Dennett, zombie and zimbo
Evgenii Rudnyi
made search on Google.
Two findings (both are not my source though):
1) Is Daniel Dennett a zombie?
Discussion on ephilosopher.com where the question, I believe is close to
the statement that I have seen.
"This is not completely serious, but is the crux of my question. It
bothers me that his and other reductionist theories of consciousness are
completely denying any phenomenology. It doesn't sit well with me
because I am pretty convinced that I have one. Now, Dennett would be the
first to say that it just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but
that is the point isn't it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can
anyone think otherwise?? Are theere real zombies out there and is
Dennett one of them?"
2) COULD DANIEL DENNETT BE A ZOMBIE? by Mike Kearns
"Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie?
The way he tells it, you'd almost have to say yes. For he has been kind
to zombies in his recent writings."
www.kearnsianthoughts.com/articles/DennettZombie_Mike_Kearns.pdf
Dennett by himself seems to deny this:
THE UNIMAGINED PREPOSTEROUSNESS OF ZOMBIES
Daniel C. Dennett
SYMPOSIUM ON ‘CONVERSATIONS WITH ZOMBIES
eripsa.org/files/dennett%20zombies.pdf
Interestingly enough, Dennett has invented a zimbo:
"I introduced the category of a zimbo, by definition a zombie equipped
for higher-order reflective informational states (e.g., beliefs about
its other beliefs and its other zombic states)."
Hence he could be not a zombie but a zimbo.
Evgenii
Craig Weinberg
>Now, Dennett would be the
> first to say that it just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but
> that is the point isn't it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can
> anyone think otherwise??
validation of the content of those feelings. Subjective phenomenology
is a legitimate and irreducibly primitive part of the universe at the
same level as probability or cause and effect. Since it's ontological
advantage is private orientation, it is actually where subjectivity
underlaps externality that is significant and signifying...the extent
to which interior fiction has the potential to diverge from objective
fact is where teleology derives it's power, and therefore a great
improvement over a zombie universe of pure logical physics.
Craig
And Dennett is a zimbo. James Randi too. They are the same zimbo.
meekerdb
Can you quote anything to that effect. In Dennett's actual writing, as
opposed to what other people have said, he says zombies are preposterous.
"I can’t see why a belief in zombies isn’t simply ridiculous, and I’m
going to go on comparing zombies to epiphenomenal gremlins and other
such prepostera until some philosopher mounts a proper
defence, showing that the belief in the possibility of zombies is
somehow better supported
than these other cases."
Brent
Craig Weinberg
> On 8/20/2011 6:10 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> > On Aug 20, 8:02 am, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
>
> >> Now, Dennett would be the
> >> first to say that it just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but
> >> that is the point isn't it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can
> >> anyone think otherwise??
>
> > Exactly. The fact that we feel is not contingent upon any external
> > validation of the content of those feelings. Subjective phenomenology
> > is a legitimate and irreducibly primitive part of the universe at the
> > same level as probability or cause and effect. Since it's ontological
> > advantage is private orientation, it is actually where subjectivity
> > underlaps externality that is significant and signifying...the extent
> > to which interior fiction has the potential to diverge from objective
> > fact is where teleology derives it's power, and therefore a great
> > improvement over a zombie universe of pure logical physics.
>
> > Craig
>
> > And Dennett is a zimbo. James Randi too. They are the same zimbo.
>
> Can you quote anything to that effect. In Dennett's actual writing, as
> opposed to what other people have said,
Both he and Randi start from a presumption that the 3p world is the
standard by which reality is measured, and then they demonstrate how
1p perception doesn't always faithfully render 3p realities and
therefore is an 'illusion'. What they fail to address is the fact that
our perception is much, much more than adequate for any evolutionary
purpose and quite effective at rendering our interior and exterior
environments to us with precision and accuracy under typical
conditions we encounter.
For an illusion, it's a helluva good one and there is no conceivable
alternative. What's more, it is only through perception that we can
question perception, so if we can't trust it, then why can we trust
not trusting it either? Why is he even talking if we are all just
biochemical machines acting out our evolutionary destiny? As long as
we survive and reproduce, it shouldn't matter what we think is true.
> he says zombies are preposterous.
> "I can’t see why a belief in zombies isn’t simply ridiculous, and I’m
> going to go on comparing zombies to epiphenomenal gremlins and other
> such prepostera until some philosopher mounts a proper
> defence, showing that the belief in the possibility of zombies is
> somehow better supported
> than these other cases."
IS a zombie.
Craig
Jason Resch
Dennett thinks that the idea of zombies/zimbos is inconsistent and therefore that neither can exist.
From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
Jason