Yes, it's true. Theoretical physics has become a lunatic asylum.

[Philip Thrift]

Finding Sabine Hossenfelder there ...

David Appell    10:49 PM, October 02, 2019

Can't one of you please tell us dummies how creating an entirely new branched off world requires no new energy?

None of the enlightened people here has stooped to answer this small but significant question. They don't even try. Please try. Assume we're stupid.

Sabine Hossenfelder  12:30 AM, October 03, 2019

David,

The reason that the "enlightened people" do not answer this question is that it has been answered thousands of times and you could easily answer your question by doing as much as asking Google. That you come here nevertheless to ask this question, one more time, demonstrates that you are not really interested in an answer but merely want to troll.

Energy conservation is not violated because to correctly sum up the total energy, you have to weigh the energy in each branch with the probability of that branch. This works the way it always works in quantum mechanics. There is nothing new going on here, nothing controversial, and nothing interesting.

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/09/the-trouble-with-many-worlds.html?showComment=1569889923590#c1373154727748966620

@philipthrift

[John Clark]

On Thu, Oct 3, 2019 at 6:24 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Can't one of you please tell us dummies how creating an entirely new branched off world requires no new energy?

Can somebody explain to this dummy why anyone would expect energy would be conserved on the cosmological scale in a expanding accelerating universe when both Noether's Theorem and Einstein's General Relativity clearly state it wouldn't be?

 John K Clark

[Philip Thrift]

The question was about Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, not Cosmology or General Relativity.

@philipthrift 

[John Clark]

On Thu, Oct 3, 2019 at 7:04 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

 >>> Can't one of you please tell us dummies how creating an entirely new branched off world requires no new energy?

 

>> Can somebody explain to this dummy why anyone would expect energy would be conserved on the cosmological scale in a expanding accelerating universe when both Noether's Theorem and Einstein's General Relativity clearly state it wouldn't be?

> The question was about Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, not Cosmology or General Relativity.

Can somebody explain to this dummy why anyone would think Cosmology and General Relativity and Noether's Theorem would have nothing to do with Many Worlds?

John K Clark

 

[Philip Thrift]

The answer to that should be fascinating.

Connect

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity

+

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noether%27s_theorem

to

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation 

to answer the Many Worlds energy question above.

@philipthrift

[Alan Grayson]

Why would the energy of a branch be related to its probability of occurrance? One can imagine a very low probability, so low that it can't even contain copies of the experimenter. Totally ridiculous! AG  

[Philip Thrift]

Exactly. 

Given a world (in Sabine's MWI above) W where there is a computer C with a quantum random number generator, after C generates a string of 1000 0s and 1s, the  energy of the computer 

   C-[one thousand (0|1)s]

in each  leaf world of the resulting branching tree will be 1/(2^1000)th of energy of C.

@philipthrift

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/3/2019 6:29 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Why would the energy of a branch be related to its probability of
> occurrance? One can imagine a very low probability, so low that it
> can't even contain copies of the experimenter. Totally ridiculous! AG

It it's probability were zero would you still count its energy?

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

But MWI eliminates probabilities.

World W branches into W0 and W1, then W00, W01, W10, W11, then ...

They all exist in MWI.

[Alan Grayson]

Presumably, in that model, its energy would be zero, in effect a non-existent universe. AG 

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/3/2019 10:44 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 12:39:09 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 10/3/2019 6:29 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Why would the energy of a branch be related to its probability of
> occurrance? One can imagine a very low probability, so low that it
> can't even contain copies of the experimenter. Totally ridiculous! AG

It it's probability were zero would you still count its energy?

Brent

But MWI eliminates probabilities.

That's its problem. But it has to explain the appearance of probabilities. 

World W branches into W0 and W1, then W00, W01, W10, W11, then ...

They all exist in MWI.

 

But WA, WB, WC,... don't. it's a popular fallacy that MWI means everything happens.

Brent

Given a world (in Sabine's MWI above) W where there is a computer C with a quantum random number generator, after C generates a string of 1000 0s and 1s, the  energy of the computer 

   C-[one thousand (0|1)s]

in each  leaf world of the resulting branching tree will be 1/(2^1000)th of energy of C.

@philipthrift 

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[smitra]

This is a problem only if you reject the block time view and instead
support presentalism. And presentalism is rather unnatural in the MWI to
begin with because how doe you synchronize all the present moments in
the different worlds? That energy is conserved in classical physics does
not necessarily mean that the past world was somehow annihilated and all
its energy ended up in the new world. But if you believe in
presentalism, then you can interpret time evolution in this way. This
then leads to the paradox of energy conservation in the MWI. But in the
block time view energy conservation is not the result of old worlds
vanishing and new worlds coming into existence. All the worlds, old and
new exist in a timeless manner, and they have certain energy contents.
The MWI then says that one world can have many successor worlds and
obviously it's then rather natural that each successor has the same
energy as the original.

Saibal

[Philip Thrift]

There is no way for the Many Worldists to squirrel out of it.

Run the code

Getting started with Qiskit: while exploring the quantum world, let’s play the coin flip game!

https://medium.com/@esobimpe/getting-started-with-qiskit-while-exploring-the-quantum-world-lets-play-the-coin-flip-game-2319bb293c6a

with a loop of 100.

if MWI is true there will be 2^100 worlds.

In each world there is a Sean Carroll looking at a different result.

@philipthrift

[Jason Resch]

Energy isn't even conserved under conventional cosmological models.  The expansion of space causes a loss of radiation energy, and if vacuum energy is non zero (also an assumed by current models) the Hubble expansion is creating energy.

Jason

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[Lawrence Crowell]

This really is a well enough explained question. 

LC

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 8:24 AM Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:

This really is a well enough explained question. 

LC

Energy conservation is not violated because to correctly sum up the total energy, you have to weigh the energy in each branch with the probability of that branch. This works the way it always works in quantum mechanics. There is nothing new going on here, nothing controversial, and nothing interesting.

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/09/the-trouble-with-many-worlds.html?showComment=1569889923590#c1373154727748966620

The trouble I see with the explanation Sabine gives, which is probably the most common response to this question, is that it dilutes the energy in each branch according to the Born weight. Given that there a zillions of branchings per second throughout the visible universe, the energy rapidly is weighted away to zero in all branches. This does not make much sense. Besides, that is not what one does in ordinary quantum mechanics -- I have no idea what Sabine is referring to here.

The only solution for MWI, it seems to me, is that the energy is simply conserved in each branch, and not conserved over branching interactions. How would you ever test this, anyway? Block universe ideas do not actually help here. And appeals to energy non conservation in non-stationary universes are beside the point -- Quantum mechanics is not GR.

Bruce 

[Philip Thrift]

Right.

It's a perfectly good question that Sabine doesn't answer.

(Of course if there is one world, there is no problem. But no reasonable physicist believes in many worlds. They are deluded by math.)

@philipthrift

[Philip Thrift]

The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology.

@philipthrift

[Philip Thrift]

Sabine Hossenfelder's book "Lost in Math" has this title in the recently published Italian version:

            "Deluded by Math" 

Maybe "Confused by Math" is another possibility.

Many times she does exactly what she accuses (in her book) others doing.

@philipthrift

[Bruce Kellett]

Yes, sometimes she gets very sloppy in her thinking and goes with the conventional arguments rather than thinking things through.  But, at least she does challenge the status quo on many occasions. The contrary voice is often needed.

Bruce 

[Philip Thrift]

She is a prophet of a find in two regards:

The End Of Theoretical Physics As We Know It

https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-end-of-theoretical-physics-as-we-know-it-20180827/

(the transition from conventional mathematics to programmatic/computing structures)

and the delusion/confusion of today's theoretical physicists with math, leading a both quantum and cosmological multiple universes. 

But her nonsensical probability argument where as worlds branch (then branch again, and again) the descendant worlds get 1/2 the matter and energy of their parent, which means we should have 0 right now.

(Now she could argue that one starts with 0 matter and energy from the beginning, so it's 0 all the way down.)

@philipthrift

 

[smitra]

The block universe point of view makes this a non-issue. You get into
trouble by assuming something like presentalism, like a hidden
assumption about the energy of one instant being transferred to the next
instant. If you drop this assumption and simply take thew block universe
point of view where all the instances already exist out there, then
there is no problem to begin with.

Saibal

[Bruce Kellett]

The thing is that this is what the conservation of energy says -- the total energy of the system at time t' > t is the same as the total energy at time t. It has nothing to do with presentism or any such metaphysical position.

 

If you drop this assumption and simply take thew block universe
point of view where all the instances already exist out there, then
there is no problem to begin with.

This would seem to be equivalent to the claim that energy is conserved separately in each branch. Again, the block universe view does nothing to assist such an interpretation, it merely shows that energy is not constant over the "block" -- from one time slice to the next -- given that the branching structure of the block defines a time direction. Why, on this view, the energy should be conserved in each disjoint branch is rather opaque.

Bruce

[smitra]

On 04-10-2019 08:20, Philip Thrift wrote:
> On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 6:56:59 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 9:12 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 5:51:29 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 8:24 AM Lawrence Crowell
>> <goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> This really is a well enough explained question.
>>
>> LC
>>
>> Energy conservation is not violated because to correctly sum up the
>> total energy, you have to weigh the energy in each branch with the
>> probability of that branch. This works the way it always works in
>> quantum mechanics. There is nothing new going on here, nothing
>> controversial, and nothing interesting.
>>
>>
> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/09/the-trouble-with-many-worlds.html?showComment=1569889923590#c1373154727748966620

>> [1]

> THE END OF THEORETICAL PHYSICS AS WE KNOW IT

>
> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-end-of-theoretical-physics-as-we-know-it-20180827/
>
> (the transition from conventional mathematics to
> programmatic/computing structures)
>
> and the delusion/confusion of today's theoretical physicists with
> math, leading a both quantum and cosmological multiple universes.
>
> But her nonsensical probability argument where as worlds branch (then
> branch again, and again) the descendant worlds get 1/2 the matter and
> energy of their parent, which means we should have 0 right now.
>
> (Now she could argue that one starts with 0 matter and energy from the
> beginning, so it's 0 all the way down.)
>

The descendant worlds get the same energy if they have well defined
energy in which case computing the weighted average to get to the
expectation value is unnecessary. In general the expectation value will
need to be computed by this weighted average. To see that this is not
crazy, suppose that QM is not the ultimate answer that 't Hooft is
correct. But it then turns out that 't Hooft's deterministic models lead
to a multiverse via the back door due to Poincare recurrence. And
because with finite information in our brains, we cannot locate
ourselves in a particular time period. Then when we do an experiment, a
splitting can occur in the sense that we now get more precisely located
across in the different sectors separated by astronomical large amounts
of time. So, no problem here with the sum of the energy of (effective)
branches increasing.

Saibal

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 5:03 PM smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote: 

The descendant worlds get the same energy if they have well defined
energy in which case computing the weighted average to get to the
expectation value is unnecessary. In general the expectation value will
need to be computed by this weighted average. To see that this is not
crazy, suppose that QM is not the ultimate answer that 't Hooft is
correct. But it then turns out that 't Hooft's deterministic models lead
to a multiverse via the back door due to Poincare recurrence. And
because with finite information in our brains, we cannot locate
ourselves in a particular time period. Then when we do an experiment, a
splitting can occur in the sense that we now get more precisely located
across in the different sectors separated by astronomical large amounts
of time. So, no problem here with the sum of the energy of (effective)
branches increasing.

Where is all this in the Schrodinger equation?

Bruce 

[Philip Thrift]

It seems to me that one world is enough if one permits oneself to accept probabilities.

One can start wherever:

The already ... mentioned psi-function.... is now the means for predicting probability of measurement results. In it is embodied the momentarily attained sum of theoretically based future expectation, somewhat as laid down in a catalog.	”
— Erwin Schrödinger

The Schrödinger equation is not the only way to study quantum mechanical systems and make predictions. The other formulations of quantum mechanics include matrix mechanics, introduced by Werner Heisenberg, and the path integral formulation, developed chiefly by Richard Feynman. Paul Dirac incorporated matrix mechanics and the Schrödinger equation into a single formulation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger_equation

Now as Feynman wrote in his paper on the meaning of probabilities in QM, these things are of a different sort.

http://www.johnboccio.com/research/quantum/notes/Feynman-Prob.pdf

Maybe a new word for these: quababilities. 

Now the underlying quabability space (quabability theory formulation in terms of sample space, etc.) is not settled matter, but all QM can be done in one world if prob/quab-abilities are permitted.

@philipthrift

[Bruno Marchal]

On 3 Oct 2019, at 21:07, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 10/3/2019 10:44 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 12:39:09 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 10/3/2019 6:29 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Why would the energy of a branch be related to its probability of
> occurrance? One can imagine a very low probability, so low that it
> can't even contain copies of the experimenter. Totally ridiculous! AG

It it's probability were zero would you still count its energy?

Brent

But MWI eliminates probabilities.

That's its problem. But it has to explain the appearance of probabilities. 

Everett extracts it from the first person indeterminacy is self-superposition, which is the very idea of the MW or Many-histories. In his long text,  He uses Mechanism quasi-explicitly. Its only problem is that he has to extracts the wave from *all* computation, and incompleteness makes this happens. The “worlds” are just computations seen from the self-aware creature supported by those computations.

World W branches into W0 and W1, then W00, W01, W10, W11, then ...

They all exist in MWI.

 
But WA, WB, WC,... don't. it's a popular fallacy that MWI means everything happens.

Not everything happen, but a beam of photons prepared in some superposition states going through the corresponding relevant mirror does create the relative W00..., W01..., W10..., W11…,  …  A bit like the initialisation procedure in Shor quantum factorisation algorithm.

Bruno

Brent

Given a world (in Sabine's MWI above) W where there is a computer C with a quantum random number generator, after C generates a string of 1000 0s and 1s, the  energy of the computer 

   C-[one thousand (0|1)s]

in each  leaf world of the resulting branching tree will be 1/(2^1000)th of energy of C.

@philipthrift 

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 4 Oct 2019, at 00:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology.

Cosmology assumes the quantum at a cosmological scale, and it is where a collapse makes the less sense. Who would observe and be responsible for the collapse of the universal wave? Belinfante estimates that the Copenhagen-von Neuman formulation of QM requires an external god looking at the universe, like materialism requires a god selecting a unique computation, but that’s no more doing science.

François Englert, who worked in quantum cosmology, was very annoyed by the collapse problem, and was relieved that it makes sense to just abandon the collapse idea.  The collapse is usually not even defined in any intelligible sense, and it introduces a duality incompatible with Mechanism, but also with the scientific attitude, I would say.

With mechanism, there is only one consciousness which differentiates into many 1p histories, and they interfere statistically, notably by allowing a 1p plural observable and sharable reality.

Why to believe in any “world"? 

Bruno

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[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, October 4, 2019 at 8:12:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 3 Oct 2019, at 21:07, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 10/3/2019 10:44 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 12:39:09 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 10/3/2019 6:29 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Why would the energy of a branch be related to its probability of
> occurrance? One can imagine a very low probability, so low that it
> can't even contain copies of the experimenter. Totally ridiculous! AG

It it's probability were zero would you still count its energy?

Brent

But MWI eliminates probabilities.

That's its problem. But it has to explain the appearance of probabilities. 

Everett extracts it from the first person indeterminacy is self-superposition, which is the very idea of the MW or Many-histories. In his long text,  He uses Mechanism quasi-explicitly. Its only problem is that he has to extracts the wave from *all* computation, and incompleteness makes this happens. The “worlds” are just computations seen from the self-aware creature supported by those computations.

Bruno

That is a good analysis of Everett Many Worlds, which is in stark contrast to a materialist (observer-free) quantum mechanics.

But Many Worlds is another indication of physicists leaving the material world behind and entering a world of immateriality.

@philipthrift 

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, October 4, 2019 at 8:28:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Oct 2019, at 00:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology.

Cosmology assumes the quantum at a cosmological scale, and it is where a collapse makes the less sense. Who would observe and be responsible for the collapse of the universal wave? Belinfante estimates that the Copenhagen-von Neuman formulation of QM requires an external god looking at the universe, like materialism requires a god selecting a unique computation, but that’s no more doing science.

François Englert, who worked in quantum cosmology, was very annoyed by the collapse problem, and was relieved that it makes sense to just abandon the collapse idea.  The collapse is usually not even defined in any intelligible sense, and it introduces a duality incompatible with Mechanism, but also with the scientific attitude, I would say.

With mechanism, there is only one consciousness which differentiates into many 1p histories, and they interfere statistically, notably by allowing a 1p plural observable and sharable reality.

Why to believe in any “world"? 

Bruno

Applied sciences 

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_applied_science#Branches_of_applied_science

do not need Many Worlds Interpretation (as far as I can see).

If there is no reason to use MWI in applied science, there is no reason to consider MWI in science at all.

@philipthrift

[Brent Meeker]

But that's what energy conservation is.

> If you drop this assumption and simply take thew block universe point
> of view where all the instances already exist out there, then there is
> no problem to begin with.

Do all the branches then exist equally?  in which case you've abandoned
energy conservation and now you need to explain why it appears to be
conserved on every branch.

Brent

>
> Saibal
>

[Brent Meeker]

And with finite information in the universe there is not distinction
between recurrences and hence there are no recurrences.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Indeed, and that is a necessity when we assume the mechanist hypothesis in the philosophy of mind/cognitive science.

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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[Bruno Marchal]

That leads back to instrumentalist metaphysics, which is the same as “shut up and calculate”. You don’t need any world, not even one, in that case. 

Bruno

@philipthrift

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[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, October 5, 2019 at 2:21:34 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Oct 2019, at 20:04, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, October 4, 2019 at 8:28:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Oct 2019, at 00:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology.

Cosmology assumes the quantum at a cosmological scale, and it is where a collapse makes the less sense. Who would observe and be responsible for the collapse of the universal wave? Belinfante estimates that the Copenhagen-von Neuman formulation of QM requires an external god looking at the universe, like materialism requires a god selecting a unique computation, but that’s no more doing science.

François Englert, who worked in quantum cosmology, was very annoyed by the collapse problem, and was relieved that it makes sense to just abandon the collapse idea.  The collapse is usually not even defined in any intelligible sense, and it introduces a duality incompatible with Mechanism, but also with the scientific attitude, I would say.

With mechanism, there is only one consciousness which differentiates into many 1p histories, and they interfere statistically, notably by allowing a 1p plural observable and sharable reality.

Why to believe in any “world"? 

Bruno

Applied sciences 

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_applied_science#Branches_of_applied_science

do not need Many Worlds Interpretation (as far as I can see).

If there is no reason to use MWI in applied science, there is no reason to consider MWI in science at all.

That leads back to instrumentalist metaphysics, which is the same as “shut up and calculate”. You don’t need any world, not even one, in that case. 

Bruno

It could appear so, but I say it leads to codicalism (between instrumentalism [strict antirealism] and realism).

@philipthrift

@philipthrift 

 

[Bruno Marchal]

“Codicalism” or even “formalism” necessitates sigma_1 arithmetical realism, which is the only ontology possible when we assume mechanism, but consciousness and matter become phenomenological, and necessitate in principle the whole of the mathematical reality, which is multiple and undefinable (by machines, provably by machine’s too).

Bruno

@philipthrift

@philipthrift 

 

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[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, October 6, 2019 at 1:19:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 5 Oct 2019, at 13:08, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Saturday, October 5, 2019 at 2:21:34 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Oct 2019, at 20:04, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Friday, October 4, 2019 at 8:28:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Oct 2019, at 00:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:

The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology.

Cosmology assumes the quantum at a cosmological scale, and it is where a collapse makes the less sense. Who would observe and be responsible for the collapse of the universal wave? Belinfante estimates that the Copenhagen-von Neuman formulation of QM requires an external god looking at the universe, like materialism requires a god selecting a unique computation, but that’s no more doing science.

François Englert, who worked in quantum cosmology, was very annoyed by the collapse problem, and was relieved that it makes sense to just abandon the collapse idea.  The collapse is usually not even defined in any intelligible sense, and it introduces a duality incompatible with Mechanism, but also with the scientific attitude, I would say.

With mechanism, there is only one consciousness which differentiates into many 1p histories, and they interfere statistically, notably by allowing a 1p plural observable and sharable reality.

Why to believe in any “world"? 

Bruno

Applied sciences 

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_applied_science#Branches_of_applied_science

do not need Many Worlds Interpretation (as far as I can see).

If there is no reason to use MWI in applied science, there is no reason to consider MWI in science at all.

That leads back to instrumentalist metaphysics, which is the same as “shut up and calculate”. You don’t need any world, not even one, in that case. 

Bruno

It could appear so, but I say it leads to codicalism (between instrumentalism [strict antirealism] and realism).

“Codicalism” or even “formalism” necessitates sigma_1 arithmetical realism, which is the only ontology possible when we assume mechanism, but consciousness and matter become phenomenological, and necessitate in principle the whole of the mathematical reality, which is multiple and undefinable (by machines, provably by machine’s too).

Bruno

 

JD Hamkins - https://twitter.com/jdhamkins - has expanded the definition of "definable" in mathematics.

Nothing is settled and written on stone tablets, like The Ten Commandments.

@philipthrift

[smitra]

We should start with listing all possibilities:

1) Schrodinger equation is exactly correct, in which case we have to
accept the MWI.

2) Schrodinger equation is only an approximation.

Under option 2) we can have single world theories where a real collapse
happens that violates the Schrodinger equation. But it's also possible
that the violation of the Schrodinger equation leading to a collapse
doesn't actually get rid of the Many Worlds part of the MWI. The way the
collapse happens will be different for the copies of an observer that
will exist in a large enough universe (in a spatial or temporal sense).

Saibal

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[Bruce Kellett]

False.

 

2) Schrodinger equation is only an approximation.

Possible, but irrelevant here. This does not go towards answering the question that was asked about energy.

Bruce

[Brent Meeker]

Just as the SE predicts there is no collapse of the WF it also predicts
there are no orthogonal worlds.  The appearance of collapse comes from
the approximate orthogonality of projections onto the preferred bases. 
So suppose we just say that when this approximate orthogonality comes
close enough to exact, we discard the other subspaces orthogonal to what
we've observed.  Those other subspaces effectively don't exist.  The
level of "close enough to exact" may have a theoretical basis in the
holographic principle and the finite information content available to
the accessible universe.

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

How does the Schrödinger equation predict "no collapse"?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger_equation

@philipthrift 

[smitra]

You can try to invoke Bohm theory as a counterexample, but as David
Deutsch has demonstrated, Bohm theory is just the MWI in disguise.

Saibal

[Bruno Marchal]

No, but once we fix the theory in which we are reasoning, then we cannot change the definition, just to claim something different about reality. 

I have not the time to follow the link, but if you think that his change of the definition of “definition” is relevant, please provide more explanation. I use the rather simple theory of Tarski, where definable means “expressible” in some first order logical formula, or expressible through some objects themselves definable in some first order theory (finite our recursively enumerable set of first-order formula). I am aware of many generalisation, but they are not relevant for my point.

Bruno

@philipthrift

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[smitra]

Yes, but there will also be imperfect recurrences where the difference
will go unnoticed for an observer until a measurement is made. You can
then have an effective splitting in single world collapse theories. and
each outcome will have a certain probability that corresponds to the
relative frequency at which different outcomes will occur in a large
time period.

Saibal

[smitra]

Energy conservation is also consistent with block time, so energy
conservation alone does not single out the interpretation of itself as a
physical transfer of energy from one instant to another instant. One can
choose to interpret it like that, but one can for example just as well
assume a multiverse of all time snaps of all possible universes with
different energy contents, the laws of physics are then nothing more
than a mathematical statement that tells you that universe X and
universe Y have the same information content giving a prescription of
how to compute things in Y given the state of X. Nothing is then
actually physically transferred from X to Y.

>
>> If you drop this assumption and simply take thew block universe point
>> of view where all the instances already exist out there, then there is
>> no problem to begin with.
>
> Do all the branches then exist equally?  in which case you've
> abandoned energy conservation and now you need to explain why it
> appears to be conserved on every branch.

If under a time evolution a state X becomes a superposition of states
Y1, Y2, ..., Yn, then the block time interpretation of that is that Y1,
Y2,....., Yn and X are all different universes and that the information
in X can be retrieved not from a single universe Y_i, but it's
distributed over the different universes Y1,...Yn. If all the Y_n have
well defined and equal energies then these energies are equal to that of
state X. The information about the energy in state X is then present in
each state Y_k separately.

Saibal

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/6/2019 3:03 AM, smitra wrote:

And with finite information in the universe there is not distinction
between recurrences and hence there are no recurrences.

Yes, but there will also be imperfect recurrences where the difference will go unnoticed for an observer until a measurement is made. You can then have an effective splitting in single world collapse theories. and each outcome will have a certain probability that corresponds to the relative frequency at which different outcomes will occur in a large time period.

What does "effective splitting in single world collapse" mean?  Sounds like classical probability due to ignorance...except that's NOT splitting.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

It is differentiating.

Imagine the WM-duplication, or better here, a guy who is duplicated in two virtual rooms, numerically identical, except for a close virtual envelop with a paper containing 1 (written on a paper)  in room 1 and 2 in room 2.

If the person there does not open the envelop, we can fuse them again, and nothing special happened. It one consciousness flux, like if no duplication occurred. 

But if the guy open the envelop and read what is on the paper, then the consciousness flux differentiates.

For the measure on the histories, the rule is graphically sum up by the diagram:

      Y   =    II

The differentiation in the future separate the past, and it allows the elimination of the splitting. The real diagram are provided by the Kripke semantic, or other semantic for the modal logic of self-reference (and its intensional variants), where we should get something like the Feynman diagrams for the histories and sub-histories.

Like you say: it is classical probabilities, from a relative first person perspective, localised in a mathematically sophisticated structure. The many-worlds of the universal wave seems to confirm the many-computations of elementary arithmetic. This one has the Gödel-Löb-Solovay “theology” capable of distinguishing quanta (knowable, observable and sharable) from qualia (knowable, observable, but not sharable).

Bruno

Brent

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[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 14, 2019 at 9:20:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Oct 2019, at 01:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 10/6/2019 3:03 AM, smitra wrote:

And with finite information in the universe there is not distinction
between recurrences and hence there are no recurrences.

Yes, but there will also be imperfect recurrences where the difference will go unnoticed for an observer until a measurement is made. You can then have an effective splitting in single world collapse theories. and each outcome will have a certain probability that corresponds to the relative frequency at which different outcomes will occur in a large time period.

What does "effective splitting in single world collapse" mean?  Sounds like classical probability due to ignorance...except that's NOT splitting.

It is differentiating.

Imagine the WM-duplication, or better here, a guy who is duplicated in two virtual rooms, numerically identical, except for a close virtual envelop with a paper containing 1 (written on a paper)  in room 1 and 2 in room 2.

If the person there does not open the envelop, we can fuse them again, and nothing special happened. It one consciousness flux, like if no duplication occurred. 

But if the guy open the envelop and read what is on the paper, then the consciousness flux differentiates.

For the measure on the histories, the rule is graphically sum up by the diagram:

      Y   =    II

The differentiation in the future separate the past, and it allows the elimination of the splitting. The real diagram are provided by the Kripke semantic, or other semantic for the modal logic of self-reference (and its intensional variants), where we should get something like the Feynman diagrams for the histories and sub-histories.

Like you say: it is classical probabilities, from a relative first person perspective, localised in a mathematically sophisticated structure. The many-worlds of the universal wave seems to confirm the many-computations of elementary arithmetic. This one has the Gödel-Löb-Solovay “theology” capable of distinguishing quanta (knowable, observable and sharable) from qualia (knowable, observable, but not sharable).

Bruno

Many Words is Gödel-Löb-Solovay “theology.

Of course!

@philipthrift

[Brent Meeker]

On 10/14/2019 7:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Oct 2019, at 01:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 10/6/2019 3:03 AM, smitra wrote:

And with finite information in the universe there is not distinction
between recurrences and hence there are no recurrences.

Yes, but there will also be imperfect recurrences where the difference will go unnoticed for an observer until a measurement is made. You can then have an effective splitting in single world collapse theories. and each outcome will have a certain probability that corresponds to the relative frequency at which different outcomes will occur in a large time period.

What does "effective splitting in single world collapse" mean?  Sounds like classical probability due to ignorance...except that's NOT splitting.

It is differentiating.

Imagine the WM-duplication, or better here, a guy who is duplicated in two virtual rooms, numerically identical, except for a close virtual envelop with a paper containing 1 (written on a paper)  in room 1 and 2 in room 2.

If the person there does not open the envelop, we can fuse them again, and nothing special happened. It one consciousness flux, like if no duplication occurred. 

But if the guy open the envelop and read what is on the paper, then the consciousness flux differentiates.

Which is the QBist interpretation of QM.

Brent

For the measure on the histories, the rule is graphically sum up by the diagram:

      Y   =    II

The differentiation in the future separate the past, and it allows the elimination of the splitting. The real diagram are provided by the Kripke semantic, or other semantic for the modal logic of self-reference (and its intensional variants), where we should get something like the Feynman diagrams for the histories and sub-histories.

Like you say: it is classical probabilities, from a relative first person perspective, localised in a mathematically sophisticated structure. The many-worlds of the universal wave seems to confirm the many-computations of elementary arithmetic. This one has the Gödel-Löb-Solovay “theology” capable of distinguishing quanta (knowable, observable and sharable) from qualia (knowable, observable, but not sharable).

Bruno

Brent

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[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, October 14, 2019 at 1:28:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

Which is the QBist interpretation of QM.   [ Re: Gödel-Löb-Solovay “theology”]

Brent

MWI is QB on steroids.

@philpthrift 

[Brent Meeker]

I'd say it's MWI plus humility.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

If this is not sarcastic: no. That is not obvious. But it is explained in all details in my papers, but you might need to study some good book in logic (like Mendelson’s one already referred to).

Bruno

@philipthrift

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Oct 2019, at 20:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 10/14/2019 7:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Oct 2019, at 01:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 10/6/2019 3:03 AM, smitra wrote:

And with finite information in the universe there is not distinction
between recurrences and hence there are no recurrences.

Yes, but there will also be imperfect recurrences where the difference will go unnoticed for an observer until a measurement is made. You can then have an effective splitting in single world collapse theories. and each outcome will have a certain probability that corresponds to the relative frequency at which different outcomes will occur in a large time period.

What does "effective splitting in single world collapse" mean?  Sounds like classical probability due to ignorance...except that's NOT splitting.

It is differentiating.

Imagine the WM-duplication, or better here, a guy who is duplicated in two virtual rooms, numerically identical, except for a close virtual envelop with a paper containing 1 (written on a paper)  in room 1 and 2 in room 2.

If the person there does not open the envelop, we can fuse them again, and nothing special happened. It one consciousness flux, like if no duplication occurred. 

But if the guy open the envelop and read what is on the paper, then the consciousness flux differentiates.

Which is the QBist interpretation of QM.

Cool!

If you have a best link on QBism, I might be interested (but I might ask again later, as I have not much time to do research right now).

Bruno

Brent

For the measure on the histories, the rule is graphically sum up by the diagram:

      Y   =    II

The differentiation in the future separate the past, and it allows the elimination of the splitting. The real diagram are provided by the Kripke semantic, or other semantic for the modal logic of self-reference (and its intensional variants), where we should get something like the Feynman diagrams for the histories and sub-histories.

Like you say: it is classical probabilities, from a relative first person perspective, localised in a mathematically sophisticated structure. The many-worlds of the universal wave seems to confirm the many-computations of elementary arithmetic. This one has the Gödel-Löb-Solovay “theology” capable of distinguishing quanta (knowable, observable and sharable) from qualia (knowable, observable, but not sharable).

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

I’d say the contrary. Usually, to accept more people and histories seems to me more humble than the belief in own own uniqueness …. But never mind, especially that with Mechanism, there are no world at all, just “numbers”, together with + and *.

Bruno

Brent

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[Brent Meeker]

On 10/15/2019 5:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Imagine the WM-duplication, or better here, a guy who is duplicated
>>> in two virtual rooms, numerically identical, except for a close
>>> virtual envelop with a paper containing 1 (written on a paper)  in
>>> room 1 and 2 in room 2.
>>>
>>> If the person there does not open the envelop, we can fuse them
>>> again, and nothing special happened. It one consciousness flux, like
>>> if no duplication occurred.
>>> But if the guy open the envelop and read what is on the paper, then
>>> the consciousness flux differentiates.
>>
>> Which is the QBist interpretation of QM.
>
> Cool!
>
> If you have a best link on QBism, I might be interested (but I might
> ask again later, as I have not much time to do research right now).

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.4211.pdf

https://arxiv.org/pdf/0706.2661.pdf

Brent

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, October 15, 2019 at 7:46:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 But never mind, especially that with Mechanism, there are no world at all, just “numbers”, together with + and *.

Bruno

That's certainly better than MWI.

@philipthrift 

[Bruno Marchal]

Thank you. Very interesting from a quick look perspective. It is still many histories, but they become even closer to what we expect from mechanism, and physics becomes rather clearly a first person (plural) constructs.

Might say more later. The only problem is that I am a bit skeptical of the use of Bayes theorem in this context, but I might be wrong on this.

Bruno




>
> Brent
>
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[Bruno Marchal]

I think so, especially that we get both the wave and the collapse has personal (epistemic, doxastic) appearance. We just need to believe that proposition like (3 divides 9 ) are true, or false.

Bruno

@philipthrift 

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