The elephant and the blind
Russell Standish
500+ experiential reports on the nature of consciousness.
I was wondering if anybody has read this, and has an
opinion. Surprisingly, the book is actually open access, so you can
download a free PDF from the MIT Press website to browse at your
leisure, which I will in due course.
The reason I ask is that in my book I make a number of conclusions,
based on taking the everthing idea seriously, inckuding:
1) That consciousness necessarily requires an awareness of self. This
comes about from a resolution of the "Occam Catastrophe" (my term),
which is an argument I made from considering the everything idea,
coupled with Occams razor theorems. It is loosely based on an earlier
argument by David Deutsch, considering virtual reality environments.
2) That consciousness necessarily requires an experience of the
passing of time. This latter is more crystallised by the notion of
computationalism, which requires time in order for a computation to
happen - but seriously I cannot see how you can measure the difference
between two things without a time dimension in which to bring the two
things together, and difference is fundamental to the botion of bit,
and information theory generally.
In Metzinger's book, he presents evidence from trascendental
meditation that the self is a kind of illusion that can disappear in
certain conscious states, and that it is possible to experience
timeless consious states.
Now I have practiced TM occasionally in my life, and I can attest to
the dissolution of the self-other boundary - but in that case it was a
sense that the self expended to encompass the entire universe, nit
that the self disapperaed. I have never experienced a timeless state, though.
I seem to remember that Bruno Marchal claimed once that smoking salvia
could induce these states states, so I might ask him personally what
he thinks of that book.
I don't want to mince words here - taken on face value, these claims
present evidence directly contradicting the many worlds interpretation
of QM, and so are in the words of Arthur C Clarke "extraordinary
evidence". Of course, it is entirely possible that my arguments
contain a fatal flaw (hopefully of the interesting kind), or that I am
somehow misinterpreting what his claims are.
Just putting this out here to see what people think of this book, and
the possibly challenge to the everything idea.
Cheers
--
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Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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PGC
The Elephant and the Blind, by Thomas Metzinger.
500+ experiential reports on the nature of consciousness.
I was wondering if anybody has read this, and has an
opinion. Surprisingly, the book is actually open access, so you can
download a free PDF from the MIT Press website to browse at your
leisure, which I will in due course.
The reason I ask is that in my book I make a number of conclusions,
based on taking the everthing idea seriously, inckuding:
1) That consciousness necessarily requires an awareness of self. This
comes about from a resolution of the "Occam Catastrophe" (my term),
which is an argument I made from considering the everything idea,
coupled with Occams razor theorems. It is loosely based on an earlier
argument by David Deutsch, considering virtual reality environments.
2) That consciousness necessarily requires an experience of the
passing of time. This latter is more crystallised by the notion of
computationalism, which requires time in order for a computation to
happen - but seriously I cannot see how you can measure the difference
between two things without a time dimension in which to bring the two
things together, and difference is fundamental to the botion of bit,
and information theory generally.
To clarify further, while continuity in subjective experience is taken as a starting assumption in the thought experiment, first-person indeterminacy arises from the machine's inherent epistemic limitations: it cannot discern which computations precisely correlate with its conscious state, and this lack of determinate knowledge is a consequence of its nature as a universal machine. Here, the modal frameworks explored by Kuznetsov, Muravitski, and others provide insights into the structured layers of self-reference that the machine experiences. Modal systems, particularly those enriched by Löbian self-reference, illustrate the intricate ways universal machines navigate beliefs and knowledge while respecting their formal limits (and having them collide, lol). Such insights underscore that, although the machine recognizes an underlying reality (of which it is a part), it can never fully encapsulate the entirety of its own computational support structure. This limitation highlights the essential incompleteness within the machine's self-awareness, reinforcing the Gödelian notion that the machine is aware of truths it can neither prove nor articulate completely.
The machine’s journey through states of belief and knowledge, governed by the recursive self-reference intrinsic to its nature, reflects a type of “forward advancement.” This phenomenon is not merely progression through states; it is progression that mirrors the machine’s unfolding and cumulative awareness, where each step cannot be reversed due to the irreversible properties of self-reference and proof inherent to these modal systems. Goldblatt’s work with S4Grz, extending modal S4 with the Grzegorczyk axiom, enriches this discussion by modeling an accumulative but asymmetric structure. In this framework, the continuity of experience aligns with the irreversibility in S4Grz’s modal space: each new state inherently depends on prior ones, reflecting a forward progression bound by the cumulative effect of successive self-referential states.
In intuitionistic logic, truth is iteratively constructed, similar to how a self-referentially correct entity or machine incrementally builds its knowledge and validates its beliefs. Each moment within the machine’s subjective experience incorporates prior validated states, which it cannot retroactively alter, capturing an intuitive sense of moving forward. This approach is consistent with a computationalist perspective, where subjective time emerges as an internal construct rather than an externally imposed continuum. Here, the contributions of Kuznetsov and Muravitski demonstrate how self-reference within the machine perpetuates a time-like progression, showing that each subjective moment is bound by prior moments in a one-way epistemic structure.
This epistemic structure becomes a lived construct, with each subjective moment arising as an explicit verification within the machine’s evolving internal state. Here, Artemov’s work on constructive knowledge within provability logic offers further support by framing knowledge as an explicit construct—a “proof term”—within logic itself. This viewpoint supports the notion that each state of subjective "time" emerges as a verified instance of the machine’s own existence, aligning with the notion of an intuitionistic “truth-making/constructing” process, which treats knowledge and belief as constructs tied to specific instances of self-referential awareness.
The computationalist machine thus experiences subjective time as an irreducible sequence, the consequence of its self-referential operations, with each new step conditioned by cumulative epistemic limitations. This sequence does not require a primitive physical time; instead, it reflects an internal, constructed flow that emerges from the constraints of recursive, self-referential processes, all grounded in the machine's inherent epistemic limitations.
In sum, this view posits that the physical is not ontologically primary but emerges as a first-person observable from the interactions and statistical properties of infinitely many computations. Time, consciousness, and self-awareness arise from the recursive and modal properties unique to self-referential machines implied by the Universal Dovetailer. In this setup, the empirical characteristics of reality, particularly the probabilistic structure observed in quantum mechanics, derive from the foundational principles in mathematics and modal logic. These results do not constitute proof of this state of affairs but suggest how subjective time, consciousness, and other first-person phenomena could arise within this arithmetical framework without adding the rather physicalist notion of primitive time.
In Metzinger's book, he presents evidence from trascendental
meditation that the self is a kind of illusion that can disappear in
certain conscious states, and that it is possible to experience
timeless consious states.
Now I have practiced TM occasionally in my life, and I can attest to
the dissolution of the self-other boundary - but in that case it was a
sense that the self expended to encompass the entire universe, nit
that the self disapperaed. I have never experienced a timeless state, though.
I seem to remember that Bruno Marchal claimed once that smoking salvia
could induce these states states, so I might ask him personally what
he thinks of that book.
I don't want to mince words here - taken on face value, these claims
present evidence directly contradicting the many worlds interpretation
of QM,
Russell Standish
>
> It's been quite some time and my notes/books are still in the basement after a
> move, so I'll go from memory and try informally. Computationalist setting as
> we've discussed for years, UDA, weak arithmetic realism, universality,
> computation, yad yada yada. Yes, this will be informal and lack precision +
> definitions. Consult the literature as I won't be making that kind of sense. At
> your own peril, with typos and all:
>
Impressive summary of Bruno Marchal's work, but I'm not going to
comment on any of that here.
>
>
>
>
> In Metzinger's book, he presents evidence from trascendental
> meditation that the self is a kind of illusion that can disappear in
> certain conscious states, and that it is possible to experience
> timeless consious states.
>
> Now I have practiced TM occasionally in my life, and I can attest to
> the dissolution of the self-other boundary - but in that case it was a
> sense that the self expended to encompass the entire universe, nit
> that the self disapperaed. I have never experienced a timeless state,
> though.
>
> I seem to remember that Bruno Marchal claimed once that smoking salvia
> could induce these states states, so I might ask him personally what
> he thinks of that book.
>
>
>
> I don't want to mince words here - taken on face value, these claims
> present evidence directly contradicting the many worlds interpretation
> of QM,
>
>
> How so? The self in the above sense and setting can be seen as the entire
> universe (of mind, lol), admitting and weakening the statement by asserting
> that this includes a component beyond our capacity to define.
experiencing no self at all. I have experienced the former in TM, but
never the latter.
The Occam catastrophe argument is that if you do not experience the
self, there is nothing to anchor your experience to our rich universe,
and you will instead experience the multiverse as a whole. Such an
experience would be rather simple, if not a non-experience
altogether. Indeed, there is some evidence from sensory deprivation
experiments (aka flotation tanks) that this does happen.
> I have no idea
> what Bruno experiences. But I do remember reading some first person diaries
> from student days. Various dissociatives and psychedelics behave similarly to
> Salvia according to these. Some student saw their field of view collapse into
> beholding the multiverse at a single moment timelessly for a few minutes,
> according to their companions; uterring: "You gotta be fuckin kidding me." at
> the end of it.
>
reviews. I don't know what is actually being claimed.
> By the way, how are the corals doing and are you still diving, Russell? Is
> there some healing or everything getting more and more bleached?
>
bleaching is pretty bad, but haven't visited that area for about 20
years, so I can't say first hand. The way things are going, we might
start getting coral growing off our coast instead.
I haven't dived for about 3 years - just been too freaking busy to get
my gear fixed after it broke down. It doesn't help that my local dive
shop closed down just after the pandemic, so have to go further afield
for gear repairs and tank fills.
PGC
On Wed, Nov 13, 2024 at 06:35:14PM -0800, PGC wrote:
>
> It's been quite some time and my notes/books are still in the basement after a
> move, so I'll go from memory and try informally. Computationalist setting as
> we've discussed for years, UDA, weak arithmetic realism, universality,
> computation, yad yada yada. Yes, this will be informal and lack precision +
> definitions. Consult the literature as I won't be making that kind of sense. At
> your own peril, with typos and all:
>
....
Impressive summary of Bruno Marchal's work, but I'm not going to
comment on any of that here.
> I have no idea
> what Bruno experiences. But I do remember reading some first person diaries
> from student days. Various dissociatives and psychedelics behave similarly to
> Salvia according to these. Some student saw their field of view collapse into
> beholding the multiverse at a single moment timelessly for a few minutes,
> according to their companions; uterring: "You gotta be fuckin kidding me." at
> the end of it.
>
Bear in mind, I haven't read Metzinger's book yet - just some of the
reviews. I don't know what is actually being claimed.
> By the way, how are the corals doing and are you still diving, Russell? Is
> there some healing or everything getting more and more bleached?
>
I live about 2000 km from the Great Barrier Reef. I understand the
bleaching is pretty bad, but haven't visited that area for about 20
years, so I can't say first hand. The way things are going, we might
start getting coral growing off our coast instead.
I haven't dived for about 3 years - just been too freaking busy to get
my gear fixed after it broke down. It doesn't help that my local dive
shop closed down just after the pandemic, so have to go further afield
for gear repairs and tank fills.
Russell Standish
>
...
>
> Bear in mind, I haven't read Metzinger's book yet - just some of the
> reviews. I don't know what is actually being claimed.
>
>
> I've read earlier writings and skimmed through some of this. While appearing
> organized and rigorous on the surface, I see him violating Occam many times
> besides conflating physical notions with immaterial metaphysical one all the
> time. E.g. for the Suchness chapter, where I kind of had an immediate hunch
> that he'd do this:
>
> I have already offered a phenomenological reinterpretation of “emptiness” as
> “epistemic openness.” One prediction would be that in all situations in which
> subject/ object structure fades away, “emptiness” and “epistemic openness” will
> be properties not only of the conscious mind, but also of what were previously
> taken to be inanimate perceptual objects. Suchness then becomes the emptiness
> of appearances in the more precise sense of their being epistemically open, for
> example in terms of lacking a predetermined conceptual essence.
>
> Taking such liberties, you can say anything. Closer to poetry/fiction/personal
> opinion.
>
>
>
>
> > By the way, how are the corals doing and are you still diving, Russell?
> Is
> > there some healing or everything getting more and more bleached?
> >
>
> I live about 2000 km from the Great Barrier Reef. I understand the
> bleaching is pretty bad, but haven't visited that area for about 20
> years, so I can't say first hand. The way things are going, we might
> start getting coral growing off our coast instead.
>
>
>
> I haven't dived for about 3 years - just been too freaking busy to get
> my gear fixed after it broke down. It doesn't help that my local dive
> shop closed down just after the pandemic, so have to go further afield
> for gear repairs and tank fills.
>
>
> Pretty bad could mean a lot. Are there still areas where things remain close to
> not being affected; e.g. places with a lot of open ocean current?
>
pristine, or course. And certainly some areas have recovered. But open
ocean current is not the issue - it's all open ocean - the issue is
sometimes the water is too hot, and with climate change, those events
are becoming more frequent.
There should be a report on the 'net about how much of the reef has
bleached to date.