Call for Papers - JEBO VSI: Conflict, Distribution, and Efficiency in Bargaining

[Emin Karagozoglu]

Dear All,

We wanted to inform you about the special issue on Conflict, Distribution, and Efficiency in Bargaining that we are co-editing for the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. You can see the Call for Papers text below:

In Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling points out “To study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations.” Since John Nash’s seminal papers in 1950 and 1953, bargaining has always been one of the most popular topics in game theory and economics. With pathbreaking developments in game theory in the 1970s, the strategic approach gained momentum and with rapid progress in experimental economics in the 1980s, behavioral models that deviated from standard assumptions started to offer new insights into bargaining process, delay, and disagreement. More than 40 years ago, Vincent Crawford wrote “… the potential welfare gains from improving the efficiency of bargaining outcomes are enormous, perhaps even greater than those that would result from a better understanding of the effects of macroeconomic policy.” in his piece on disagreement in bargaining. Economists spent a great deal of effort in understanding environments (e.g., rules, procedures, institutions) that yield bargaining outcomes with better efficiency and distributive attributes. Thanks to this effort, the profession has accumulated valuable knowledge and achieved a much better understanding of the bargaining process and outcomes. Nevertheless, we believe that there are still questions that beg for better answers. The co-editors of the special issue believe that closer communication among and collaboration between bargaining scholars who use different methodologies (e.g., theoretical, experimental, and empirical) are absolutely essential to fulfill the potential of the broad “bargaining research” agenda. One of the co-editors of this special issue started the annual Bargaining: Experiments, Empirics, and Theory (BEET) workshops back in 2016 with a similar goal – to encourage interactions between bargaining scholars who use different methods and new approaches to bargaining research. This special issue will be organized around the eighth edition of the BEET workshop, which will be held in Maastricht University on June 3-4, 2024 to take a further step in achieving this goal. Acceptance to / presenting in the workshop is not required to be considered for the special issue. Both workshop participants and non-participants are encouraged to submit high-quality papers dealing with topics related to conflict, distribution, and efficiency in bargaining.

The three keywords in the special issue title i.e., conflict, distribution, and efficiency, hint at topics of interest for the special issue. These topics include but are not restricted to, commitment, threats, ultimatums, asymmetric/incomplete information, uncertainty, communication, entitlements, property rights, reputation-building, outside options, preferences for fairness or equality, delay, disagreement, distributive and procedural justice, institutions, arbitration, mediation, litigation, bargaining procedures/protocols, bargaining mechanism design, war of attrition, time pressure, and emotions that may influence bargaining behavior such as envy, spite or anger.

In line with our motivation, the special issue deliberately aims to have a multi-methodological emphasis. As such we welcome axiomatic, game theoretical (both mainstream and behavioral), empirical, and experimental (lab, field, lab-in-the-field, neuroeconomics experiments, online experiments, quasi-experiments etc.) papers linked to conflict, distribution, and efficiency in bargaining. If you are interested in submitting your paper to the special issue but not sure whether it is a good fit, you are more than welcome to contact one of the special issue editors before submitting.

Submission Open Date: May 1, 2024

Submission Closing Date: March 1, 2025

Papers must be submitted electronically via the Elsevier Editorial System site for the Journal here. To ensure that all manuscripts are correctly identified for inclusion in the special issue, it is important to select "VSI: Bargaining" when you reach the “Article Type” step in the submission process.

All the best,

Special Issue Guest Editors

Emin Karagözoğlu, Bilkent University,  Ankara, Turkey
karag...@bilkent.edu.tr 

Topi Miettinen, Hanken School of Economics, Helsinki Graduate School of Economics,  Helsinki, Finland
topi.mi...@hanken.fi 

Bernardo Silveira, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA

silv...@econ.ucla.edu