New Russia-Germany pipeline
Roman Werpachowski
the two countries, lying on the bed of the Baltic Sea. Construction costs will
be at least 6 billion dollars higher than the costs of the planned second Yamal
pipe (which Germany could take it gas from as well), going through Poland. Why
do Russia and Germany choose a solution which will be more expensive for German
customers? From the Russia's POV, the answer is clear. With the Baltic
pipeline, Russia will be able to exert its pressure on Poland by switching off
the gas supplies, without disrupting the gas deliveries to Germany. What I
cannot understand is, why Germany, which recently -- in the person of president
Koehler -- declared that it won't make deals with Russia "over Polish heads",
picks a more expensive solution just to please Russian "energy warmongering".
It seems like an outright betrayal of the Polish side, in this matter.
--
Po co wybierać mniejsze zło? Cthulu na prezydenta!
Christian Feldhaus
> Germany plans to sign a deal with Russia about building a gas pipeline between
> the two countries, lying on the bed of the Baltic Sea.
Well, it's election campaign time in both Poland and Germany. In one
country the deal is viewed as the "second Rapallo Treaty" or called the
Schröder-Putin Pact (which only accidentally, of course, sounds a little
like Hitler-Stalin Pact ...), in the other it is considered either
"securing resources for the future" or "Putin's farewell offer to
Schröder", depending on the political camp. In my opinion, much of that
is campaign noise indeed.
Imagine that the Kaczynski Brothers will soon be president and PM in
Poland; a scenario which is not that unlikely. You would then have a
president who recently demanded 40 billion euro "reparations" from the
German government (despite knowing very well that the German demands he
reacted to were not supported by the government at all), and a prime
minister who supports the introduction of death penalty in Poland. For
such people it is politically vital, I suppose, to paint things black
when it comes to Germany and Russia.
Guess that the next German government which will, unless hell freezes
over, be different from the current coalition will also set different
accents regarding the relations with Russia. What a CDU led government
would have done in this case, however, can only be speculated about.
After all, it is actually a deal between E.ON (Ruhrgas), BASF
(Wintershall) and Gazprom, with the latter having the majority.
> Construction costs will be at least 6 billion dollars higher than the
> costs of the planned second Yamal pipe
Really? Admittedly I have not read much about the cost aspect so far,
but according to two articles I came across, the Baltic Sea project
costs will be a total of 4 billion euro. Now E.ON and BASF apparently
consider the Baltic Sea connection to be more lucrative than having to
pay for the connection via Belarus and Poland. But in my opinion it is
not realistic to assume that Poland would actually be "cut off" if
Russia interrupts the supply via the Yamal line.
Talking about costs - just yesterday and today the papers in DE are full
of articles about natural gas becoming more expensive ...
Christian
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
>
>> Germany plans to sign a deal with Russia about building a gas pipeline between
>> the two countries, lying on the bed of the Baltic Sea.
>
> Well, it's election campaign time in both Poland and Germany. In one
> country the deal is viewed as the "second Rapallo Treaty" or called the
> Schröder-Putin Pact (which only accidentally, of course, sounds a little
> like Hitler-Stalin Pact ...), in the other it is considered either
> "securing resources for the future" or "Putin's farewell offer to
> Schröder", depending on the political camp. In my opinion, much of that
> is campaign noise indeed.
Polish energetic security is not just campaign noise. For one, Gazprom once
froze without warning its gas supplies to Poland. Germany was given such
warning. This alone shows how Russia differs between its trade partners. For
second, Russia has already used oil supplies as an instrument of blackmail
towards the Baltic states.
Another thing is that when this Baltic pipeline is built, Poland will be unable
to build any pipeline from Norway (the pipelines cannot cross on the seabed).
>
> Imagine that the Kaczynski Brothers will soon be president and PM in
> Poland; a scenario which is not that unlikely. You would then have a
> president who recently demanded 40 billion euro "reparations" from the
> German government (despite knowing very well that the German demands he
> reacted to were not supported by the government at all), and a prime
> minister who supports the introduction of death penalty in Poland. For
> such people it is politically vital, I suppose, to paint things black
> when it comes to Germany and Russia.
1. Today, it is most probably that Donald Tusk will become president. He has
good relations with Angela Merkel.
2. It would be very unlikely anyway, that both Kaczynskis would held posts at
the same time. One of them would have to resign.
3. Death penalty, while being one the things which make me dislike Kaczynskis
(both of them), is more of a campaign slogan than a real proposition.
4. Not only them fear about Poland's energy dependence on Russia.
>
> Guess that the next German government which will, unless hell freezes
> over, be different from the current coalition will also set different
> accents regarding the relations with Russia. What a CDU led government
> would have done in this case, however, can only be speculated about.
> After all, it is actually a deal between E.ON (Ruhrgas), BASF
> (Wintershall) and Gazprom, with the latter having the majority.
We both know such deals always have the blessing of the governments.
>
>> Construction costs will be at least 6 billion dollars higher than the
>> costs of the planned second Yamal pipe
>
> Really? Admittedly I have not read much about the cost aspect so far,
> but according to two articles I came across, the Baltic Sea project
> costs will be a total of 4 billion euro. Now E.ON and BASF apparently
> consider the Baltic Sea connection to be more lucrative than having to
> pay for the connection via Belarus and Poland. But in my opinion it is
> not realistic to assume that Poland would actually be "cut off" if
> Russia interrupts the supply via the Yamal line.
The risk is there. I have just outlined why I see the risk. You surprise me
with the information about the costs. It seems natural to me, though, that it's
more expensive to construct and maintain an under-sea pipeline than a
land-based one.
>
> Talking about costs - just yesterday and today the papers in DE are full
> of articles about natural gas becoming more expensive ...
Oil is getting more expensive, too.
Christian Feldhaus
> Polish energetic security is not just campaign noise. For one, Gazprom once
> froze without warning its gas supplies to Poland. Germany was given such
> warning. This alone shows how Russia differs between its trade partners. For
> second, Russia has already used oil supplies as an instrument of blackmail
> towards the Baltic states.
As for the "campaign noise", that primarily referred to expressions like
the ones I mentioned. I do (well, try to) understand the Polish concerns
about this deal but find it hard to imagine that, in a fully functioning
EU gas market (which we do not quite have yet), one country could be
left in the lurch while others enjoy the resources they import.
That is why, in my opinion, the concerns are exaggerated. Besides, who
knows how Gazprom or the Russian government will treat its trade
partners if Putin's German counterpart is not Schröder but Merkel ...
> > What a CDU led government would have done in this case, however, can
> > only be speculated about. After all, it is actually a deal between E.ON
> > (Ruhrgas), BASF (Wintershall) and Gazprom, with the latter having the
> > majority.
>
> We both know such deals always have the blessing of the governments.
Sure, of course. (Guess why Putin and Schröder, and not just the company
reps, will meet in Berlin tomorrow <g>.) What I meant is that these and
other companies do have their own interests. So would a Merkel/CDU
government have said No to such a pipeline deal if BASF or another
company had shown a lot of interest?
And as I wrote, I actually don't know the answer to this question. I am
somewhat inclined to believe that somebody like Merkel who grew up in a
USSR "satellite" will be more skeptical and/or critical regarding
Putin's Russia.
> You surprise me with the information about the costs. It seems natural to
> me, though, that it's more expensive to construct and maintain an
> under-sea pipeline than a land-based one.
The latter is certainly true. How much that Baltic sea pipeline will
cost, well, this €4bn figure was mentioned here for example ...
"Bau einer Gas-Pipeline durch die Ostsee für fast vier Milliarden Euro"
http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1125645147744.shtml
... and in this article which also says that a "land line" would have
cost much less - estimates go from 25 to 50 percent:
"Als weiteres Argument wird ins Feld geführt, der Bau der
Parallelleitung durch Polen werde im Endeffekt nur die Hälfte, nach
Angaben des früheren Vizepremiers Janusz Steinhoff sogar nur ein Viertel
bis ein Drittel der mit vier Milliarden Euro sehr teueren Ostsee-Leitung
kosten." http://www.welt.de/data/2005/09/07/771526.html
> > Talking about costs - just yesterday and today the papers in DE are full
> > of articles about natural gas becoming more expensive ...
>
> Oil is getting more expensive, too.
Right, but is that "automatism" necessary? At least in Germany, when the
price of oil increases, the price of natural gas goes up in precisely
the same way, and vice versa. Not sure about whether this is due to some
law; I rather think it's due to some long term contractual agreements.
Anyway, this kind of "bundling" is currently being discussed here ...
Christian
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
>
>> Polish energetic security is not just campaign noise. For one, Gazprom once
>> froze without warning its gas supplies to Poland. Germany was given such
>> warning. This alone shows how Russia differs between its trade partners. For
>> second, Russia has already used oil supplies as an instrument of blackmail
>> towards the Baltic states.
>
> As for the "campaign noise", that primarily referred to expressions like
> the ones I mentioned. I do (well, try to) understand the Polish concerns
> about this deal but find it hard to imagine that, in a fully functioning
> EU gas market (which we do not quite have yet), one country could be
> left in the lurch while others enjoy the resources they import.
That depends on the contract terms. Germany is also heavily dependent on
Russian resources, and I can imagine a contract forbidding the buyer the
re-export. Besides, Germany would only be able to sell Poland its surplus.
>
> That is why, in my opinion, the concerns are exaggerated. Besides, who
> knows how Gazprom or the Russian government will treat its trade
> partners if Putin's German counterpart is not Schröder but Merkel ...
>
>> > What a CDU led government would have done in this case, however, can
>> > only be speculated about. After all, it is actually a deal between E.ON
>> > (Ruhrgas), BASF (Wintershall) and Gazprom, with the latter having the
>> > majority.
>>
>> We both know such deals always have the blessing of the governments.
>
> Sure, of course. (Guess why Putin and Schröder, and not just the company
> reps, will meet in Berlin tomorrow <g>.) What I meant is that these and
> other companies do have their own interests. So would a Merkel/CDU
> government have said No to such a pipeline deal if BASF or another
> company had shown a lot of interest?
>
> And as I wrote, I actually don't know the answer to this question. I am
> somewhat inclined to believe that somebody like Merkel who grew up in a
> USSR "satellite" will be more skeptical and/or critical regarding
> Putin's Russia.
I sincerely hope. I am fed up with the way Schroeder is caving to Putin.
>
>> You surprise me with the information about the costs. It seems natural to
>> me, though, that it's more expensive to construct and maintain an
>> under-sea pipeline than a land-based one.
>
> The latter is certainly true. How much that Baltic sea pipeline will
> cost, well, this ¤4bn figure was mentioned here for example ...
>
> "Bau einer Gas-Pipeline durch die Ostsee für fast vier Milliarden Euro"
> http://www.ksta.de/html/artikel/1125645147744.shtml
>
> ... and in this article which also says that a "land line" would have
> cost much less - estimates go from 25 to 50 percent:
>
> "Als weiteres Argument wird ins Feld geführt, der Bau der
> Parallelleitung durch Polen werde im Endeffekt nur die Hälfte, nach
> Angaben des früheren Vizepremiers Janusz Steinhoff sogar nur ein Viertel
> bis ein Drittel der mit vier Milliarden Euro sehr teueren Ostsee-Leitung
> kosten." http://www.welt.de/data/2005/09/07/771526.html
See?
>
>> > Talking about costs - just yesterday and today the papers in DE are full
>> > of articles about natural gas becoming more expensive ...
>>
>> Oil is getting more expensive, too.
>
> Right, but is that "automatism" necessary? At least in Germany, when the
> price of oil increases, the price of natural gas goes up in precisely
> the same way, and vice versa. Not sure about whether this is due to some
> law; I rather think it's due to some long term contractual agreements.
> Anyway, this kind of "bundling" is currently being discussed here ...
I guess it's because they are to some extent substitutes: it doesn't cost too
much to switch your car from gasoline to natural gas. Higher oil prices mean
higher demand for the latter, which pushes the prices up. Not speaking about
what people choose to heat their houses in the winter with (oil or gas).
Vegasexcitement
--
Many Thanks, :)
Don Strevel, Las Vegas, NV.
in...@mysecretvegas.com for an autoresponder message.
"Roman Werpachowski" <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote in message
news:slrndhubvt.6n...@theta1.cft.edu.pl...
Christian Feldhaus
> If it benefits all, would it not be ok?
Sure. Except there is that "if" at the beginning ...
Part of the Polish concerns are probably based on the fact that, with a
Baltic Sea pipeline, the revenue from the current "transfer fees" (that,
say, German companies pay for the gas from the current land pipeline)
will be reduced. The other effect is somewhat hypothetical, I think, but
very grave if it should ever become reality: The gas supply from Russia
to Poland could be interrupted in case of a conflict.
For the European Union as a whole this Baltic Sea pipeline has a fairly
high priority too. What causes concerns at the EU level (legitimate ones
IMO) is that, contrary to previous plans, only Russian and German
companies are involved in the deal. And as Roman wrote, a land pipeline
would be less expensive - but as long as there aren't that many
alternatives, companies such as E.ON (which has a 6.5% stake in Gazprom)
and BASF don't really have to worry: The consumers will have to pay the
price that the few suppliers demand ...
Now that may change due to the liberalization of the EU energy market
and due to other pipelines being in the pipeline <g>. Which is also why
the concerns in Poland about being "cut off" do not seem very realistic
to me. Yes, there are quite a few points that could and should be
criticized about this deal, from economic and ecologic issues to
alienating neighbors. But drawing parallels to the Hitler-Stalin pact,
for example, is absurd in this case.
Christian
Roman Werpachowski
> If it benefits all, would it not be ok?
Because it doesn't. Today, Russia can't cut off the gas deliveries to Poland,
because it would at the same time cut off the deliveries for Germany. When the
trans-Baltic pipelines is built, two things will change:
1. Russia will be able to treat Poland separately from Germany
2. Poland will not be able to build a pipeline from Norway, since pipelines
cannot cross at the sea bed.
Now, were Poland and Germany enemies, or even didn't give a sh...t about each
other, all this would have been normal and standard practice. But they're both
in the EU, and such things should be dealt with in a different way.
Roman Werpachowski
> But drawing parallels to the Hitler-Stalin pact,
> for example, is absurd in this case.
Which I did not do... But I see in this case a shining example of Germany and
Russia dealing over Polish heads, neglecting our legitimate interests.
Christian Feldhaus
> Which I did not do...
I know, and I sincerely hope my message did not suggest that.
> But I see in this case a shining example of Germany and
> Russia dealing over Polish heads, neglecting our legitimate interests.
Well, I do not quite believe in these horror scenarios of an entire
country being cut off. Besides, as I wrote, even though the two
governments involved OKed and supported the deal, it is still a
commercial agreement - E.ON nor BASF are note owned or controlled by the
government ...
Christian
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
>
>> Which I did not do...
>
> I know, and I sincerely hope my message did not suggest that.
I just wanted to make things clear ;-)
>
>> But I see in this case a shining example of Germany and
>> Russia dealing over Polish heads, neglecting our legitimate interests.
>
> Well, I do not quite believe in these horror scenarios of an entire
> country being cut off. Besides, as I wrote, even though the two
Baltic states had the unpleasant experience of suffering oil deliveries cutoff.
> governments involved OKed and supported the deal, it is still a
> commercial agreement - E.ON nor BASF are note owned or controlled by the
> government ...
But on the other side? Gazprom is state owned and has been used as a foreign
policy tool before.
TT Arvind
> Another thing is that when this Baltic pipeline is built, Poland will
> be unable to build any pipeline from Norway (the pipelines cannot cross
> on the seabed).
Why is that the case? It is common enough in the North Sea fields for
pipelines in the North Sea fields to cross each other that there is a
standard form contract to deal with it:
I've not read too much about this proposed pipeline - is there
something different about it?
> Po co wybieraæ mniejsze z³o? Cthulu na prezydenta!
Heh :-) Is that in connection with the October elections in Poland?
--
Arvind
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski wrote:
>
>> Another thing is that when this Baltic pipeline is built, Poland will
>> be unable to build any pipeline from Norway (the pipelines cannot cross
>> on the seabed).
>
> Why is that the case? It is common enough in the North Sea fields for
> pipelines in the North Sea fields to cross each other that there is a
> standard form contract to deal with it:
>
> http://www.oilandgas.org.uk/issues/stdagreements/worddocs/Post-Workshop%20Pipeline%20Crossing%20Agreement.doc
Hah! There goes BUST another myth being perpetuated in Polish press. Thank you
for the info.
The crucial part would be to get the Russians to sign such agreement, though.
>
> I've not read too much about this proposed pipeline - is there
> something different about it?
>
>> Po co wybierać mniejsze zło? Cthulu na prezydenta!
>
> Heh :-) Is that in connection with the October elections in Poland?
Yes. Do you want a translation?
J.M.
I am not informed too well on this matter, but from what I have heard, the
Baltic Sea solution is less expensive in the long run, because no third
parties (e.g. Poland) need to be paid for allowing the gas to be
transported across their territory. As far as I can tell, it is just about
money, nothing more and nothing less. Perhaps from a German POV, it makes
more sense to have just a bilateral agreement with one other country than
an agreement requiring the participation of several states, all wanting to
make money in the process. Certainly, as a customer, I want cheap gas,
especially as prices have skyrocketed recently, and I don't want to pay
more just to avoid hurt feelings across the border.
Jan
Roman Werpachowski
Are you also informed than in this deal, Germany is not allowed to re-sell the
surplus of the gas?
--
Po co wybierać mniejsze zło? Cthulhu na prezydenta!
J.M.
No, like I said, I am not informed about the details, so I just posted my
two cents worth of what I did know. Frankly, I don't really care too much
about this issue, particularly, Polish sensitivies -- Poland is just
hypersensitive. (Sorry to say that, but that is the way it looks from this
side of the border.)
Jan
Roman Werpachowski
>> Are you also informed than in this deal, Germany is not allowed to re-sell
>> the surplus of the gas?
>>
>
>
> No, like I said, I am not informed about the details, so I just posted my
> two cents worth of what I did know. Frankly, I don't really care too much
> about this issue, particularly, Polish sensitivies -- Poland is just
> hypersensitive. (Sorry to say that, but that is the way it looks from this
> side of the border.)
1. Russia used its deliveries of oil to Baltic states as a political tool in
the past.
2. Do you remember how about a year ago Gazprom cut off gas deliveries to
Poland and Germany and did not bother to inform Poland about it in advance,
while simultaneously informing Germany?
It's not hypersensitivity, it's about economic and national security. I wonder
how much of the Russian aggressive policy, esp. towards the Baltic states, is
mentioned in German media. Have you, for example, read how often does Russian
air force violate Lithuanian air space?
J.M.
> On the Fri, 23 Sep 2005 18:46:26 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>
>>> Are you also informed than in this deal, Germany is not allowed to
>>> re-sell the surplus of the gas?
>>>
>>
>>
>> No, like I said, I am not informed about the details, so I just posted my
>> two cents worth of what I did know. Frankly, I don't really care too much
>> about this issue, particularly, Polish sensitivies -- Poland is just
>> hypersensitive. (Sorry to say that, but that is the way it looks from
>> this side of the border.)
>
> 1. Russia used its deliveries of oil to Baltic states as a political tool
> in the past.
That is an issue between the Baltic states / Poland and Russia. I don't see
what this has to do with German-Polish relations.
> 2. Do you remember how about a year ago Gazprom cut off gas deliveries to
> Poland and Germany and did not bother to inform Poland about it in
> advance, while simultaneously informing Germany?
Sure. I am well aware of the fact that Russian-Polish relations aren't very
good. But again, I don't see what this has to do with Germany.
>
> It's not hypersensitivity, it's about economic and national security.
I don't see how Germany is a problem for Polish economic and national
security.
> I
> wonder how much of the Russian aggressive policy, esp. towards the Baltic
> states, is mentioned in German media. Have you, for example, read how
> often does Russian air force violate Lithuanian air space?
What does any of this have to do with Germany?
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>> On the Fri, 23 Sep 2005 18:46:26 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>>
>>>> Are you also informed than in this deal, Germany is not allowed to
>>>> re-sell the surplus of the gas?
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, like I said, I am not informed about the details, so I just posted my
>>> two cents worth of what I did know. Frankly, I don't really care too much
>>> about this issue, particularly, Polish sensitivies -- Poland is just
>>> hypersensitive. (Sorry to say that, but that is the way it looks from
>>> this side of the border.)
>>
>> 1. Russia used its deliveries of oil to Baltic states as a political tool
>> in the past.
>
> That is an issue between the Baltic states / Poland and Russia. I don't see
> what this has to do with German-Polish relations.
I wrote it to prove that the threat of Russia using its gas and oil deliveries
as an instrument of political pressure on Poland and the Baltic states is real
and not just "Polish hypersensitivity".
>
>> 2. Do you remember how about a year ago Gazprom cut off gas deliveries to
>> Poland and Germany and did not bother to inform Poland about it in
>> advance, while simultaneously informing Germany?
>
> Sure. I am well aware of the fact that Russian-Polish relations aren't very
> good. But again, I don't see what this has to do with Germany.
German decisions will make it easier for Russia to exert such pressure on
Poland.
>>
>> It's not hypersensitivity, it's about economic and national security.
>
> I don't see how Germany is a problem for Polish economic and national
> security.
If the new pipeline goes through Poland, Russia will not be able to cut gas
supplies to Poland. If it goes under the Baltic Sea, Russia will be able.
>
>> I
>> wonder how much of the Russian aggressive policy, esp. towards the Baltic
>> states, is mentioned in German media. Have you, for example, read how
>> often does Russian air force violate Lithuanian air space?
>
> What does any of this have to do with Germany?
"Poland is just hypersensitive". Those were your words. I wrote all this to
prove to you and other people reading this thread that the threat from Russia
is real and is not just "Polish hypersensitivity". You are entitled to the
view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this view behind the
"Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think that Germany should
sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake of relations with Russia, say
it openly.
J.M.
>>>
>>> 1. Russia used its deliveries of oil to Baltic states as a political
>>> tool in the past.
>>
>> That is an issue between the Baltic states / Poland and Russia. I don't
>> see what this has to do with German-Polish relations.
>
> I wrote it to prove that the threat of Russia using its gas and oil
> deliveries as an instrument of political pressure on Poland and the Baltic
> states is real and not just "Polish hypersensitivity".
Quite true, but what does this have to do with German-Polish relations?
Germany made its choice based on what it perceived to be best for Germany.
I refer to "Polish hypersensitivity" whenever someone implies that Germany
does something to hurt Poland. If Poland is hurt by this decision, then
this is coincidental, not the aim of German policy.
>
>>
>>> 2. Do you remember how about a year ago Gazprom cut off gas deliveries
>>> to Poland and Germany and did not bother to inform Poland about it in
>>> advance, while simultaneously informing Germany?
>>
>> Sure. I am well aware of the fact that Russian-Polish relations aren't
>> very good. But again, I don't see what this has to do with Germany.
>
> German decisions will make it easier for Russia to exert such pressure on
> Poland.
True, but what is your point? Poland does not avoid policies that might harm
German interests either, so why should Germany avoid decisions that might
harm Poland? I recall Germany having some differences with the US
concerning Iraq. Poland (along with quite a few other countries) helped the
America's attempt to isolate Germany in Europe on this matter and even
signed the "letter of 8". Here, Poland pursued its foreign policy aims
without any regard to German interests, so please don't complain if Germany
does the same. Put differently, Poland's Iraq policy made it easier for the
US to exert pressure on Germany, which it did, so don't complain about
Russian pressure on Poland for which Germany bears some responsibility.
>
>>>
>>> It's not hypersensitivity, it's about economic and national security.
>>
>> I don't see how Germany is a problem for Polish economic and national
>> security.
>
> If the new pipeline goes through Poland, Russia will not be able to cut
> gas supplies to Poland. If it goes under the Baltic Sea, Russia will be
> able.
>
>>
>>> I
>>> wonder how much of the Russian aggressive policy, esp. towards the
>>> Baltic states, is mentioned in German media. Have you, for example, read
>>> how often does Russian air force violate Lithuanian air space?
>>
>> What does any of this have to do with Germany?
>
> "Poland is just hypersensitive".
Let me be more specific: Hypersensitive in thinking everything Germany does
is directed against Poland.
> Those were your words. I wrote all this
> to prove to you and other people reading this thread that the threat from
> Russia
> is real and is not just "Polish hypersensitivity".
No, that pressure is quite real. True.
> You are entitled to
> the view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this view
> behind the "Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think that
> Germany should sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake of
> relations with Russia, say it openly.
Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with Germany
for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is not a matter
of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish interests should
play a larger role in German policy than they do vice versa.
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>>>>
>>>> 1. Russia used its deliveries of oil to Baltic states as a political
>>>> tool in the past.
>>>
>>> That is an issue between the Baltic states / Poland and Russia. I don't
>>> see what this has to do with German-Polish relations.
>>
>> I wrote it to prove that the threat of Russia using its gas and oil
>> deliveries as an instrument of political pressure on Poland and the Baltic
>> states is real and not just "Polish hypersensitivity".
>
> Quite true, but what does this have to do with German-Polish relations?
> Germany made its choice based on what it perceived to be best for Germany.
> I refer to "Polish hypersensitivity" whenever someone implies that Germany
> does something to hurt Poland. If Poland is hurt by this decision, then
> this is coincidental, not the aim of German policy.
This is not coincidental, this is the aim of Russian policy, which Germany
easily agreed to.
>>
>>>
>>>> 2. Do you remember how about a year ago Gazprom cut off gas deliveries
>>>> to Poland and Germany and did not bother to inform Poland about it in
>>>> advance, while simultaneously informing Germany?
>>>
>>> Sure. I am well aware of the fact that Russian-Polish relations aren't
>>> very good. But again, I don't see what this has to do with Germany.
>>
>> German decisions will make it easier for Russia to exert such pressure on
>> Poland.
>
> True, but what is your point? Poland does not avoid policies that might harm
> German interests either, so why should Germany avoid decisions that might
> harm Poland? I recall Germany having some differences with the US
> concerning Iraq. Poland (along with quite a few other countries) helped the
> America's attempt to isolate Germany in Europe on this matter and even
> signed the "letter of 8". Here, Poland pursued its foreign policy aims
Please explain further, how Poland hurt Germany back then. I didn't know Poland
was that powerful. AFAIR, Germany was hurt mostly by itself, or more precisely,
by Schroeder's stone-age diplomacy and riding to Bundestag on the backs of
anti-war protesters. If Germans handled their refusal to join America in the
war in Iraq in a different matter, their relations with America would not
worsen -- at least not that much. Poland specifically does not bear the blame
for the attitude of the American government. Poland did not sign the deal with
the USA saying "we will join you so that Rumsfeld will be able to put "New
Europe" against "Old Europe".
> without any regard to German interests, so please don't complain if Germany
> does the same. Put differently, Poland's Iraq policy made it easier for the
> US to exert pressure on Germany, which it did, so don't complain about
> Russian pressure on Poland for which Germany bears some responsibility.
The ability of Poland to change German-American relations is grossly
overestimated by you. In view of Schroeder's anti-war campaign of 2003,
whatever Poland did do would be of no consequence to Bush's reaction to that.
And spare me complaints about "and you bought F-16!" Germany does not make any
military aircraft of its own design and Poland DID buy (or got) some Mig-29's
from Germany.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> It's not hypersensitivity, it's about economic and national security.
>>>
>>> I don't see how Germany is a problem for Polish economic and national
>>> security.
>>
>> If the new pipeline goes through Poland, Russia will not be able to cut
>> gas supplies to Poland. If it goes under the Baltic Sea, Russia will be
>> able.
>>
>>>
>>>> I
>>>> wonder how much of the Russian aggressive policy, esp. towards the
>>>> Baltic states, is mentioned in German media. Have you, for example, read
>>>> how often does Russian air force violate Lithuanian air space?
>>>
>>> What does any of this have to do with Germany?
>>
>> "Poland is just hypersensitive".
>
> Let me be more specific: Hypersensitive in thinking everything Germany does
> is directed against Poland.
If you show me somebody who thinks so I will tell him that.
>
>> Those were your words. I wrote all this
>> to prove to you and other people reading this thread that the threat from
>> Russia
>> is real and is not just "Polish hypersensitivity".
>
> No, that pressure is quite real. True.
>
>> You are entitled to
>> the view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this view
>> behind the "Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think that
>> Germany should sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake of
>> relations with Russia, say it openly.
>
> Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with Germany
> for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is not a matter
> of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish interests should
> play a larger role in German policy than they do vice versa.
I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in the UN
Security Council.
J.M.
>> Quite true, but what does this have to do with German-Polish relations?
>> Germany made its choice based on what it perceived to be best for
>> Germany. I refer to "Polish hypersensitivity" whenever someone implies
>> that Germany does something to hurt Poland. If Poland is hurt by this
>> decision, then this is coincidental, not the aim of German policy.
>
> This is not coincidental, this is the aim of Russian policy, which Germany
> easily agreed to.
Germany wants reliable, cheap natural gas. Going through the Baltic Sea is
the easiest solution, as it requires only a bilateral agreement and not the
agreement of three or more states. If this is not in Poland's interest,
then this is coincidental, not aim of Germany's policy. On the other hand,
if it is Russia's aim to hurt Poland, then this is a matter between Poland
and Russia. Germany has nothing to do with it.
>> True, but what is your point? Poland does not avoid policies that might
>> harm German interests either, so why should Germany avoid decisions that
>> might harm Poland? I recall Germany having some differences with the US
>> concerning Iraq. Poland (along with quite a few other countries) helped
>> the America's attempt to isolate Germany in Europe on this matter and
>> even signed the "letter of 8". Here, Poland pursued its foreign policy
>> aims
>
> Please explain further, how Poland hurt Germany back then. I didn't know
> Poland was that powerful.
I never said that the damage was serious ;-).
> AFAIR, Germany was hurt mostly by itself, or
> more precisely, by Schroeder's stone-age diplomacy and riding to Bundestag
> on the backs of anti-war protesters. If Germans handled their refusal to
> join America in the war in Iraq in a different matter, their relations
> with America would not worsen -- at least not that much. Poland
> specifically does not bear the blame for the attitude of the American
> government. Poland did not sign the deal with the USA saying "we will join
> you so that Rumsfeld will be able to put "New Europe" against "Old
> Europe".
I never said that. That is not the point. The point is: how much does Poland
coordinate its foreign policy with Germany and takes German sensitivities
into account? Signing that statement (with other "New European"
governments) also occurred behind Germany's back and without consulting
Germany, and indeed made it easier for the US to divide Europe into "old"
and "new". I am not blaming Poland for Schröder's stupid policies or for
the worsening of our relations with the US. I am merely pointing out that
Poland signed this statement because it thought that signing this statement
was in Poland's best interest, and in doing so, ignored the interests of
other countries. Germany is currently doing exactly the same thing: signing
an agreement with Russia and ignoring other countries. I see no difference.
>
>> without any regard to German interests, so please don't complain if
>> Germany does the same. Put differently, Poland's Iraq policy made it
>> easier for the US to exert pressure on Germany, which it did, so don't
>> complain about Russian pressure on Poland for which Germany bears some
>> responsibility.
>
> The ability of Poland to change German-American relations is grossly
> overestimated by you.
I never said that Poland is at fault or bears a significant responsibility.
Read what I write, not what you interpret ;-)
> In view of Schroeder's anti-war campaign of 2003,
> whatever Poland did do would be of no consequence to Bush's reaction to
> that.
That is not the point. I could argue similarly: given Poland's miserable
relations with Russia, whatever Germany agrees to with Russia will not
affect relations between Russia and Poland.
>
> And spare me complaints about "and you bought F-16!"
I spared you those, so why do you bring it up?
> Germany does not make
> any military aircraft of its own design and Poland DID buy (or got) some
> Mig-29's from Germany.
So what? Did I say anything?
>>
>>> You are entitled to
>>> the view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this view
>>> behind the "Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think that
>>> Germany should sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake of
>>> relations with Russia, say it openly.
>>
>> Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with
>> Germany for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is not
>> a matter of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish
>> interests should play a larger role in German policy than they do vice
>> versa.
>
> I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in
> the UN Security Council.
Please explain to me, why we should care more about Polish interests than
vice versa?
Jan
Christian Weisgerber
> And spare me complaints about "and you bought F-16!" Germany does not make any
> military aircraft of its own design and Poland DID buy (or got) some Mig-29's
> from Germany.
Germany has participated/is participating in both Panavia Tornado
and Eurofighter Typhoon development and production.
--
Christian "naddy" Weisgerber na...@mips.inka.de
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>>> Quite true, but what does this have to do with German-Polish relations?
>>> Germany made its choice based on what it perceived to be best for
>>> Germany. I refer to "Polish hypersensitivity" whenever someone implies
>>> that Germany does something to hurt Poland. If Poland is hurt by this
>>> decision, then this is coincidental, not the aim of German policy.
>>
>> This is not coincidental, this is the aim of Russian policy, which Germany
>> easily agreed to.
>
> Germany wants reliable, cheap natural gas. Going through the Baltic Sea is
> the easiest solution, as it requires only a bilateral agreement and not the
> agreement of three or more states. If this is not in Poland's interest,
> then this is coincidental, not aim of Germany's policy. On the other hand,
> if it is Russia's aim to hurt Poland, then this is a matter between Poland
> and Russia. Germany has nothing to do with it.
1. The construction costs are higher for the Baltic Sea pipeline.
2. If the transfer payments to Poland are a problem, there surely could have
been made an agreement in which Poland, for the sake of its economical
security, is giving up the right to those payments. AFAIR, nobody ever asked
Poland about it. Perhaps it's the fault of our too lenient foreign policy.
3. Maintenance costs for an under-sea pipeline -- do you think they are lower
than of a land-based one? What does it tell you about the economical benefits
of this deal to Germany?
Of course there are differences. When making a decision in foreign policy, one
should consider not only formal similarities -- like you do above -- but also
practical consequences for oneself and one's supposed FRIENDS. What you write
above basically means "since Poland doesn't have 100% clean record in relations
with Germany and sometimes makes decisions which are a bit unconvenient to its
bigger neighbour, Germany has right to hurt Poland's interests on a much larger
scale".
>
>>
>>> without any regard to German interests, so please don't complain if
>>> Germany does the same. Put differently, Poland's Iraq policy made it
>>> easier for the US to exert pressure on Germany, which it did, so don't
>>> complain about Russian pressure on Poland for which Germany bears some
>>> responsibility.
>>
>> The ability of Poland to change German-American relations is grossly
>> overestimated by you.
>
> I never said that Poland is at fault or bears a significant responsibility.
> Read what I write, not what you interpret ;-)
>
>> In view of Schroeder's anti-war campaign of 2003,
>> whatever Poland did do would be of no consequence to Bush's reaction to
>> that.
>
> That is not the point. I could argue similarly: given Poland's miserable
> relations with Russia, whatever Germany agrees to with Russia will not
> affect relations between Russia and Poland.
>
>>
>> And spare me complaints about "and you bought F-16!"
>
> I spared you those, so why do you bring it up?
>
>> Germany does not make
>> any military aircraft of its own design and Poland DID buy (or got) some
>> Mig-29's from Germany.
>
> So what? Did I say anything?
No, it was "just in case" ;-)
>
>
>>>
>>>> You are entitled to
>>>> the view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this view
>>>> behind the "Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think that
>>>> Germany should sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake of
>>>> relations with Russia, say it openly.
>>>
>>> Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with
>>> Germany for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is not
>>> a matter of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish
>>> interests should play a larger role in German policy than they do vice
>>> versa.
>>
>> I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in
>> the UN Security Council.
>
> Please explain to me, why we should care more about Polish interests than
> vice versa?
Until now, Poland was rather a complying partner for Germany.
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski <r o m a nNOSPAM@student.+removewithpluses+ifpan.edu.pl> wrote:
>
>> And spare me complaints about "and you bought F-16!" Germany does not make any
>> military aircraft of its own design and Poland DID buy (or got) some Mig-29's
>> from Germany.
>
> Germany has participated/is participating in both Panavia Tornado
> and Eurofighter Typhoon development and production.
Is the Eurofigher project still alive, BTW?
J.M.
>
> 1. The construction costs are higher for the Baltic Sea pipeline.
> 2. If the transfer payments to Poland are a problem, there surely could
> have been made an agreement in which Poland, for the sake of its
> economical security, is giving up the right to those payments. AFAIR,
> nobody ever asked Poland about it. Perhaps it's the fault of our too
> lenient foreign policy. 3. Maintenance costs for an under-sea pipeline --
> do you think they are lower than of a land-based one? What does it tell
> you about the economical benefits of this deal to Germany?
>
I think the companies/governments involved looked at the advantages and
disadvantages of both possibilities and decided on the solution that seemed
best to them. I am not in a position to judge whether or not that was a
smart choice. I do believe that Poland was not an issue at all in their
choice. It was not their intention to either hurt or help Poland - the
German companies/government involved just did what they thought was best
for them and Germany. I see nothing wrong with that for the reasons I
explained.
>>
>> I never said that. That is not the point. The point is: how much does
>> Poland coordinate its foreign policy with Germany and takes German
>> sensitivities into account? Signing that statement (with other "New
>> European" governments) also occurred behind Germany's back and without
>> consulting Germany, and indeed made it easier for the US to divide Europe
>> into "old" and "new". I am not blaming Poland for Schröder's stupid
>> policies or for the worsening of our relations with the US. I am merely
>> pointing out that Poland signed this statement because it thought that
>> signing this statement was in Poland's best interest, and in doing so,
>> ignored the interests of other countries. Germany is currently doing
>> exactly the same thing: signing an agreement with Russia and ignoring
>> other countries. I see no difference.
>
> Of course there are differences. When making a decision in foreign policy,
> one should consider not only formal similarities -- like you do above --
> but also practical consequences for oneself and one's supposed FRIENDS.
Sure, and Poland *conspiring* together with 7 other countries behind the
EU's back and signing that letter to GWB is not the behaviour of FRIENDS
either. I use the word conspire intentionally, as these 8 countries were on
the verge of joining the EU, but rather than consulting with the EU
presidency on this issue, these 8 countries formed their own foreign policy
on this matter which was definitely and clearly directed against Germany
and France.
> What you write above basically means "since Poland doesn't have 100% clean
> record in relations with Germany and sometimes makes decisions which are a
> bit unconvenient to its bigger neighbour,
They were more than just inconvenient. They laid the groundwork for
America's policy "punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia" and its
policy of "Old and New Europe". For that matter, the situation in Iraq
would have developed quite differently if Europe had found a common
position on this issue.
> Germany has right to hurt
> Poland's interests on a much larger scale".
No, what I am saying is: we either have a culture of consulting our
neighbors on big foreign policy issues (Iraq is/was a big foreign policy
issue) or we don't have such a culture. Germany and France have such a
culture, Poland and Germany apparently do not. That does not mean that two
of these countries always have to agree, but that does mean that they
always have to talk to each other. France and Germany do this, Poland and
Germany do not. Let me put it differently: except for Iraq, Germany was
smart enough never to be put in a situation of having to choose to take
sides between the US and France and thwarted any attempt of either France
or the US to force Germany to take sides. Germany was quite successful in
this foreign policy for over 50 years. A similar foreign policy for Poland:
never to take sides between the US and France/Germany would have been
smart, but Poland said quite clearly: if there is ever a disagreement
between these two, we will take the side of America (even if there is no
immediate need). Fine, that is Poland's choice, but don't expect this not
to influence Germany's policy towards Poland.
For that matter, I am not convinced that Poles will be freezing in the
foreseeable future because of Germany's decision to build a Baltic Sea
pipeline. (But if they do, I am sure the US will remember Poland's loyalty
and help you.... *wry grin*)
>>>>
>>>>> You are entitled to
>>>>> the view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this
>>>>> view behind the "Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think
>>>>> that Germany should sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake
>>>>> of relations with Russia, say it openly.
>>>>
>>>> Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with
>>>> Germany for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is
>>>> not a matter of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish
>>>> interests should play a larger role in German policy than they do vice
>>>> versa.
>>>
>>> I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in
>>> the UN Security Council.
>>
>> Please explain to me, why we should care more about Polish interests than
>> vice versa?
>
> Until now, Poland was rather a complying partner for Germany.
Nice or death and the "letter of 8" is complying? Give me a break. Actually,
Germany has bent over backwards to help Poland join the EU and to give
Poland a fair deal in joining the EU -- one of Germany's red line issues in
the negotations for the Treaty of Nice was that Poland have as many votes
as Spain. Germany defended that and had to give up other red-line issues
that would have been more beneficial for Germany. Poland's response to that
was the "letter of 8", "Nice or Death" and of course the F-16 :-P
If Poland is smart, then it will take this Baltic Sea issue as well as new
planned center for expelled Germans in Berlin with grace and without too
much whining. Schroeder is on his way out, as is his "special relationship"
with Putin, so that it would make sense for Poland to learn from its past
mistakes and try to start new with a new German Chancellor. And no, we will
not watch you freeze in the winter ;-).
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>>
>> 1. The construction costs are higher for the Baltic Sea pipeline.
>> 2. If the transfer payments to Poland are a problem, there surely could
>> have been made an agreement in which Poland, for the sake of its
>> economical security, is giving up the right to those payments. AFAIR,
>> nobody ever asked Poland about it. Perhaps it's the fault of our too
>> lenient foreign policy. 3. Maintenance costs for an under-sea pipeline --
>> do you think they are lower than of a land-based one? What does it tell
>> you about the economical benefits of this deal to Germany?
>>
>
> I think the companies/governments involved looked at the advantages and
> disadvantages of both possibilities and decided on the solution that seemed
> best to them. I am not in a position to judge whether or not that was a
> smart choice. I do believe that Poland was not an issue at all in their
> choice. It was not their intention to either hurt or help Poland - the
> German companies/government involved just did what they thought was best
> for them and Germany. I see nothing wrong with that for the reasons I
> explained.
If the German government thinks ignoring his neighbours is a good thing for
Germany and for German foreign policy, let me congratulate you on the quality
of your leaders.
Besides, I think the reason was different: Germany HAD to ignore Poland.
Otherwise, Russia wouldn't make the deal. German government complied easily.
After all, as Schroeder said, Putin's a true democrat and all.
>
>>>
>>> I never said that. That is not the point. The point is: how much does
>>> Poland coordinate its foreign policy with Germany and takes German
>>> sensitivities into account? Signing that statement (with other "New
>>> European" governments) also occurred behind Germany's back and without
>>> consulting Germany, and indeed made it easier for the US to divide Europe
>>> into "old" and "new". I am not blaming Poland for Schröder's stupid
>>> policies or for the worsening of our relations with the US. I am merely
>>> pointing out that Poland signed this statement because it thought that
>>> signing this statement was in Poland's best interest, and in doing so,
>>> ignored the interests of other countries. Germany is currently doing
>>> exactly the same thing: signing an agreement with Russia and ignoring
>>> other countries. I see no difference.
>>
>> Of course there are differences. When making a decision in foreign policy,
>> one should consider not only formal similarities -- like you do above --
>> but also practical consequences for oneself and one's supposed FRIENDS.
>
> Sure, and Poland *conspiring* together with 7 other countries behind the
> EU's back and signing that letter to GWB is not the behaviour of FRIENDS
> either.
Yes, and I never considered this a particularly bright move on our part.
However, practical consequences for Germany were negligible, except perhaps for
some distemper of Chirac's and possible Schroeder. The case with the pipeline
is much different, *as I have already explained*.
Besides, if you need to bring up an issue which is over 2 years old..
> I use the word conspire intentionally, as these 8 countries were on
> the verge of joining the EU, but rather than consulting with the EU
> presidency on this issue, these 8 countries formed their own foreign policy
> on this matter which was definitely and clearly directed against Germany
> and France.
Excuse me, but there was no EU common foreign policy at the time, especially
about Iraq. If Poland and other EE countries were to take into account that
they are to become EU members soon, which EU country's policy should they
consider more? German or British?
>
>> What you write above basically means "since Poland doesn't have 100% clean
>> record in relations with Germany and sometimes makes decisions which are a
>> bit unconvenient to its bigger neighbour,
>
> They were more than just inconvenient. They laid the groundwork for
> America's policy "punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia" and its
> policy of "Old and New Europe". For that matter, the situation in Iraq
> would have developed quite differently if Europe had found a common
> position on this issue.
Naah. Let's not kid ourselves. The letter of 8 was totally unimportant. A
thing prepared for the media, forgotten after 2 weeks (maybe not by Chirac, but
he's a special case, with his personality). Germany would be scorned by the USA
no matter what Poland would do, and what laid the groundwork for that was
Schroeder's inability of opposing the war without being seen by GWB as a
traitor. An important for the development of the situation in Iraq thing was
that Tony Blair sided with Bush. Germany can make its vengeance in that
direction.
Look at Iran: no support from Great Britain, and the USA is much more peaceful.
GB is about the only country in Europe which can influence American foreign
policy.
>
>> Germany has right to hurt
>> Poland's interests on a much larger scale".
>
> No, what I am saying is: we either have a culture of consulting our
> neighbors on big foreign policy issues (Iraq is/was a big foreign policy
> issue) or we don't have such a culture. Germany and France have such a
> culture, Poland and Germany apparently do not. That does not mean that two
> of these countries always have to agree, but that does mean that they
> always have to talk to each other. France and Germany do this, Poland and
> Germany do not. Let me put it differently: except for Iraq, Germany was
> smart enough never to be put in a situation of having to choose to take
> sides between the US and France and thwarted any attempt of either France
> or the US to force Germany to take sides. Germany was quite successful in
> this foreign policy for over 50 years. A similar foreign policy for Poland:
> never to take sides between the US and France/Germany would have been
> smart, but Poland said quite clearly: if there is ever a disagreement
> between these two, we will take the side of America (even if there is no
> immediate need). Fine, that is Poland's choice, but don't expect this not
> to influence Germany's policy towards Poland.
Poland never said that. It happened ONCE and the shock was so great that even
such educated Germans like you cannot get over it. Just think, Poland is not
going to be Germany's client state ("gee, thanks for rushing us in the EU")
forever.
>
> For that matter, I am not convinced that Poles will be freezing in the
> foreseeable future because of Germany's decision to build a Baltic Sea
> pipeline. (But if they do, I am sure the US will remember Poland's loyalty
> and help you.... *wry grin*)
We'll see. Perhaps Poland will be able to stop this pipeline from being built.
>
>>>>>
>>>>>> You are entitled to
>>>>>> the view that this is not a matter for Germany, but don't hide this
>>>>>> view behind the "Polish hypersensitivity" smokescreen. If you think
>>>>>> that Germany should sacrifice its relations with Poland for the sake
>>>>>> of relations with Russia, say it openly.
>>>>>
>>>>> Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with
>>>>> Germany for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is
>>>>> not a matter of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish
>>>>> interests should play a larger role in German policy than they do vice
>>>>> versa.
>>>>
>>>> I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in
>>>> the UN Security Council.
>>>
>>> Please explain to me, why we should care more about Polish interests than
>>> vice versa?
>>
>> Until now, Poland was rather a complying partner for Germany.
>
> Nice or death and the "letter of 8" is complying? Give me a break. Actually,
> Germany has bent over backwards to help Poland join the EU and to give
> Poland a fair deal in joining the EU -- one of Germany's red line issues in
> the negotations for the Treaty of Nice was that Poland have as many votes
> as Spain. Germany defended that and had to give up other red-line issues
> that would have been more beneficial for Germany. Poland's response to that
> was the "letter of 8", "Nice or Death" and of course the F-16 :-P
"Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we finally reached
a compromise. It's not as if other important decisions in the EU's history were
made without such thrillers. If other countries in the EU can haggle, so can
Poland. I sometimes get the impression that "you should have been quiet"
attitude towards the members is quite common... W/r to F-16, Germans also
bought some weapons from the USA, didn't it?
>
> If Poland is smart, then it will take this Baltic Sea issue as well as new
> planned center for expelled Germans in Berlin with grace and without too
> much whining. Schroeder is on his way out, as is his "special relationship"
> with Putin, so that it would make sense for Poland to learn from its past
> mistakes and try to start new with a new German Chancellor. And no, we will
> not watch you freeze in the winter ;-).
Poland proposed a construction of a network of Centres dealing with "difficult"
aspects of the XXth century European history. If the new German chancellor
(chances are, it may be Schroeder again...) ignores this and goes for an
exclusively-German Centre dealing with Germans as victims ONLY, than I think it
will be clear who is saner. As for the pipeline, it may be that Poland will be
able to block the construction of it, since it will be passing through Polish
economical zone.
Christian Weisgerber
> > Germany has participated/is participating in both Panavia Tornado
> > and Eurofighter Typhoon development and production.
>
> Is the Eurofigher project still alive, BTW?
The Typhoon has tentatively entered service with the air forces of
Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Production/ongoing development
is managed by Eurofighter GmbH and according to them, 51 planes
have been delivered so far.
J.M.
>> I think the companies/governments involved looked at the advantages and
>> disadvantages of both possibilities and decided on the solution that
>> seemed best to them. I am not in a position to judge whether or not that
>> was a smart choice. I do believe that Poland was not an issue at all in
>> their choice. It was not their intention to either hurt or help Poland -
>> the German companies/government involved just did what they thought was
>> best for them and Germany. I see nothing wrong with that for the reasons
>> I explained.
>
> If the German government thinks ignoring his neighbours is a good thing
> for Germany and for German foreign policy, let me congratulate you on the
> quality of your leaders.
Well, Germany does not ignore those neighbors it considers to be
sufficiently important ;-).
>
> Besides, I think the reason was different: Germany HAD to ignore Poland.
> Otherwise, Russia wouldn't make the deal.
LOL. You think Russia does not want to sell its gas? Give me a break. Both
parties profit from the deal.
> German government complied
> easily. After all, as Schroeder said, Putin's a true democrat and all.
Putin being a democrat is, of course, a joke. Of course, Schröder and Putin
are good friend, too good for my taste, but that is not the issue and not
the reason the pipeline will be built in the Baltic Sea.
>
> Yes, and I never considered this a particularly bright move on our part.
> However, practical consequences for Germany were negligible, except
> perhaps for some distemper of Chirac's and possible Schroeder. The case
> with the pipeline is much different, *as I have already explained*.
I understand your explanation, but do not agree with it. I also already
explained to you, why I view this differently: because it allowed the US to
have a different policy towards "Old Europe" than what would have been
possible otherwise.
>
> Besides, if you need to bring up an issue which is over 2 years old..
It is important to bring it up, because it illustrates Polish foreign policy
priorities. I see no indication that these priorities have changed.
Considering which party become strongest in today's election to the Sejm, I
don't expect Polish foreign policy to be more considerate of German
sensitivities in the future either.
>
>> I use the word conspire intentionally, as these 8 countries were on
>> the verge of joining the EU, but rather than consulting with the EU
>> presidency on this issue, these 8 countries formed their own foreign
>> policy on this matter which was definitely and clearly directed against
>> Germany and France.
>
> Excuse me, but there was no EU common foreign policy at the time,
no, but there was discussion in the EU. I would never accuse the UK of doing
foreign policy behind the EU's back - the EU presidency was well aware of
what the UK was doing.
> especially about Iraq. If Poland and other EE countries were to take into
> account that they are to become EU members soon, which EU country's policy
> should they consider more? German or British?
Actually, Chirac said it quite nicely: Poland missed a great opportunity to
shut up. Was Chirac right in saying that? No. Was he unacceptably rude?
Yes. Would it have been best for Poland to do just that? Yes. Put
differently, EE should have avoided taking sides, and if they insist on
taking sides, they should have been less vocal about it. Basically, Poland
said: "We don't give a damn about Germany and its sensitivities." If Poland
wants to send troops to Iraq, then it is free to do so, but if you do it in
that way, then don't expect other countries to be sensitive towards your
fears.
>
>>
>>> What you write above basically means "since Poland doesn't have 100%
>>> clean record in relations with Germany and sometimes makes decisions
>>> which are a bit unconvenient to its bigger neighbour,
>>
>> They were more than just inconvenient. They laid the groundwork for
>> America's policy "punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia" and its
>> policy of "Old and New Europe". For that matter, the situation in Iraq
>> would have developed quite differently if Europe had found a common
>> position on this issue.
>
> Naah. Let's not kid ourselves. The letter of 8 was totally unimportant. A
> thing prepared for the media,
fine. So if Poland prefers to do its communications with Germany via the
media rather than in direct consultations, then don't expect Germany to
coordinate its activities with Poland other than through the media ;-)
> forgotten after 2 weeks (maybe not by
> Chirac, but he's a special case, with his personality).
Rumsfeld remembered.
> Germany would be
> scorned by the USA no matter what Poland would do, and what laid the
> groundwork for that was Schroeder's inability of opposing the war without
> being seen by GWB as a traitor. An important for the development of the
> situation in Iraq thing was that Tony Blair sided with Bush. Germany can
> make its vengeance in that direction.
Germany it not being vengeful towards anyone. It just treats other countries
the way they treat Germany.
>
> Look at Iran: no support from Great Britain, and the USA is much more
> peaceful. GB is about the only country in Europe which can influence
> American foreign policy.
You can look at that differently: no support at all from Europe, and the US
is more peaceful. In the unlikely event that there is no support for the US
from the UK, but from all other countries, the US will proceed as planned,
even without UK support. The US does something if it has enough support, no
matter where it comes from. For practical purposes, as the UK is probably
the most supportive country worldwide, wheneven the UK fails to support the
US, then the US probably has little support elsewhere. Hence, it appears
the UK is more influential than it actually is.
>
>>
>>> Germany has right to hurt
>>> Poland's interests on a much larger scale".
>>
>> No, what I am saying is: we either have a culture of consulting our
>> neighbors on big foreign policy issues (Iraq is/was a big foreign policy
>> issue) or we don't have such a culture. Germany and France have such a
>> culture, Poland and Germany apparently do not. That does not mean that
>> two of these countries always have to agree, but that does mean that they
>> always have to talk to each other. France and Germany do this, Poland and
>> Germany do not. Let me put it differently: except for Iraq, Germany was
>> smart enough never to be put in a situation of having to choose to take
>> sides between the US and France and thwarted any attempt of either France
>> or the US to force Germany to take sides. Germany was quite successful in
>> this foreign policy for over 50 years. A similar foreign policy for
>> Poland: never to take sides between the US and France/Germany would have
>> been smart, but Poland said quite clearly: if there is ever a
>> disagreement between these two, we will take the side of America (even if
>> there is no immediate need). Fine, that is Poland's choice, but don't
>> expect this not to influence Germany's policy towards Poland.
>
> Poland never said that.
No, but the first opportunity Poland had, it ACTED blindly pro-US.
> It happened ONCE and the shock was so great that
> even such educated Germans like you cannot get over it.
I am over it, you're the one complaining. I am perfectly happy with our
relations. I can live quite fine with Poland's foreign policy and with ours
as well.
> Just think, Poland
> is not going to be Germany's client state
No one expects that. I would not call France a German client state either,
but Chirac does consult occassionally with Schroeder.
> ("gee, thanks for rushing us in
> the EU") forever.
>
>>
>> For that matter, I am not convinced that Poles will be freezing in the
>> foreseeable future because of Germany's decision to build a Baltic Sea
>> pipeline. (But if they do, I am sure the US will remember Poland's
>> loyalty and help you.... *wry grin*)
>
> We'll see. Perhaps Poland will be able to stop this pipeline from being
> built.
How might Poland be able to do that?
Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8 and Nice
or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas, but you expect
Poland to be taken seriously?
> If other countries in the EU can
> haggle, so can Poland.
Except for the UK (which isn't the focus of our most cordial relations
either), most countries realize that red-lines aren't a good thing in
negotiating. For that matter, the constitution was a bit different: the
negotiations took place in the convention and ideally, it should have been
adopted without member states messing with it. Some messing with it was
unavoidable, but taking such a stance as Poland (and Spain) did in that
situation was really not particularly smart. Because Spain corrected its
position after its election, Spain's demands were perceived to be nutty
Aznar, rather than Spain.
> I sometimes get the impression that "you should
> have been quiet" attitude towards the members is quite common...
Towards new members you mean? Well, if I were to join a club, I would indeed
keep a fairly low profile for a while and not be too demanding at first.
Having a big mouth sort of ruins the first impression. For that matter, the
EU has a record of being fairly forthcoming towards its new member states,
so there is no need to a big mouth either.
> W/r to
> F-16, Germans also bought some weapons from the USA, didn't it?
Sure. And I would not have brought it up, but you did :-P
>
>>
>> If Poland is smart, then it will take this Baltic Sea issue as well as
>> new planned center for expelled Germans in Berlin with grace and without
>> too much whining. Schroeder is on his way out, as is his "special
>> relationship" with Putin, so that it would make sense for Poland to learn
>> from its past mistakes and try to start new with a new German Chancellor.
>> And no, we will not watch you freeze in the winter ;-).
>
> Poland proposed a construction of a network of Centres dealing with
> "difficult" aspects of the XXth century European history. If the new
> German chancellor (chances are, it may be Schroeder again...)
No, probably not. Thank God.
> ignores this
> and goes for an exclusively-German Centre dealing with Germans as victims
> ONLY,
It would deal with the history of the expelled Germans. Indeed, many of
these people were victims. But these people were not victims of Poland, but
victims of the consequences of German aggression. I see nothing wrong with
portraying that.
> than I think it will be clear who is saner. As for the pipeline, it
> may be that Poland will be able to block the construction of it, since it
> will be passing through Polish economical zone.
I see no relationship between Poland's economical zone and the pipeline.
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>>> I think the companies/governments involved looked at the advantages and
>>> disadvantages of both possibilities and decided on the solution that
>>> seemed best to them. I am not in a position to judge whether or not that
>>> was a smart choice. I do believe that Poland was not an issue at all in
>>> their choice. It was not their intention to either hurt or help Poland -
>>> the German companies/government involved just did what they thought was
>>> best for them and Germany. I see nothing wrong with that for the reasons
>>> I explained.
>>
>> If the German government thinks ignoring his neighbours is a good thing
>> for Germany and for German foreign policy, let me congratulate you on the
>> quality of your leaders.
>
> Well, Germany does not ignore those neighbors it considers to be
> sufficiently important ;-).
If Germany considers Poland as an unimportant neighbour, than I suggest that
your government should buy themselves a new map. Preferably one printed after
1918.
>>
>> Besides, I think the reason was different: Germany HAD to ignore Poland.
>> Otherwise, Russia wouldn't make the deal.
>
> LOL. You think Russia does not want to sell its gas? Give me a break. Both
> parties profit from the deal.
Russia wants to sell gas, for sure. But it can give Germany a better or a worse
deal. My opinion is that Germany was used by the Russians as a tool in their
anti-Polish policy.
>
>> German government complied
>> easily. After all, as Schroeder said, Putin's a true democrat and all.
>
> Putin being a democrat is, of course, a joke. Of course, Schröder and Putin
> are good friend, too good for my taste, but that is not the issue and not
> the reason the pipeline will be built in the Baltic Sea.
It is one of the resons, IMO.
>>
>> Yes, and I never considered this a particularly bright move on our part.
>> However, practical consequences for Germany were negligible, except
>> perhaps for some distemper of Chirac's and possible Schroeder. The case
>> with the pipeline is much different, *as I have already explained*.
>
> I understand your explanation, but do not agree with it. I also already
> explained to you, why I view this differently: because it allowed the US to
> have a different policy towards "Old Europe" than what would have been
> possible otherwise.
OK, we disagree here.
>>
>> Besides, if you need to bring up an issue which is over 2 years old..
>
> It is important to bring it up, because it illustrates Polish foreign policy
> priorities. I see no indication that these priorities have changed.
> Considering which party become strongest in today's election to the Sejm, I
> don't expect Polish foreign policy to be more considerate of German
> sensitivities in the future either.
We used to be quite sensitive to German sensitivities since 1989.
Reconciliation, all that. I'd like you to remember that it was German
initiative of Ms Steinbach & Co which removed the illusion of "oh-so-good"
German-Polish relations.
>>
>>> I use the word conspire intentionally, as these 8 countries were on
>>> the verge of joining the EU, but rather than consulting with the EU
>>> presidency on this issue, these 8 countries formed their own foreign
>>> policy on this matter which was definitely and clearly directed against
>>> Germany and France.
>>
>> Excuse me, but there was no EU common foreign policy at the time,
>
> no, but there was discussion in the EU. I would never accuse the UK of doing
> foreign policy behind the EU's back - the EU presidency was well aware of
> what the UK was doing.
And the fact that Poland was supporting US invasion was also known to everyone
involved.
>
>> especially about Iraq. If Poland and other EE countries were to take into
>> account that they are to become EU members soon, which EU country's policy
>> should they consider more? German or British?
>
> Actually, Chirac said it quite nicely: Poland missed a great opportunity to
> shut up. Was Chirac right in saying that? No. Was he unacceptably rude?
> Yes. Would it have been best for Poland to do just that? Yes.
No country will tell Poland to "shut up". Period. Especially not this old
corrupt weasel.
It would have been better if Poland did not sign this letter -- it wouldn't
have been an excuse now.
> Put
> differently, EE should have avoided taking sides, and if they insist on
> taking sides, they should have been less vocal about it. Basically, Poland
> said: "We don't give a damn about Germany and its sensitivities." If Poland
> wants to send troops to Iraq, then it is free to do so, but if you do it in
> that way, then don't expect other countries to be sensitive towards your
> fears.
It's not fears. It's *reality*.
>
>>
>>>
>>>> What you write above basically means "since Poland doesn't have 100%
>>>> clean record in relations with Germany and sometimes makes decisions
>>>> which are a bit unconvenient to its bigger neighbour,
>>>
>>> They were more than just inconvenient. They laid the groundwork for
>>> America's policy "punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia" and its
>>> policy of "Old and New Europe". For that matter, the situation in Iraq
>>> would have developed quite differently if Europe had found a common
>>> position on this issue.
>>
>> Naah. Let's not kid ourselves. The letter of 8 was totally unimportant. A
>> thing prepared for the media,
>
> fine. So if Poland prefers to do its communications with Germany via the
> media rather than in direct consultations, then don't expect Germany to
> coordinate its activities with Poland other than through the media ;-)
>
>> forgotten after 2 weeks (maybe not by
>> Chirac, but he's a special case, with his personality).
>
> Rumsfeld remembered.
You say Poland should be responsible for this nut? He'd say many bad things
about Germany anyway.
>
>> Germany would be
>> scorned by the USA no matter what Poland would do, and what laid the
>> groundwork for that was Schroeder's inability of opposing the war without
>> being seen by GWB as a traitor. An important for the development of the
>> situation in Iraq thing was that Tony Blair sided with Bush. Germany can
>> make its vengeance in that direction.
>
> Germany it not being vengeful towards anyone. It just treats other countries
> the way they treat Germany.
I don't think it's about vengeance or reciprocity. It's about German old
tradition of favouring Russia.
>>
>> Look at Iran: no support from Great Britain, and the USA is much more
>> peaceful. GB is about the only country in Europe which can influence
>> American foreign policy.
>
> You can look at that differently: no support at all from Europe, and the US
> is more peaceful. In the unlikely event that there is no support for the US
> from the UK, but from all other countries, the US will proceed as planned,
> even without UK support. The US does something if it has enough support, no
> matter where it comes from. For practical purposes, as the UK is probably
> the most supportive country worldwide, wheneven the UK fails to support the
> US, then the US probably has little support elsewhere. Hence, it appears
> the UK is more influential than it actually is.
Maybe.
> No, but the first opportunity Poland had, it ACTED blindly pro-US.
pro-US? Yes. Blindly? I don't think so.
>> "Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we finally
>> reached a compromise. It's not as if other important decisions in the EU's
>> history were made without such thrillers.
>
> Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8 and Nice
> or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas, but you expect
> Poland to be taken seriously?
After what other countries did at the same time? I'd say we are following the
trend.
>
>> If other countries in the EU can
>> haggle, so can Poland.
>
> Except for the UK (which isn't the focus of our most cordial relations
> either), most countries realize that red-lines aren't a good thing in
> negotiating. For that matter, the constitution was a bit different: the
> negotiations took place in the convention and ideally, it should have been
... in which Poland was not a full-powered member, as you may recall.
> adopted without member states messing with it. Some messing with it was
> unavoidable, but taking such a stance as Poland (and Spain) did in that
> situation was really not particularly smart. Because Spain corrected its
> position after its election, Spain's demands were perceived to be nutty
> Aznar, rather than Spain.
Poland corrected its position after the government changed, too. I don't see
any difference. Miller is quite a moron, BTW.
>
>> I sometimes get the impression that "you should
>> have been quiet" attitude towards the members is quite common...
>
> Towards new members you mean? Well, if I were to join a club, I would indeed
> keep a fairly low profile for a while and not be too demanding at first.
Excuse me, but if to join a club you have to carry out difficult negotiations,
then your receipt cannot work.
> Having a big mouth sort of ruins the first impression. For that matter, the
> EU has a record of being fairly forthcoming towards its new member states,
> so there is no need to a big mouth either.
This "fairly forthcoming" appearance was not that obvious in Copenhagen, 2003.
>> Poland proposed a construction of a network of Centres dealing with
>> "difficult" aspects of the XXth century European history. If the new
>> German chancellor (chances are, it may be Schroeder again...)
>
> No, probably not. Thank God.
I concurr ;-)
>
>> ignores this
>> and goes for an exclusively-German Centre dealing with Germans as victims
>> ONLY,
>
> It would deal with the history of the expelled Germans. Indeed, many of
> these people were victims. But these people were not victims of Poland, but
> victims of the consequences of German aggression. I see nothing wrong with
> portraying that.
Neither would I, except that it most probably won't be portrayed the way you
put it.
>
>
>> than I think it will be clear who is saner. As for the pipeline, it
>> may be that Poland will be able to block the construction of it, since it
>> will be passing through Polish economical zone.
>
> I see no relationship between Poland's economical zone and the pipeline.
Poland can try to prove in the international courts that this pipeline is an
ecological danger. I'm not saying this is possible or that the new Polish
government will try this, but it's a possibility.
The most probable thing for Poland to do is to make this deal with Norway.
Germany could take part in it, too. It's not too smart to rely 100% with your
energy deliveries on a corrupt and authoritarian regime, aggressive towards its
neighbours.
J.M.
> On the Sun, 25 Sep 2005 21:30:47 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>>
>>>> I think the companies/governments involved looked at the advantages and
>>>> disadvantages of both possibilities and decided on the solution that
>>>> seemed best to them. I am not in a position to judge whether or not
>>>> that was a smart choice. I do believe that Poland was not an issue at
>>>> all in their choice. It was not their intention to either hurt or help
>>>> Poland - the German companies/government involved just did what they
>>>> thought was best for them and Germany. I see nothing wrong with that
>>>> for the reasons I explained.
>>>
>>> If the German government thinks ignoring his neighbours is a good thing
>>> for Germany and for German foreign policy, let me congratulate you on
>>> the quality of your leaders.
>>
>> Well, Germany does not ignore those neighbors it considers to be
>> sufficiently important ;-).
>
> If Germany considers Poland as an unimportant neighbour, than I suggest
> that your government should buy themselves a new map. Preferably one
> printed after 1918.
Well, those countries most important to Germany are in order of decreasing
importance (not necessarily geographical neighbors) are: the US, France,
the UK, Spain, Russia, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland. Although
one could argue about whether the US or France is more important. The same
holds for Spain/Italy/Russia and the Netherlands/Austria/Poland. Sorry, but
other countries are simply higher on our list for various reasons. And the
fact that Poland is a bit further down the list means that we don't
necessarily consult with you.
>
>>>
>>> Besides, I think the reason was different: Germany HAD to ignore Poland.
>>> Otherwise, Russia wouldn't make the deal.
>>
>> LOL. You think Russia does not want to sell its gas? Give me a break.
>> Both parties profit from the deal.
>
> Russia wants to sell gas, for sure. But it can give Germany a better or a
> worse deal.
I can't judge whether the deal was good or bad or if it could have been
better.
> My opinion is that Germany was used by the Russians as a tool
> in their anti-Polish policy.
I don't know about that, but generally speaking, I like the idea of
bilateral agreements without getting third parties involved. That may be
part of the German pedantic security mentality, as having one negotiating
partner is "safer" than having several.
>
>>
>>> German government complied
>>> easily. After all, as Schroeder said, Putin's a true democrat and all.
>>
>> Putin being a democrat is, of course, a joke. Of course, Schröder and
>> Putin are good friend, too good for my taste, but that is not the issue
>> and not the reason the pipeline will be built in the Baltic Sea.
>
> It is one of the resons, IMO.
Merkel and the CDU have at the very least implied their approval.
>
>>>
>>> Yes, and I never considered this a particularly bright move on our part.
>>> However, practical consequences for Germany were negligible, except
>>> perhaps for some distemper of Chirac's and possible Schroeder. The case
>>> with the pipeline is much different, *as I have already explained*.
>>
>> I understand your explanation, but do not agree with it. I also already
>> explained to you, why I view this differently: because it allowed the US
>> to have a different policy towards "Old Europe" than what would have been
>> possible otherwise.
>
> OK, we disagree here.
Seems so.
>
>>>
>>> Besides, if you need to bring up an issue which is over 2 years old..
>>
>> It is important to bring it up, because it illustrates Polish foreign
>> policy priorities. I see no indication that these priorities have
>> changed. Considering which party become strongest in today's election to
>> the Sejm, I don't expect Polish foreign policy to be more considerate of
>> German sensitivities in the future either.
>
> We used to be quite sensitive to German sensitivities since 1989.
> Reconciliation, all that.
Quite true.
> I'd like you to remember that it was German
> initiative of Ms Steinbach & Co which removed the illusion of "oh-so-good"
> German-Polish relations.
It was not a *German* initiative, but Ms. Steinbach's (and her
association's) initiative. Please don't blame Germany for something one
organization does. Again, here we have Polish hypersensitivity. I think
Poland should be quite happy that Germany has become a stable democracy
that tolerates minority views, even if it does not like these views. More
importantly, she received no support for her initiative, not in parliament,
not in the government, not in the population. So what exactly bothers you
about her initiative?
>
>>>
>>>> I use the word conspire intentionally, as these 8 countries were on
>>>> the verge of joining the EU, but rather than consulting with the EU
>>>> presidency on this issue, these 8 countries formed their own foreign
>>>> policy on this matter which was definitely and clearly directed against
>>>> Germany and France.
>>>
>>> Excuse me, but there was no EU common foreign policy at the time,
>>
>> no, but there was discussion in the EU. I would never accuse the UK of
>> doing foreign policy behind the EU's back - the EU presidency was well
>> aware of what the UK was doing.
>
> And the fact that Poland was supporting US invasion was also known to
> everyone involved.
I think we have exchanged our views enough on this matter and it is taking
us nowhere, so let's leave it at that.
>
>>
>>> especially about Iraq. If Poland and other EE countries were to take
>>> into account that they are to become EU members soon, which EU country's
>>> policy should they consider more? German or British?
>>
>> Actually, Chirac said it quite nicely: Poland missed a great opportunity
>> to shut up. Was Chirac right in saying that? No. Was he unacceptably
>> rude? Yes. Would it have been best for Poland to do just that? Yes.
>
> No country will tell Poland to "shut up". Period. Especially not this old
> corrupt weasel.
That is not the point.
>
> It would have been better if Poland did not sign this letter -- it
> wouldn't have been an excuse now.
>
>> Put
>> differently, EE should have avoided taking sides, and if they insist on
>> taking sides, they should have been less vocal about it. Basically,
>> Poland said: "We don't give a damn about Germany and its sensitivities."
>> If Poland wants to send troops to Iraq, then it is free to do so, but if
>> you do it in that way, then don't expect other countries to be sensitive
>> towards your fears.
>
> It's not fears. It's *reality*.
We'll continue this discussion when Poles are actually without heating in
winter.
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> What you write above basically means "since Poland doesn't have 100%
>>>>> clean record in relations with Germany and sometimes makes decisions
>>>>> which are a bit unconvenient to its bigger neighbour,
>>>>
>>>> They were more than just inconvenient. They laid the groundwork for
>>>> America's policy "punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia" and
>>>> its policy of "Old and New Europe". For that matter, the situation in
>>>> Iraq would have developed quite differently if Europe had found a
>>>> common position on this issue.
>>>
>>> Naah. Let's not kid ourselves. The letter of 8 was totally unimportant.
>>> A thing prepared for the media,
>>
>> fine. So if Poland prefers to do its communications with Germany via the
>> media rather than in direct consultations, then don't expect Germany to
>> coordinate its activities with Poland other than through the media ;-)
>>
>>> forgotten after 2 weeks (maybe not by
>>> Chirac, but he's a special case, with his personality).
>>
>> Rumsfeld remembered.
>
> You say Poland should be responsible for this nut?
No, not at all.
>
> I don't think it's about vengeance or reciprocity. It's about German old
> tradition of favouring Russia.
Well, Russia is influential than Poland and has more of what we need
(natural resources). Having good relations with Russia is indeed quite
important to us.
>
>>>
>>> Look at Iran: no support from Great Britain, and the USA is much more
>>> peaceful. GB is about the only country in Europe which can influence
>>> American foreign policy.
>>
>> You can look at that differently: no support at all from Europe, and the
>> US is more peaceful. In the unlikely event that there is no support for
>> the US from the UK, but from all other countries, the US will proceed as
>> planned, even without UK support. The US does something if it has enough
>> support, no matter where it comes from. For practical purposes, as the UK
>> is probably the most supportive country worldwide, wheneven the UK fails
>> to support the US, then the US probably has little support elsewhere.
>> Hence, it appears the UK is more influential than it actually is.
>
> Maybe.
>
>> No, but the first opportunity Poland had, it ACTED blindly pro-US.
>
> pro-US? Yes. Blindly? I don't think so.
Yes, blindly. Even before the war began, it was clear that of the three main
"official American" reasons for starting the war:
1) WMD
2) Iraqi support of terrorism, (often suggested as involvement with 9/11)
3) Saddam's previous aggression
the first two were lies. The case the US made for the first two (notably
before the UN SC) were anything but convincing. Yes, those countries
involved in starting the war were blind to the realities.
>
>
>
>>> "Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we finally
>>> reached a compromise. It's not as if other important decisions in the
>>> EU's history were made without such thrillers.
>>
>> Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8 and
>> Nice or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas, but you
>> expect Poland to be taken seriously?
>
> After what other countries did at the same time? I'd say we are following
> the trend.
Then your PR sucks ;-)
>
>>
>>> If other countries in the EU can
>>> haggle, so can Poland.
>>
>> Except for the UK (which isn't the focus of our most cordial relations
>> either), most countries realize that red-lines aren't a good thing in
>> negotiating. For that matter, the constitution was a bit different: the
>> negotiations took place in the convention and ideally, it should have
>> been
>
> ... in which Poland was not a full-powered member, as you may recall.
>
>> adopted without member states messing with it. Some messing with it was
>> unavoidable, but taking such a stance as Poland (and Spain) did in that
>> situation was really not particularly smart. Because Spain corrected its
>> position after its election, Spain's demands were perceived to be nutty
>> Aznar, rather than Spain.
>
> Poland corrected its position after the government changed, too. I don't
> see any difference. Miller is quite a moron, BTW.
Maybe so. The perception is, however, that Poland refused to change until it
was totally isolated.
>
>>
>>> I sometimes get the impression that "you should
>>> have been quiet" attitude towards the members is quite common...
>>
>> Towards new members you mean? Well, if I were to join a club, I would
>> indeed keep a fairly low profile for a while and not be too demanding at
>> first.
>
> Excuse me, but if to join a club you have to carry out difficult
> negotiations, then your receipt cannot work.
>
>> Having a big mouth sort of ruins the first impression. For that matter,
>> the EU has a record of being fairly forthcoming towards its new member
>> states, so there is no need to a big mouth either.
>
> This "fairly forthcoming" appearance was not that obvious in Copenhagen,
> 2003.
Fine. But this is getting us nowhere and as you said, this is two years
ago...
>
>
>>> Poland proposed a construction of a network of Centres dealing with
>>> "difficult" aspects of the XXth century European history. If the new
>>> German chancellor (chances are, it may be Schroeder again...)
>>
>> No, probably not. Thank God.
>
> I concurr ;-)
>
>>
>>> ignores this
>>> and goes for an exclusively-German Centre dealing with Germans as
>>> victims ONLY,
>>
>> It would deal with the history of the expelled Germans. Indeed, many of
>> these people were victims. But these people were not victims of Poland,
>> but victims of the consequences of German aggression. I see nothing wrong
>> with portraying that.
>
> Neither would I, except that it most probably won't be portrayed the way
> you put it.
How do you know? It won't be Steinbach making it. Many people will be
involved and I would be very surprised if it did not take a very balanced
view of the matter. Of course, Poles will be mentioned as they did the
actual expelling, but I am confident that this will be put in the correct
historical context.
>
>>
>>
>>> than I think it will be clear who is saner. As for the pipeline, it
>>> may be that Poland will be able to block the construction of it, since
>>> it will be passing through Polish economical zone.
>>
>> I see no relationship between Poland's economical zone and the pipeline.
>
> Poland can try to prove in the international courts that this pipeline is
> an ecological danger. I'm not saying this is possible or that the new
> Polish government will try this, but it's a possibility.
Ok, but it seems far-fetched, as many pipelines of this sort exist.
>
> The most probable thing for Poland to do is to make this deal with Norway.
> Germany could take part in it, too. It's not too smart to rely 100% with
> your energy deliveries on a corrupt and authoritarian regime, aggressive
> towards its neighbours.
I don't think we rely on it 100% ;-)
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> I don't know about that, but generally speaking, I like the idea of
> bilateral agreements without getting third parties involved. That may be
> part of the German pedantic security mentality, as having one negotiating
> partner is "safer" than having several.
Don't you see any disagreement here between that and the idea of European
integration?
Hasn't she received funds from the German government in the past?
>> It's not fears. It's *reality*.
>
> We'll continue this discussion when Poles are actually without heating in
> winter.
Let's hope we won't have the opportunity to continue it, then.
>> pro-US? Yes. Blindly? I don't think so.
>
> Yes, blindly. Even before the war began, it was clear that of the three main
> "official American" reasons for starting the war:
> 1) WMD
> 2) Iraqi support of terrorism, (often suggested as involvement with 9/11)
> 3) Saddam's previous aggression
> the first two were lies. The case the US made for the first two (notably
> before the UN SC) were anything but convincing. Yes, those countries
> involved in starting the war were blind to the realities.
But Saddam's tyrannical nature was not a lie. It was a major reason why Polish
elites (like Adam Michnik) supported the war.
>>
>>
>>
>>>> "Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we finally
>>>> reached a compromise. It's not as if other important decisions in the
>>>> EU's history were made without such thrillers.
>>>
>>> Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8 and
>>> Nice or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas, but you
>>> expect Poland to be taken seriously?
>>
>> After what other countries did at the same time? I'd say we are following
>> the trend.
>
> Then your PR sucks ;-)
Not after the Polish plumber ;-)
>> Poland corrected its position after the government changed, too. I don't
>> see any difference. Miller is quite a moron, BTW.
>
> Maybe so. The perception is, however, that Poland refused to change until it
> was totally isolated.
So? It only proves Poland was not acting irrationally then.
> How do you know? It won't be Steinbach making it. Many people will be
> involved and I would be very surprised if it did not take a very balanced
> view of the matter. Of course, Poles will be mentioned as they did the
> actual expelling, but I am confident that this will be put in the correct
> historical context.
I hope some mention will also be made of the expelling done by other nations,
including Germany.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> than I think it will be clear who is saner. As for the pipeline, it
>>>> may be that Poland will be able to block the construction of it, since
>>>> it will be passing through Polish economical zone.
>>>
>>> I see no relationship between Poland's economical zone and the pipeline.
>>
>> Poland can try to prove in the international courts that this pipeline is
>> an ecological danger. I'm not saying this is possible or that the new
>> Polish government will try this, but it's a possibility.
>
> Ok, but it seems far-fetched, as many pipelines of this sort exist.
The difference is the abundance of old chemical ammunitions nearby. WW II
stuff, maybe even WW I. Gazprom today said it is not going to clean the area
before building the pipeline. All they are going to do is "watch carefully".
>>
>> The most probable thing for Poland to do is to make this deal with Norway.
>> Germany could take part in it, too. It's not too smart to rely 100% with
>> your energy deliveries on a corrupt and authoritarian regime, aggressive
>> towards its neighbours.
>
> I don't think we rely on it 100% ;-)
What are other sources of the gas?
David Frese
>> I don't think we rely on it 100% ;-)
>
> What are other sources of the gas?
Norway, or course; and Britain. Take a look at this (btw, there seems to
be quite a lot "sea-crossings" of pipelines in the north sea):
http://www.platts.com/Oil/Resources/News%20Features/northsea/gas_pipes.gif
And, there also seems to be already the possibility for Russia to cut off
Poland - the Transgas-Pipeline (is that Yamal II already built?)
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/images/UkraineGasMap.jpg
And, what I'd like to say in this discussion: Your speaking of "re-export"
and "German surplus" is idiotic (sorry I have to say that) - that are
independent private companies, and they will sell the gas they have
bought to anybody who pays for it; especially within the EU. And if they
ever signed a treaty forbidding the selling of that gas from Russia to
Polish companies (which I greatly doubt, and would probably break EU law)
then they will sell them the gas from the North Sea ;-)
--
David
Roman Werpachowski
> On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 17:39:18 +0000, Roman Werpachowski wrote:
>
>>> I don't think we rely on it 100% ;-)
>>
>> What are other sources of the gas?
>
> Norway, or course; and Britain. Take a look at this (btw, there seems to
> be quite a lot "sea-crossings" of pipelines in the north sea):
> http://www.platts.com/Oil/Resources/News%20Features/northsea/gas_pipes.gif
>
> And, there also seems to be already the possibility for Russia to cut off
> Poland - the Transgas-Pipeline (is that Yamal II already built?)
> http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/images/UkraineGasMap.jpg
The existing pipeline delivers gas also to Germany, so Russia can't turn off
the delivery.
No, Yamal II will never be built.
>
> And, what I'd like to say in this discussion: Your speaking of "re-export"
> and "German surplus" is idiotic (sorry I have to say that) - that are
> independent private companies, and they will sell the gas they have
> bought to anybody who pays for it; especially within the EU. And if they
> ever signed a treaty forbidding the selling of that gas from Russia to
> Polish companies (which I greatly doubt, and would probably break EU law)
> then they will sell them the gas from the North Sea ;-)
Well... we'll see.
J.M.
> On the Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:39:26 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> I don't know about that, but generally speaking, I like the idea of
>> bilateral agreements without getting third parties involved. That may be
>> part of the German pedantic security mentality, as having one negotiating
>> partner is "safer" than having several.
>
> Don't you see any disagreement here between that and the idea of European
> integration?
Not at all. Certain areas of public policy are the responsibility of the EU
and the EU negotiates, others are reserved for the states. Such a division
of responsibility in any federation (not that the EU is one). Energy and
foreign policy are clearly responsibities of the member states and I see no
one seriously suggesting that this should be changed.
>>
>>
>> It was not a *German* initiative, but Ms. Steinbach's (and her
>> association's) initiative. Please don't blame Germany for something one
>> organization does. Again, here we have Polish hypersensitivity. I think
>> Poland should be quite happy that Germany has become a stable democracy
>> that tolerates minority views, even if it does not like these views. More
>> importantly, she received no support for her initiative, not in
>> parliament, not in the government, not in the population. So what exactly
>> bothers you about her initiative?
>
> Hasn't she received funds from the German government in the past?
Well, she hasn't, I am quite sure, her organisation may have, I don't know.
The various organisations representing the various ethnic groups from
former German territories are likely to be considered a cultural
organisation as one of their aims is to preserve this heritage. Such
efforts may of course include museums. Cultural organisations are generally
funded for these cultural activities, even if politics is involved, as
separating politics and culture is not always possible. Similarly, gay and
lesbian organisations may get government funding for their cultural
activities (which is probably quite displeasing to a number of
conservatives) even if some of this culture can be quite political or if
the the same organisations engage politically as well.
Although I do not agree with them politically, I have no objections to these
organisations being funded for culture, even if I don't necessarily agree
with how they present this culture. I object to funding culture based on
political views or whether I personally like this culture.
>
>>> It's not fears. It's *reality*.
>>
>> We'll continue this discussion when Poles are actually without heating in
>> winter.
>
> Let's hope we won't have the opportunity to continue it, then.
Agreed.
>
>
>>> pro-US? Yes. Blindly? I don't think so.
>>
>> Yes, blindly. Even before the war began, it was clear that of the three
>> main "official American" reasons for starting the war:
>> 1) WMD
>> 2) Iraqi support of terrorism, (often suggested as involvement with 9/11)
>> 3) Saddam's previous aggression
>> the first two were lies. The case the US made for the first two (notably
>> before the UN SC) were anything but convincing. Yes, those countries
>> involved in starting the war were blind to the realities.
>
> But Saddam's tyrannical nature was not a lie. It was a major reason why
> Polish elites (like Adam Michnik) supported the war.
So what? Saddam's nature was one out of three reasons (the third) and the
only one which does not legally justify war. You can't go around attacking
tyrants whenever you feel like it. Why does Poland (or the US) have the
right to decide that it is better for the Iraqi people to suffer a certain
number of innocent deaths (either because of direct attack or because they
can't prevent terrorists from murdering) than to suffer under Saddam? What
gives Poland the right to decide that?? Frankly, no one has that right --
except to some degree the SC.
>>>>> "Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we finally
>>>>> reached a compromise. It's not as if other important decisions in the
>>>>> EU's history were made without such thrillers.
>>>>
>>>> Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8 and
>>>> Nice or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas, but
>>>> you expect Poland to be taken seriously?
>>>
>>> After what other countries did at the same time? I'd say we are
>>> following the trend.
>>
>> Then your PR sucks ;-)
>
> Not after the Polish plumber ;-)
That was a campaign in France. That message hasn't gotten to us yet ;-)
>
>>> Poland corrected its position after the government changed, too. I don't
>>> see any difference. Miller is quite a moron, BTW.
>>
>> Maybe so. The perception is, however, that Poland refused to change until
>> it was totally isolated.
>
> So? It only proves Poland was not acting irrationally then.
Irrationally is the wrong word here, I suppose. Maybe sensibly is better? In
case, the "new" government was acting sensibly... The old wasn't.
>
>
>> How do you know? It won't be Steinbach making it. Many people will be
>> involved and I would be very surprised if it did not take a very balanced
>> view of the matter. Of course, Poles will be mentioned as they did the
>> actual expelling, but I am confident that this will be put in the correct
>> historical context.
>
> I hope some mention will also be made of the expelling done by other
> nations, including Germany.
I have no idea as to how the exposition would be conceived. I doubt that the
focus will lie on the expulsions done by Germans, as this is not what the
museum is supposed to be about. Nevertheless, other German museums and
places of remembrance have generally been fairly good in portraying history
accurately, so I would be very surprised if this museum were biased. I also
do not think that Steinbach et al. will decide by themselves how the museum
will be conceived. Let's deal with this issue if and when the museum is
built and not beforehand.
>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> than I think it will be clear who is saner. As for the pipeline, it
>>>>> may be that Poland will be able to block the construction of it, since
>>>>> it will be passing through Polish economical zone.
>>>>
>>>> I see no relationship between Poland's economical zone and the
>>>> pipeline.
>>>
>>> Poland can try to prove in the international courts that this pipeline
>>> is an ecological danger. I'm not saying this is possible or that the new
>>> Polish government will try this, but it's a possibility.
>>
>> Ok, but it seems far-fetched, as many pipelines of this sort exist.
>
> The difference is the abundance of old chemical ammunitions nearby. WW II
> stuff, maybe even WW I. Gazprom today said it is not going to clean the
> area before building the pipeline. All they are going to do is "watch
> carefully".
>
>>>
>>> The most probable thing for Poland to do is to make this deal with
>>> Norway. Germany could take part in it, too. It's not too smart to rely
>>> 100% with your energy deliveries on a corrupt and authoritarian regime,
>>> aggressive towards its neighbours.
>>
>> I don't think we rely on it 100% ;-)
>
> What are other sources of the gas?
I have no idea, but I don't think we get more than about 1/3 from Russia.. I
seem to remember that...
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>> On the Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:39:26 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>>> I don't know about that, but generally speaking, I like the idea of
>>> bilateral agreements without getting third parties involved. That may be
>>> part of the German pedantic security mentality, as having one negotiating
>>> partner is "safer" than having several.
>>
>> Don't you see any disagreement here between that and the idea of European
>> integration?
>
> Not at all. Certain areas of public policy are the responsibility of the EU
> and the EU negotiates, others are reserved for the states. Such a division
> of responsibility in any federation (not that the EU is one). Energy and
> foreign policy are clearly responsibities of the member states and I see no
> one seriously suggesting that this should be changed.
Your statement above was more general than that ("pedantic security mentality"
may well apply to those areas which are EU responsibility now).
>
>>>
>>>
>>> It was not a *German* initiative, but Ms. Steinbach's (and her
>>> association's) initiative. Please don't blame Germany for something one
>>> organization does. Again, here we have Polish hypersensitivity. I think
>>> Poland should be quite happy that Germany has become a stable democracy
>>> that tolerates minority views, even if it does not like these views. More
>>> importantly, she received no support for her initiative, not in
>>> parliament, not in the government, not in the population. So what exactly
>>> bothers you about her initiative?
>>
>> Hasn't she received funds from the German government in the past?
>
> Well, she hasn't, I am quite sure, her organisation may have, I don't know.
> The various organisations representing the various ethnic groups from
> former German territories are likely to be considered a cultural
> organisation as one of their aims is to preserve this heritage. Such
> efforts may of course include museums. Cultural organisations are generally
> funded for these cultural activities, even if politics is involved, as
> separating politics and culture is not always possible. Similarly, gay and
> lesbian organisations may get government funding for their cultural
> activities (which is probably quite displeasing to a number of
> conservatives) even if some of this culture can be quite political or if
> the the same organisations engage politically as well.
>
> Although I do not agree with them politically, I have no objections to these
> organisations being funded for culture, even if I don't necessarily agree
> with how they present this culture. I object to funding culture based on
> political views or whether I personally like this culture.
How about funding nazi culture? Or extreme-Islamic mullahs? Would you object to
that?
>> But Saddam's tyrannical nature was not a lie. It was a major reason why
>> Polish elites (like Adam Michnik) supported the war.
>
> So what? Saddam's nature was one out of three reasons (the third) and the
> only one which does not legally justify war. You can't go around attacking
> tyrants whenever you feel like it. Why does Poland (or the US) have the
> right to decide that it is better for the Iraqi people to suffer a certain
> number of innocent deaths (either because of direct attack or because they
> can't prevent terrorists from murdering) than to suffer under Saddam? What
> gives Poland the right to decide that?? Frankly, no one has that right --
> except to some degree the SC.
Surely you do remember that NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1997 had no UN
blessing? I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a bit
too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of some tyrant in a
cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to do it. The problem is of
finding a way, for sure...
>
>>>>>> "Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we finally
>>>>>> reached a compromise. It's not as if other important decisions in the
>>>>>> EU's history were made without such thrillers.
>>>>>
>>>>> Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8 and
>>>>> Nice or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas, but
>>>>> you expect Poland to be taken seriously?
>>>>
>>>> After what other countries did at the same time? I'd say we are
>>>> following the trend.
>>>
>>> Then your PR sucks ;-)
>>
>> Not after the Polish plumber ;-)
>
> That was a campaign in France. That message hasn't gotten to us yet ;-)
You Germans are so slow... :D
>
>>
>>>> Poland corrected its position after the government changed, too. I don't
>>>> see any difference. Miller is quite a moron, BTW.
>>>
>>> Maybe so. The perception is, however, that Poland refused to change until
>>> it was totally isolated.
>>
>> So? It only proves Poland was not acting irrationally then.
>
> Irrationally is the wrong word here, I suppose. Maybe sensibly is better? In
> case, the "new" government was acting sensibly... The old wasn't.
Which is similar to Spain's case. No need to make differences here.
>>
>>
>>> How do you know? It won't be Steinbach making it. Many people will be
>>> involved and I would be very surprised if it did not take a very balanced
>>> view of the matter. Of course, Poles will be mentioned as they did the
>>> actual expelling, but I am confident that this will be put in the correct
>>> historical context.
>>
>> I hope some mention will also be made of the expelling done by other
>> nations, including Germany.
>
> I have no idea as to how the exposition would be conceived. I doubt that the
> focus will lie on the expulsions done by Germans, as this is not what the
> museum is supposed to be about.
Maybe focusing on them is too much, but showing that they happened is
necessary. People seem to think that the only expulsions in WW II happened in
1945.
> Nevertheless, other German museums and
> places of remembrance have generally been fairly good in portraying history
> accurately, so I would be very surprised if this museum were biased. I also
> do not think that Steinbach et al. will decide by themselves how the museum
> will be conceived. Let's deal with this issue if and when the museum is
> built and not beforehand.
I think such issues should be decided beforehand. When you start pouring
concrete in the ground, it's too late for design meetings.
> I have no idea, but I don't think we get more than about 1/3 from Russia.. I
> seem to remember that...
Lucky bastards ;-)
J.M.
> On the Mon, 26 Sep 2005 22:44:24 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>>
>>> On the Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:39:26 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>>>> I don't know about that, but generally speaking, I like the idea of
>>>> bilateral agreements without getting third parties involved. That may
>>>> be part of the German pedantic security mentality, as having one
>>>> negotiating partner is "safer" than having several.
>>>
>>> Don't you see any disagreement here between that and the idea of
>>> European integration?
>>
>> Not at all. Certain areas of public policy are the responsibility of the
>> EU and the EU negotiates, others are reserved for the states. Such a
>> division of responsibility in any federation (not that the EU is one).
>> Energy and foreign policy are clearly responsibities of the member states
>> and I see no one seriously suggesting that this should be changed.
>
> Your statement above was more general than that ("pedantic security
> mentality" may well apply to those areas which are EU responsibility now).
Ok, I understand what you are trying to say. Nevertheless, in this case, the
EU would not be doing the negotiations and the EU would offer Germany no
security in this area. In other areas, trade for example, things are
different. Would it be desirable to have a common EU energy policy - with
common I mean the commission being responsible with parliamentary approval
and majority voting in the council and not the interstate haggling? Maybe
it would be better - but that is not the situation right now.
Of course not all "culture" should be funded. Hence, some political control
is necessary, and usually such control is excercised by some sort of
council representing different groups of society. And gay culture would not
have received approval 40 years ago and probably enough people object to
them receiving money today as well. Generally, I do favor giving funding
not based on political criteria, unless these groups are undemocratic,
preach hate, etc. But the organisations representing expelled Germans
clearly do not fall into that category.
>
>>> But Saddam's tyrannical nature was not a lie. It was a major reason why
>>> Polish elites (like Adam Michnik) supported the war.
>>
>> So what? Saddam's nature was one out of three reasons (the third) and the
>> only one which does not legally justify war. You can't go around
>> attacking tyrants whenever you feel like it. Why does Poland (or the US)
>> have the right to decide that it is better for the Iraqi people to suffer
>> a certain number of innocent deaths (either because of direct attack or
>> because they can't prevent terrorists from murdering) than to suffer
>> under Saddam? What gives Poland the right to decide that?? Frankly, no
>> one has that right -- except to some degree the SC.
>
> Surely you do remember that NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1997 had no UN
> blessing?
There is a fundamental difference: in Saddam was not killing massively at
the time of the intervention and it was clear that probably a lot more
people would be killed in any war and it was clear that stabilizing a
country like Iraq after the war would be very difficult. For that matter,
waiting to get SC approval would not have worsened the situation or risked
a significantly higher number of people killed by Saddam. On the other
hand, in Kosovo, genocide was taking place before our eyes and it seemed
likely that it would be possible to save a large number of lives by
intervening immediately. Any delay would cost lives. Granted, in a purely
legalistic sense, Kosovo was as illegal as Iraq. In a moral sense, the
situations are incomparable.
> I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a
> bit too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of some
> tyrant in a cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to do it.
There was no "cheap and efficient way" to dispose of Saddam. In fact, there
is hardly ever a cheap and efficient way to dispose of a tyrant, certainly
not of those tyrants that *really* deserve the name.
> The problem is of finding a way, for sure...
In most case, there is no cheap and efficient way, or else there would be
no/would not have been tyrrany in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Nazi-Germany,
the Soviet Union,...
>
>>
>>>>>>> "Nice or death" was totally stupid, but as you may recally, we
>>>>>>> finally reached a compromise. It's not as if other important
>>>>>>> decisions in the EU's history were made without such thrillers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Quite true. But let's summarize the past two years: the letter of 8
>>>>>> and Nice or Death: you admit that both were not the brightest ideas,
>>>>>> but you expect Poland to be taken seriously?
>>>>>
>>>>> After what other countries did at the same time? I'd say we are
>>>>> following the trend.
>>>>
>>>> Then your PR sucks ;-)
>>>
>>> Not after the Polish plumber ;-)
>>
>> That was a campaign in France. That message hasn't gotten to us yet ;-)
>
> You Germans are so slow... :D
I've understood *hug* :-P
>
>>
>>>
>>>>> Poland corrected its position after the government changed, too. I
>>>>> don't see any difference. Miller is quite a moron, BTW.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe so. The perception is, however, that Poland refused to change
>>>> until it was totally isolated.
>>>
>>> So? It only proves Poland was not acting irrationally then.
>>
>> Irrationally is the wrong word here, I suppose. Maybe sensibly is better?
>> In case, the "new" government was acting sensibly... The old wasn't.
>
> Which is similar to Spain's case. No need to make differences here.
True, I don't know why, but in Spain it was perceived to be Aznar, not
Spain, but Poland was perceived to be Poland. Part of this was probably
that Spain had a history of being cooperative and pro-EU, so we did not
attribute this to Spain but to Aznar. Similarly, some of this attitude was
probably due to the fact what Poland was new in the EU and its first action
was so harsh. Additionally, it seems that states that are in the EU for a
longer period of time, are perceived more realistically, less
homogeneously.
>
>>>
>>>
>>>> How do you know? It won't be Steinbach making it. Many people will be
>>>> involved and I would be very surprised if it did not take a very
>>>> balanced view of the matter. Of course, Poles will be mentioned as they
>>>> did the actual expelling, but I am confident that this will be put in
>>>> the correct historical context.
>>>
>>> I hope some mention will also be made of the expelling done by other
>>> nations, including Germany.
>>
>> I have no idea as to how the exposition would be conceived. I doubt that
>> the focus will lie on the expulsions done by Germans, as this is not what
>> the museum is supposed to be about.
>
> Maybe focusing on them is too much, but showing that they happened is
> necessary.
I don't think they will show that it is "necessary". I find it hard to
accept that any human suffering is "necessary". I would expect them to
illustrate the events resulting in the expulsion, beginning with German
aggression. I hope they will illustrate that the people expelling the
Germans at the time believed that this was essential for their own
security, survival and welfare (and for Poland, this was probably true,
much less so in other areas), but I don't expect them to obtain an
absolution. Indeed, the Benes decrees, for example, were unjust, even in
the light of German aggression and even if they were unavoidable.
> People seem to think that the only expulsions in WW II happened
> in 1945.
>
>> Nevertheless, other German museums and
>> places of remembrance have generally been fairly good in portraying
>> history accurately, so I would be very surprised if this museum were
>> biased. I also do not think that Steinbach et al. will decide by
>> themselves how the museum will be conceived. Let's deal with this issue
>> if and when the museum is built and not beforehand.
>
> I think such issues should be decided beforehand. When you start pouring
> concrete in the ground, it's too late for design meetings.
Oh, if the design turns out to be bad, there will be scandal here and it
will be fixed. (But I am optimistic that it will be ok, maybe not for every
Pole's taste, but it will be ok)
>
>> I have no idea, but I don't think we get more than about 1/3 from
>> Russia.. I seem to remember that...
>
> Lucky bastards ;-)
Well, prior to 1990, we probably got next to nothing from them, so I would
have been surprised if we had replaced all our previous sources with
Russian gas...
>
Roman Werpachowski
One of the ways Poland will react to the pipeline deal is trying to convince
the EU that it *would* be better.
Hmm... I have some doubts. They do sound pretty aggressive towards Poland, some
of them.
>>
>>>> But Saddam's tyrannical nature was not a lie. It was a major reason why
>>>> Polish elites (like Adam Michnik) supported the war.
>>>
>>> So what? Saddam's nature was one out of three reasons (the third) and the
>>> only one which does not legally justify war. You can't go around
>>> attacking tyrants whenever you feel like it. Why does Poland (or the US)
>>> have the right to decide that it is better for the Iraqi people to suffer
>>> a certain number of innocent deaths (either because of direct attack or
>>> because they can't prevent terrorists from murdering) than to suffer
>>> under Saddam? What gives Poland the right to decide that?? Frankly, no
>>> one has that right -- except to some degree the SC.
>>
>> Surely you do remember that NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1997 had no UN
>> blessing?
>
> There is a fundamental difference: in Saddam was not killing massively at
> the time of the intervention and it was clear that probably a lot more
> people would be killed in any war and it was clear that stabilizing a
> country like Iraq after the war would be very difficult. For that matter,
> waiting to get SC approval would not have worsened the situation or risked
> a significantly higher number of people killed by Saddam. On the other
> hand, in Kosovo, genocide was taking place before our eyes and it seemed
> likely that it would be possible to save a large number of lives by
> intervening immediately. Any delay would cost lives. Granted, in a purely
> legalistic sense, Kosovo was as illegal as Iraq. In a moral sense, the
> situations are incomparable.
Well... look at what happens in Kosovo now. Albanians are driving the local
Serbs out, killing them and destroying their culture (burning monasteries).
Islamic organizations from the Middle East are building a bridgehead there. So
one could argue about "unforeseen consequences" and all that, similar to Iraq.
It's not that I condemn the NATO intervention of 1997, far from it, but this is
not that shiny as we'd like it to be.
Besides, in Iraq Saddam's secret police was killing people as well. I don't
know the yearly rate, but I wouldn't be surprised if it was of the order of
thousand per year.
>
>> I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a
>> bit too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of some
>> tyrant in a cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to do it.
>
> There was no "cheap and efficient way" to dispose of Saddam. In fact, there
> is hardly ever a cheap and efficient way to dispose of a tyrant, certainly
> not of those tyrants that *really* deserve the name.
>
>> The problem is of finding a way, for sure...
>
> In most case, there is no cheap and efficient way, or else there would be
> no/would not have been tyrrany in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Nazi-Germany,
> the Soviet Union,...
Given the horrors of the last two, any way would be great.
Seems so.
>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> How do you know? It won't be Steinbach making it. Many people will be
>>>>> involved and I would be very surprised if it did not take a very
>>>>> balanced view of the matter. Of course, Poles will be mentioned as they
>>>>> did the actual expelling, but I am confident that this will be put in
>>>>> the correct historical context.
>>>>
>>>> I hope some mention will also be made of the expelling done by other
>>>> nations, including Germany.
>>>
>>> I have no idea as to how the exposition would be conceived. I doubt that
>>> the focus will lie on the expulsions done by Germans, as this is not what
>>> the museum is supposed to be about.
>>
>> Maybe focusing on them is too much, but showing that they happened is
>> necessary.
>
> I don't think they will show that it is "necessary". I find it hard to
> accept that any human suffering is "necessary". I would expect them to
> illustrate the events resulting in the expulsion, beginning with German
> aggression.
You completely misunderstood me. I said that is necessary for the Centre to
show that the Germans were doing the expulsions, too.
> I hope they will illustrate that the people expelling the
> Germans at the time believed that this was essential for their own
> security, survival and welfare (and for Poland, this was probably true,
> much less so in other areas), but I don't expect them to obtain an
> absolution. Indeed, the Benes decrees, for example, were unjust, even in
> the light of German aggression and even if they were unavoidable.
>
>> People seem to think that the only expulsions in WW II happened
>> in 1945.
>>
>>> Nevertheless, other German museums and
>>> places of remembrance have generally been fairly good in portraying
>>> history accurately, so I would be very surprised if this museum were
>>> biased. I also do not think that Steinbach et al. will decide by
>>> themselves how the museum will be conceived. Let's deal with this issue
>>> if and when the museum is built and not beforehand.
>>
>> I think such issues should be decided beforehand. When you start pouring
>> concrete in the ground, it's too late for design meetings.
>
> Oh, if the design turns out to be bad, there will be scandal here and it
> will be fixed. (But I am optimistic that it will be ok, maybe not for every
> Pole's taste, but it will be ok)
We *do* have some taste for modern architecture too, if that's what you're
aiming at.
>>
>>> I have no idea, but I don't think we get more than about 1/3 from
>>> Russia.. I seem to remember that...
>>
>> Lucky bastards ;-)
>
> Well, prior to 1990, we probably got next to nothing from them, so I would
> have been surprised if we had replaced all our previous sources with
> Russian gas...
True.
J.M.
>>
>> Ok, I understand what you are trying to say. Nevertheless, in this case,
>> the EU would not be doing the negotiations and the EU would offer Germany
>> no security in this area. In other areas, trade for example, things are
>> different. Would it be desirable to have a common EU energy policy - with
>> common I mean the commission being responsible with parliamentary
>> approval and majority voting in the council and not the interstate
>> haggling? Maybe it would be better - but that is not the situation right
>> now.
>
> One of the ways Poland will react to the pipeline deal is trying to
> convince the EU that it *would* be better.
Well, the constitution is pretty dead and so I don't expect any serious
reform of the EU in the foreseeable future...
>>
>> Of course not all "culture" should be funded. Hence, some political
>> control is necessary, and usually such control is excercised by some sort
>> of council representing different groups of society. And gay culture
>> would not have received approval 40 years ago and probably enough people
>> object to them receiving money today as well. Generally, I do favor
>> giving funding not based on political criteria, unless these groups are
>> undemocratic, preach hate, etc. But the organisations representing
>> expelled Germans clearly do not fall into that category.
>
> Hmm... I have some doubts. They do sound pretty aggressive towards Poland,
> some of them.
Well, you express it so carefully that it is hard to disagree, and indeed
"some" may be aggressive -- but I don't think they are undemocratic or
preach hate. Instead, they are not satisfied (whether justified or not)
with the way Poland deals with our common history. That in itself is not
sufficient (in my opinion) to justify cutting the funding, especially as
the really aggressive tones come just from some members and does not appear
to be a matter of policy. As a matter of policy, they want reconciliation
with Poland. Granted, what some of them say makes such reconciliation
difficult, but none of that seems to justify cutting funding.
>>>
>>> Surely you do remember that NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1997 had no
>>> UN blessing?
>>
>> There is a fundamental difference: in Saddam was not killing massively at
>> the time of the intervention and it was clear that probably a lot more
>> people would be killed in any war and it was clear that stabilizing a
>> country like Iraq after the war would be very difficult. For that matter,
>> waiting to get SC approval would not have worsened the situation or
>> risked a significantly higher number of people killed by Saddam. On the
>> other hand, in Kosovo, genocide was taking place before our eyes and it
>> seemed likely that it would be possible to save a large number of lives
>> by intervening immediately. Any delay would cost lives. Granted, in a
>> purely legalistic sense, Kosovo was as illegal as Iraq. In a moral sense,
>> the situations are incomparable.
>
> Well... look at what happens in Kosovo now. Albanians are driving the
> local Serbs out, killing them and destroying their culture (burning
> monasteries).
Which is precisely *why* such intervention is difficult and should not be
done light-heartedly and why the UN generally needs to be involved and why
there should be a world-wide consensus that such intervention is
justified. Nevertheless, in this particular situation, watching while
genocide was occurring under our eyes was not acceptable.
> Islamic organizations from the Middle East are building a bridgehead
> there. So one could argue about "unforeseen consequences" and all that,
> similar to Iraq.
I don't follow what you are trying to say. There will always be unforeseen
consequences and difficulties, which is why generally no single country or
organisation has the right to decide what is best for the innocent people
involved and why the UN needs to be involved.
> It's not that I condemn the NATO intervention of 1997,
> far from it, but this is not that shiny as we'd like it to be.
I never said it was shiny. I said it stopped the genocide.
>
> Besides, in Iraq Saddam's secret police was killing people as well. I
> don't know the yearly rate, but I wouldn't be surprised if it was of the
> order of thousand per year.
That is, of course, speculative. But for argument's sake, even if it is
true, what has the war in Iraq de facto achieved? It has replaced Saddam's
terrorism with terrorism which is probably just as deadly, possibly
deadlier. Granted, that was not the aim of the war, but war is probably the
most unpredictable of all possible policies, so countries starting a war
also carry a certain degree of responsibility for these undesired results.
What gives a country like the US or Poland the right to force these
undesirable results upon the Iraqi people, intentional or not?
>
>>
>>> I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a
>>> bit too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of some
>>> tyrant in a cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to do it.
>>
>> There was no "cheap and efficient way" to dispose of Saddam. In fact,
>> there is hardly ever a cheap and efficient way to dispose of a tyrant,
>> certainly not of those tyrants that *really* deserve the name.
>>
>>> The problem is of finding a way, for sure...
>>
>> In most case, there is no cheap and efficient way, or else there would be
>> no/would not have been tyrrany in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Nazi-Germany,
>> the Soviet Union,...
>
> Given the horrors of the last two, any way would be great.
Yes, and there was no cheap and easy way. I am sure, many people looked for
a cheap and easy way, but found none, so they chose the hard way. You need
to acquaint yourself with the unpleasant reality that getting rid of
tyrants generally takes violence and blood and lot's of both.
>>> Which is similar to Spain's case. No need to make differences here.
>>
>> True, I don't know why, but in Spain it was perceived to be Aznar, not
>> Spain, but Poland was perceived to be Poland. Part of this was probably
>> that Spain had a history of being cooperative and pro-EU, so we did not
>> attribute this to Spain but to Aznar. Similarly, some of this attitude
>> was probably due to the fact what Poland was new in the EU and its first
>> action was so harsh. Additionally, it seems that states that are in the
>> EU for a longer period of time, are perceived more realistically, less
>> homogeneously.
>
> Seems so.
>
>>> Maybe focusing on them is too much, but showing that they happened is
>>> necessary.
>>
>> I don't think they will show that it is "necessary". I find it hard to
>> accept that any human suffering is "necessary". I would expect them to
>> illustrate the events resulting in the expulsion, beginning with German
>> aggression.
>
> You completely misunderstood me. I said that is necessary for the Centre
> to show that the Germans were doing the expulsions, too.
Ok, I agree.
>
>> I hope they will illustrate that the people expelling the
>> Germans at the time believed that this was essential for their own
>> security, survival and welfare (and for Poland, this was probably true,
>> much less so in other areas), but I don't expect them to obtain an
>> absolution. Indeed, the Benes decrees, for example, were unjust, even in
>> the light of German aggression and even if they were unavoidable.
>>
>>> People seem to think that the only expulsions in WW II happened
>>> in 1945.
>>>
>>>> Nevertheless, other German museums and
>>>> places of remembrance have generally been fairly good in portraying
>>>> history accurately, so I would be very surprised if this museum were
>>>> biased. I also do not think that Steinbach et al. will decide by
>>>> themselves how the museum will be conceived. Let's deal with this issue
>>>> if and when the museum is built and not beforehand.
>>>
>>> I think such issues should be decided beforehand. When you start pouring
>>> concrete in the ground, it's too late for design meetings.
>>
>> Oh, if the design turns out to be bad, there will be scandal here and it
>> will be fixed. (But I am optimistic that it will be ok, maybe not for
>> every Pole's taste, but it will be ok)
>
> We *do* have some taste for modern architecture too, if that's what you're
> aiming at.
Not at all. Now you completely misunderstood me. I wasn't even talking about
architecture at all, but about the way the museum will inform about the
expulsions. If the exposition is too one-sided, then there will be a
scandal and the exposition will be fixed. I am optimistic that it will be
balanced, but fixing an exposition is not that hard, even after the museum
has opened. I was merely trying to say, that some Poles (and Germans) may
not like it anyhow, but I expect it to be ok.
>
>>>
>>>> I have no idea, but I don't think we get more than about 1/3 from
>>>> Russia.. I seem to remember that...
>>>
>>> Lucky bastards ;-)
>>
>> Well, prior to 1990, we probably got next to nothing from them, so I
>> would have been surprised if we had replaced all our previous sources
>> with Russian gas...
>
> True.
>
Jan
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>
>>>
>>> Ok, I understand what you are trying to say. Nevertheless, in this case,
>>> the EU would not be doing the negotiations and the EU would offer Germany
>>> no security in this area. In other areas, trade for example, things are
>>> different. Would it be desirable to have a common EU energy policy - with
>>> common I mean the commission being responsible with parliamentary
>>> approval and majority voting in the council and not the interstate
>>> haggling? Maybe it would be better - but that is not the situation right
>>> now.
>>
>> One of the ways Poland will react to the pipeline deal is trying to
>> convince the EU that it *would* be better.
>
> Well, the constitution is pretty dead and so I don't expect any serious
> reform of the EU in the foreseeable future...
Would it be that serious?
>
>>>
>>> Of course not all "culture" should be funded. Hence, some political
>>> control is necessary, and usually such control is excercised by some sort
>>> of council representing different groups of society. And gay culture
>>> would not have received approval 40 years ago and probably enough people
>>> object to them receiving money today as well. Generally, I do favor
>>> giving funding not based on political criteria, unless these groups are
>>> undemocratic, preach hate, etc. But the organisations representing
>>> expelled Germans clearly do not fall into that category.
>>
>> Hmm... I have some doubts. They do sound pretty aggressive towards Poland,
>> some of them.
>
> Well, you express it so carefully that it is hard to disagree, and indeed
> "some" may be aggressive -- but I don't think they are undemocratic or
> preach hate. Instead, they are not satisfied (whether justified or not)
> with the way Poland deals with our common history. That in itself is not
> sufficient (in my opinion) to justify cutting the funding, especially as
> the really aggressive tones come just from some members and does not appear
> to be a matter of policy. As a matter of policy, they want reconciliation
> with Poland. Granted, what some of them say makes such reconciliation
> difficult, but none of that seems to justify cutting funding.
On this side of the border, we see only the negative side of this organisations.
Of course, that's why Poland did not move out like Spain did. Poland acted
responsibly, Spain did not.
> What gives a country like the US or Poland the right to force these
> undesirable results upon the Iraqi people, intentional or not?
It's a hard question. The West is often accused of tolerating dictators. If we
stop tolerating them, and sanctions do not work (how could Saddam be harmed by
them? they were harming civilians, not him), then what should we do?
Besides, war is as unpredictable with the U.N. blessing as without it.
>>
>>>
>>>> I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a
>>>> bit too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of some
>>>> tyrant in a cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to do it.
>>>
>>> There was no "cheap and efficient way" to dispose of Saddam. In fact,
>>> there is hardly ever a cheap and efficient way to dispose of a tyrant,
>>> certainly not of those tyrants that *really* deserve the name.
>>>
>>>> The problem is of finding a way, for sure...
>>>
>>> In most case, there is no cheap and efficient way, or else there would be
>>> no/would not have been tyrrany in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Nazi-Germany,
>>> the Soviet Union,...
>>
>> Given the horrors of the last two, any way would be great.
>
> Yes, and there was no cheap and easy way. I am sure, many people looked for
Hmm... preventive war in 1938 against Hitler? Militarily, it would have to be
done by France. Given the performance of the French Army in 1940, I don't think
it had a high chance of success, though.
We'll see.
Roman
David Frese
> On the Mon, 26 Sep 2005 21:34:51 +0200, David Frese wrote:
>> On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 17:39:18 +0000, Roman Werpachowski wrote:
>>
>>>> I don't think we rely on it 100% ;-)
>>>
>>> What are other sources of the gas?
>>
>> Norway, or course; and Britain. Take a look at this (btw, there seems to
>> be quite a lot "sea-crossings" of pipelines in the north sea):
>> http://www.platts.com/Oil/Resources/News%20Features/northsea/gas_pipes.gif
>>
>> And, there also seems to be already the possibility for Russia to cut
>> off Poland - the Transgas-Pipeline (is that Yamal II already built?)
>> http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/images/UkraineGasMap.jpg
>
> The existing pipeline delivers gas also to Germany, so Russia can't turn
> off the delivery.
And it will continue to do so. But the point was: Today there are two
pipelines starting in Russia and ending in Germany; one through Poland,
and one not through Poland. So with that Baltic Sea pipeline, there will
be another one of the latter type, but it's not a fundamentally different
situation.
> No, Yamal II will never be built.
Aha
>> And, what I'd like to say in this discussion: Your speaking of
>> "re-export" and "German surplus" is idiotic (sorry I have to say that) -
>> that are independent private companies, and they will sell the gas they
>> have bought to anybody who pays for it; especially within the EU. And if
>> they ever signed a treaty forbidding the selling of that gas from Russia
>> to Polish companies (which I greatly doubt, and would probably break EU
>> law) then they will sell them the gas from the North Sea ;-)
>
> Well... we'll see.
And I'm sure, if the Russian government would try to blackmail the Polish
government some day, you will get the full support of all the other EU
members. That's what the EU is there for (among other things of course).
--
David
Roman Werpachowski
> And it will continue to do so. But the point was: Today there are two
> pipelines starting in Russia and ending in Germany; one through Poland,
> and one not through Poland. So with that Baltic Sea pipeline, there will
> be another one of the latter type, but it's not a fundamentally different
> situation.
It depends on the amount of deliveries through each pipe.
> And I'm sure, if the Russian government would try to blackmail the Polish
> government some day, you will get the full support of all the other EU
> members. That's what the EU is there for (among other things of course).
Well... we'll see.
J.M.
>>>
>>> One of the ways Poland will react to the pipeline deal is trying to
>>> convince the EU that it *would* be better.
>>
>> Well, the constitution is pretty dead and so I don't expect any serious
>> reform of the EU in the foreseeable future...
>
> Would it be that serious?
Transfering power to the EU, enabling the EU parliament, council and
commission to make decisions for the member states requires the treaties to
be amended. I don't expect that to happen soon.
>>
>> Well, you express it so carefully that it is hard to disagree, and indeed
>> "some" may be aggressive -- but I don't think they are undemocratic or
>> preach hate. Instead, they are not satisfied (whether justified or not)
>> with the way Poland deals with our common history. That in itself is not
>> sufficient (in my opinion) to justify cutting the funding, especially as
>> the really aggressive tones come just from some members and does not
>> appear to be a matter of policy. As a matter of policy, they want
>> reconciliation with Poland. Granted, what some of them say makes such
>> reconciliation difficult, but none of that seems to justify cutting
>> funding.
>
> On this side of the border, we see only the negative side of this
> organisations.
Quite possible, I am not particularly fond of them either. And I would agree
with you that they do more harm than good.
>
>>
>> That is, of course, speculative. But for argument's sake, even if it is
>> true, what has the war in Iraq de facto achieved? It has replaced
>> Saddam's terrorism with terrorism which is probably just as deadly,
>> possibly deadlier. Granted, that was not the aim of the war, but war is
>> probably the most unpredictable of all possible policies, so countries
>> starting a war also carry a certain degree of responsibility for these
>> undesired results.
>
> Of course, that's why Poland did not move out like Spain did. Poland acted
> responsibly, Spain did not.
I think both acted irresponsibly, Spain perhaps more so. Actually, I would
say that the entire fault lies with Aznar, not Spain. It is simply insane
to go to war if 90% of your population opposes it. But no country,
including Poland, is in any capacity to bring a "good" end to the war,
which is why I believe all countries involved in Iraq acted irresponsibly.
>
>> What gives a country like the US or Poland the right to force these
>> undesirable results upon the Iraqi people, intentional or not?
>
> It's a hard question. The West is often accused of tolerating dictators.
> If we stop tolerating them, and sanctions do not work (how could Saddam be
> harmed by them? they were harming civilians, not him), then what should we
> do?
Let me rephrase the following: The Arab world is often accused of tolerating
morally corrupt societies in the West. If we Arabs stop tolerating them,
and sanctions do not work (how are the morally corrupt westeners harmed by
them?), when what should we the Arab world do?
Why do we have more of a right to force democracy and human rights upon
countries like Iran than Iran has the right to force the Sharia on us? Why
are western values worth more than conservative Islamic values?
Granted, Saddam was not a conservative Islamic regime, but the arguments are
similar. If we go around attempting to force regimes which we consider to
be better, more just on other societies, then why should others not try to
do the same with us? For that matter, it is very difficult if not
impossible to establish a totally different society by force.
So what should we do? Most societies become more democratic and more
pluralistic as the education and the welfare of the people improves, as
they have better access to the outside world. We should promote this change
but without force. Put differently, a very famous Pole was very much in
favor of change in eastern Europe and encouraged it, and played a big role
in this change, but he was definitely opposed to using force to obtain it
and he was particularly opposed to the war in Iraq.
>
> Besides, war is as unpredictable with the U.N. blessing as without it.
It is, but at least then you have a recognized and accepted organization
making the decision, an organization which is much less likely to be
perceived as being partial to specific interests. Part of the problem in
Iraq results from a large number of people, especially Iraqis and people in
the Arab world believing that the US is not in Iraq to help the Iraqi
people but the help itself to Iraqi oil and to establish itself as a power
in the region.
>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a
>>>>> bit too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of
>>>>> some tyrant in a cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to
>>>>> do it.
>>>>
>>>> There was no "cheap and efficient way" to dispose of Saddam. In fact,
>>>> there is hardly ever a cheap and efficient way to dispose of a tyrant,
>>>> certainly not of those tyrants that *really* deserve the name.
>>>>
>>>>> The problem is of finding a way, for sure...
>>>>
>>>> In most case, there is no cheap and efficient way, or else there would
>>>> be no/would not have been tyrrany in Iran, Libya, North Korea,
>>>> Nazi-Germany, the Soviet Union,...
>>>
>>> Given the horrors of the last two, any way would be great.
>>
>> Yes, and there was no cheap and easy way. I am sure, many people looked
>> for
>
> Hmm... preventive war in 1938 against Hitler?
Well, certainly it would have been ok to use force to defend Czechoslovakia.
I have absolutely no problem using force to defend a country being
attacked. (Similarly, I would not have objected to Saddam being removed in
the first Gulf War.)
But if you are talking about a preventive war against Hitler, you are not
being honest. There is no such thing: it would have been a war against
Germany and everyone in Germany would have perceived it that way. Suppose
the war was successful and some sort of regime was imposed on Germany, we
would likely have a rerun of 1918/19. The peace and friendship in Europe we
enjoy today is only possible because after the war the Germans saw Hitler
for what he was. If Germany would have been defeated in a preventive war,
Germans would see in Hitler a hero and themselves as victims of French
aggression. It is hard to see how lasting peace could have resulted from
that, as they would fear future French aggression. The way history was,
Germans themselves were glad that Hitler was gone and realized that the
allies fought a just war against Germany. On this basis, peace was
possible.
On the other hand, if Germany had won a preventive war, nothing would have
changed, except that many people (inside and outside of Germany) would
think that Germany was fighting a just war. For that matter, Hitler would
probably have become a hero just the same.
Getting rid of Hitler with war was never really an option, I think.
> Militarily, it would have to
> be done by France. Given the performance of the French Army in 1940, I
> don't think it had a high chance of success, though.
No, probably not.
Jan
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>>
>> organisations.
>
> Quite possible, I am not particularly fond of them either. And I would agree
> with you that they do more harm than good.
In such situation, were I a minister of the German government responsible for
funding such organizations -- and were sure of my opinion -- I would not
hesitate to cut the funding. I mean, there are always more organizations asking
for money than receiving them. It's a waste of taxpater's money to fund those
which are harmful. The fact it contineously happens indicates some level of
acceptance to their harmful activity among German politicians.
This is moral relativism. We both know that democracy and culture based on
human rights is better than murdering people.
There was a man who wanted to be eaten by another man in Germany. How can we
impose our moral values on them?
>
> Granted, Saddam was not a conservative Islamic regime, but the arguments are
> similar. If we go around attempting to force regimes which we consider to
> be better, more just on other societies, then why should others not try to
> do the same with us? For that matter, it is very difficult if not
> impossible to establish a totally different society by force.
That's why I think the war in Iraq was a mistake. But I don't think that
supporting this war means necessarily you're rotten or evil. In Poland, the
support for this war came from a misguided idealism on the part of a part of
our elites, and a misguided calculation that we can "prove to be useful" to
America by our, thankfully gone out of politics -- he's not even an MP now --
former prime minister Miller. The second motivation is very ugly and immoral --
I mean, they also sacrificed 17 Polish soldiers' lives -- but the first has
something to say in its defence. If there was a possibility to depose of Saddam
in a decent way, the action would be justified and we should have shrunk from
it because of the doubts stemming from moral relativism.
>
> So what should we do? Most societies become more democratic and more
> pluralistic as the education and the welfare of the people improves, as
> they have better access to the outside world. We should promote this change
> but without force. Put differently, a very famous Pole was very much in
> favor of change in eastern Europe and encouraged it, and played a big role
> in this change, but he was definitely opposed to using force to obtain it
> and he was particularly opposed to the war in Iraq.
Yes, but he was also opposed to the notion "every culture is equivalent".
>
>>
>> Besides, war is as unpredictable with the U.N. blessing as without it.
>
> It is, but at least then you have a recognized and accepted organization
> making the decision, an organization which is much less likely to be
> perceived as being partial to specific interests. Part of the problem in
> Iraq results from a large number of people, especially Iraqis and people in
> the Arab world believing that the US is not in Iraq to help the Iraqi
> people but the help itself to Iraqi oil and to establish itself as a power
> in the region.
And you think they'd not think like that if the UN gave a blessing?
>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I think that war with Iraq was a mistake, but I think you went a
>>>>>> bit too far in the paragraph above. If we have a way to dispose of
>>>>>> some tyrant in a cheap and efficient way, than I see no reason not to
>>>>>> do it.
>>>>>
>>>>> There was no "cheap and efficient way" to dispose of Saddam. In fact,
>>>>> there is hardly ever a cheap and efficient way to dispose of a tyrant,
>>>>> certainly not of those tyrants that *really* deserve the name.
>>>>>
>>>>>> The problem is of finding a way, for sure...
>>>>>
>>>>> In most case, there is no cheap and efficient way, or else there would
>>>>> be no/would not have been tyrrany in Iran, Libya, North Korea,
>>>>> Nazi-Germany, the Soviet Union,...
>>>>
>>>> Given the horrors of the last two, any way would be great.
>>>
>>> Yes, and there was no cheap and easy way. I am sure, many people looked
>>> for
>>
>> Hmm... preventive war in 1938 against Hitler?
>
> Well, certainly it would have been ok to use force to defend Czechoslovakia.
> I have absolutely no problem using force to defend a country being
> attacked. (Similarly, I would not have objected to Saddam being removed in
> the first Gulf War.)
Given the fact that Czechoslovakia was given to Hitler on a silver plate, who'd
fight this war?
>
> But if you are talking about a preventive war against Hitler, you are not
> being honest. There is no such thing: it would have been a war against
> Germany and everyone in Germany would have perceived it that way. Suppose
> the war was successful and some sort of regime was imposed on Germany, we
> would likely have a rerun of 1918/19. The peace and friendship in Europe we
> enjoy today is only possible because after the war the Germans saw Hitler
> for what he was. If Germany would have been defeated in a preventive war,
> Germans would see in Hitler a hero and themselves as victims of French
> aggression. It is hard to see how lasting peace could have resulted from
> that, as they would fear future French aggression. The way history was,
> Germans themselves were glad that Hitler was gone and realized that the
> allies fought a just war against Germany. On this basis, peace was
> possible.
You're right. Some say a better option for Poland to contain Hitler was to form
a defensive alliance with him against the USSR. It has some nasty moral
implications, though. And I don't think he'd honor such alliance for long.
>
> On the other hand, if Germany had won a preventive war, nothing would have
> changed, except that many people (inside and outside of Germany) would
> think that Germany was fighting a just war. For that matter, Hitler would
> probably have become a hero just the same.
>
> Getting rid of Hitler with war was never really an option, I think.
Except maybe for von Stauffenberg's attempt. If he only placed this suitcase
better...
J.M.
> On the Wed, 28 Sep 2005 00:10:33 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>>>
>>> On this side of the border, we see only the negative side of this
>>> organisations.
>>
>> Quite possible, I am not particularly fond of them either. And I would
>> agree with you that they do more harm than good.
>
> In such situation, were I a minister of the German government responsible
> for funding such organizations -- and were sure of my opinion -- I would
> not hesitate to cut the funding. I mean, there are always more
> organizations asking for money than receiving them. It's a waste of
> taxpater's money to fund those which are harmful.
Well, others do not share my opinion. For that matter, I am not even sure if
these organisations receive direct funding or just tax breaks because they
qualify as a charity. But in many cases, money for cultural projects is
distributed not by a government minister based on his whim or personal
preferences but by committees representing all aspects of society.
> The fact it contineously
> happens indicates some level of acceptance to their harmful activity among
> German politicians.
Of course these organisations have some political support, mainly from the
CSU in Bavaria, but also from the conservative branch of the CDU. These
politicians would not consider the activities to be harmful though.
>>
>> Let me rephrase the following: The Arab world is often accused of
>> tolerating morally corrupt societies in the West. If we Arabs stop
>> tolerating them, and sanctions do not work (how are the morally corrupt
>> westeners harmed by them?), when what should we the Arab world do?
>>
>> Why do we have more of a right to force democracy and human rights upon
>> countries like Iran than Iran has the right to force the Sharia on us?
>> Why are western values worth more than conservative Islamic values?
>
> This is moral relativism. We both know that democracy and culture based on
> human rights is better than murdering people.
Of course it is - but more than that, it is practical politics. It is just
as immoral to wage wars to impose one own's "superior" moral views on
others. We don't have the option of snipping our fingers to make every
country free and democratic. We have the option of trying to bring about
this change slowly and peacefully, or we have the option of trying to bring
about this change with force. In that case, we have to accept that others
will also try to bring about changes in our societies by force.
>
> There was a man who wanted to be eaten by another man in Germany. How can
> we impose our moral values on them?
Germany is a single society and makes the rules it lives by. For that
matter, the "cost" of enforcing our morality here is negligible. The cost
of *trying* to bring about freedom and democracy worldwide is not.
>
>>
>> Granted, Saddam was not a conservative Islamic regime, but the arguments
>> are similar. If we go around attempting to force regimes which we
>> consider to be better, more just on other societies, then why should
>> others not try to do the same with us? For that matter, it is very
>> difficult if not impossible to establish a totally different society by
>> force.
>
> That's why I think the war in Iraq was a mistake.
So you've changed your mind? I seem to recall (maybe incorrectly) that
initially you supported the war?
> But I don't think that
> supporting this war means necessarily you're rotten or evil.
I never said that.
> In Poland,
> the support for this war came from a misguided idealism on the part of a
> part of our elites, and a misguided calculation that we can "prove to be
> useful" to America by our, thankfully gone out of politics -- he's not
> even an MP now -- former prime minister Miller. The second motivation is
> very ugly and immoral -- I mean, they also sacrificed 17 Polish soldiers'
> lives -- but the first has something to say in its defence. If there was a
> possibility to depose of Saddam in a decent way, the action would be
> justified and we should have shrunk from it because of the doubts stemming
> from moral relativism.
It might have been justified, but we still would have the problem (and the
responsibility) of establishing a new order in Iraq. Frankly, I think it is
*impossible* for the west to establish any sort of decent government in any
Arab country, simply because the people there do not trust us and hence
they will mistrust any government we might help to establish. A democracy
needs very widespread acceptance of its constitutional order so that it can
live in peace. No constitution drawn up in Iraq under the watchful eyes of
the US will ever enjoy the kind of popular support that it will need in
order for there to be peace. Keep in mind that if even as few as 1% of the
people do not accept a constitution, a country cannot live in peace. We
have seen that in Spain (ETA), UK (IRA) or Germany during the Weimar
Republic.
>
>>
>> So what should we do? Most societies become more democratic and more
>> pluralistic as the education and the welfare of the people improves, as
>> they have better access to the outside world. We should promote this
>> change but without force. Put differently, a very famous Pole was very
>> much in favor of change in eastern Europe and encouraged it, and played a
>> big role in this change, but he was definitely opposed to using force to
>> obtain it and he was particularly opposed to the war in Iraq.
>
> Yes, but he was also opposed to the notion "every culture is equivalent".
I never said that different cultures were equivalent. I just said that if we
claim to have the right to change other societies by force to our liking,
then others will claim that same right. We can only live in peace if we
accept that countries must deal with their internal matters internally.
There should be no exceptions to this rule, other than those exceptions
approved by the SC.
>
>>
>>>
>>> Besides, war is as unpredictable with the U.N. blessing as without it.
>>
>> It is, but at least then you have a recognized and accepted organization
>> making the decision, an organization which is much less likely to be
>> perceived as being partial to specific interests. Part of the problem in
>> Iraq results from a large number of people, especially Iraqis and people
>> in the Arab world believing that the US is not in Iraq to help the Iraqi
>> people but the help itself to Iraqi oil and to establish itself as a
>> power in the region.
>
> And you think they'd not think like that if the UN gave a blessing?
With a UN blessing, it is likely that a larger number of countries would
have been involved. The UN, not the US, would run a post-war Iraq and the
new constitution would be drawn up under UN eyes, not American ones. Would
that have made a big difference? No, probably not. But maybe a small
difference.
In any case, that is not the issue. The UN, particularly, the states in the
SC realized that establishing a peaceful post-war order in Iraq was next to
impossible. Why do you think France and Germany opposed these plans? There
were, of course, some egotistical reasons involved, just as there were
egotistical reasons for the US, UK, Spain and Poland wanting to go to war,
but the main opposition resulted from the fact that there was not enough
reason to go to war and the lack of a good perspective for Iraq after the
war. In other words, this was one of the primary reasons why the SC did not
approve plans for war in Iraq. Hence, the rule "no attack on any country
without SC approval" would indeed have prevented this mess.
>>
>> Well, certainly it would have been ok to use force to defend
>> Czechoslovakia. I have absolutely no problem using force to defend a
>> country being attacked. (Similarly, I would not have objected to Saddam
>> being removed in the first Gulf War.)
>
> Given the fact that Czechoslovakia was given to Hitler on a silver plate,
> who'd fight this war?
Well, we were talking hypothetically. Hypothetically, the UK and France had
the option not to appease Hitler and to say: if you do that, there will be
war.
>
>>
>> But if you are talking about a preventive war against Hitler, you are not
>> being honest. There is no such thing: it would have been a war against
>> Germany and everyone in Germany would have perceived it that way. Suppose
>> the war was successful and some sort of regime was imposed on Germany, we
>> would likely have a rerun of 1918/19. The peace and friendship in Europe
>> we enjoy today is only possible because after the war the Germans saw
>> Hitler for what he was. If Germany would have been defeated in a
>> preventive war, Germans would see in Hitler a hero and themselves as
>> victims of French aggression. It is hard to see how lasting peace could
>> have resulted from that, as they would fear future French aggression. The
>> way history was, Germans themselves were glad that Hitler was gone and
>> realized that the allies fought a just war against Germany. On this
>> basis, peace was possible.
>
> You're right. Some say a better option for Poland to contain Hitler was to
> form a defensive alliance with him against the USSR.
Ugh? Was that really an option? Hitler wanted to swallow Poland in two
bites. First by splitting it with Stalin and then by swallowing the rest...
> It has some nasty
> moral implications, though.
Well, the only positive aspect would have been that most of the Polish
population might have suffered somewhat less. (As you recall, the
Netherlands surrendered almost immediately and instructed its army not to
fight at all). It would not have helped Polish Jews though.
> And I don't think he'd honor such alliance for
> long.
Nope, Poles had the wrong "race" :-(
>
>>
>> On the other hand, if Germany had won a preventive war, nothing would
>> have changed, except that many people (inside and outside of Germany)
>> would think that Germany was fighting a just war. For that matter, Hitler
>> would probably have become a hero just the same.
>>
>> Getting rid of Hitler with war was never really an option, I think.
>
> Except maybe for von Stauffenberg's attempt. If he only placed this
> suitcase better...
Well, his attempt was rather late....
Jan
>
> Roman
>
Roman Werpachowski
>> In such situation, were I a minister of the German government responsible
>> for funding such organizations -- and were sure of my opinion -- I would
>> not hesitate to cut the funding. I mean, there are always more
>> organizations asking for money than receiving them. It's a waste of
>> taxpater's money to fund those which are harmful.
>
> Well, others do not share my opinion. For that matter, I am not even sure if
> these organisations receive direct funding or just tax breaks because they
> qualify as a charity. But in many cases, money for cultural projects is
> distributed not by a government minister based on his whim or personal
> preferences but by committees representing all aspects of society.
>
>> The fact it contineously
>> happens indicates some level of acceptance to their harmful activity among
>> German politicians.
>
> Of course these organisations have some political support, mainly from the
> CSU in Bavaria, but also from the conservative branch of the CDU. These
> politicians would not consider the activities to be harmful though.
It doesn't speak too well about those politicians.
>
>>>
>>> Let me rephrase the following: The Arab world is often accused of
>>> tolerating morally corrupt societies in the West. If we Arabs stop
>>> tolerating them, and sanctions do not work (how are the morally corrupt
>>> westeners harmed by them?), when what should we the Arab world do?
>>>
>>> Why do we have more of a right to force democracy and human rights upon
>>> countries like Iran than Iran has the right to force the Sharia on us?
>>> Why are western values worth more than conservative Islamic values?
>>
>> This is moral relativism. We both know that democracy and culture based on
>> human rights is better than murdering people.
>
> Of course it is - but more than that, it is practical politics. It is just
> as immoral to wage wars to impose one own's "superior" moral views on
> others. We don't have the option of snipping our fingers to make every
> country free and democratic. We have the option of trying to bring about
> this change slowly and peacefully, or we have the option of trying to bring
> about this change with force. In that case, we have to accept that others
> will also try to bring about changes in our societies by force.
But those who use force against us do not do this because they think they
"free" us from any kind of tyranny. They think we are the tyrants.
Anyway, I think that you're right that we cannot change any society against its
wishes. However, if there is an organized opposition with a wide-spread support
inside of the country, which accepts foreign intervention (of course, it's not
the case of Iraq), then the picture changes a little.
>
>
>>
>> There was a man who wanted to be eaten by another man in Germany. How can
>> we impose our moral values on them?
>
> Germany is a single society and makes the rules it lives by. For that
> matter, the "cost" of enforcing our morality here is negligible. The cost
> of *trying* to bring about freedom and democracy worldwide is not.
So is it about moral principles or just the cost? If Iraq was a tiny island on
the Pacific, it would be OK for the West to demolish its society, because the
costs are litle?
>>
>>>
>>> Granted, Saddam was not a conservative Islamic regime, but the arguments
>>> are similar. If we go around attempting to force regimes which we
>>> consider to be better, more just on other societies, then why should
>>> others not try to do the same with us? For that matter, it is very
>>> difficult if not impossible to establish a totally different society by
>>> force.
>>
>> That's why I think the war in Iraq was a mistake.
>
> So you've changed your mind? I seem to recall (maybe incorrectly) that
> initially you supported the war?
Yes, some time ago I've changed my mind. It was a mistake, and a costly one.
You're right, I don't think the new Iraq government will fare well. I hope it
ends just with another Islamic republic, not with a civil war. However, your
examples (Spain, UK) are not good. I think that if the only problem in Iraq was
something like IRA or ETA, people would be much, much happier there than they
are now. Basically, IRA and ETA are small groups of "lightweight terrorists",
trying to make some fuss without harming too many people. The Weimar Republic,
I think it was much more than 1% who did not accept the way things were going
there.
>>
>>>
>>> So what should we do? Most societies become more democratic and more
>>> pluralistic as the education and the welfare of the people improves, as
>>> they have better access to the outside world. We should promote this
>>> change but without force. Put differently, a very famous Pole was very
>>> much in favor of change in eastern Europe and encouraged it, and played a
>>> big role in this change, but he was definitely opposed to using force to
>>> obtain it and he was particularly opposed to the war in Iraq.
>>
>> Yes, but he was also opposed to the notion "every culture is equivalent".
>
> I never said that different cultures were equivalent. I just said that if we
> claim to have the right to change other societies by force to our liking,
> then others will claim that same right. We can only live in peace if we
> accept that countries must deal with their internal matters internally.
> There should be no exceptions to this rule, other than those exceptions
> approved by the SC.
So, for example, was Reagan right when he imposed sanctions against Poland in
1981, for the martial law?
As long as Germany was winning, von Stauffenber saw no reason to kill Hitler.
J.M.
> On the Wed, 28 Sep 2005 10:52:09 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>
>>> In such situation, were I a minister of the German government
>>> responsible for funding such organizations -- and were sure of my
>>> opinion -- I would not hesitate to cut the funding. I mean, there are
>>> always more organizations asking for money than receiving them. It's a
>>> waste of taxpater's money to fund those which are harmful.
>>
>> Well, others do not share my opinion. For that matter, I am not even sure
>> if these organisations receive direct funding or just tax breaks because
>> they qualify as a charity. But in many cases, money for cultural projects
>> is distributed not by a government minister based on his whim or personal
>> preferences but by committees representing all aspects of society.
>>
>>> The fact it contineously
>>> happens indicates some level of acceptance to their harmful activity
>>> among German politicians.
>>
>> Of course these organisations have some political support, mainly from
>> the CSU in Bavaria, but also from the conservative branch of the CDU.
>> These politicians would not consider the activities to be harmful though.
>
> It doesn't speak too well about those politicians.
No, it doesn't, but we're entitled to our fair share of crappy politicians,
just like every other country too ;-) For that matter, I don't consider
these "Steinbach" organisations very helpful, but I don't think they are as
bad as they are perceived in Poland, for example.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> Let me rephrase the following: The Arab world is often accused of
>>>> tolerating morally corrupt societies in the West. If we Arabs stop
>>>> tolerating them, and sanctions do not work (how are the morally corrupt
>>>> westeners harmed by them?), when what should we the Arab world do?
>>>>
>>>> Why do we have more of a right to force democracy and human rights upon
>>>> countries like Iran than Iran has the right to force the Sharia on us?
>>>> Why are western values worth more than conservative Islamic values?
>>>
>>> This is moral relativism. We both know that democracy and culture based
>>> on human rights is better than murdering people.
>>
>> Of course it is - but more than that, it is practical politics. It is
>> just as immoral to wage wars to impose one own's "superior" moral views
>> on others. We don't have the option of snipping our fingers to make every
>> country free and democratic. We have the option of trying to bring about
>> this change slowly and peacefully, or we have the option of trying to
>> bring about this change with force. In that case, we have to accept that
>> others will also try to bring about changes in our societies by force.
>
> But those who use force against us do not do this because they think they
> "free" us from any kind of tyranny. They think we are the tyrants.
What's the difference? They think we have a bad society that needs to be
fixed. It is our "artificial" restriction just to look at tyrants.
>
> Anyway, I think that you're right that we cannot change any society
> against its wishes. However, if there is an organized opposition with a
> wide-spread support inside of the country, which accepts foreign
> intervention (of course, it's not the case of Iraq), then the picture
> changes a little.
Sure, in that case it does. But in that case, getting UN support is easier
as well. And even the internal Shiite opposition in Iraq certainly wanted
to get rid of Saddam, but it is much less clear that they wanted the US and
Poland to do this.
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> There was a man who wanted to be eaten by another man in Germany. How
>>> can we impose our moral values on them?
>>
>> Germany is a single society and makes the rules it lives by. For that
>> matter, the "cost" of enforcing our morality here is negligible. The cost
>> of *trying* to bring about freedom and democracy worldwide is not.
>
> So is it about moral principles or just the cost?
Mostly about moral principles. You always have to choose between different
"moral goods". Not killing innocent civilians in a war and having a
functional society that lives in relative peace is also a "moral good", not
just freedom from tyranny. Ideally, you would want to have both, but
practically, you may have to choose or at least risk loosing one when
gaining the other.
> If Iraq was a tiny
> island on the Pacific, it would be OK for the West to demolish its
> society, because the costs are litle?
No. Although countries like the US prefer may interfering in small countries
because its cost is smaller.
>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Granted, Saddam was not a conservative Islamic regime, but the
>>>> arguments are similar. If we go around attempting to force regimes
>>>> which we consider to be better, more just on other societies, then why
>>>> should others not try to do the same with us? For that matter, it is
>>>> very difficult if not impossible to establish a totally different
>>>> society by force.
>>>
>>> That's why I think the war in Iraq was a mistake.
>>
>> So you've changed your mind? I seem to recall (maybe incorrectly) that
>> initially you supported the war?
>
> Yes, some time ago I've changed my mind. It was a mistake, and a costly
> one.
Ok. Interesting ;-)
Well, of course Spain and the UK are not Iraq. I merely meant to illustrate
that countries with significantly fewer problems than Iraq and with a much
greater consensus in society concerning the constitutional order (i.e.
Spain and the UK) had a very hard time dealing with terrorism for quite
some time (30 years or so) just because a very small minority opposed the
constitutional order. The problems in Iraq are much more serious and Iraq
is in much worse shape than the UK or Spain to deal with these problems.
> I think that if the only problem
> in Iraq was something like IRA or ETA, people would be much, much happier
> there than they are now.
Certainly. That is what I am trying to say.
> Basically, IRA and ETA are small groups of
> "lightweight terrorists", trying to make some fuss without harming too
> many people.
Sure.
> The Weimar Republic, I think it was much more than 1% who did
> not accept the way things were going there.
True, but those willing to use violence to evoke change were probably around
1% initially.
>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> So what should we do? Most societies become more democratic and more
>>>> pluralistic as the education and the welfare of the people improves, as
>>>> they have better access to the outside world. We should promote this
>>>> change but without force. Put differently, a very famous Pole was very
>>>> much in favor of change in eastern Europe and encouraged it, and played
>>>> a big role in this change, but he was definitely opposed to using force
>>>> to obtain it and he was particularly opposed to the war in Iraq.
>>>
>>> Yes, but he was also opposed to the notion "every culture is
>>> equivalent".
>>
>> I never said that different cultures were equivalent. I just said that if
>> we claim to have the right to change other societies by force to our
>> liking, then others will claim that same right. We can only live in peace
>> if we accept that countries must deal with their internal matters
>> internally. There should be no exceptions to this rule, other than those
>> exceptions approved by the SC.
>
> So, for example, was Reagan right when he imposed sanctions against Poland
> in 1981, for the martial law?
Basically yes. I was talking about military measures and war, not economic
matters.
>>>
>>> Except maybe for von Stauffenberg's attempt. If he only placed this
>>> suitcase better...
>>
>> Well, his attempt was rather late....
>
> As long as Germany was winning, von Stauffenber saw no reason to kill
> Hitler.
True, he was not opposed to Hitler out of principle, but because he no
longer thought Hitler was advantageous for himself. He acted out of mostly
egotistical reasons, which is precisely why I object to so many Germans
seeing in him some sort of hero. For that matter, if you really want to
assasinate someone like Hitler for moral reasons, you have to do it
yourself and risk your own life. Shoot him or stay there while the bomb
explodes. Von Stauffenberg failed because of this.
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Sure, in that case it does. But in that case, getting UN support is easier
> as well. And even the internal Shiite opposition in Iraq certainly wanted
> to get rid of Saddam, but it is much less clear that they wanted the US and
> Poland to do this.
Hmm... I'm not a Shiite, but if I were one, I'd very much prefer that foreign
soldiers die while clashing with Saddam's army, than to do it myself. I think
it's not that they didn't want the USA to topple Saddam -- I'd think that most
Iraqis would welcome that -- but they wanted the USA to get the hell out as
soon as they did that.
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> There was a man who wanted to be eaten by another man in Germany. How
>>>> can we impose our moral values on them?
>>>
>>> Germany is a single society and makes the rules it lives by. For that
>>> matter, the "cost" of enforcing our morality here is negligible. The cost
>>> of *trying* to bring about freedom and democracy worldwide is not.
>>
>> So is it about moral principles or just the cost?
>
> Mostly about moral principles. You always have to choose between different
> "moral goods". Not killing innocent civilians in a war and having a
> functional society that lives in relative peace is also a "moral good", not
> just freedom from tyranny. Ideally, you would want to have both, but
> practically, you may have to choose or at least risk loosing one when
> gaining the other.
>
>> If Iraq was a tiny
>> island on the Pacific, it would be OK for the West to demolish its
>> society, because the costs are litle?
>
> No. Although countries like the US prefer may interfering in small countries
> because its cost is smaller.
All countries do.
Depends on what kind of change you're speaking. Remember that Lenin hoped for a
*communist* revolution in Germany in 1920. This would involve much more than 1%.
>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So what should we do? Most societies become more democratic and more
>>>>> pluralistic as the education and the welfare of the people improves, as
>>>>> they have better access to the outside world. We should promote this
>>>>> change but without force. Put differently, a very famous Pole was very
>>>>> much in favor of change in eastern Europe and encouraged it, and played
>>>>> a big role in this change, but he was definitely opposed to using force
>>>>> to obtain it and he was particularly opposed to the war in Iraq.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, but he was also opposed to the notion "every culture is
>>>> equivalent".
>>>
>>> I never said that different cultures were equivalent. I just said that if
>>> we claim to have the right to change other societies by force to our
>>> liking, then others will claim that same right. We can only live in peace
>>> if we accept that countries must deal with their internal matters
>>> internally. There should be no exceptions to this rule, other than those
>>> exceptions approved by the SC.
>>
>> So, for example, was Reagan right when he imposed sanctions against Poland
>> in 1981, for the martial law?
>
> Basically yes. I was talking about military measures and war, not economic
> matters.
But sanctions againt Iraq were very deadly for the ordinary people, too.
>
>>>>
>>>> Except maybe for von Stauffenberg's attempt. If he only placed this
>>>> suitcase better...
>>>
>>> Well, his attempt was rather late....
>>
>> As long as Germany was winning, von Stauffenber saw no reason to kill
>> Hitler.
>
> True, he was not opposed to Hitler out of principle, but because he no
> longer thought Hitler was advantageous for himself. He acted out of mostly
> egotistical reasons, which is precisely why I object to so many Germans
> seeing in him some sort of hero. For that matter, if you really want to
> assasinate someone like Hitler for moral reasons, you have to do it
> yourself and risk your own life. Shoot him or stay there while the bomb
> explodes. Von Stauffenberg failed because of this.
Neither do I consider him a hero. When I was in Kreisau (home of Stauffenberg),
I could not understand why they treat him like one.
J.M.
> On the Wed, 28 Sep 2005 13:30:55 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>
>> Sure, in that case it does. But in that case, getting UN support is
>> easier as well. And even the internal Shiite opposition in Iraq certainly
>> wanted to get rid of Saddam, but it is much less clear that they wanted
>> the US and Poland to do this.
>
> Hmm... I'm not a Shiite, but if I were one, I'd very much prefer that
> foreign soldiers die while clashing with Saddam's army, than to do it
> myself. I think it's not that they didn't want the USA to topple Saddam --
> I'd think that most Iraqis would welcome that -- but they wanted the USA
> to get the hell out as soon as they did that.
Sure, and because most of them realize that this is not viable, they
probably had mixed feelings about the west getting involved at all.
Granted, in 1991 things would have looked differently...
>>>>> There was a man who wanted to be eaten by another man in Germany. How
>>>>> can we impose our moral values on them?
>>>>
>>>> Germany is a single society and makes the rules it lives by. For that
>>>> matter, the "cost" of enforcing our morality here is negligible. The
>>>> cost of *trying* to bring about freedom and democracy worldwide is not.
>>>
>>> So is it about moral principles or just the cost?
>>
>> Mostly about moral principles. You always have to choose between
>> different "moral goods". Not killing innocent civilians in a war and
>> having a functional society that lives in relative peace is also a "moral
>> good", not just freedom from tyranny. Ideally, you would want to have
>> both, but practically, you may have to choose or at least risk loosing
>> one when gaining the other.
>>
>>> If Iraq was a tiny
>>> island on the Pacific, it would be OK for the West to demolish its
>>> society, because the costs are litle?
>>
>> No. Although countries like the US prefer may interfering in small
>> countries because its cost is smaller.
>
> All countries do.
>
True ;-)
True, but probably not as deadly. Furthermore, a "food for oil program" was
in place for precisely that reason. Beyond that, sanctions are unlikely to
result in the type of anarchy we see now.
>>>>> Except maybe for von Stauffenberg's attempt. If he only placed this
>>>>> suitcase better...
>>>>
>>>> Well, his attempt was rather late....
>>>
>>> As long as Germany was winning, von Stauffenber saw no reason to kill
>>> Hitler.
>>
>> True, he was not opposed to Hitler out of principle, but because he no
>> longer thought Hitler was advantageous for himself. He acted out of
>> mostly egotistical reasons, which is precisely why I object to so many
>> Germans seeing in him some sort of hero. For that matter, if you really
>> want to assasinate someone like Hitler for moral reasons, you have to do
>> it yourself and risk your own life. Shoot him or stay there while the
>> bomb explodes. Von Stauffenberg failed because of this.
>
> Neither do I consider him a hero. When I was in Kreisau (home of
> Stauffenberg), I could not understand why they treat him like one.
Of course you do, you are just too nice to say it ;-) So I will: Germans
feel better if they can claim that at least some Germans fought against
Hitler. Actually, the Scholls are a much better example of that. They were
stupid, but sincere and moral.
Jan
>
Roman Werpachowski
> Of course you do, you are just too nice to say it ;-) So I will: Germans
> feel better if they can claim that at least some Germans fought against
> Hitler. Actually, the Scholls are a much better example of that. They were
> stupid, but sincere and moral.
Who were the Scholls? I read about some German clergy which resisted the nazis.
J.M.
> On the Wed, 28 Sep 2005 14:33:09 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Of course you do, you are just too nice to say it ;-) So I will: Germans
>> feel better if they can claim that at least some Germans fought against
>> Hitler. Actually, the Scholls are a much better example of that. They
>> were stupid, but sincere and moral.
>
> Who were the Scholls? I read about some German clergy which resisted the
> nazis.
>
I could explain myself, but someone else already did a nice job of it:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophie_Scholl
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Rose
Sophie Scholl was "stupid" because she took unnecessary risks, which got the
whole group caught.
Jan
J.M.
> On the Wed, 28 Sep 2005 14:33:09 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Of course you do, you are just too nice to say it ;-) So I will: Germans
>> feel better if they can claim that at least some Germans fought against
>> Hitler. Actually, the Scholls are a much better example of that. They
>> were stupid, but sincere and moral.
>
> Who were the Scholls? I read about some German clergy which resisted the
> nazis.
>
Actually, here is some more information, including the text of the leaflets
rosignol
Roman Werpachowski <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
[zap]
> > Only to the point that Poland wants to sacrifice its relations with Germany
> > for the sake of relations with the US. For that matter, it is not a matter
> > of actually sacrificing it -- I just don't think Polish interests should
> > play a larger role in German policy than they do vice versa.
>
> I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in the
> UN
> Security Council.
[snicker]
The only way Germany will ever get a permanent seat in the UNSC is if
France gives up it's seat in favor of a 'European' one.
--
al Qaeda delenda est
Christian Feldhaus
> The only way Germany will ever get a permanent seat in the UNSC is if
> France gives up it's seat in favor of a 'European' one.
Not that having a permanent in such a body is particularly relevant, but
why do you suggest that only one EU member state should give up its seat
for that purpose? ;-)
Christian
J.M.
Who cares, not that the UN has become irrelevant ;-) ?
Nice to have you back, BTW.
Jan
rosignol
m...@privacy.net.invalid (Christian Feldhaus) wrote:
Because the British don't have nearly as much invested in the EU as
France does- there might actually be a debate in France as to if it was
worth doing. In Britain, they'd just say 'bugger that'.
BTW, I hear the EU and UN have agreed with each other that they're in
charge of the Internet now. Has there been much mention of it over
there?
J.M.
> In article <1h3wqst.oqxzf1qh8pyN%m...@privacy.net.invalid>,
> m...@privacy.net.invalid (Christian Feldhaus) wrote:
>
>> rosignol <rosi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > The only way Germany will ever get a permanent seat in the UNSC is if
>> > France gives up it's seat in favor of a 'European' one.
>>
>> Not that having a permanent in such a body is particularly relevant, but
>> why do you suggest that only one EU member state should give up its seat
>> for that purpose? ;-)
>
>
> Because the British don't have nearly as much invested in the EU as
> France does- there might actually be a debate in France as to if it was
> worth doing. In Britain, they'd just say 'bugger that'.
As would France. As long as there is no common EU foreign and defense policy
in place, neither country would give up its seat. If there is such a
policy, maybe with the UK opting out, then your suggestion might work, but
that is not going to happen in the next 20 years at least, now that the
constitution is dead.
>
>
> BTW, I hear the EU and UN have agreed with each other that they're in
> charge of the Internet now. Has there been much mention of it over
> there?
>
Nope. Whose in charge of exactly what? What about the US?
Jan
rosignol
"J.M." <jm...@gmx.de> wrote:
> rosignol schrieb:
[zap]
> >> I'll keep this in mind when Germany finally makes a bid for the seat in
> >> the UN
> >> Security Council.
> >
> >
> > [snicker]
> >
> > The only way Germany will ever get a permanent seat in the UNSC is if
> > France gives up it's seat in favor of a 'European' one.
> >
> Who cares, not that the UN has become irrelevant ;-) ?
The UN? Irrelevant? When did that happen!?!? ;)
> Nice to have you back, BTW.
I missed the discussions here.... you don't get as good of a
cross-section of opinion in blog comment-threads.
J.M.
>
>
> I missed the discussions here.... you don't get as good of a
> cross-section of opinion in blog comment-threads.
>
So why did you run off in the first place ;-) ?
Christian Feldhaus
> BTW, I hear the EU and UN have agreed with each other that they're in
> charge of the Internet now. Has there been much mention of it over
> there?
Was it the Sun or Fox News which reported that? ;-) Guess what you mean
is that the way the Internet has worked so far - with the US and its
government ultimately controlling the rootzone - has been discussed for
quite a while, and will of course be discussed in Tunis again. Both the
EU and the ITU have concerns when it comes to how this control is
shared, or rather not shared, at present. But the EU is not interested
in inheriting the current monopoly. Imagine what wuld happen if each
relevant document had to be translated into 20+ languages <g>.
Christian
Roman Werpachowski
> Nope. Whose in charge of exactly what? What about the US?
It'a about who controls the root DNS servers. It's the only centralized thing
in the Internet infrastructure.
J.M.
> On the Fri, 07 Oct 2005 13:33:40 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Nope. Whose in charge of exactly what? What about the US?
>
> It'a about who controls the root DNS servers. It's the only centralized
> thing in the Internet infrastructure.
>
Yes, I seemed to remember the US controls those and that some folks wanted
to see that changed... So what has happened/is going to happen?
Jan
Christian Feldhaus
> Yes, I seemed to remember the US controls those and that some folks wanted
> to see that changed... So what has happened/is going to happen?
1. Nobody knows.
2. We'll see.
3. Two articles in German:
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/64501
(1 Oct)
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/64654
(6 Oct)
:-)
Christian
Roman Werpachowski
I don't know. Neither do I know what is the reason behind such request.
The USA seems to be doing a fine job with the DNS as it is.
J.M.
> On the Fri, 07 Oct 2005 17:03:55 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
>>
>>> On the Fri, 07 Oct 2005 13:33:40 +0200, J.M. wrote:
>>>> Nope. Whose in charge of exactly what? What about the US?
>>>
>>> It'a about who controls the root DNS servers. It's the only centralized
>>> thing in the Internet infrastructure.
>>>
>> Yes, I seemed to remember the US controls those and that some folks
>> wanted
>> to see that changed... So what has happened/is going to happen?
>
> I don't know. Neither do I know what is the reason behind such request.
> The USA seems to be doing a fine job with the DNS as it is.
I just read the German links Christian posted. It seems countries like Iran,
Brasil and China do not like the US being in charge. Beyond that, it seems
the EU is also supporting change to make everything more "international". I
suppose I don't really see the point of that as long as the US does not
abuse its position...
Jan
>
Claudio
It is a 100% technical issue. I do not understand why change it if it
works fine.
Regards,
--claudio--
rosignol
"J.M." <jm...@gmx.de> wrote:
Run off?
More of a 'wandered off to various blogs for a while' kind of thing...
newsgroups can be kind of insular, it's good to get more perspectives
and information.
rosignol
Claudio <cla...@example.org> wrote:
You don't even need to change it. The DNS servers are directories, they
tell computers what ip address to connect to if you to access a server
in a specified domain.
What the EU/UN types don't seem to realize is that there isn't anything
preventing them from setting up their own root servers and running them
however they please- just as more than one company can publish a
telephone directory, more than one group can run root nameservers. Users
(or, more specifically, the network administrators who set up non-root
nameservers) will decide what set of servers to refer lookups to, just
as is done now.
But these are politicians and bureaucrats we're talking about, and it
looks like they haven't bothered to ask their office sysadmin to explain
how it works. So instead of setting up their own servers, they're trying
to vote themselves ownership of the existing servers, nevermind that the
current owner of those servers is not going to go along with it.
Roman Werpachowski
> You don't even need to change it. The DNS servers are directories, they
> tell computers what ip address to connect to if you to access a server
> in a specified domain.
>
> What the EU/UN types don't seem to realize is that there isn't anything
> preventing them from setting up their own root servers and running them
> however they please- just as more than one company can publish a
> telephone directory, more than one group can run root nameservers. Users
> (or, more specifically, the network administrators who set up non-root
> nameservers) will decide what set of servers to refer lookups to, just
> as is done now.
>
> But these are politicians and bureaucrats we're talking about, and it
> looks like they haven't bothered to ask their office sysadmin to explain
> how it works. So instead of setting up their own servers, they're trying
> to vote themselves ownership of the existing servers, nevermind that the
> current owner of those servers is not going to go along with it.
Well, it's not that simple. The US blocked the introduction of the .xxx
domain for porn. Not that I'm a porn lover, but it upset some people as
an example of Republican moral crusade. Now, the EU can make its own
root servers, but they have to duplicate the domain structure of the
American servers, otherwise we're in the situation of the EU building a
second Internet.
--
"Kiedy widzę kto nam proponuje IV Rzeczpospolitą, to poproszę o piątą"
J.M.
Well, I don't think anyone uses these newsgroup as their only source of
information ;-) Anyhow, nice to have you back
Jan
>
rosignol
Roman Werpachowski <"r o m a nNOSPAM"@theta1.cft.edu.pl> wrote:
[zap]
> Well, it's not that simple. The US blocked the introduction of the .xxx
> domain for porn. Not that I'm a porn lover, but it upset some people as
> an example of Republican moral crusade.
Didn't even make the news here.
> Now, the EU can make its own
> root servers, but they have to duplicate the domain structure of the
> American servers, otherwise we're in the situation of the EU building a
> second Internet.
Hardly- at most, they'd be publishing the internet equivalent of a phone
directory that might not be entirely compatible with the other
directory.
Stegozor
> Well, it's not that simple. The US blocked the introduction of the .xxx
> domain for porn. Not that I'm a porn lover, but it upset some people as
> an example of Republican moral crusade.
Just a side remark: Republicans were against the .xxx extension because
of moral concerns, civil rights groups were against too, because they
feared that it might lead to filtering, and porno site editors were also
against it, for the same reasons. So nobody seems to regret this
extension, and the Republicans were not the only ones to try to block
it. In fact, it was abandoned due to a consensus.
Roman Werpachowski
Aha. As I said, I don't think that arguments for taking the control of
the Internet from the USA hold much water anyway.
rosignol
m...@privacy.net.invalid (Christian Feldhaus) wrote:
> rosignol <rosi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > BTW, I hear the EU and UN have agreed with each other that they're in
> > charge of the Internet now. Has there been much mention of it over
> > there?
>
> Was it the Sun or Fox News which reported that?
Neither. It was mentioned on instapundit.com, and some columnists have
picked up on it.
> ;-) Guess what you mean
> is that the way the Internet has worked so far - with the US and its
> government ultimately controlling the rootzone - has been discussed for
> quite a while, and will of course be discussed in Tunis again. Both the
> EU and the ITU have concerns when it comes to how this control is
> shared, or rather not shared, at present.
They see something important that they have no say in, and they want
access to what they imagine to be a gold-plated feeding trough. Typical
bureaucratic reaction.
I see little benefit to anyone other than EU/UN bureaucrats from letting
them in. If they want to run an internet, they can build their own, and
end users can decide for themselves if they want to connect to it.
> But the EU is not interested
> in inheriting the current monopoly. Imagine what wuld happen if each
> relevant document had to be translated into 20+ languages <g>.
I'm actually not much concerned about the root servers. IMO, it doesn't
matter much how many people publish competing phone directories, so long
as the numbers in them are accurate. What I'm concerned about is the
other part of ICANN job- assigning network address blocks (i.e., ip
addresses). If someone starts assigning ip addresses that are already in
use and configuring the routers accordingly, it'll bugger the network up
but good.
On the upside, I doubt very many people who know what they're doing will
be interested in UN-allocated blocks of ip addresses . Unfortunately,
there are lots and lots of idiots out there, and a lot of them are
politicians.
rosignol
m...@privacy.net.invalid (Christian Feldhaus) wrote:
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/11/16/internet.summit.ap/index.html
[...]
Negotiators from more than 100 countries agreed late Tuesday to leave
the United States in charge of the Internet's addressing system,
averting a U.S.-EU showdown at this week's U.N. technology summit.
[...]
;p
Christian Feldhaus
> If they want to run an internet, they can build their own, and
> end users can decide for themselves if they want to connect to it.
Technically possible ... but two or more "parallel Internets" would not
make too much sense in my opinion.
Christian
Christian Feldhaus
> Negotiators from more than 100 countries agreed late Tuesday to leave
> the United States in charge of the Internet's addressing system,
> averting a U.S.-EU showdown at this week's U.N. technology summit.
>
> [...]
>
> ;p
Fine :-p As I wrote earlier, some consider this US rootzone control to
be a problem, but it would be silly (or worse) to duplicate the current
structure because of that. As long as there is no actual misuse of the
current monopoly, people can live with what we have now. What I did not
know, for example, is what Sabine Dolderer told Deutsche Welle a couple
of days ago: The "connection" between the A-Root in the US and the
twelve other root servers in the world is based on some loose agreement,
not formal contracts.
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1773568,00.html
(text in German, URL provided for reference purposes only <g>)
In other words, if the US government one day misused its position, this
"connection" could break apart anyway. I hope, and actually believe,
that such a case won't come, though.
Christian
TT Arvind
> I'm actually not much concerned about the root servers. IMO, it doesn't
> matter much how many people publish competing phone directories, so long
> as the numbers in them are accurate.
Precisely. The story behind the present frumpus goes back several
years. Within a couple of years of its formation, ICANN managed to
alienate nearly every single national TLD manager in the world. In
2001, national TLDs announced that they were breaking away from the
ICANN process. ICANN ate humble pie and changed the way it operated.
But politicians had scented blood, and at the ITU's 2003 WSIS, one of
the Arab states suggested that the ITU create a new organisation to
control ccTLDs and IP address assignment. This gathered momentum
amongst politicians, until it was dropped earlier today.
And, to be honest, it was never anything more than a bunch of
politicians displaying their ignorance of the internet. Competing root
servers have existed since Eugene Kashpureff, maybe even earlier.
There are still alternate DNS root servers like OpenNIC, and if there
is enough customer demand for it, ISPs will start connecting to them,
since they go to great pains to make their systems compatible with
ICANN.
It's even more ridiculous to say, as some have, that ICANN's monopoly
effectively gives the US the power to cut any country off from the
world by deleting its TLD from the A root. We already have
organisations like ORSN which maintain rootservers to serve as a
fallback in the extremely unlikely event that the US decides to apply
cold-war style policies to the internet. There's no need to create a
separate organisation just for this.
> What I'm concerned about is the
> other part of ICANN job- assigning network address blocks (i.e., ip
> addresses). If someone starts assigning ip addresses that are already in
> use and configuring the routers accordingly, it'll bugger the network up
> but good.
I don't think it'll be a problem for long. Most networks will decide
pretty quickly to which of the two systems they want to belong, and
we'll end up with two competing internets that don't talk well to each
other. I think it's pretty obvious which one most will opt for.
--
Arvind
TT Arvind
Roman Werpachowski wrote:
> Well, it's not that simple. The US blocked the introduction of the .xxx
> domain for porn. Not that I'm a porn lover, but it upset some people as
> an example of Republican moral crusade.
Not quite "blocked" - it's officially only been "delayed" to allow time
for consultation, and it may come through yet. The approved registrar
certainly seems to be getting on with things.
Anyway, this is hardly an argument for getting an intergovernmental
involved. The .xxx incident comes from the fact that the present
process involves *one* government. I shudder to think what would
happen if it involved a hundred.
--
Arvind
TT Arvind
> http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1773568,00.html
> (text in German, URL provided for reference purposes only <g>)
That is an excellent summary of the situation. There has actually been
one case where a country's TLD was cut off for a few days - Libya's -
but that was due to a technical error, and was not deliberate.
--
Arvind
Roman Werpachowski
Sure. As you know, I don't see any problem with the current situation.
--
"[...] Some are born great, some
achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them."
rosignol
"TT Arvind" <ttar...@hotmail.com> wrote:
Whooboy.
Betcha the admin who fat-fingered that one won't be bragging about it on
his resumé. Heh.
TT Arvind
> But politicians had scented blood, and at the ITU's 2003 WSIS, one of
> the Arab states suggested that the ITU create a new organisation to
> control ccTLDs and IP address assignment.
I've since dug through some old notes, and I think it was actually Iran
who proposed this, with the enthusiastic support of China. That does
put something of a different colour on the proposal, doesn't it?
--
Arvind
Roman Werpachowski
I wonder how it happens that the EU, being so sensitive to human rights
violations, allies itself with such country so easily, and on more than
one issue (Galileo comes to mind).
TT Arvind
> I wonder how it happens that the EU, being so sensitive to human rights
> violations, allies itself with such country so easily, and on more than
> one issue (Galileo comes to mind).
Well, on the question of the Internet the EU ultimately allied itself
with the US, much to the disappointment of some other countries.
Galileo is a much more complicated question, where I've not really
understood all the politics.
--
Arvind
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski wrote:
>
>> I wonder how it happens that the EU, being so sensitive to human rights
>> violations, allies itself with such country so easily, and on more than
>> one issue (Galileo comes to mind).
>
> Well, on the question of the Internet the EU ultimately allied itself
> with the US, much to the disappointment of some other countries.
Thank God, otherwise the shame would be too much to bear.
> Galileo is a much more complicated question, where I've not really
> understood all the politics.
Does Europe realize the folly of aiding China in gaining militar
superpower status through development of high-tech, or not?
Roman Werpachowski
> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
> >> Roman Werpachowski schrieb:
> >>
> >>> between the two countries, lying on the bed of the Baltic Sea.
> >>> Construction costs will be at least 6 billion dollars higher than the
> >>> costs of the planned second Yamal pipe (which Germany could take it gas
> >>> from as well), going through Poland. Why do Russia and Germany choose a
> >>> solution which will be more expensive for German customers? From the
> >>> Russia's POV, the answer is clear. With the Baltic pipeline, Russia will
> >>> be able to exert its pressure on Poland by switching off the gas
> >>> supplies, without disrupting the gas deliveries to Germany. What I
> >>> cannot understand is, why Germany, which recently -- in the person of
> >>> president Koehler -- declared that it won't make deals with Russia "over
> >>> Polish heads", picks a more expensive solution just to please Russian
> >>> "energy warmongering". It seems like an outright betrayal of the Polish
> >>> side, in this matter.
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> I am not informed too well on this matter, but from what I have heard,
> >> the Baltic Sea solution is less expensive in the long run, because no
> >> third parties (e.g. Poland) need to be paid for allowing the gas to be
> >> transported across their territory. As far as I can tell, it is just
> >> about money, nothing more and nothing less. Perhaps from a German POV, it
> >> makes more sense to have just a bilateral agreement with one other
> >> country than an agreement requiring the participation of several states,
> >> all wanting to make money in the process. Certainly, as a customer, I
> >> want cheap gas, especially as prices have skyrocketed recently, and I
> >> don't want to pay more just to avoid hurt feelings across the border.
> >
> > Are you also informed than in this deal, Germany is not allowed to re-sell
> > the surplus of the gas?
> >
> No, like I said, I am not informed about the details, so I just posted my
> two cents worth of what I did know. Frankly, I don't really care too much
> about this issue, particularly, Polish sensitivies -- Poland is just
> hypersensitive. (Sorry to say that, but that is the way it looks from this
> side of the border.)
And here we are in 2022.
Who was right about the damn pipeline?
Roman