417. This twofold nature of man is so evident that some have thought that we
had two souls. A single subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden
variations from unmeasured presumption to a dreadful dejection of heart.
418. It is dangerous to make man see too clearly his equality with the
brutes without showing him his greatness. It is also dangerous to make his
see his greatness too clearly, apart from his vileness. It is still more
dangerous to leave him in ignorance of both. But it is very advantageous to
show him both. Man must not think that he is on a level either with the
brutes or with the angels, nor must he be ignorant of both sides of his
nature; but he must know both.
419. I will not allow man to depend upon himself, or upon another, to the
end that, being without a resting-place and without repose.
420. If he exalt himself, I humble him; if he humble himself, I exalt him;
and I always contradict him, till he understands that he is an
incomprehensible monster.
421. I blame equally those who choose to praise man, those who choose to
blame him, and those who choose to amuse themselves; and I can only approve
of those who seek with lamentation.
422. It is good to be tired and wearied by the vain search after the true
good, that we may stretch out our arms to the Redeemer.
423. Contraries. After having shown the vileness and the greatness of
man.--Let man now know his value. Let him love himself, for there is in him
a nature capable of good; but let him not for this reason love the vileness
which is in him. Let him despise himself, for this capacity is barren; but
let him not therefore despise this natural capacity. Let him hate himself,
let him love himself; he has within him th
105. How difficult it is to submit anything to the judgement of another,
without prejudicing his judgement by the manner in which we submit it! If we
say, "I think it beautiful," "I think it obscure," or the like, we either
entice the imagination into that view, or irritate it to the contrary. It is
better to say nothing; and then the other judges according to what really
is, that is to say, according as it then is and according as the other
circumstances, not of our making, have placed it. But we at least shall have
added nothing, unless it be that silence also produces an effect, according
to the turn and the interpretation which the other will be disposed to give
it, or as he will guess it from gestures or countenance, or from the tone of
the voice, if he is a physiognomist. So difficult is it not to upset a
judgement from its natural place, or, rather, so rarely is it firm and
stable!
106. By knowing each man's ruling passion, we are sure of pleasing him; and
yet each has his fancies, opposed to his true good, in the very idea
234. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on
religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an
uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at all, for
nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in religion than there
is as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is not certain that we may see
to-morrow, and it is certainly possible that we may not, see it. We cannot
say as much about religion. It is not certain that it is; but who will
venture to say that it is certainly possible that it is not? Now when we
work for to-morrow, and so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we
ought to work for an uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which
was demonstrated above.
Saint Augustine has seen that we work for an uncertainty, on sea, in
John 7:40. Dispute among the Jews as among the Christians of to-day. Some
believed in Jesus Christ; others believed Him not, because of the prophecies
which said that He should be born in Bethlehem. They should have considered
more carefully whether He was not. For His miracles being convincing, they
should have been quite sure of these supposed contradictions of His teaching
to Scripture; and this obscurity did not excuse, but blinded them. Thus
those who refuse to believe in the miracles in the present day on account of
a supposed contradiction, which is unreal, are not excused.
The Pharisees said to the people, who believed in Him, because of His
miracles: "This people who knoweth not the law are cursed. But have any of
the rulers or of the Pharisees believed in him? For we know that out of
Galilee ariseth no prophet." Nicodemus answered: "Doth our law judge any man
before it hear him, and specially such a man who works such miracles"?
830.
381. When we are too young, we do not judge well; so, also, when we are too
old. If we do not think enough, or if we think too much on any matter, we
get obstinate and infatuated with it. If one considers one's work
immediately after having done it, one is entirely prepossessed in its
favour; by delaying too long, one can no longer enter into the spirit of it.
So with pictures seen from too far or too near; there is but one exact point
which is the true place wherefrom to look at them: the rest are too near,
too far, too high or too low. Perspective determines that point in the art
of painting. But who shall determine it in truth and morality?
382. When all is equally agitated, nothing appears to be agitated, as in a
ship. When all tend to debauchery, none appears to do so. He who stops draws
attention to the excess of others, like a fixed point.
383. The licentious tell men of orderly lives that they stray from nature's
path, while they themselves follow it; as people in a ship think those move
who are on the shore. On all sides the language is similar. We must have a
fixed point in order to judge. The harbour decides for those who are in a
ship; but where shall we find a harbour in morality?
384. Contradiction is a bad sign of truth; several things which are certain
are contradicted; several things which are false pass without contradiction.
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the want of contradiction a sign
of truth.
385. Scepticism.--Each thing here is partly true and partly false. Essential
truth is not so; it is altogether pure and altogether true. This mixture
dishonours and annihilates it. Nothing i
God must reign over all, and all men must be brought back to Him. In things
of the flesh lust reigns specially; in intellectual matters, inquiry
specially; in wisdom, pride specially. Not that a man cannot boast of wealth
or knowledge, but it is not the place for pride; for in granting to a man
that he is learned, it is easy to convince him that he is wrong to be proud.
The proper place for pride is in wisdom, for it cannot be granted to a man
that he has made himself wise, and that he is wrong to be proud; for that is
right. Now God alone gives wisdom, and that is why Qui gloriatur, in Domino
glorietur.74
461. The three lusts have made three sects; and the philosophers have done
no other thing than follow one of the three lusts.
462. Search for the true good.--Ordinary men place the good in fortune and
external goods, or at least in amusement. Philosophers have shown the vanity
of all this and have placed it where they could.
463. Philosophers.--They believe that God alone is worthy to be loved and
admired; and they have desired to be loved and admired of men and do not
know their own corruption. If they feel full of feelings of love and
admiration and find therein their chief delight, very well, let them think
themselves good. But if they find themselves averse to Him, if they have no
inclination but the desire to establish themselves in the esteem of men, and
if their whole perfection consists only