Messaging for voting activism: "pride" and turnout

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Jameson Quinn

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Jul 26, 2017, 3:23:49 PM7/26/17
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I'm working on writing a piece on Medium expressing why I think voting reform is important. I want to stay away from dry technicalities and go to the emotional heart of my activism. And I think that that heart is that I want a democracy that voters can be proud of. In practice, I believe that such pride would reflect more-honest voting and would lead to higher turnout, and that both of these would improve outcomes. It's the simple idea of the wisdom of the crowd: a larger crowd whose voices can be heard more clearly and honestly will be wiser.

My initial attempts at writing this piece are up at https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/make-america-proud-to-vote-again-mava-7ef14b8bf606. For now, they're still very incomplete, but I'd welcome comments. Of course, the people I'm sending this message to are in some sense the "early adopter" audience for this piece of writing once it's finished. So if you comment now, I hope that when I'm done, and send another message in this thread to tell you about it, you'll take a moment to "like" the piece on Medium.


Jameson Quinn

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Jul 27, 2017, 3:14:44 PM7/27/17
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I've now published the article: here it is. Comments are of course still welcome, and upvotes/likes are appreciated.

Phil Uhrich

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Jul 30, 2017, 4:27:01 PM7/30/17
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I'm still not exactly sure how it works. When the candidates do their rankings is it supposed to just be in their riding or state wide? If it's riding that would most likely just be the one other major party. If it's state wide how is that any different than just keeping it in the party except that it might create party factions?

Jameson Quinn

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Jul 30, 2017, 6:54:21 PM7/30/17
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2017-07-30 13:27 GMT-07:00 Phil Uhrich <philu...@gmail.com>:
I'm still not exactly sure how it works.  When the candidates do their rankings is it supposed to just be in their riding or state wide?

State-wide. 

And I'm sorry; they're intended to be ratings, not rankings. I realized that I'd written that wrong on the GOLD electorama page, so I fixed it. 
 
... If it's state wide how is that any different than just keeping it in the party except that it might create party factions?
 
As you suggest, allows some amount of within-party discrimination, if candidates choose to exercise that power. It also allows ordering the candidates outside the party, for the leftover votes that flow out of the party. It also allows independents to have a meaningful impact if they don't win. 


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Steve Cobb

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Jul 31, 2017, 3:06:17 PM7/31/17
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About the problem:


Voter turnout is a clever focus for The Problem. Low turnout has several causes, a bunch of which in turn result from the poor election method: poor candidate offering, gratuitous negative compaigning (including among candidates who should be allies), suboptimal or even perverse outcomes (from vote splitting), and an unresponsive party duopoly.


However, voter turnout depends on other things as well. I can think of at least five general reasons to vote or not: decision importance, candidate interest, my influence on the outcome, civic virtue, and cost. We all know about the “paradox of voting”. I would expect turnout to be low in a large, constitutionally-constrained, decentralized democracy.


You don’t mention it, but your initial chart of countries’ voter turnouts is of the 35 OECD nations—not random but cherry-picked. When making OECD comparisons I usually say something like “among our peer OECD nations”. But let’s run with it: are the countries with higher turnout than the US democratically so great (e.g. in the metrics of democracy index, prosperity, respect for human rights, and low corruption), and those below so awful? What leaps out at me is that Mexico (the OECD’s poorest, most corrupt, and most violent country) is above, and below the US are elite countries from their respective regions. I don’t even see any correlation with size. In fact, to me turnout vs. size and prosperity is the chart’s story, and warrants further investigation. At least two of the countries higher on the list have compulsory voting, imposing a fine if you don’t. Maybe not such great examples. BTW, I wrote this paragraph before clicking the chart’s reference link, which leads to a highly informative article spelling out this and more. In the 6 OECD countries with some form of compulsory voting, pride is making virtue out of necessity.


Looking at the chart of US turnout history, there seem to be three distinct periods. Turnout has been markedly lower for the past century than during the previous century—why? We have the same voting method and representation system. The chart suggests that the problem lies elsewhere. 


Why should the wisdom of a crowd depend on some minimum participation level? Does a market require some percentage of players from its community? Presumably every market player believes that he or she has some valuable information to contribute, and is interested in helping to arrive at the right answer. A voter contributes a mixture of pure information and interest, desiring not necessarily a “correct”, but a *personally beneficial* answer. In the case of interest, we have a bit of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game going, like WWI trench warfare: my side will not turn out to vote if your side will not turn out. We can just send some representatives, for whom the cost is relatively lower.


Sidenote: A significant number of principled Americans consider voting, and certainly voting for certain types of candidates, to be an act of violence, an attempt to impose by force one’s opinion on others, with little regard for human rights. Such people debate internally whether they should vote as an act of self defense, or whether it merely legitimizes the process, but, regardless, to such people the “I voted” button signals no virtue. But many more libertarians and also conservatives who do believe in voting would disagree vehemently with this statement (common sense to a leftist):

“For me, it comes down to pride in democracy. That should be America’s legacy to all its citizens. Even if I disagree with you, I believe that you have a right to that pride.”

They would say that America’s legacy is the conception of human rights defined in the founding documents (DoI and Constitution), and they would qualify “democracy” as “liberal democracy” or “constitutional democracy”. Mere “democracy” is mob rule. My purpose here is to point out what is both a potential landmine and a principled reason for lower voter turnout. 


There is an internal contradiction in promoting majority turnout but not a majority decision basis, e.g. in Approval Voting. What, we value participation but not consensus? I suppose that it is more legitimate than a plurality of a minority. Admittedly, in this particular article you don’t promote AV or any other single-winner methods.


You mention spoilers, but not vote splitting. Spoilers refer to obviously irrelevant candidates who do nothing but change the outcome. The implication is that they should not have run. The more general problem is vote splitting, e.g. if there are two or more equally strong candidates whom no one would accuse of being mere spoilers. I really think we should be hammering on vote splitting as the one big problem that all voting reformers can agree on. In the causal chain, vote splitting lies between the root cause (the current voting method) and low voter turnout.


About the solution: 


GOLD is both complex and radical. Would it not make sense to first give a brief overview of simpler alternative voting methods, at least the ones that we like, as obvious reforms, before launching into the GOLD proposal? This article seems aimed at people new to voting theory and reform. BTW, in the article you never define the acronym GOLD.


However, it seems that GOLD is an allocational method, not a rating (what I’m now calling evaluational) method like the ones that we usually promote. Except for the candidates rating each other. Interesting challenge how to describe GOLD coherently along with our other endorrsed methods. 


Is GOLD really a five-part package deal, or are some elements optional? That fifth redistricting step in particular looks like an optional variation. Simplifying GOLD will make it more feasible.


Meta:


As you say, the article got a bit long. For that reason you need to say something about the conclusion, or at least the solution, early on, e.g. in the title or subtitle. They are currently devoid of keywords. How about “Proportionally Proud” or “Pride and Proportionality”? At least say “Voting turnout” instead of just “turnout” in that key subtitle location. The first half of the article (The Problem) is a familiar lament about apathy. Nobody scanning their feed will have any clue that your article contains a radical new proposal. The beginning of the article needs a 1-2-sentence pitch, e.g. in the subtitle: “Voting turnout shows our civic and national pride, and GOLD proportional voting could restore it.”


It seems to me that you have three sections, but only one has a heading. They should be labeled in some way, to the effect of: The Symptoms, The Underlying Disease, and The Cure(s), but all including keywords.


The current voting method is not called “plurality”, but “plurality voting” (preferably capitalized, IMO)—plurality is a possible decision basis. How many Americans know the term FPTP? As long as we’re being radical and creating new terms I wish we’d try calling it “choose-one plurality voting”, for reasons that I’ve mentioned before. 


Don’t mention python—it won’t impress the people who understand what it means, and it will only puzzle or scare the others. Just say that you built the FAQs.’


Anyway, a good start. I’m sure you’ll be writing more GOLD articles in the years to come.

Phil Uhrich

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Jul 31, 2017, 7:12:59 PM7/31/17
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Rate all other statewide candidates? From all parties? And that gets displayed on the ballot? In California with 53 CD's? Or New Hampshire's state house of representatives with 400 members? What about single district states? Is it only votes of eliminated candidates that get moved on to other candidates? Wouldn't that make it a bad idea for a party to have 1 strong front runner with way too many over votes? What happens in a special election?

Jameson Quinn

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Jul 31, 2017, 7:29:40 PM7/31/17
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2017-07-31 16:12 GMT-07:00 Phil Uhrich <philu...@gmail.com>:
Rate all other statewide candidates? From all parties? 

Yes.
 
And that gets displayed on the ballot?

No, of course not! That information is public, and should be available to voters, but you wouldn't ever put it all on the ballot!

On the ballot, you might include a candidate's top rating category: "George Washington; if needed, delegated transfers will go first to Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Betsy Ross." It might be useful in this context to legally define "officially endorsed" to mean "gave the highest rating to".
 
In California with 53 CD's?  Or New Hampshire's state house of representatives with 400 members? What about single district states? 

GOLD is not really appropriate for single-district states. It would reduce to a kind of optionally-delegated, rated IRV; better than plurality, but a long way from the simplicity/quality pareto front for a single-winner method. 
 
Is it only votes of eliminated candidates that get moved on to other candidates?  Wouldn't that make it a bad idea for a party to have 1 strong front runner with way too many over votes? 

No. Overvotes are also transferred, with proportional weighting. So if a candidate gets 150% (3/2) of a quota, then 2/3 of the weight of each of their votes is subtracted, leaving 1/3; and these thirds are transferred. 
 
What happens in a special election?

Single-winner, single-district method. Yes, that spoils proportionality, but it's the simplest answer.

Jameson Quinn

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Aug 1, 2017, 12:32:08 AM8/1/17
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Thanks for your thoughtful response, Steve. I'm going to quickly respond to you point-by-point. Thus, these responses will be generally less well-thought-out and less coherent than yours were. You have been warned.

2017-07-31 12:06 GMT-07:00 'Steve Cobb' via The Center for Election Science <electionscience@googlegroups.com>:

About the problem:


Voter turnout is a clever focus for The Problem. Low turnout has several causes, a bunch of which in turn result from the poor election method: poor candidate offering, gratuitous negative compaigning (including among candidates who should be allies), suboptimal or even perverse outcomes (from vote splitting), and an unresponsive party duopoly.


However, voter turnout depends on other things as well. I can think of at least five general reasons to vote or not: decision importance, candidate interest, my influence on the outcome, civic virtue, and cost. We all know about the “paradox of voting”. I would expect turnout to be low in a large, constitutionally-constrained, decentralized democracy.

This is fair. Some of the reasons for lower turnout are not bad things — such as being a big country — or even are undisputably good things — such as the kind of constitutional limits on democracy that are set out in the Bill of Rights.

But nobody, ever, would suggest "I have a great idea for increasing turnout! Let's repeal the first amendment, so that people like journalists and those with strong convictions about religion have an extra reason to vote!" Or: "Let's kill 99% of Americans, so that the ones who remain have a proportionally greater democratic voice!"

Aside from trivially stupid ideas like those, I think that pretty much anything you could do to make more people want to vote, would be an improvement to voting.


You don’t mention it, but your initial chart of countries’ voter turnouts is of the 35 OECD nations—not random but cherry-picked. When making OECD comparisons I usually say something like “among our peer OECD nations”. But let’s run with it: are the countries with higher turnout than the US democratically so great (e.g. in the metrics of democracy index, prosperity, respect for human rights, and low corruption), and those below so awful? What leaps out at me is that Mexico (the OECD’s poorest, most corrupt, and most violent country) is above, and below the US are elite countries from their respective regions. I don’t even see any correlation with size. In fact, to me turnout vs. size and prosperity is the chart’s story, and warrants further investigation. At least two of the countries higher on the list have compulsory voting, imposing a fine if you don’t. Maybe not such great examples. BTW, I wrote this paragraph before clicking the chart’s reference link, which leads to a highly informative article spelling out this and more. In the 6 OECD countries with some form of compulsory voting, pride is making virtue out of necessity.

Fair points. I didn't want to get too distracted by this stuff.  


Looking at the chart of US turnout history, there seem to be three distinct periods. Turnout has been markedly lower for the past century than during the previous century—why? We have the same voting method and representation system. The chart suggests that the problem lies elsewhere. 

Interesting questions, but not my points. 


Why should the wisdom of a crowd depend on some minimum participation level? Does a market require some percentage of players from its community? Presumably every market player believes that he or she has some valuable information to contribute, and is interested in helping to arrive at the right answer. A voter contributes a mixture of pure information and interest, desiring not necessarily a “correct”, but a *personally beneficial* answer. In the case of interest, we have a bit of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game going, like WWI trench warfare: my side will not turn out to vote if your side will not turn out. We can just send some representatives, for whom the cost is relatively lower.

(Nitpick: not all cooperation/defection scenarios are PDs.
 
If you work out the game theory of this situation (two "sides", nonzero cost to voting, payout strictly increasing in your "side"'s vote percentage), there are basically three possibilities:
  • Costs are lower than marginal benefits for all voters. 100% turnout.
  • There is at least one equilibrium where costs equal marginal benefits for each side. It would take implausibly strong assumptions to guarantee that turnout for both sides is equal at equilibrium. Thus, one side is getting an "unfair advantage".
  • One side's costs are always higher than their marginal benefits. Only one side turns out.
All of these three are unrealistic, but all in all, I'd say that #3 is more unrealistic, and #1 is morally preferable to #2. Yes, there are situations in #2 where a minority turns out more because they actually get more utility, and so differential turnout increases utility. But there are far more situations where the differential turnout decreases utility, and only reflects differential costs or idiosyncrasies of the benefit function.

In other words: I think it's reasonable to treat higher turnout as an axiomatic unalloyed good in this article.


Sidenote: A significant number of principled Americans consider voting, and certainly voting for certain types of candidates, to be an act of violence, an attempt to impose by force one’s opinion on others, with little regard for human rights. Such people debate internally whether they should vote as an act of self defense, or whether it merely legitimizes the process, but, regardless, to such people the “I voted” button signals no virtue. But many more libertarians and also conservatives who do believe in voting would disagree vehemently with this statement (common sense to a leftist):

It's not just libertarians and other flavors of anarchists who think that voting for certain candidates is morally bad. I'd guess that most people on all sides believe this. Certainly I do, and I'm far from being libertarian.

But we live in a world where voting exists, and where people disagree. If you gave me a magic wand to decide election results, I'd be tempted to use it in some cases, because I really do think that my judgement is clearly better than that of some. But even better than using that wand, would be destroying it; there's no way I know of to have such wands exist and yet make sure they never fall into the wrong hands.

A meta-norm that voting is, in and of itself, a moral good, is the best way I know of to destroy the wand. It's small change as far as moral goods go, but it's a good. 

I realize that this argument is a rather glib response to an entire body of philosophy. Of course it is; I don't want to get into a huge debate over this stuff. But I do think that if we did get into that huge debate, a fleshed-out version of the above would be a reasonable stance.

“For me, it comes down to pride in democracy. That should be America’s legacy to all its citizens. Even if I disagree with you, I believe that you have a right to that pride.”

They would say that America’s legacy is the conception of human rights defined in the founding documents (DoI and Constitution), and they would qualify “democracy” as “liberal democracy” or “constitutional democracy”. Mere “democracy” is mob rule. My purpose here is to point out what is both a potential landmine and a principled reason for lower voter turnout. 


I absolutely agree that there should be constitutional limits on democracy. Do you think there's a good way for me to have said that in the article, without getting too distracted or sounding too mealy-mouthed by qualifying otherwise-simple statements? 

There is an internal contradiction in promoting majority turnout but not a majority decision basis, e.g. in Approval Voting. What, we value participation but not consensus? I suppose that it is more legitimate than a plurality of a minority. Admittedly, in this particular article you don’t promote AV or any other single-winner methods.


You mention spoilers, but not vote splitting. Spoilers refer to obviously irrelevant candidates who do nothing but change the outcome. The implication is that they should not have run. The more general problem is vote splitting, e.g. if there are two or more equally strong candidates whom no one would accuse of being mere spoilers. I really think we should be hammering on vote splitting as the one big problem that all voting reformers can agree on. In the causal chain, vote splitting lies between the root cause (the current voting method) and low voter turnout.


More generally, vote splitting is one reason for wasted votes. 


About the solution: 


GOLD is both complex and radical. Would it not make sense to first give a brief overview of simpler alternative voting methods, at least the ones that we like, as obvious reforms, before launching into the GOLD proposal? This article seems aimed at people new to voting theory and reform. BTW, in the article you never define the acronym GOLD.

I'd like to. But the article is already pretty long. 


However, it seems that GOLD is an allocational method, not a rating (what I’m now calling evaluational) method like the ones that we usually promote. Except for the candidates rating each other.

And the voters who choose partisan transfers, implicitly rating at 3 levels (my choice, same party, not same party) 

Interesting challenge how to describe GOLD coherently along with our other endorrsed methods. 

True.
 


Is GOLD really a five-part package deal, or are some elements optional? That fifth redistricting step in particular looks like an optional variation. Simplifying GOLD will make it more feasible.

5th step is not "redistricting", but "assigning additional (overlapping) territory".

You're right that the method would work perfectly well without it. The choice I've made with GOLD is to try to design something that would work as well and satisfy voters as well as possible, even if that means some extra complexity. Even with this choice, I think it's less than twice as complex as another PR method, and from the voters' perspective, far simpler than something like STV.

The idea is that any PR method is more complicated on the inside than most voters will ever understand. So what they care about is their job as a voter, and the outcome they get.  


Meta:


As you say, the article got a bit long. For that reason you need to say something about the conclusion, or at least the solution, early on, e.g. in the title or subtitle. They are currently devoid of keywords. How about “Proportionally Proud” or “Pride and Proportionality”? At least say “Voting turnout” instead of just “turnout” in that key subtitle location. The first half of the article (The Problem) is a familiar lament about apathy. Nobody scanning their feed will have any clue that your article contains a radical new proposal. The beginning of the article needs a 1-2-sentence pitch, e.g. in the subtitle: “Voting turnout shows our civic and national pride, and GOLD proportional voting could restore it.”

Good suggestion. 


It seems to me that you have three sections, but only one has a heading. They should be labeled in some way, to the effect of: The Symptoms, The Underlying Disease, and The Cure(s), but all including keywords.


Also good. 

The current voting method is not called “plurality”, but “plurality voting” (preferably capitalized, IMO)—plurality is a possible decision basis. How many Americans know the term FPTP? As long as we’re being radical and creating new terms I wish we’d try calling it “choose-one plurality voting”, for reasons that I’ve mentioned before. 

Personally, I think of FPTP as a multiwinner method (basically the worst one), while plurality voting is a single winner method.

But yes, I'm open to trying to do branding on this. I'm not fully convinced by "choose-one plurality voting" but I could be. For instance, if I saw other people using it and it sounded good... 


Don’t mention python—it won’t impress the people who understand what it means, and it will only puzzle or scare the others. Just say that you built the FAQs.’


OK. (The brag is not "python", but "python in 1999", by the way.) 


Anyway, a good start. I’m sure you’ll be writing more GOLD articles in the years to come.


Thanks a lot for the critique. 

Brian Langstraat

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Aug 1, 2017, 12:30:20 PM8/1/17
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Jameson,

I disagree with your following statment:

Personally, I think of FPTP as a multiwinner method (basically the worst one), while plurality voting is a single winner method.

"FPTP as a multiwinner method" is often called Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV).
I have discussed the merits of SNTV in several Topics.
Just today, I voted for SNTV in a local special election.

My proposition is:
SNTV is the simplest change to multi-winner elections (currently N-votes where N is the number of winners) that would reduce the chances of winner-takes-all by the majority (At-Large Approval Voting).

SNTV is not the worst (nor the best) multi-winner method.
SNTV has several advantages over other common multi-winner methods, including:
Simplicity (choose one/precinct-countable, so simpler then ranked and ranged (except AV) methods)
Diversity (reduces the chances of winner-takes-all by the majority (At-Large Approval/Range Voting) with a slight advantage for minor parties/independents)
Proportionality (actually tends to improve as parties and voters become more strategic, since coordination reduces the number of wasted votes)
History (used by many governments prior to two-party domination)

On Monday, July 31, 2017 at 11:32:08 PM UTC-5, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Thanks for your thoughtful response, Steve. I'm going to quickly respond to you point-by-point. Thus, these responses will be generally less well-thought-out and less coherent than yours were. You have been warned.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to electionscien...@googlegroups.com.

Jeremy Macaluso

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Aug 1, 2017, 2:00:23 PM8/1/17
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You are talking about three different things, not two.

1. District Plurality: elects a council through multiple single winner elections. The actual districts are optional.
2. Multi-winner FPTP: an at-large election where each person votes for n candidates and the n candidates with the most votes all win.
3. SNTV/Limited voting: an at-large election where each person votes for 1 candidate and the n candidates with the most votes all win.

The first two are not proportional at all. The third one is semi-proportional - if everyone is knowledgeable and strategic it will be proportional, but it won't if people screw up.

Jameson Quinn

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Aug 1, 2017, 10:52:52 PM8/1/17
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2017-08-01 9:30 GMT-07:00 Brian Langstraat <langstra...@gmail.com>:
Jameson,

I disagree with your following statment:

Personally, I think of FPTP as a multiwinner method (basically the worst one), while plurality voting is a single winner method.

"FPTP as a multiwinner method" is often called Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV).
I have discussed the merits of SNTV in several Topics.
Just today, I voted for SNTV in a local special election.

I wasn't talking about SNTV. I was talking about FPTP: you need to elect a bunch of people to a legislature, so you divide the voters into districts/ridings/constituencies and let each area elect one person via choose-one plurality voting. That's FPTP, and it's a multi-winner system because there are lots of winners at the same time.
 
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Steve Cobb

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Aug 6, 2017, 2:44:15 AM8/6/17
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The GOLD voting method is clever, shifting the work from the many voters to the relatively few candidates. The former get a simple ballot like the current one, the latter are forced to declare in a meaningful way their preferences among themselves. That would be a huge cultural change. Note that GOLD is another allocational method, not a rating method; votes flow as discrete tokens. And it is precinct summable—Is there any non-allocational PR method that does not require retaining original ballots? 


>I'm not fully convinced by "choose-one plurality voting" but I could be.

You saw Aaron’s recent blog post defining a voting method:

https://electology.org/blog/what-voting-method

If a voting method consists of three elements, and is defined by those three elements, surely the name should be based on those three elements, or at least the most salient of them? Plurality Voting is thus a misleading name. FPTP might be a little less absurd name if it were used for multi-winner elections, but until your comment I’ve never heard that suggested. 

Steve Cobb

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Aug 6, 2017, 3:12:21 AM8/6/17
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I forgot to mention that GOLD's candidate-rating element requires candidates who are agents, or who have representative agents, and would not be suitable for other types of decisions.
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