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Amancio Mccrae
On July 20, 2007, the court granted the United States' motion for leave to file an amicus brief in Albanian Associated Fund, Inc. v. Township of Wayne (D. N.J.), a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) case brought by plaintiffs who are seeking to construct a mosque in the Township. The Township commenced eminent domain proceedings against the Albanian Association Fund's land while its application for a conditional use permit to construct a mosque on that land was pending before the Township's Planning Board. The Township argued on summary judgment that eminent domain proceedings are not covered by RLUIPA. The Division's brief argues that the Townships' commencement of eminent domain proceedings in this case constitutes the implementation of a land use regulation covered by RLUIPA.
A federal court jury in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania found that the defendants had discriminated against an African American couple by lying about the availability of a rental unit. However, the jury declined to award the couple any compensatory damages, even a nominal amount. The judge then refused to let the jury consider whether to grant punitive damages. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and on June 3, 1999, the Civil Rights Division filed an amicus brief arguing that the judge should have allowed the jury to decide whether to award punitive damages. On March 22, 2000, the appellate court reversed the district courts' judgment for the defendants by holding that "in a case alleging discrimination under the Fair Housing Act the discrimination itself is the harm," and directed the district court to enter judgment for the plaintiffs and to hold a new jury trial on whether the plaintiffs should be awarded punitive damages. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 8, 2001.
The plaintiffs, homeowners insurance trade associations, filed a lawsuit on June 26, 2013, alleging HUD violated the Administrative Procedure Act in its February 2013 regulation formalizing that the Fair Housing Act provides for disparate impact liability. On November 7, 2014, the district court denied HUD's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. On September 23, 2015, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's decision and remanded for consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. On remand, the plaintiffs alleged that HUD violated the APA because the regulation impermissibly interprets the FHA to provide for disparate impact claims against insurance underwriting and pricing practices that exceed the contours of disparate impact claims permitted by Inclusive Communities. HUD's opening brief, filed August 30, 2016, and its reply brief, filed October 28, 2016, argued that the plaintiffs misread Inclusive Communities and misconstrue the Rule's requirements.
On November 9, 2000, the United States filed an amicus brief that opposed the legal arguments made by the City of Dallas in its motion for summary judgment. The United States argued that the City violated the Fair Housing Act by improperly denying a reasonable accommodation when it refused to grant the plaintiff a variance to the City's 1000 foot spacing requirement and six person occupancy limit for group homes serving persons with disabilities.
The United States filed two amicus briefs in this case, brought by private plaintiffs. They had claimed that a condominium complex in Anne Arundel County, Maryland violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to be designed and constructed so that it is accessible and usable by persons with disabilities. In the United States' first brief, the Division set forth the standard for determining whether the defendants had violated the accessibility provisions of the Act. In the second brief, which was filed on December 20, 1999, the Division presented the court with our views as to what equitable remedies are appropriate in a case in which the defendants have been found liable for violating the accessibility provisions of the Fair Housing Act. On April 21, 2000, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for both monetary damages and equitable relief. In its opinion, the court found that "affirmative action relief in the form of retrofitting or a retrofitting fund is an appropriate remedy in this case." Accordingly, the court ordered the establishment of a fund of approximately $333,000 to pay for the cost of retrofitting the common areas of the condominium and, with the consent of individual owners, interiors of inaccessible units. Individuals seeking to retrofit their units will be entitled to receive an incentive payment of $3,000 to do so. Although the condominium association was not found liable for the violations, the court ordered it to permit the retrofitting of the common areas. The court will also appoint a special master to oversee the retrofitting project, and retains jurisdiction until all funds have been expended or distributed. If any funds remain unspent, the court noted that "the equitable principles and the purposes" of the Fair Housing will guide the distribution of those funds.
On May 26, 2011, the United States executed a Memorandum of Agreement with Bank of America Corporation resolving the United States' claims that the Bank violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act by failing to lower the interest rate on servicemembers' credit card loans to 6%, or to maintain the reduced interest rate through the entire period of military service, after those servicemembers sent in military orders and requested a reduction in the interest rate between October 2003 and December 2007. Under the agreement, the Bank will provide $86,023 to compensate nine servicemembers whom the Division claimed were victims of the Bank's conduct. The Bank will also make changes to its policies and procedures to ensure that it does not impose fees or interest rates in excess of 6% on servicemembers' credit card loan obligations that originated prior to the period of military service, such as training employees, verifying active duty information with the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center database before raising a servicemember's credit card interest rate above 6%, and designating a telephone number at which servicemembers with questions about SCRA benefits may reach Bank of America representatives.
On November 13, 2009, the en banc Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bloch v. Frischholz (7th Cir.) ordered the partial reinstatement of a Jewish family's FHA suit against a condominium board that repeatedly removed a mezuzah, a small religious object required by the familys' faith, from their door frame. The original panel affirmed the trial court's finding for the defendants in holding that the FHA does not reach post-acquisition discrimination per Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes and that the condo association did not discriminate because it acted under a neutral, though previously unenforced, policy of barring hallway clutter. On January 16, 2009, at the request of the en banc Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States filed an amicus brief arguing that the court should reinstate a Jewish familys' FHA suit against a condominium board that barred them from placing a mezuzah on their door frame. In its brief, the United States argues that the trial court and the panel majority erred in holding that the FHA did not apply to post-acquisition discrimination and that the family presented evidence suggesting that the condominium board changed the enforcement of its rules to bar the familys' mezuzah based on anti-Jewish animus. The en banc decision "effectively overrules Halprin as far as 3617 is concerned" and holds that the "contractual connection between the Blochs and the [Condo] Board distinguishes this case from Halprin" for purposes of 3604(b). As a result, the court found the plaintiffs 'claims of post-acquisition discrimination viable under both FHA provisions and ordered the trial court to determine whether defendants acted with discriminatory intent on remand. As for Section 3604(a), the unanimous court agreed with Halprin in holding that post-acquisition discrimination claims under this provision extend to actual and constructive evictions (and little else) but dismissed this count after finding that the plaintiffs failed to explain their decision to remain on the premises.
On July 11, 2000, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs in Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation (M.D. Tenn.). In this case, plaintiffs allege that defendants' practice of permitting Nissan dealers to set finance charges at their discretion resulted in African-Americans paying higher finance charges, and that these higher charges could not be explained by non-discriminatory factors. In our amicus brief in support of plaintiffs 'opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, we argue that a lender has a non-delegable duty to comply with ECOA, and, thus, is liable under ECOA for discriminatory pricing in loans that it approves and funds. The United States further argue that plaintiffs do not need to prove that defendant was on notice regarding the alleged discrimination, but that, in any case, plaintiffs have offered evidence that defendant was on notice. The court subsequently denied summary judgment for the defendants, and the case is currently on appeal regarding class certification.
On April 28, 2011, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal.), in support of the Congregation's motion for summary judgment in this Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) suit. The statement of interest addresses the standard the court should apply in evaluating the Congregation's RLUIPA Section 2(b)(1) claim, and discusses certain criteria for determining whether a substantial burden exists under RLUIPA Section 2(a). On January 6, 2011, the court issued an order holding that the City's administrative zoning decisions did not preclude the congregation's RLUIPA claims in federal court. The United States had filed a statement of interest on November 1, 2010. In the order, the court quoted the United States' Statement of Interest extensively.
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