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Decoding Sudan's New Peace Proposal: Déjà vu of the Framework Agreement!
A Critical Look at Sudan's Proposed Peace Deal
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
On Friday, March 15, a joint statement was published after an assembly in Cairo of the National Umma Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, and the Arab Socialist Baath Party. The statement addressed several issues regarding the present Sudanese political crisis, but the most notable of them was the seventh paragraph, which reads as follows:
“Seventh: We have become aware of leaks and (unpublished) information circulating in secret over the past few days about preparations being made for a political settlement project that establishes totalitarianism, in which power will be shared for a period of ten years between the army, the Rapid Support Forces, columns of armed movements, and some names of civil organizations... These are “understandings” that are rejected in substance and form. We will review them and explain the risks of accepting them or keeping silent about them."
This paragraph alluded directly to the document that is currently circulating in Sudanese political circles with the title "A proposal for a political solution to end the war and establish the Sudanese state". This document, as stated in the text of its introduction, is the product of "an initiative by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, Prime Minister of the glorious December Revolution government," as the document referred to him, and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA). The preface of the document asserted that it draws its foundation from all current settlement efforts, including the Jeddah Declaration, signed on May 11, 2023, the IGAD roadmap, the African Union efforts, and the Manama Declaration of Principles.
The text that accompanied the distribution of this document among the Sudanese political community stated that it builds upon the understandings and agreements that were concluded in Manama and Jeddah, incorporating a political dimension to render it as comprehensive as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed with the leader of the "Sudan People's Liberation Movement" (John Garang) in 2005, just weeks prior to his death, in order to bring an end to the civil war in South Sudan. However, the writer of the text seems to have overlooked the reality that Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti) is not Garang. It's possible that they were trying to insinuate a resemblance for their own satisfaction and to deceive the Sudanese society, in an attempt to morally justify certain questionable stances on the current situation.
However, the currently ongoing authoritarian conflict in Sudan bears no resemblance to the struggle of the peoples of the Sudanese periphery against developmental, cultural, and ethnic discrimination. Since Hemedti's militia (Rapid Support Forces) served as a tool for this discrimination and repression that the people of the Sudanese margins have faced and continue to face. The scenes of the Rapid Support Forces killing Khamis Abkar, the governor of South Darfur, mutilating his body amid racist chants of victory, and the subsequent mass massacres of the Masalit community by militia members remain vivid in our memories.
Upon reading this introduction, anyone with basic knowledge of Sudanese affairs will immediately recognize the series of fallacies that comprise the document. For example, the introduction mentions the "Sudanese Professionals Association" (SPA) without specifying which faction it refers to. Nevertheless, the fact that the SPA name is referenced in conjunction with Dr. Abdalla Hamdok indicates that it pertains to the branch of the SPA that is presently affiliated with Hamdok's "Taqadum Front. This is the faction that lost the mid-2020 elections conducted by the SPA to renew its leadership council. Yet, after the electoral defeat, this faction, led by the legal practitioner Taha Osman Ishaq, refused to accept the democratic defeat, announcing a split and the formation of a parallel grouping. At that time, the "Forces of Freedom and Change" alliance readily incorporated the electorally defeated splinter faction into its structures, on the grounds that the overtly left-leaning stance of the elected faction would alter its internal balance of power. Evidently, the "Forces of Freedom and Change (currently in control of the Taqadum Front headed by Hamdok) were more concerned with sustaining that state of affairs in order to preserve authority over decision-making, even at the expense of democracy or its logomachic commitment to it.
The Forces of Freedom and Change did not expect anyone to wonder at the time how an alliance that rejected the results of the democratic elections, among the union forces, could be sincere in its claim of seeking to bring democracy or advance the wheels of democratic civil transformation?! Not to mention that the existence of elected unions and a broad union front that declared itself and is composed of democratically elected leaders negates the justification for the existence of the “SPA” in the first place.
The second logical fallacy in the introduction was the invocation of the Declaration of Principles signed in Manama. This document was never publicly announced, nor was its signing officially acknowledged by either party or by any of the mediating states, which included the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Indeed, the Army camp has consistently denied that any negotiations even took place in Manama, let alone that it signed an agreement there. Regardless of the veracity of the military's denial, it is simply illogical to propose a plan for acceptance by both parties based on a document that one of them denies even exists. Such a move can only be seen as a cynical ploy for political and media advantage.
The third point of contention regarding the proposal submitted to the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is that it is presented as an initiative by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA). Both are members of the same political coalition, the Taqadum Front. So why did they single themselves out to present the proposal without the rest of the coalition? Is it a new attempt at political "trickery" to impose a fait accompli in favor of a specific internal or external party, as it may seem from the rest of the document?
Let's not dwell on that too much since the introduction appears hastily written, as does the remainder of the document, which is full of flaws.
The proposed document is divided into three chapters, entitled:
- First: Principles and Foundations of the Comprehensive Solution, which includes what the document calls the Principles and Foundations of the Comprehensive Solution.
- Second: Cessation of Hostilities and Humanitarian Assistance, which includes what is called the "Cessation of Hostilities Agreement".
- Third: The Political Process.
The majority of the text in the first and second chapters are formulated in the form of generalities and principles that cannot be disagreed upon. However, other texts came to confirm that the document is merely another authoritarian agreement.
Some of the opening texts contained positive details: for example, the commitment to the Jeddah Declaration for the Protection of Civilians, signed on May 11, 2023, which has never seen the light of implementation over the past ten months.
Other texts were a tedious repetition of what was stated in the 2019 Constitutional Document and all subsequent documents over the past five years, without any commitment from the parties involved! For example, that Sudan should be ruled by a civilian democracy in which the people choose their rulers, and that a single professional and national army should be built and established, and the civilian institutions of the state should be established and rebuilt in a way that guarantees efficiency, professionalism, and national unity, and that opportunities should be distributed fairly, and that the principle of peaceful political work should be committed to, and a balanced foreign policy should be adopted, and so on, as stated in the first chapter.
The second chapter of the proposed agreement, which deals with the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance, contains a number of positive details. The preamble to this chapter, unlike the first chapter, clearly states that it was facilitated by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and the Arab Republic of Egypt (in that order). This suggests that it is one of the drafts or documents that was circulated during the Manama negotiations that the military denied.
However, Article 1.4 of this chapter reaffirms the commitment of both parties to the Agreement on the Declaration of Principles and Foundations for a Comprehensive Solution, which was agreed upon by the two parties and signed on January 20, 2024. This refers to the Manama Agreement again, which the military denies ever taking place.
This appears to be another attempt at political embarrassment or one-upmanship, returning to the "divide and rule" tactic that the Forces for Freedom and Change have become addicted to as a political tactic in their dealings with others. This involves trying to divide any other party that they cannot control or drag them into line with their own agenda. This has been the case with the Sudanese Professionals Association, the Resistance Committees, the Democratic Unionist Party, and even the Popular Congress Party. Now they are trying to do the same with the Sudanese army. This is being done by emphasizing the reference to the Manama Agreement, which the leaders of the Forces for Freedom and Change and their media mouthpieces claim that Shams al-Din Kabashi, Burhan's deputy in the leadership of the army, signed in agreement with, while Burhan and the rest of the army leaders rejected it.
In general, the repeated reference to this disputed agreement does not suggest that this proposal is being made in good faith with the intention of being accepted by both parties. Rather, it is an attempt to establish a fait accompli and impose it.
Article 2 contains several positive provisions, which addressed some issues for the first time regarding practical measures for the cessation of hostilities. For example, paragraph 2.4 speaks clearly about the two parties freezing their forces, forces under their control, and the forces allied with them in their current positions. This wording seems to have been chosen carefully and specifically to provide institutional legal and political cover for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its leadership from the violations committed by its forces. The two parties do not officially recognize or acknowledge the existence of forces allied with them that are not formally part of them. However, the RSF commander Hemedti has claimed to some politicians who are communicating with him that there are forces within his militia that he does not control, and he has claimed that they are the ones committing the violations, in an attempt to evade institutional responsibility for what these forces are doing. This happened repeatedly, most recently in his meeting with Hamdok’s Taqadum front on January 1-2, 2024, before the signing of the Hamdok-Hemedti agreement in Addis Ababa.
Hemedti's advisor, Youssif Izzat, supported this assertion with a statement in which he rebuked Yasir Arman, one of the leaders of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), for publicly asking Hemedti to hold meetings with the people of Al Gezira State, Arman's home state, to discuss stopping the violations committed against them. Izzat rebuked Arman in a public letter, directing him to speak about this matter with "Kikal" (a well-known arms dealer before the war, who joined the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia after the war and was declared commander of Gezira region after its invasion by the RSF in December 2023). This also highlights Izzat (who holds Canadian citizenship) efforts to produce defense justifications that could help them evade institutional responsibility.
In general, the implementation of Article 2.4 will pose a particular challenge to the RSF, if this agreement is finalized.
The numbering of the items in the document also suggests that it was either renumbered from a different original, or perhaps translated from a foreign language. For example, item 2.5 calls for the withdrawal of snipers from all areas, but then the numbering jumps to 2.8 (on not obstructing the movement of civilians) and then to 2.10 (on good intentions). This suggests that the document was not originally written in its current form but was rather pieced together from different sources.
Clause 2.12 of the agreement reads like a laundry list of 31 don'ts, meticulously outlining prohibited actions that constitute a breach. Notably, these provisions included, for the first time ever, a clear ban on torture, cruel treatment, sexual violence, harassment, and the unlawful detention of civilians (Article 2.12.17). The agreement also laudably prohibited the use of human shields (Article 2.12.23), the seizure of essential civilian infrastructure (Clause 2.12.24), and the encroachment on civilian homes (Clause 2.12.25). These are precisely the violations the Rapid Support Forces militia has been committing while vehemently denying their existence.
However, the agreement, and Clause 2.12, glaringly omits any solutions to the existing situation. It offers no roadmap for the militia to vacate occupied civilian homes and return stolen property, despite documented evidence – including recordings circulated by the militia itself – of their refusal to do so. The agreement remains silent on the fate of civilian detainees and hostages held by the militia, whose members have resorted to releasing pictures of the captives to extort ransoms from their families.
This silence exposes a crucial gap between the lip-service enshrined in the agreement and the harsh realities on the ground.
The third article of the agreement, for the first time, introduces a mechanism for monitoring the cessation of hostilities. The article details the tasks and powers of the so-called Joint Center for Monitoring the Ceasefire. It refers to Annex 1, which provides further details. Clause 3.3 states that the parties agree that this center will be the only mechanism responsible for monitoring the implementation of this agreement.
The text's emphasis on the exclusivity of this center is intended to preempt any practical international measures to impose, enforce, or monitor the ceasefire, with their attendant legal and political responsibilities. As it stands, the proposed ceasefire agreement relies entirely on the good faith of the parties, without any effective enforcement mechanisms. The Sudanese people and the world have witnessed the failure of this approach over the course of eleven ceasefire agreements that were signed in the Jeddah Forum from May 2023 until the forum's work was suspended, none of which were adhered to. But it seems that proponents of the proposal have not heard Albert Einstein's definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Either that, or they do not care about implementing a real ceasefire on the ground. After all these attempts, it has become clear, as it was from the beginning, that the warring parties will not stop fighting for power unless a third party forces them to do so. And attempts to avoid the involvement of international forces, even in a limited capacity, to monitor the ceasefire and ensure the protection of civilians are nothing more than a green light for the militias to continue their abuses, especially after the events of the Rapid Support Forces' invasion of the cities of Al-Geneina in West Darfur and the ongoing events in Wad Madani after the invasion of Al Gezira state.
Article 4 of the agreement, concerning measures and procedures in case of breach or violation, exposes a glaring disregard for the gravity of the crimes committed by the warring parties. It trivializes these atrocities by dividing them into "serious" and "non-serious" violations (as per a table attached in Annex 2).
For non-serious violations, the prescribed measures include "warning and reprimand of the violating party" and referring the perpetrator(s) to a "competent court" with the details of the action taken to be communicated to the center. However, the authority of this court remains undefined. Is it a military court under the jurisdiction of the concerned party to the conflict, or the judicial authority of the 1956 state that the "Rapid Support Forces" militia seeks to dismantle?
In the case of serious violations, the measures do not go beyond "denouncing and condemning the violating party" or, once again, referring the perpetrators to trial! Again, there is no clarification regarding the nature of the court, its neutrality, or any commitment beyond notifying the center of the action taken.
This entire article and its contents are nothing more than a blatant attempt to evade institutional responsibility for the violations committed by both parties to the conflict.
The final paragraph of this clause establishes a mechanism for resolving serious violations that cannot be resolved by the Joint High Committee, which comprises the intelligence chiefs of Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain (in that order, which is noteworthy given that it differs from the order of the facilitating countries in the agreement's preamble, which began with Bahrain, followed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United States, and finally Egypt). It is also noteworthy that the directors of the Saudi and US intelligence agencies, who are also guarantors and facilitators of the agreement, are not included in this mechanism. The meeting of the mechanism also includes the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (currently Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabashi) and the Second Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (Abdul-Rahim Daglo, Hemedti's brother). This mechanism meets to discuss serious violations, reach solutions, and ensure they do not recur.
What is shocking here is that this agreement, presented by Dr. Abdullah Hamdok (Prime Minister of the Revolution Government, according to his description in the preamble) and the Sudanese "Professionals' Gathering" faction, which lost the elections, both civilian parties, treat the violations that occurred during this cursed war as a mere administrative matter to be resolved through meetings and discussions of a high-level mechanism, not as human rights violations to be addressed through the rule of law, justice, and accountability. Rather, according to their proposal, public condemnation of the violating party is a sufficient measure to be taken in the case of violations they have classified as serious.
Article Five of the agreement, on humanitarian arrangements, appears to be included as a mere perfunctory exercise. Its 13 sub-clauses fail to address the harsh realities on the ground. It even ignores any mention of the emergency rooms, courageous volunteers, and first responders who have been the frontline heroes of Sudan's humanitarian catastrophe for the past year. The world has hailed these brave individuals as the only lifeline for delivering aid in Sudan since the war broke out. Yet the agreement does not even mention their protection, despite their repeated arrests by both sides of the conflict. It also fails to demand recognizing them as humanitarian providers who deserve protection under the Geneva Conventions. This glaring omission exposes the mindset of the agreement's drafters. They were more concerned with rushing through the process and reciting empty platitudes about humanitarian arrangements than with addressing the real needs of the Sudanese people. This is likely a continuation of their efforts to monopolize civil voices and representation in Sudan's political space. Or maybe it is their political jealousy that prevents them from acknowledging other actors, even those working in areas directly related to the people's livelihood, life, and security. Clearly, these concerns are not on the "Taqadum" agenda.
The third chapter of the agreement on the political process is the most riddled with holes. It begins by defining the parties eligible to participate, starting with the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, political parties, and armed movements. Notably, the agreement states political parties within (Taqadum front) but not the coordination itself, despite its status as a declared united entity with an organizational structure. The agreement then goes on to detail the other entities participating in the formation of Taqadum as independent entities also participating in the political process from their independent positions. Both Taqadum and its predecessor, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), have always sought to be treated politically as a united front. However, when it comes to direct negotiations, they aspire to have more seats by dismantling their structure for bigger representation to ensure the greatest possible influence in any negotiations. They always approached Sudanese politics with this quota-based mentality.
This "flooding" tactic that the FFC (and now Taqadum) has consistently employed aims to secure a mechanical numerical majority in any political process it participates in or boycotts altogether. This focus on participants rather than issues or stances in the political process is a tactic that the FFC has used over the past five years to consistently undermine any attempt to design an inclusive political process that addresses the root causes of Sudan's problems. It has also led to the emergence of several fictitious organizations that are out of touch with reality and are nothing more than political parties’ facades with different banners.
This section on the political process came riddled with further contentious points. The proposed solution for the leadership of the new army, for example, is based on a power-sharing formula between the two currently warring factions. The agreement suggests a formula that would divide military authority, with two representatives from the armed forces and two from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) forming the new leadership. One of these four would be the commander-in-chief, two would be deputies, and one would be the chief of staff. The chief of staff would be from the RSF if the commander-in-chief is from the armed forces, and vice versa.
Such a power-sharing approach, based on dividing positions, cannot be a viable foundation for security sector reform. If the premise is that the current military organizations are all flawed, corrupt and need fixing, how can anyone reasonably expect that mixing these flawed elements will produce a better outcome?
This simplistic approach to security and military sectors reform, which has been adopted by the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and, more recently Taqadum, has long been a stumbling block to reaching a clear consensus on the process of transformation needed in these institutions. It reflects intellectual and political laziness, prioritizing the simple pursuit of power over comparative research, the study of similar experiences, relevant scientific theories, or even the consultation of non-partisan professional experts to develop a scientific approach of what such true reform entails. This flawed approach to reform is likely to perpetuate the very problems it purports to address. It ignores the deep-seated structural issues within the security and military apparatus, such as the lack of accountability, transparency, and civilian oversight.
The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) have long viewed security and military reform as an opportunity to seize power. Their proposed solutions prioritize power-sharing among various military and security factions, or empowering armed groups that support them to protect their political authority. However, this approach undermines the very foundation of a genuine security sector reform. It reveals a deep distrust on the concept of civilian oversight over the military institutions and a lack of commitment to civilian rule. Power-sharing should not be the cornerstone of security sector reform; it should be the rule of law and the supremacy of state institutions.
The FFC's approach is akin to restructuring the Ministry of Health by dividing its powers between state agencies and private hospitals. It further ignores the critical importance of competence and qualification, treating state institutions as mere spoils to be distributed among the warring factions.
Reforming Sudan's security and military institutions requires a scientific and professional modernization process that enables them to effectively enforce both military and civilian law. It is not a mere political equation of power-sharing. The FFC's myopic approach to security sector reform is a recipe for continued instability and conflict. Only a genuine commitment to civilian oversight, professionalization, and the rule of law can pave the way for a stable and democratic Sudan.
A handwritten note appended to the proposed agreement further detailing a proposed distribution of leadership positions within the country's new armed forces. The note, which assigns the selection of the army's commander-in-chief to political forces, the leadership of the infantry forces to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the leadership of the air and naval forces to "competence and specialization," betrays a troubling lack of understanding of the Sudanese army’s current structure and the challenges of building a professional national army. The note's proposal to assign the leadership of the infantry forces to the RSF, a paramilitary group with an infamous history, is particularly concerning. It effectively institutionalizes the RSF's power and autonomy, making it a state within a state and undermining the prospects for civilian control of the military.
The note's reliance on a spoils system approach to military leadership is also deeply flawed. Rather than building a professional army based on merit and competence, the proposal would reward political actors and militias with positions of power. This approach is likely to perpetuate the very divisions and tensions that have plagued Sudan's military for decades.
The handwritten note is a reminder that the road to a sustainable peace and democratization in Sudan is long and fraught with peril. Building a professional national army is essential to this process. This handwritten note does not serve this purpose. It also indicates that its writer does not know the structure of the current Sudanese army staff or the structure of its leadership body and did not bother to conduct quick research on the development of the structure of modern armies, what is appropriate in periods of transition, and the administrative and political differences between the structures. Commanding the staff on the basis of tasks or structuring it on the basis of combat forces, and what is best to serve the transition phase and protect them from a military coup, or perhaps he realizes all of this and wants to leave the opportunity available for a party looking forward to another military coup in the future to control the ground forces in order to use them to accomplish it. It goes deeply into the approach of quotas that preserve the “Rapid Support Forces” militia with an independent institutional presence that gives it a share in the leadership of the army to satisfy it, as if the formation of a new national professional army will be achieved through “distributing the cake.”
Talking about the different situation in Sudan, its specificity, etc., is one of the justifications given by some politicians who are eager to share influence by seeking the help of their allies from the army and the “militia” over the state apparatus once again. This is what makes them now struggle to regain control of the state apparatus from outside it, instead of facing their natural duty as politicians to manage it and face its responsibilities. It also makes them ignore the fact that the fact that they allow themselves this superior influence will allow the same for others and, of course, for the military establishment as well. Such rules are necessary—even necessary—to build any real, stable democracy. And the attempt to limit our dreams and aspirations for democracy in Sudan by talking about “dangerous” secrets that should not be circulated and discussed except within a narrow framework of the political elite and avoiding broad public discussion of them in order to protect them (and what is meant here, of course, is to protect the influence of this elite in determining them), is merely a legalization of guardianship. This is a political and blatant violation of the rights of the masses, who valiantly revolted to uproot Al-Bashir and lay the foundations for their equal participation in shaping the political future of their country.
The wavy words mentioned in point (d), in talking about justice and praising it, its necessity, and the necessity of investigations into violations, neglected that they had previously extended their hand with immunities that strike the concept of transitional justice in death. Transitional justice is not just a formal procedure for escaping punishment, but rather a process of reconciliation. Real social issues need to be opened and cleaned up, not window-dressed, and covered up.
The agreement sets the duration of the transitional period after the cessation of war at 10 years, divided into two phases. The second half will be governed by elected transitional bodies (elections that the agreement allowed the current leaders of the army and the Rapid Support Forces to run in). The length of the transitional period in Sudan has always been a subject of debate between Sudanese political forces. However, this period is not just a time frame. The discussion and determination of its duration should be linked to the tasks that need to be accomplished during it, and not be stated in passing and through the lust for power that emanates from the folds of the proposed agreement, which speaks at the same time about a transitional constitution and a permanent constitution with the same simplicity that makes it easy to mention these terms and to deal with these issues superficially in its haste to finish and breathe the air of power.
The proposal for this agreement in its current form is nothing more than a practical translation of the ambitions of some foreign countries (namely UAE) that want to ensure that their interests in Sudan are served by ensuring the political future of the owner of the Rapid Support Forces militia, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti), by allowing him to escape accountability, re-empowering his militia to take control of the Sudanese state apparatus, and then allowing him to engage in political work and run for elections using its accumulated influence.
In summary, this agreement in its current form treats the April 15 civil war in Sudan as if it never happened, as if the Sudanese have no choice but to tolerate and coexist with it. The current proposal forces the victims of the war to forget their pain and suffering and to once again accept the dysfunctional power equations that initially led Sudan into this deadly conflict.
The end of the war in Sudan is closely associated with halting alternative narratives that contradict reality and have been prevalent since April 15, 2023. But unfortunately, what is noted is that narratives that distort and falsify reality are steadily increasing these days, while the militia’s allies—individuals and organizations—are striving, inside and outside Taqadum, to promote equations that guarantee the continuity of the institutional survival of the Rapid Support Forces militia and guarantee a political future for its owner, Hemedti. As if all these crimes, violations, killings, looting, rape, and displacement that took place at the hands of his militia during this war had not occurred.
The attempt to turn back the clock and seek to produce a new equation for dividing power between the armed parties in the country, with justifications that seek to portray it as an (acceptable) effort to stop the war, is unreasonable and unacceptable. It is nothing but an attempt to use military weapons to ensure political power.
Any effort to address the catastrophe occurring now in Sudan should clearly focus on stopping hostilities, silencing the gun, and enforcing this through clear and capable mechanisms, without seeking to link this to subsequent political demands. These important political demands and discussions cannot be more important than stopping rifle bullets, cannon bombs, aircraft, and militia mercenaries from claiming people’s lives. Following achieving that, a comprehensive political process should commence without any prior conditions or agreements, such as the granting of immunity, the determination of the transition period, and the specifics of the transitional government's structures. Similarly, any political process must clearly define its objectives, a goal that should be evident to all those involved in public work, given the events that have transpired and continue to unfold in Sudan.
The Rapid Support Forces militia cannot continue to have an institutional presence in the future of Sudan, and there is no way to accept the continuity of the army and the state apparatus without fundamental reforms that restore the form they were in before the war.
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Amgad Fareid El-Tayeb
Executive Director of Fikra for Studies and Development
Previously served as the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Sudan; Dr. Abdalla Hamdok during the transitional period following the toppling of the Islamic dictatorship in Sudan. He has also served as a political advisor to the United Nations Special Political Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He made a prominent political and social contribution to the liberation movement to overthrow Bashir’s Islamic regime before and during the December 2018 revolution. He served as the head of the foreign relations committee of the Sudanese Professional Association and Spokesperson of it during the revolution. Founder of the Nafeer Initiative in 2013 and contributed significantly to the establishment of the Girifna and Sudan Change Now movements. He has also written extensively on cases of violations of migrants' rights, democratization, and issues of military and civil institutional reforms in Sudan. He can be contacted by email at: amjed...@gmail.com , Am...@fikrasd.com
Twitter: @amjedfarid
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