not denied that yet,
is that QM does not give me or you a picture (much less an explanation)
of the world as we know it, with somewhat reliable objects placed at
definite position at definite times. This is a fact, not a demand on
my part on the theory. Most people who feel unhappy about this
state-of-affairs don't blame it on the theory (as they did 3
generations
ago) but blame it on themselves or on us, humans, who have not
interpreted the theory correctly yet.
> From Bruno's message I take it that you subscribe to the
> Everett Interpretation which indeed "avoids" some of these
> problems but has some more of its own and
> surely does a number on your "naive reality"!
> What is it then: many worlds or one?
Many worlds of course. Have you or have you not read "Fabric
of Reality" by David Deutsch?
[GK]
Oh yes. But I am not a convert.
[LC]
As for a number on my "naive reality"... For Christ's sake,
I give up with you. You are hopeless. You are probably one
of those people who calls "fascist" everyone who has political
disagreements with you, whether or not they themselves adopt
the term.
[GK]
(...I'll pass on this one!)
[LC]
I give up. I hereby grant permission for the incredible
Godfrey Kurt Lee to call me a "naive realist" --- but him
only! Nobody else better try it!
Lee
[GK]
Wow!! Actually my name is Godfrey Kurtz. Lee is a bad nickname
that I had to use to get a username from AOL. No pun intended.
(I hesitate to call you anything, at this stage! )
P.S. I will reply to the rest of your post when I am less
exercised :-)
[GK]
Now that Bruno promoted me to a machine I feel like telling
you, like good all HAL 5000: "Why don't you take a pill and
lay down?" (:-)
Get well soon,
Godfrey