Cvss Calculator V3
Alma Wass
- When evaluating Availability impacts for DoS that require sustained traffic, use the 1k Reference Architecture. The number of requests must be fewer than the "test request per seconds rates" and cause 10+ seconds of user-perceivable unavailability to rate the impact as A:H.
- The initial time to remediate is based on the SLAs in our handbook. A vulnerabilities due date is assigned by automation when imported into GitLab, and can change over time based on a number of factors.
Accuracy and consistency of these scores is important. At any time when deciding on a score do not hesitate to ask for advice in the Bug Bounty Council issue or by reaching out to team members by any way you see fit. All CVSS & bounty amounts are peer reviewed as described in our HackerOne Process runbook.
CVSS is owned by FIRST and used by permission. This calculator is based on the FIRST CVSS user guide, especially the Scoring Rubrics section. Remember, in particular, to "constrain impacts to a reasonable final impact which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve".
not a question, just an attempt to save other ppl some time. We had the need of calculating the score of CVSS3.1 Vector strings. We first used an external python script but that comes with a cost. Hence I decided to implement a cvss calculator in SPL.
Members of the medical device cybersecurity ecosystem have developed calculators to facilitate using the rubric. Some of the tools are desktop applications, such as spreadsheet based calculators, and others are web-based. The desktop calculators are available in the CVSS Rubric Tools GitHub repo and links to the web-based calculators are listed below.
CVSS 3.1 calculator is designed to help you evaluate the severity of security vulnerabilities with precision. It follows the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 3.1 standards, which is a free and open standard owned and managed by FIRST.org . Based on the metric values you enter, the CVSS calculator applies the formula specified in the CVSS version 3.1 standard to produce scores.
For example, vulnerability submissions resulting in potential revenue losses can be highly contextual, especially in situations where there is no direct financial gain for the attackers (e.g., bypassing a payment wall). Similarly, a vulnerability in highly sensitive or exposed business components may have some indirect consequences, such as reputational damage. Companies may decide to reclassify a vulnerability when contextual mitigating or escalating factors arise. Whenever a business impact modifier is evoked, this will be clearly and transparently communicated towards the researcher. A business impact modifier can only downgrade the severity score as calculated by the CVSSv3 calculator by maximum one category, but can upgrade the score to any category.
Intigriti strives to provide seamless communication and cooperation between companies and security researchers. In the event of any disputes regarding the outcome of a vulnerability report, the Intigriti mediation team will examine the situation from a neutral point of view and provide advice if needed.
The severity of a vulnerability is calculated by using the CVSS v3 calculator. Intigriti uses the base metrics to calculate the CVSS v3 score. The critical to exceptional category is reserved for exceptional issues that reflect a CVSS v3 score of 9.5 - 10.0.
This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the Base score) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable component.
A vulnerability exploitable with adjacent network access means the vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, however the attack is limited to the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11), or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, and cannot be performed across an OSI layer 3 boundary (e.g., a router).
A vulnerability exploitable with Local access means that the vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack, and the attacker's path is via read/write/execute capabilities. In some cases, the attacker may be logged in locally in order to exploit the vulnerability, otherwise, she may rely on User Interaction to execute a malicious file.
An example of such an attack is a cold boot attack which allows an attacker to access to disk encryption keys after gaining physical access to the system, or peripheral attacks such as Firewire/USB Direct Memory Access attacks.
This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist to exploit the vulnerability. Such conditions may require the collection of more information about the target, the presence of certain system configuration settings, or computational exceptions.
A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected. 2
For example, a successful attack may depend on an attacker overcoming any of the following conditions:
- The attacker must conduct target-specific reconnaissance. For example, on target configuration settings, sequence numbers, shared secrets, etc.
- The attacker must prepare the target environment to improve exploit reliability. For example, repeated exploitation to win a race condition, or overcoming advanced exploit mitigation techniques.
- The attacker must inject herself into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim in order to read and/or modify network communications (e.g. man in the middle attack).
The attacker is authorized with (i.e. requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
This metric captures the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner. This metric value is greatest when no user interaction is required.
NOTE: We consider every action a separate user must take as user interaction, even if it is just visiting a link or performing an action within the application. An exception can be made for situations in which the attack is automatically triggered within a common user flow (for example: "wormable" stored XSS on the front page) or in a feed or component that is part of the core business case (for example: CSRF by opening an e-mail in an e-mail client). Exceptions are made at the discretion of the program owner.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited. For example, a successful exploit may only be possible during the installation of an application by a system administrator.
NOTE: We consider the scope as changed if the new scope is also indirectly covered by the bug bounty program (for example: if you can leverage a vulnerability in the application layer to gain control over the network layer). We only consider scope changes that result in a higher authorization level for the attacker (e.g., from the web application to the local file system or network, but not from the web application to the browser).
An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the authorization privileges intended by the vulnerable component. In this case the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different.
This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is constrained. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is constrained. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.
This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the impacted component, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted component itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of an impacted component.
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