If Time Can Heal, Why Pay the “COIN” Now
In their October 1, 2008 Small Wars Journal Op-Ed, Crusader
Mentality; A response to Andrew Bacevich, Matthew E. Valkovic and
Brian M Burton, misidentify the benefits of counterinsurgency training
that Bacevich opposes. Valkovic, M. and Burton, B. argue that contrary
to Bacevich's belief, the Army is still a force to be reckoned with in
conventional combat fighting even though force-on-force maneuver
training is no longer the sole focus of basic training, as a
considerable portion of the time is now devoted to counterinsurgency
(COIN) training. It is difficult to comprehend the possibility that
the Army will be equally prepared for it's conventional force-on-force
role when the time spent on such training is significantly reduced.
Valkovic, M. and Burton, B. further assert that counterinsurgency is
necessary to more effectively prosecute the wars of today, yet fail to
recognize the truth that an Army equipped with the skills to perform
counterinsurgency and stability operations will be called upon to
utilize those skills, furthering the longevity of “small wars” that
are highly questionable for America to be involved in at all. Rather
than overextend and overwhelm our soldiers in the expectation for them
to learn and perform duties that are not part of their job
description, it is far wiser to reconsider America's foreign policy,
and remove ourselves from our self-proclaimed role of “savior of
world.”
Valkovic, M. and Burton, B. (2008) insist that while military
training has now expanded to what is termed as “full spectrum
operations” with the inclusion of COIN training in addition to the
conventional warfare maneuver training, that “...[the] Army... is
still very much a force concerned with its conventional combat role.”
Yet as Bacevich, A. points out in his 2009 book, Limits of Power, the
military is expecting “Wherever possible, the warrior will [be]...
functioning as diplomat, mediator, and relief worker.” (p. 134) It
stands to reason that soldiers who are required to perform such a
broad range of different skills will become essentially, “jacks-of-all-
trades,” and masters of none. It is an outlandish assumption that it
is possible for each soldier to become proficient at all of these
skills and transition easily from an irregular warfare role to a
conventional combat role, without something to be left lacking. And
indeed, what is left lacking is “conventional-warfare capabilities
that are already eroding,” which even officer corps have lamented, as
Bacevich provides in his October 2008 essay, The Petraeus Doctrine.
Valkovic, M. and Burton, B. (2008) then continue to admonish Bacevich
for undermining the supposed importance of counterinsurgency which
they believe is necessary to preserve U. S. national security, to
which they ask “ When did striving to fight America's current wars
better become the wrong thing to do?” It can be empathetically agreed
that striving to fight and win our wars more effectively is a desired
objective, yet asking our troops to engage in COIN operations does not
achieve this purpose. Contrary to overly optimistic belief that
practicing irregular warfare techniques will establish self-
sufficiency and effective governance in the countries we have invaded,
it is far more likely that in the pursuit of these ends, by these
means, there will be a resulting dependance of these countries on our
military as these states continue to fail in rebuilding their
societies by themselves while the U.S. continues to meddle, thereby
extending the persistent presence of the U.S. troops. Valkovic, M.
and Burton, B. also criticize Bacevich for offering no alternative
solutions to America's predicament, and demand “Is America suppose
to... act like the past seven years never happened? ...[and] go back
to preparing for conventional wars... rather than the irregular ones
it actually is fighting?” The answer here is undeniably a no, yet the
lessons we should take from the war to date in order to determine the
future course of the Long War should not result in charging our
soldiers with the enormous responsibility of nation-building. Such a
course will only further drive America down it's path of enduring
frequent, perpetual small wars as a normal part of our nation's
culture as “war in this context implies not only coercion but also
social engineering.” (Bacevich, A. 2008, October)
According to Bacevich, (2009) “America doesn't need a bigger army.
It needs a smaller—foreign policy, one that assigns soldiers missions
that are consistent with their capabilities.” (p. 169) Therein lies
Bacevich's proposed solution to America's current predicament.
American government must reassess it's self-appointed stature of “sole
superpower” bearing on the impossible responsibility of enlightening
the rest of the world in our theories related to freedom, politics and
religion. To continue trekking across the globe with military troops
destroying pathways before us, creating so-called preventative small
wars in the name of peace, upon nations that have little desire for
our presence, will “invite inevitable overextension, bankruptcy, and
ruin.” (Bacevich, A. 2009, p. 169) The needed change should not be
occurring within the military troops who are seeking to evolve in
their roles as pawns in this political agenda, having resigned
themselves to the fate of fighting many more Iraqs and Afghanistans.
“The antidote... is not to try harder but to think
differently.” (Bacevich, A. 2009, p. 188) Bacevich's proposed,
alternative solution is a strategy of containment. Rather than waging
in the Long war with no end in sight, with no apparent achievable
goal, and developing strategies to accommodate the fight of a
senseless war, it would seem glaringly apparent that the obvious
answer is not to wage in this war. Implementing the use of containment
rather than transformation will reserve our resources of military
power, substantially curtail the necessity of fiscal spending in this
defense, and ultimately buy America the time to set itself right.
“Time is our ally. With time, our adversary will wither and die—unless
through our own folly we choose to destroy ourselves
first.” (Bacevich, A. 2009, March 02)
References:
Bacevich, A. (2009) The Limits of Power: The End of American
Exceptionalism
Bacevich, A. (2009, March 02) Raising Jihad. National Interest online.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20932
Bacevich, A. (2008, October) The Petraeus Doctrine. The Atlantic.
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine
Valkovic, M. and Burton, B. (2008, October 01) Crusader Mentality: A
Response to Andrew Bacevich. Small Wars Journal Op-Ed.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/crusader-mentality/