Desert Storm Trainer

[Anjali Reyome]

TheArmy Long Range Training Plan (ALRTP), publishedin July 1989, provided Army planners with broad guidance fortraining the Total Army for the next thirty years. The ALRTP madeeducated assumptions regarding future doctrine, force structure, weaponssystems, and the training environment. In response to the ALRTP, Army trainingdevelopers considered a series of training strategies. One ofthese strategies, distributed training, would cut costs by using technology toexport training from resident schools to units and individuals. Creation offuture training sites would require evaluation of both firing range andmaneuver area needs for new weapons systems and effective employment oftraining aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).

Late in FY 88 the Army leadership began development of a comprehensive training strategy called the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). It will link near-term with long-term strategies for heavy, light, aviation, special operations, and support forces and the reserve components. The concept anticipates that Army training eventually will be based on devices rather than supported by them. Training will decrease at institutions and increase at home stations, while telecommunications technology will allow the linkage of institutions, combat training centers, and home stations. CATS envisions that commanders will readjust their available resources in order to bring their commands to required training standards. In FY 91 the Army continued development of the CATS concept and solicited comment from Army commanders.

Resources for CATS included training ammunition and operating tempo (OPTEMPO). In FY 86 the Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) produced Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training. This publication provided models for estimating training ammunition needs, but units continued to request more ammunition than they used. Planners then combined historical expenditure data with STRAC models to reduce overestimates. FY 90 and 91 training ammunition requests were computed at 110 percent of historical expenditures for tank, Bradley, artillery, and mortar systems and at 105 percent for all other systems. This resulted in a $200 million per year cost reduction.

Despite pressures to reduce budgets, the Army leadership succeeded in maintaining the level of OPTEMPO it felt was necessary to maintain combat readiness. OPTEMPO refers to the number of operating miles per year for major ground equipment and flying hours per month for aircraft. Training OPTEMPOs for active and reserve component units were prioritized. This was based upon the Department of the Army Master Priority List to ensure that those units most likely to enter hostilities early would have attained a higher level of readiness. During FY 90 and 91 allowances for ground OPTEMPO for the active component, Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve (USAR) averaged 800, 288, and 200 miles per year, respectively. Air OPTEMPO figures for each were 14.5, 9.0, and 8.1 hours per month.

Copies of Field Manual 25-101, Battle FocusedTraining, which complements Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, weredistributed to divisions and TRADOC schools in FY 90. Training theForce defined the process for training management, while BattleFocused Training provided guidance for implementing training at battalion and lowerechelons. Field Manual 25-101 emphasized the importance of identifyingmission-essential tasks, the relationship of individual and unit tasks,and the need for realistic training for battle. The Chief of Staffurged all officers and NCOs to apply the principles of Field Manual 25-101 intheir training programs.

The Army has founded its leader development program upon three pillars-formal education or institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Its Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) consists of the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC), the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), the Sergeants Major Course, and various functional courses. Prior to FY 90, promotion to staff sergeant required attendance at PLDC; promotion to master sergeant required successful completion of ANCOC; and graduation from the sergeants major course was mandatory for promotion to command sergeant major. Effective 1 October 1989 soldiers had to complete PLDC for promotion to sergeant. After 1 October 1990, BNCOC was mandatory for promotion to sergeant first class.

In FY 90 the Army's Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) was implemented in selected Army schools for both senior NCOs and officers. To assist individual self-development programs, LADP utilized observations by the soldier, classmates, and faculty regarding a soldier's leadership potential. The emphasis upon self-development has resulted in replacement of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) for enlist-

ed personnel by the Self-Development Test (SDT). TheSQT concentrated upon military occupational specialities (MOSs),whereas the SDT combines MOS questions with others on training and leadership.The Chief of Staff authorized SDT in July 1990, and its initialuse was scheduled to begin in the active component in October 1991. Forthe first two years, SDT results will be released only to the persons whotake the test.

In recent years the Army has adopted a comprehensive physical fitness program. All Army personnel must meet body weight standards and pass the semiannual Army Physical Fitness Test. The Army Physical Fitness School, located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, developed doctrine on physical fitness and performance. In 1990 the VANGUARD Task Force recommended elimination of the school and transfer of its functions to the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In FY 91 HQDA decided to reduce the school's functions and move it to Fort Benning, Georgia, in FY 92. The Master Fitness Trainer Course, an on campus program of the school that taught senior NCOs and officers to advise commanders on their units' physical training, will be discontinued in FY 92. It has been replaced by the institution of physical fitness courses in the Army's leadership schools and the use of mobile training teams that conduct on-site physical fitness instruction for both active and reserve components' units. The Army has a sequential institutional officer education system that consists of the Officer Basic Course, the Officer Advanced Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff Officer Course, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Army War College. It also participates in the Joint Professional Military Education program. Military Qualification Standards (MQSs) is the Army's evolving officer leader development system that is based on common tasks and professional knowledge. MQS I encompasses precommissioning training, MQS II applies to company grade, and MQS III covers field grade officers. MQS I and II are centered on common and branch manuals. The MQS I manual was revised and distributed in 1990, and the MQS II manual was released in FY 91. Officers will be tested periodically on MQS I and II subjects. A draft of the MQS III manual, which emphasized broad areas of knowledge and self-development, was circulated for review and comment in FY 91.

Army officials expressed serious concern in 1991 that Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM created substantial backlogs in attendance at the leader development schools. The Chief of Staff remarked that "there will be no constructive credit given for experience in DESERT STORM- by itself, combat cannot substitute for the comprehensive development achieved in the Army's educational system." BNCOC, ANCOC, and the Sergeants Major Course were expected to underfill by 35 to 45 percent, 25 to 35 percent, and 9 percent, respectively, in FY 91. A one-time exemption

was granted for soldiers eligible for promotion to sergeant first class and master sergeant who were unable to attend BNCOC/ANCOC because of participation in the Persian Gulf war. Officer Basic Courses were not adversely affected by the war, but Officer Advanced Courses were. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School was running near minimum fill in early FY 91, but Command and General Staff College selectees who served in the Persian Gulf obtained priority status for the next academic yea r. School officials anticipated a period of one to two years to eliminate the attendance backlogs. During FY 90-91 the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) initiated two major self-development programs targeted at the NCO. These programs were Read-to-Lead, designed to help NCOs achieve the Army's reading standards, and the NCO Leader Education and Development (NCO LEAD) initiative, intended to improve soldiers' academic competencies. Thousands of soldiers assigned to Saudi Arabia and Ku wait received ACES services. The ACES staff worked sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and provided both traditional classroom instruction and nontraditional options. This instruction included language and cultural programs operated by the Defense Language Institute (DLI).

Readiness for the complexities of contemporary warfarerequires frequent unit training under conditions similar to combat.Effective unit training employs both field maneuvers and deploymentexercises supplemented by battlefield simulations. The increasing speed andlethality of weapons systems created in recent years called forlarge maneuver areas which home stations could not provide. By 1987 theArmy formulated its Combat Training Centers (CTCs) program which consistedof three instrumented tactical field sites and a wargamingprogram. The four CTCs are the National Training Center (NTC), the JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC), the Combat Maneuver Training Center(CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

Opened at Fort Irwin, California, in 1981, the NTC hasconcentrated on training heavy battalion/brigade forces under mid-to high-intensity conditions. In FY 90 twelve of fourteen scheduled unitrotations were accomplished. This included three heavy/lightrotations. Rotation 90-8 served as the NTC's first contingency operations(CONOPS) rotation involving elements of the 7th Infantry Division(Light), the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 75th Ranger Regiment, andthe 5th Special Operations Forces Group. In FY 91 Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM reduced twelve scheduled rotations at the NTC to five.

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