Justifying History Doesn’t Make It Right: A Refutation of “Truman Made
a Tough Call”
“Hiroshima Bombing Anniversary: Truman made a tough call—but the
right one,” editorial from the Las Vegas Review Journal is justifying
atomic warfare. Its anonymity could be a patriot, now-civilian
expressing allegiance about the tragic historical circumstance. The
rationale that the atomic bombs saved lives cannot be known and
remains conjecture. By stating that the Japanese had not surrendered
legitimizes the escalation from firebombing to atomic weapons. Cost-
benefit analysis of human life accepts minimal collateral damage. But
a higher casualty estimate can consider jerrybuilt or expensive
proposals. In the process it has advanced the technology of warfare,
making defense an industry for investment and slaughter. Goldhagen’s
five principles of eliminationism do not indict Truman guilty.
Imperialism, the plague-like colonizer is what needs to be eliminated.
Goldhagen and the survivors of the Holocaust and atomic warfare are
reminders that wrong choices have occurred and conflict resolution was
under utilized. By acting out of fear, the full capabilities of human
intellect and will are decommissioned by clumsy primal reactions.
Humans have the capacity of conflict resolution by shifting from
defensive postures and leaving cynicism behind.
“Millions more Japanese would have died,” “deaths of hundreds of
thousands more,” “Our casualties would have been higher,” “despite
losing many more lives” and “millions more Americans and Japanese”
focuses on body count alone as the main reason for the world’s first
deployment of atomic weapons. The repetition of one justification is
insistent and almost obliterates further inquiry. The firebombing of
67 Japanese cities over three years produced an estimated 500,000
deaths, with 240,000 additional deaths after both atomics had dropped.
2,700,000 Japanese and 418,500 American deaths totaled when it was
over. The proposed Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu
originally had casualty projections from General MacArthur of 13,742
American deaths was never relayed to his Commander-in-chief by Henry
Stimson, Secretary of War. At Truman’s request, former President
Hoover provided a memo circulated by Stimson, stating that the
invasion of Japan would cost 500,000 to one million American lives.
The estimates based on unofficial and dubious intelligence briefings
between Hoover and Pentagon officers under Major General Clayton
Bissell. In April 1945, Allen Dulles and the Office of Strategic
Services were in Switzerland with Japanese military officials using
secret channels to secure peace for Japan. The Under Secretary of the
Navy, Ralph Bard believed, “That the Japanese were ready for peace. In
my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the
atom bomb.” General Douglas MacArthur was aware that, “The war might
have ended weeks earlier if the United States had agreed, as it later
did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.”
Truman’s opposition to advice from Eisenhower, Einstein, Leahy and
others, indicates something other than “the way to end the war”
justification. Stimson is regarded as the prime influence upon
Truman’s “tough call” as a display of power to Stalin and other
nations. Inflating the casualty projections would justify the $2
million cost of the Manhattan Project. Little Boy and Fat Man begat
nuclear proliferation as others soon after secured their own
superpower status weapon. This may serve as an example of the threat
behaviors of learned aggression and mimicry. “Eliminationism is
initiated by one political leader or a small group of leaders,” from
Goldhagen’s Ending Our Age of Suffering is applicable as an example of
the enormous power of influence of a dogmatic few over civilization.
Human evolution is not over. The ancient battle cry that proclaims
killing in the name of god and country is vestigial tribalism. Harvard
biologist Edward O. Wilson believes that a step toward ending war is
to reject fatalism, in ourselves and in our political leaders and that
group aggression can be altered and even disappear. Primates observed
by Stanford neuroendocrinologist Robert Sapolsky, to study stress also
clarified the mechanisms of aggression. After an anomalous
tuberculosis event killed off aggro male members of a Kenyan baboon
troop, aggression and conflict ceased, allowing a more harmonious
legacy. Fight or flight threat assessments are instant choices of the
ancient limbic system of the brain. Self-preservation is primary.
Empathy and judgment involve secondary complex cortical activity. Fear
and stress induced defensiveness need to diminish their dominance over
the social constructs of nation/states. World wars offer a poor
history of conflict resolution. Solution without slaughter can become
a primary objective. “65 Years after Hiroshima,” the editorial from
the Asahi Shimbun suggests progress, idealism and patient optimism
towards a world without nuclear weapons. As much history should not be
repeated, any steps to reduce eliminationism offer humans a worthy
evolutionary goal. In 1954, Einstein told Linus Pauling, “I made one
great mistake in my life when I signed the letter to President
Roosevelt recommending that atom bombs be made.” Even Robert McNamara,
former Secretary of Defense for President Kennedy and Johnson in the
documentary, The Fog of War said, “Belief and seeing, they’re both
often wrong.” Imperialist exploitation has been the modus operandi.
Behavior modification occurs by replacing repetitive noxious habits
with preferred action. The human brain holds an enormous capacity for
memory and learns from mistakes is analogous to “those that don’t know
their history are doomed to repeat their past.”
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