Electoral System to Elect a Moderate Committee Chair

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Brian Langstraat

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May 5, 2017, 1:32:03 PM5/5/17
to The Center for Election Science
Range Voting (RV) tends to elect moderate candidates, but with strategic voters (max/min scores) tends to become Approval Voting (AV).
AV tends to elect moderate candidates, but with strategic partisan voters (single vote) tends to become First-Past-The-Post (FPTP).
FPTP tends to elect partisan (sometimes extremist) candidates.
Thus, RV with strategic partisan voters tends to elect partisan (sometimes extremist) candidates. [See Link below]

RV would often elect partisan/extremist candidates, since strategic partisan voters often sufficiently out number moderate voters in real elections.
A committee vote would usually elect a partisan/extremist chair, since committee members are usually strategic and partisan.
A public vote would often elect a partisan/extremist committee chair, since voters are often strategic and partisan.

"Best voting system to elect Prime Minister or Speaker of the House?" discusses methods to elect a moderate committee chair (house speaker) when only committee members vote.

I suggested that the following AV method may be a simple way to elect an acceptable moderate leader for a legislative body:
Each legislator must vote to approve more than half of the legislators.
The legislator with the the most approvals is the leader.

The AV (>1/2) method has a fatal flaw when the majority party uses extreme collusion to precisely spread out every party member's approval, but only 2 defective party members would correct this fatal flaw.

The AV (>1/2) method should elect a moderate committee chair in public elections, since majority parties should not be able to precisely spread out voter's approval, even with strategic partisan voters.
For example, the AV (>1/2) method should elect a moderate city council member to be mayor with public elections.

Disappointingly, the AV (>1/2) method would not work well for general elections, since it is dependent on a set number of candidates which is very susceptible to candidate cloning (like Borda Count).

What are the potential issues with using AV (>1/2) to elect a moderate committee chair in public elections?

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