Online Cooperation Colloquia Autumn 2025

[Simon Columbus]

Dear colleagues,

We are excited to invite you to the autumn 2025 Cooperation Colloquia, an online colloquium series on interdisciplinary cooperation research. Colloquia will take place every second Friday at 15:00 Central European Time (9:00 New York / 14:00 London / 21:00 Beijing), via Zoom. 

2025-09-12 | Doruk İriş (Sogang University) 
2025-09-26 | Talbot M. Andrews (Cornell University)
2025-10-10 | Setayesh Radkani (MIT)
2025-10-24 | Christian Ruff (University of Zürich)
2025-11-07 | Bianca Beersma (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
2025-11-21 | Kristopher M. Smith (Washington State University)
2025-12-05 | Alex Mesoudi (University of Exeter)

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Our first speaker will be Doruk İriş, who will talk about 'normative expectations of reciprocal negotiators'. Please find the abstract below.

Normative expectations of reciprocal negotiators

Doruk İriş (Sogang University)

This paper develops a theoretical framework to examine how normative expectations--what one considers others should do based on their fairness perceptions--in shaping the behavior of players with reciprocal preferences in a public goods game. Standard reciprocity models typically assume uniform, exogenously determined, and moderate expectations. By contrast, I allow players to (i) vary in how demanding they are of others, (ii) disagree about what counts as fair, and (iii) form self-centered normative expectations endogenously. In noncooperative play, strong reciprocal concerns transform the payoff structure from a material payoff dilemma into a coordination game in utilities, with one exception. In coalition formation, three central results emerge: (i) the empty coalition is always stable, (ii) the grand coalition becomes stable once reciprocal concerns are sufficiently strong, and (iii) partial coalitions can be stable under specific conditions. Exogenous expectations create distinct effects on cooperation: lower expectations facilitate the stability of the grand coalition, whereas higher expectations increase the size of partial coalitions, potentially leading to a majority coalition. This latter finding is more consistent with empirical observation.

We are looking forward to seeing you at the colloquia!

Simon Columbus (University of St Andrews) and Qinyu Xiao (University of Vienna)