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The Capturing of Al Gezira State by The Rapid Support Forces Militia: Escalation of War in Sudan
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
Al-Gezira State, situated south of Khartoum, was the target of an assault by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) early in the morning of December 15, 2023. RSF advanced from the east and attacked Wad Madani, the state capital.
In recent weeks, the militia has been extending its forces southward as the two sides in the battle of Khartoum appear to have given up hope of concluding a victory there. After eight months of battle, Sudan's capital, Khartoum, became a veritable ghost town as the RSF controls the streets and neighborhoods and the Sudanese Army Forces (SAF) hid in the camps they still controlled. Residents of Khartoum were divided into two groups: those who fled the city and never returned, and those who are still trapped inside the militia's siege, powerless to escape.
Gezira State and its capital, Wad Madani, are currently sheltering hundreds of thousands of displaced people who were displaced from their homes in Khartoum since the outbreak of war and the major influx of displacement that comprised more than two-thirds of the capital's population of nearly eight million people. This was primarily owing to its proximity to Khartoum, as it is only 186 kilometers southeast of the capital. It is also the country's second largest metropolitan center after Khartoum, given to its access to a network of paved roads that connects it to most other regions of the country, the most important of which being the main highway that connects Madani to the national port of PortSudan via the cities of Gedaref and Kassala with a 950 kilometers length. Its network of paved roads also extends south and west to Sennar, Kosti, and Al-Obeid. The presence of several industrial activities, particularly in the food industry, has contributed to the state's service network and infrastructure being comparatively adequate. Notably, the Gezira Scheme, the largest agricultural scheme in Sudan and the largest flow-through irrigation project globally, has been situated in this state for an extended period of time. At present, Madani accommodates the greatest number of sanctuaries designated for displaced individuals in Sudan.
Gezira State and its capital, Wad Madani, have been the main hub for most local and international humanitarian relief efforts. For example, after the militia invaded Khartoum, the childhood immunizations and vaccines were transported and stored in Wad Madani. The RSF's storming of Wad Madani will directly hinder the routine immunization of 1.4 million infants under the age of one, as well as a vaccination program aimed at immunizing 15.5 million youngsters against German measles that is currently spreading throughout the country. Furthermore, the majority of specialized treatment centers, including the National Center for Oncology, the Center for Surgery and Treatment of Cardiac Diseases, the National Center for Gastrointestinal Bleeding, and others, relocated to Wad Madani and Gezira State.
All of this was for naught after the militia attack on Wad Madani!
Also, after the militia occupied the stores of the National Medical Supplies Fund in Khartoum, "Wad Madani" became the primary center for storage and supply of medicines for the rest of the country, particularly for medicines that require refrigerated storage such as insulin for diabetics and oxytocin, which is used to facilitate difficult births and control postpartum hemorrhage.
Ever since word got out about the attack on Wad Madani, its residents and those displaced into it have been rushing to leave. The militia entered the Rufa'a area east of the city, then the Hantoub neighborhood, committing atrocities after the other; looting, rape, killing and intimidation. The Rapid Support Forces militia perpetrated the same atrocities that it committed in Khartoum, El Geneina, and every other area seized by its forces in Sudan. Humanitarian agencies reported that more than 300,000 people were displaced from Wad Madani in the first two days of the militia onslaught, with the figure rising to over 500,000 in the days that followed. On December 19, the militia prevented displaced residents fleeing Wad Madani from leaving the city, instead inviting them - in a ridiculous spectacle alternative reality - to go about their normal lives. The militia imposed a blockade on Madani, turning the town into a big open jail akin to what Israel did in Gaza, and took its citizens hostages.
Video recordings captured the invasion of the Coptic Church farm in the eastern city of Wad Madani. The militia soldiers recorded themselves carrying their machine guns and attempting to bribe and threaten the church’s monks into leaving with a word of praise for the Rapid Support Forces, oblivious to the prohibition on entering the church with weapons in the first place. While images of banks looting and the burning of the Central Bank of Sudan's offices in Madani circulated on social media.
Mr. Radwan Abdel-Jabbar, one of the officials of the Maygoma Orphanage, which relocated to "Wad Madani" after the militia stormed Khartoum to house over 200 children, half of whom have special needs, bore witness to the scale of the disaster and the extent of the horror, which the militia broadcast throughout Wad Madani. While appeals and requests about the supply of contraception after rape and the medication used for prevention of STDs dominated the social media. Six incidences of sexual rape committed by members of the Rapid Support Forces were confirmed in the first day, while the number of unverified reports of crimes has surpassed 130 and is continually growing. The United Nations agencies, for their part, were content to give preliminary figures and announce the suspension of all field humanitarian efforts both within and outside the state.
On December 18, Madani fell into the hands of the militia. On Tuesday, December 19, the Sudanese Army General Command issued a statement about the circumstances surrounding the militia's capture of Al-Gezira State, stating that the First Division - Infantry, which was tasked with protecting the region, had withdrawn from its positions and that an investigation would be launched to determine the reasons and circumstances that led to the withdrawal of these forces. What the army leadership is missing, as it reels in its evident inability, is that the investigation required is not just the withdrawal of its forces from Madani, but the circumstances of the whirlpool into which it has led the country since its coup with the Rapid Support Forces militia on October 25, 2021. Everything that is happening now is a direct outcome of the disruption of the path of civil democratic transformation that followed the ousting of the tyrant Al-Bashir, and the reintroduction of the use of guns in the political scene.
The coup d'état of October 25, 2021, stands as the inaugural domino, whose reverberations have set in motion the inexorable unraveling that presently unfolds before our eyes in Sudan. The current state of affairs in the Sudanese territory, where the militia is wreaking havoc while the army institution finds itself incapable of fulfilling its fundamental duty of upholding the nation's security and safeguarding its citizens, serves as a stark reminder of the imperative to reform the military establishment and the security sector in Sudan. It is crucial to reinstate their proficiency and efficacy, thereby enabling them to execute their existential responsibilities rather than enduring the ignominious impotence that presently unfolds before our eyes. The fervent pursuit of this demand, persistently rejected and evaded by the army leadership, constituted the primary catalyst for the political strife that preceded and ultimately precipitated the coup. This identical pattern of procrastination and evasion was employed by the "RSF" militia in the aftermath of the coup. Those whose vision remained obscured by ideology and the lingering vestiges of political violence, acquired through their protection of the "Muslim Brotherhood" regime, which was toppled by the Sudanese revolution in April 2019, or driven by their own personal political aspirations, are the very ones impeded the trajectory towards a better future for Sudan and paved the way—both directly and indirectly—into the inferno of this calamitous war.
For the umpteenth time, the leaders of the civilian groups that make up the "Forces of Freedom and Change" alliance have refused to stand by the Sudanese people while they've been through so much anguish. Their media rooms and media cadres' efforts to divert attention and alter the narrative around the demands to halt the "RSF" assault on citizens and the state of Al-Gezira exposed their clandestine collusion with the militia! As their leaders hastily attempted to rationalize the "Rapid Support" crimes by bringing up the army's transgressions, a scandalous tactic that involved invoking "whataboutism" to legitimize the fascism practiced by the militia. At a time when the invading militia forces were committing violations and crimes, Yassir Arman, leader of the SPLM faction affiliated with the Forces of Freedom and Change, hurried to speak about the arrests made by army forces in Wad Madani based on ethnic and geographical grounds, depending on a fake letter from the state governor ordering such arrests. The independent Juhayna News Documentation Center promptly exposed the letter's forgery after it went viral on social media among militia supporters. In spite of this, Arman chose to be part of the propaganda machine that attempts to build an alternative hegemonic reality that presents the militia as a heroic force fighting for democracy, fairness, and civilian government. Other leaders of "Forces of Freedom and Change" choose to mimic the militia's language by bringing up the army's bombardment of Darfur or the visit of the army commander Al-Burhan to "Wad Madani" and his statements there to justify the attack.
All these (civilian) leaders of the Forces of Freedom and Change have thus far demonstrated a profound and flagrant inability to address the stark reality that this war is being waged between two morally compromised factions and that violations must not, under any circumstances, be rationalized or condoned. The genuine stance opposing war ought not to entail deflecting attention from one side's actions by drawing comparisons with the other. This conflict is inherently detrimental, with all involved factions exhibiting criminal attributes. Attempting to rationalize the transgressions committed by the fascist militia in any manner constitutes active complicity in its transgressions, rendering those who engage in such justifications indistinguishable from those who bear arms.
The civilian leaders, currently commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Glorious December Revolution, which commenced on December 19, 2018, ought to bear in mind that this revolution took place through the collective action of the people and for the collective good of the people. Anyone who ignores their suffering and the wrongdoings committed against them during this bloody conflict cannot be representing it.
Guns of the militia shall not carry you to the government seats over the skulls and blood of your people, and even if this transpires, you will merely serve as an ornamental entourage of the fascist.
The assault by the militia on Wad Madani and its subsequent occupation of Al-Gezira State, a region that was previously considered secure for displaced people, serve as a perilous indication of the widening scope of the war. The militia now has an unobstructed path to initiate an assault on the eastern states of Sudan, namely Gedaref, Kassala, and the Red Sea. The geopolitical situation in these states is intricate since it involves countries in the region that are now facing escalated tension, particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia. However, the RSF seems to have an abundant supply of weapons, ammunition, and fighters to do so.
The assault by the militia in eastern Sudan may lead to Eritrea engaging in military intervention in support of the army, which in turn may push Ethiopia to intervene in opposition. Both will have ample arguments, as language serves as an invaluable instrument for diplomacy of war, particularly in the realm where political and economic interests intersect with social connections. The ongoing conflict in Sudan has the potential to escalate from a protracted civil war into a catalyst for a catastrophic regional conflict, with far-reaching consequences for both the affected region and the rest of the world in the foreseeable future.
As the Western capitals of the global community approach the holiday season, which lasts until the first week of January, this threat is rising dramatically. The window of holidays will allow the opposing sides the room to attempt the most brutal imposition of a fait accompli by expanding to new regions.
Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, the militia leader, declared Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kikel's installation as the region's military commander. Kikel, a notorious bandit, smuggler, and arms dealer, operated in the Butana plains for years, which are situated to the east of Al-Gezira state. After the army and the "Rapid Support Forces" collaborated on the overthrow of the transitional civilian government on October 25, 2021, Kikel declared in 2022 the establishment of a military militia known as "Sudan Shield" with the objective of supporting the coup against civilians. Kikel and his militia declared their allegiance to the Rapid Support Forces subsequent to the commencement of this war, thereby granting him the space to exercise intimidation and pillaging at his discretion as a field commander for the militia. His successful execution of the assault on "Wad Madani" resulted in the region's command chair being bestowed upon him as a recompense.
What a democracy and civilian authority that criminals, arms dealers, and bandits have brought!
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Amgad Fareid El-Tayeb
CEO of Fikra for Studies and Development
previously served as the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Sudan; Dr. Abdalla Hamdok during the transitional period following the toppling of the Islamic dictatorship in Sudan. He has also served as a political advisor to the United Nations Special Political Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He made a prominent political and social contribution to the liberation movement to overthrow Bashir Islamic regime before and during the December 2018 revolution acted as the head of the foreign relation committee of the Sudanese Professional Association and Spokesperson of it during the revolution. Founder of the Nafeer Initiative in 2013 and contributed significantly to the establishment of the Girifna and Sudan Change Now movements. He has also written extensively on cases of violations of migrants' rights, democratization, and issues of military and civil institutional reforms in Sudan. He can be contacted by email at: amjed...@gmail.com , Am...@fikrasd.com
Twitter: @amjedfarid
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