I like these simple arguments more than the typical WDS math arguments going into Condorcet winners and all that stuff. (Well, actually, I like the math arguments when I am on the receiving end, but I know that not everyone is as nerdy so simpler arguments work better in the real world.)
Refute the majority winner argument by saying that IRV only requires that the winner be preferred by a majority over ONE other candidate. Imagine a system where your ballot is like in IRV, but two candidates are picked randomly, all others are eliminated, and you find the "majority winner" among those two random candidates. I would hardly call that a "majority winner" but the only thing different in IRV is that the randomness is replaced by a sort of sensible process, but it can still feel random in elections with many candidates.
I like these simple arguments more than the typical WDS math arguments going into Condorcet winners and all that stuff. (Well, actually, I like the math arguments when I am on the receiving end, but I know that not everyone is as nerdy so simpler arguments work better in the real world.)
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