end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

[Lynn Landes]

 

Although I just posted a number of news articles about allegations of election fraud, I also agree with ending all partisan discussions. I strongly support discussions about solutions, so here goes.

 

Trying to substantiate voting results using any kind of poll is hugely problematic. And voting software can flip votes so easily, without anyone noticing, that all someone has to do (a rigger from the inside or hacker from the outside) is to flip a large enough “vote total” so that a recount is not triggered – and consequently in most states - no hand count is allowed.  The bottom line is that either the machines have got to go entirely, or a hand count always takes place first, and then the machine count is used to verify the hand count, and not the other way around - as is the current practice.

 

That solution, however, does not address the issue of how to stop “old school” ballot dumping. And therein lies a bigger problem. The secret anonymous ballot is impossible to verify (trace to the voter) without a number or signature on it, keeping in mind before the Civil War the “secret ballot” was not widespread.  Voters must be able to verify for themselves that their votes were counted. So, either the voters must know their ballot number or verify their signature, and be able to check that number against their vote online.

 

Even that is not enough, because although a voter may be able to verify their vote with a number or a signature, what about everyone else’s votes?  The vote “totals” could be completely different and any legitimate audit would be hard, if not impossible, to do using numbers alone. Any auditor will tell you that a receipt, pay stub, etc. must be traceable to a person or company, otherwise it is not evidence of anything and is of no use.

 

And that’s been my argument for years – that the “secret ballot” is at the core of our voter verification dilemma. And although “open voting” has its downside (vote selling and intimidation), the public’s will must be recognized.  The unintended consequences of the secret ballot has been to encourage cowardice amongst our society, in that all this secrecy does not promote discussion or debate about issues and answers. Instead, we’ve become a secretive society afraid to speak its own mind and defend its own choices.

 

As far as politics are concerned, many voters are tired of picking teams (political parties that don’t represent many of their interests) and want to decide on issues individually. So, “direct democracy” in the form of binding or non-binding referendums is a way of ensuring the people’s will is respected. And there again, open voting is the only way we can ensure that our and everyone else’s vote was counted properly. 

 

I want to emphasize that “open voting” does have a down side, and the public may not accept it right away or at all. So maybe we should use number tracing for election verification, and see how that works.

 

Lynn Landes

http://www.thelandesreport.com/VotingSecurity.htm

 

[Paul Lehto]

Lynn is correct that the secret ballot makes elections fundamentally non-auditable in any meaningful sense of that word. My father was an IRS auditor and if tax returns were like ballots nobody would ever have to show receipts for deductions or credits. Simply put, that is no audit at all. And even when every voter can verify their ballot counted that does nothing to stop ballot box stuffing and all the recounts in the world never detect ballot box stuffing or "illegal votes" where they exist. 

But open voting, which Lynn admits has a downside, deserves to have that downside pointed to in the form of a long history of voter intimidation by bosses, employers, family members, spouses and others. The secret ballot historically was a reform in response to epidemics of voter intimidation and also vote selling such that almost every state constitution thought it important enough to be included. While I respect the desire to make a real election audit possible, going back to open voting corrupts elections in a different but powerful way.

Paper ballots hand counted in precincts with precinct posted results allows anyone to tabulate for themselves by organizing volunteers to check posted results. And it is simple genius to realize that although human beings are fallible, if you arrange fallible human beings in adversarial counting arrangements where they don't trust each other and they to catch errors in stacks of 10 for example, then out of this distrust comes a paradoxically treatable count! In fact hand counts featuring stacking are how counting machines are checked, and how we all verify our cash coming out of the ATM. It is just common sense experience that hand counts are the only way to go.

The only objection has been getting the people power sufficient to count. The solution is simple. Use the jury summonsing procedure to draft all the counters needed. Most people would be delighted to count votes for one historic night of democracy rather than serving on a two week jury trial.  Administratively this is utter doable once the political will is there.

Far from being a primitive system, properly done hand counted paper ballots are simple genius. They survive power outages, are inexpensive and low tech, anybody can understand and supervise. Most importantly they are the only system that protects our right to vote at the point where we need it the very most: to kick out a criminally corrupt incumbent government.

We may not agree which government or party is corrupt, but we all know corruption exists. And it is such childish simplicity to steal an election on a computer that if you computerize the elections, we all know that when we need the right to vote the most, we don't have it.  Why would we ever want a voting system that works like that?? 

Finally, for a voting system solution we ought to be clear about what we can ask of a voting technology and what we can't ask of the technology itself.  We can ask it to be low cost, work without power, not be corruptible by one or three people at any scale, and most importantly the main thing we can ask is that the voting system CREATES EVIDENCE of fraud.  

Visible and transparent paper ballots with good chain of custody creates evidence of fraud because people can see and observe and testify about shenanigans.  Any shenanigans are not just observable but isolated to the precinct level and thus involve small numbers of ballots, rarely enough to change a race. This is why we have 0.5% thresholds in numerous states for recounts it is a throwback understanding to hand counted paper ballots making it almost impossible for errors or fraud to exceed a tiny percentage. Those 0.5% recount thresholds are now totally archaic and inappropriate. 

HCPB give us everything we can reasonable ask for from evidence to the ability to run elections without power to guaranteeing our right to vote when we need it the very most.  All of the faults or frauds that can occur are not the fault of the voting system, they are problems of lawyers or prosecutors not acting, witnesses not speaking up, or breaks in chain of custody that weren't supposed to happen. In other words, the HCPB voting system has no faults, and any problems with it are not something we can ask a voting system to do. Other parts of the election create the few faults that come along, not the HCPB. It's simple and it's genius.

PAUL LEHTO, J.D.

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[Jonathan Simon]

Lynn -

 

This is something to which I've also given thought.

 

What about a process, as you describe below, in which each ballot is assigned a unique number, chosen by and known only to the voter who cast it and the image of every ballot is publicly posted by number (i.e., anonymously)? The individual voter could search and verify their ballot. And "watchdogs" could view and count all the ballots to verify the all-important aggregate count.

 

This is essentially a crowd-sourced two-step audit/verification process. The individual voters who checked their own ballots would essentially be performing a random audit. One could assume at least a 10% check rate - it would undoubtedly be much higher, especially for general elections of any import. That's a huge audit for ballot tampering or tossing - with huge deterrence impact. So a rigger couldn't risk altering/tossing any ballots.

 

Then the watchdogs would re-tabulate the whole set of ballots, which would serve as a check against what Lynn points out below is the tabulation process that remains absurdly vulnerable when the only verification is individual voters checking their own ballots.

 

That leaves only digital ballot box stuffing, the creation and casting of ballots with identifying numbers but no voter having cast them. These will not be checked by any voter - since no voter is privy to those identifying numbers - and they would be included in both the original tabulation and the verification tabulation. The answer here is simple: the verified tabulation of total ballots must match (i.e., not exceed) the hard record of voters signing in when they cast their ballots.

 

With all three checks in place, the ballot tracing and verifying process should effectively deter or detect any manipulation attempt, while not compromising ballot secrecy. I've looked at it from a rigger's standpoint and it appears to work. Thoughts?

 

Jonathan D. Simon

Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy

www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

[Lynn Landes]

 

Paul - Thank you for that thoughtful response. I would like to add:

 

1)     getting enough people to staff the polls should follow the “jury pool” model. People don’t volunteer for jury duty. They get drafted for it. And if you don’t show up, you can go to jail.

2)     Here is an article I wrote explaining the problems with the secret ballot - http://www.thelandesreport.com/SecretBallot.htm. In 1892, Grover Cleveland became the first American president to be elected by the secret ballot. It was no accident that the secret ballot was introduced after the Civil War, just as African Americans were getting the right to vote.  It  was no accident that nontransparent electronic ballot scanners and nontransparent exit polls by the major news networks (led by the AP) were introduced in 1964, just as the Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights Act were being passed. Basically, what one hand was giving to expand the voting franchise, the other hand was taking away any meaningful transparency to our elections.

 

Lynn Landes

http://www.thelandesreport.com/VotingSecurity.htm

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/CAD%3D1OvdkHhjScvkXzKRDT%3Dnc9Vf_Z1eByJCv1biwqdzpHAep8w%40mail.gmail.com.

[Lynn Landes]

 

Jonathan: Very interesting. My first caveat would be that the machine count acts as a verification for the hand count, and not the other way around. Why couldn’t we all see our own individual ballot and all of the other ballots per precinct, if they are anonymous, and add them up ourselves?   Lynn

 

From: Jonathan Simon [mailto:verified...@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 11:36 AM
To: lynnl...@gmail.com; Election...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ei] end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

 

Lynn -

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

Anything involving computers is going to be non-transparent, because you can't see what is going on inside the machines.  Therefore, the computers could be programmed to lie to voters checking their own ballots about what it received on their ballot (this even extends to manipulation of ballot images) -- store what the original result (including ballot image) was for reporting to the voter, but give a corrupted result to the tabulation program (including corrupted image if election officials check for that).

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-----Original Message-----
From: 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity <Election...@googlegroups.com>
To: lynnl...@gmail.com; Election...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, Nov 12, 2020 11:35 am
Subject: Re: [ei] end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

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[Lynn Landes]

 

Lucius - What if the voters can also see, check, and add up everyone else’s ballots, in that they would be anonymous, but numbered?

 

Lynn Landes

http://www.thelandesreport.com/VotingSecurity.htm

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/653619662.2851193.1605199884216%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Jonathan Simon]

Bruce - Mail-in voters can already verify their ballot. Half the country voted mail-in. I don't see any great evidence of coercion. To me it looks like a non-problem.

 

Jonathan D. Simon

Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy

www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

In a message dated 11/12/2020 11:15:12 AM Pacific Standard Time, bruce...@gmail.com writes:

 

Hi,

On 11/12/20 8:35 AM, 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity wrote:

 

Lynn -

 

This is something to which I've also given thought.

 

What about a process, as you describe below, in which each ballot is assigned a unique number, chosen by and known only to the voter who cast it and the image of every ballot is publicly posted by number (i.e., anonymously)? The individual voter could search and verify their ballot. And "watchdogs" could view and count all the ballots to verify the all-important aggregate count.

That cannot and must not be done. I do not favor being able to sell your vote. Or have voters subject to coercion. If a voter can "verify their ballot" they can sell their vote, period. Sorry. Just no way around that.

Cheers - Bruce

 

 

[Bruce Korb]

Hi,

On 11/12/20 8:35 AM, 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity wrote:

Lynn -

 

This is something to which I've also given thought.

 

What about a process, as you describe below, in which each ballot is assigned a unique number, chosen by and known only to the voter who cast it and the image of every ballot is publicly posted by number (i.e., anonymously)? The individual voter could search and verify their ballot. And "watchdogs" could view and count all the ballots to verify the all-important aggregate count.

That cannot and must not be done. I do not favor being able to sell your vote. Or have voters subject to coercion. If a voter can "verify their ballot" they can sell their vote, period. Sorry. Just no way around that.

Cheers - Bruce

[Elizabeth Walter]

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mark-brnovich-arizona-voter-fraud_n_5facc324
c5b6d647a39bca1c

Arizona’s GOP Attorney General: Trump likely lost State, no evidence of
fraud.





https://www.rawstory.com/2020/11/trump-ambassadors-claim-of-election-shenan
igans-in-pennsylvania-quickly-falls-apart/

On Thursday, The New York Times
<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/11/us/joe-biden-trump#a-us-ambassador-
claimed-her-absentee-ballot-was-not-counted-we-found-it-was> reported that a
diplomat in the Trump administration who claimed to be a “disenfranchised”
voter, did in fact have her ballot counted despite her claims to the
contrary.

From: 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity
<Election...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 8:36 AM
To: lynnl...@gmail.com; Election...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ei] end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

Author: <https://www.amazon.com/dp/B087H83JCR/ref> CODE RED: Computerized

Elections and the War on American Democracy

<http://www.codered2018.com> www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

In a message dated 11/12/2020 4:10:40 AM Pacific Standard Time,

lynnl...@gmail.com <mailto:lynnl...@gmail.com> writes:



Even that is not enough, because although a voter may be able to verify
their vote with a number or a signature, what about everyone else’s votes?
The vote “totals” could be completely different and any legitimate audit
would be hard, if not impossible, to do using numbers alone. Any auditor
will tell you that a receipt, pay stub, etc. must be traceable to a person
or company, otherwise it is not evidence of anything and is of no use.

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98937815%40mail.yahoo.com

<https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/1134042932.2860024.1605
198937815%40mail.yahoo.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> .

[Elizabeth Walter]

https://www.alternet.org/2020/11/pennsylvania-postal-worker-recants-claims-
of-voting-irregularities--says-that-project-veritas-penned-his-affidavit/


Pennsylvania postal worker recants claims of voting ‘irregularities’ — says
that Project Veritas penned his affidavit




Again, we need to be very careful that we focus on credible news sites, not
those that just claim to be “news” sites but are designed to spread
disinformation.



I am on board with Jonathan Simon’s analysis and the clear and present
danger concern.

From: 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity
<Election...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 8:36 AM
To: lynnl...@gmail.com; Election...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ei] end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

Author: <https://www.amazon.com/dp/B087H83JCR/ref> CODE RED: Computerized

Elections and the War on American Democracy

<http://www.codered2018.com> www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

In a message dated 11/12/2020 4:10:40 AM Pacific Standard Time,

lynnl...@gmail.com <mailto:lynnl...@gmail.com> writes:



Even that is not enough, because although a voter may be able to verify
their vote with a number or a signature, what about everyone else’s votes?
The vote “totals” could be completely different and any legitimate audit
would be hard, if not impossible, to do using numbers alone. Any auditor
will tell you that a receipt, pay stub, etc. must be traceable to a person
or company, otherwise it is not evidence of anything and is of no use.

[Bruce Korb]

Actually, they can't authoritatively verify their ballot. They can only authoritatively demonstrate that it was received and counted. As I was trying to demonstrate with a pair of images showing me voting for Biden and for tRUmp (I'd have to go resurrect the tRUmp one), images of voted ballots are not authoritative. Images can be shopped. Ballots can also be spoiled and re-voted. Proving how you voted is difficult. By design.

Also, we don't see any great evidence of coercion because we're not looking for it either. I've spoken with folks very interested in that and, to my knowledge, there have been _no_ rigorous studies on the issue. One solution I like would have VBM ballots held until after the election. Voters would have the opportunity to repudiate their VBM ballot and vote in person. That has a side effect of allowing candidates to drop out and voters being able to, consequently, change their mind. Anyway, in addition to a study, that scheme would be another way to see if coercion was a problem.

Cheers - Bruce

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

Last time I checked (on October 10, the day after putting my ballot in the Brookline Town Hall drop box), mail-in voters can only verify that the system says that their ballot was received and accepted.  The system could lie about that, and it says nothing about whether the ballot was counted the way you cast it.  I used the online system because it was all I could get, but for real verification, you would need continuous public observation(*) of the drop box and then of any ballot boxes to which the ballots were transferred, and public observation(*) of the hand counting(*) of the paper ballots.

(*)Public observation and ballot counting needs to use unrelated groups of people, so that 1 party can't dominate any of these procedures and have their way with them without somebody raising the alarm.

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[Lynn Landes]

 

Selling votes can occur now. All you need to do is take a photo of your filled-out ballot and send it to the person interested in paying you for your vote. 

 

Lynn Landes

http://www.thelandesreport.com/VotingSecurity.htm

 

From: election...@googlegroups.com [mailto:election...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruce Korb
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 2:15 PM
To: Election...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [ei] end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

 

Hi,

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[Jim Soper2]

re: One solution I like would have VBM ballots held until after the election. Voters would have the opportunity to repudiate their VBM ballot and vote in person. That has a side effect of allowing candidates to drop out and voters being able to, consequently, change their mind.

this is a helpful idea that should be tried out. A voter who felt unduly pressured, or taking a 'donation' could change their vote, making the whole process less reliable for the other party discouraging the practice. Exactly how they finally voted could then not be a public record. 

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[Paul Lehto]

As to Jonathan's proposal for every voter to cerify their ballot:  

Legally a requirement that voters verify their ballots would need to be written in such a way as to also modify the rule of evidence and cardinal principle in election law with zero exceptions Ive heard of that "NO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE" is never allowed to modify the interpretation of the four corners of the ballot. 

Thus, even if someone had impeccable video of a touch screen flipping their vote and it being accidentally cast for the wrong party without their knowledge that evidence would be absolutely inadmissible to impeach or modify what the ballot shows. Once you cast your vote for M. MOUSE, it is over. No do overs.

Once you open the door to extrinsic evidence with ballots the argument will be that you create universes of ambiguity and uncertainty in election results. E.g. how to distinguish an improper change of heart in ballot choice from a ballot image error or image manipulation fraud?  Or memory error? What are the administrative costs of the more OCD folks poring over their ballots like a document being edited and swamping election officials with requested changes? 

I've not thought this entirely through but believe this is something to think about

PAUL LEHTO, J.D.. 

On Thu, Nov 12, 2020, 8:35 AM 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity <Election...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

Lynn -

 

This is something to which I've also given thought.

 

What about a process, as you describe below, in which each ballot is assigned a unique number, chosen by and known only to the voter who cast it and the image of every ballot is publicly posted by number (i.e., anonymously)? The individual voter could search and verify their ballot. And "watchdogs" could view and count all the ballots to verify the all-important aggregate count.

 

This is essentially a crowd-sourced two-step audit/verification process. The individual voters who checked their own ballots would essentially be performing a random audit. One could assume at least a 10% check rate - it would undoubtedly be much higher, especially for general elections of any import. That's a huge audit for ballot tampering or tossing - with huge deterrence impact. So a rigger couldn't risk altering/tossing any ballots.

 

Then the watchdogs would re-tabulate the whole set of ballots, which would serve as a check against what Lynn points out below is the tabulation process that remains absurdly vulnerable when the only verification is individual voters checking their own ballots.

 

That leaves only digital ballot box stuffing, the creation and casting of ballots with identifying numbers but no voter having cast them. These will not be checked by any voter - since no voter is privy to those identifying numbers - and they would be included in both the original tabulation and the verification tabulation. The answer here is simple: the verified tabulation of total ballots must match (i.e., not exceed) the hard record of voters signing in when they cast their ballots.

 

With all three checks in place, the ballot tracing and verifying process should effectively deter or detect any manipulation attempt, while not compromising ballot secrecy. I've looked at it from a rigger's standpoint and it appears to work. Thoughts?

 

Jonathan D. Simon

Executive .

[Jonathan Simon]

Although Bruce is correct that such a photo or copy does not constitute "proof." You could trick the would-be coercer unless they took the trouble to examine your ballot and watch you drop it in mail or collection box. That's pretty labor-intensive for a scheme that depends on volume.

 

Jonathan D. Simon

Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy

www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/000901d6b93c%2480fe3cd0%2482fab670%24%40gmail.com.

[Jonathan Simon]

Thx Paul. Just to clarify, under my thought experiment (not quite yet a "proposal"), voters would not be required to certify (or even verify) their ballots, nor would every voter be expected to or need to check and verify their ballots. It would be an option open to voters - and the expectation is that enough of them would check and verify to serve as a "crowd-sourced" audit.

 

The idea is not for voters to be able to change individual ballots but only spot what they perceive to be alterations. If enough voters found such alterations it would be obvious that the election had been interfered with and investigation would presumably be undertaken. It would not be about voters curing their ballots. The idea is to have the same deterrent impact as a serious audit without concentrating the burden of such on the election administrators - instead distributing it among the electorate itself.

 

Of course it is open to mischief on the part of voters trying to disrupt the post-election process by crying wolf - falsely claiming their ballots do not reflect their intent. This is, as you suggest, a major potential problem, acknowledged.

 

Jonathan D. Simon

Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy

www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

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[Jennifer Tanner]

Yes Jonathan,, you had me with enough voters catching errors would get the right attention early, good idea,

and then you correctly identified those who will cry foul just to muck with the election. What to do??

Jennifer Tanner 

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/2116080116.3076061.1605284688867%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Jonathan Simon]

Not sure what to do, Jennifer. But whatever it might be I think can and must wait until the dust settles on the present crisis. - Jon

 

Jonathan D. Simon

Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy

www.CodeRed2020.com

@JonathanSimon14

617-538-6012

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/AEBFCAC5-4BB3-4581-A792-A9C16C52FDBD%40gmail.com.

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

As noted before, another source of mischief, if voters have to use a computer to check their ballot:  The computer could lie to them, so that the voters think nothing is wrong.  Doesn't have to be their own computer -- if the server that they have to go to for this is compromised with malware(*) that can do the equivalent of Photoshopping the corrupted ballots back to looking right when a voter asks to see them, they would have no way to find out, because they can't see what is going on inside the computer.

(*)Which could come from a cyberattack, but is also likely (probably even more likely) to come from an inside job and/or Urosevich-style vendor, so that system security is simply bypassed.

--
Lucius Chiaraviglio | luc...@verizon.net (main)
                    | lchi...@gmail.com (photos & BSRA)
                    | lchi...@yahoo.com (alternative)
                    | luc...@post.harvard.edu (fwd only)

-----Original Message-----
From: 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity <Election...@googlegroups.com>
To: jjtan...@gmail.com; Election...@googlegroups.com
Cc: lehto...@gmail.com
Sent: Fri, Nov 13, 2020 12:20 pm
Subject: Re: [ei] end debate, enter solutions regarding vote verification

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/1849817599.3088418.1605288035769%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Jennifer Tanner]

Agreed. Its a waiting game and a praying game.  And quiet brainstorming for the future now that many more people will be aware that elections need to be secure and they really are not

Jennifer 

[Bruce Korb]

What concerns me is that so few voters actually do the validation and most of those who do can't spot the discrepancy. In other words, they don't actually validate. There is a handful left who actually do the validation by comparing the ballot with their filled out sample ballot. Assuming that malware only flips a small fraction of the votes, that means only a small fraction of the handful of voters would notice. How do you distinguish these very few from troublemakers? Or it just being an inexplicable anomaly? Putting voters into the loop just doesn't seem like a fruitful road to travel.

I still think Philip Stark has the right idea: post-cast stamp the ballots with a unique pseudo random number in order to bind images and paper together, then publish _all_ ballot images. The images can be used to validate the count and the unique numbers used to ensure that all ballots are accounted for.

-  Bruce

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/AEBFCAC5-4BB3-4581-A792-A9C16C52FDBD%40gmail.com.

[Randy Moor]

Lucius,

So I look up my number and see my own ballot as cast. But if I download all ballots to do my own tabulations I may get doctored ballots that match official announced doctored results. Is that what you are saying?

 

Couldn’t I get around that by downloading all ballots just to get a list of all the numbers identifying ballots and then looking up each ballot identification number individually to see all the ballots as actually cast? Or alternatively couldn’t I just download all ballots and look up my own ballot within that data set? How would the computer know to doctor just my own ballot in that all-ballots set?

 

Perhaps I’m missing something but you seem to be ignoring the second step of Jonathan’s two-step verification/audit process which is to make available the whole set of ballots to those who want to tabulate all the ballots themselves.

 

Randy Moor

 

From: 'Lucius Chiaraviglio' via Election Integrity

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/1852487858.3093047.1605288853739%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

Doctoring (or un-doctoring) the number of ballots differently depending upon which ones you tried to download would certainly be within the capabilities of malicious programmers to arrange.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/F42EA5A2CD1748C3B3E29BA353F78FBB%40tablet.

[Luis Mochan]

I wonder if the following proposal has been discussed in this group:

Ronald L. Rivest (2006). "The ThreeBallot Voting System",
http://bit.ly/2j7ISb7
http://theory.csail.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf

The main idea is that asking the voter to fill not one, but three
balots subject to certain rules (among the three ballots all
candidates must get exactly one vote, except for the desired candidate,
which should get exactly two votes; multiple or no candidates may be
marked in each individual ballot as long as the previous rule is obeyed). The
ballots are marked with a unique random number and the voter is given
back a copy of one of his ballots, chosen by him. With this scheme, it
is possible to have both secret and verifiable votes. The vote in the
chosen ballot can be verified by the voter or it could be verified
together with others by a third party without compromising the secrecy
of the actual vote (the ballot that is kept cannot show which
candidate got the necessary second vote; that would required a copy of
at least another of the three ballots). Implementation would have its
subtleties/difficulties, but I found it an interesting idea.

I wrote a few years back simplified description of the scheme (in
Spanish) here: http://bit.ly/2FEIagb

Regards,
Luis

On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 09:53:14AM -0800, Jennifer Tanner wrote:
> Agreed. Its a waiting game and a praying game. And quiet brainstorming for the future now that many more people will be aware that elections need to be secure and they really are not
> Jennifer
>
> > On Nov 13, 2020, at 9:20 AM, Jonathan Simon <verified...@aol.com> wrote:
> >
> > Not sure what to do, Jennifer. But whatever it might be I think can and must wait until the dust settles on the present crisis. - Jon
> >
> > Jonathan D. Simon
> > Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

> > Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy <https://www.amazon.com/dp/B087H83JCR/ref>
> > www.CodeRed2020.com <http://www.codered2018.com/>

> > @JonathanSimon14
> > 617-538-6012
> > In a message dated 11/13/2020 9:17:32 AM Pacific Standard Time, jjtan...@gmail.com writes:
> >
> > Yes Jonathan,, you had me with enough voters catching errors would get the right attention early, good idea,
> > and then you correctly identified those who will cry foul just to muck with the election. What to do??
> > Jennifer Tanner
> >
> > On Nov 13, 2020, at 8:24 AM, 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity <Election...@googlegroups.com <mailto:Election...@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
> >
> > Thx Paul. Just to clarify, under my thought experiment (not quite yet a "proposal"), voters would not be required to certify (or even verify) their ballots, nor would every voter be expected to or need to check and verify their ballots. It would be an option open to voters - and the expectation is that enough of them would check and verify to serve as a "crowd-sourced" audit.
> >
> > The idea is not for voters to be able to change individual ballots but only spot what they perceive to be alterations. If enough voters found such alterations it would be obvious that the election had been interfered with and investigation would presumably be undertaken. It would not be about voters curing their ballots. The idea is to have the same deterrent impact as a serious audit without concentrating the burden of such on the election administrators - instead distributing it among the electorate itself.
> >
> > Of course it is open to mischief on the part of voters trying to disrupt the post-election process by crying wolf - falsely claiming their ballots do not reflect their intent. This is, as you suggest, a major potential problem, acknowledged.
> >
> > Jonathan D. Simon
> > Executive Director, Election Defense Alliance (2006 - 2016)

> > Author: CODE RED: Computerized Elections and the War on American Democracy <https://www.amazon.com/dp/B087H83JCR/ref>
> > www.CodeRed2020.com <http://www.codered2018.com/>
> > @JonathanSimon14
> > 617-538-6012

> > In a message dated 11/13/2020 7:46:21 AM Pacific Standard Time, lehto...@gmail.com <mailto:lehto...@gmail.com> writes:
> >
> >
> > As to Jonathan's proposal for every voter to cerify their ballot:
> >
> > Legally a requirement that voters verify their ballots would need to be written in such a way as to also modify the rule of evidence and cardinal principle in election law with zero exceptions Ive heard of that "NO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE" is never allowed to modify the interpretation of the four corners of the ballot.
> >
> > Thus, even if someone had impeccable video of a touch screen flipping their vote and it being accidentally cast for the wrong party without their knowledge that evidence would be absolutely inadmissible to impeach or modify what the ballot shows. Once you cast your vote for M. MOUSE, it is over. No do overs.
> >
> > Once you open the door to extrinsic evidence with ballots the argument will be that you create universes of ambiguity and uncertainty in election results. E.g. how to distinguish an improper change of heart in ballot choice from a ballot image error or image manipulation fraud? Or memory error? What are the administrative costs of the more OCD folks poring over their ballots like a document being edited and swamping election officials with requested changes?
> >
> > I've not thought this entirely through but believe this is something to think about
> >
> > PAUL LEHTO, J.D..
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 12, 2020, 8:35 AM 'Jonathan Simon' via Election Integrity <Election...@googlegroups.com <mailto:Election...@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
> > Lynn -
> >
> > This is something to which I've also given thought.
> >
> > What about a process, as you describe below, in which each ballot is assigned a unique number, chosen by and known only to the voter who cast it and the image of every ballot is publicly posted by number (i.e., anonymously)? The individual voter could search and verify their ballot. And "watchdogs" could view and count all the ballots to verify the all-important aggregate count.
> >
> > This is essentially a crowd-sourced two-step audit/verification process. The individual voters who checked their own ballots would essentially be performing a random audit. One could assume at least a 10% check rate - it would undoubtedly be much higher, especially for general elections of any import. That's a huge audit for ballot tampering or tossing - with huge deterrence impact. So a rigger couldn't risk altering/tossing any ballots.
> >
> > Then the watchdogs would re-tabulate the whole set of ballots, which would serve as a check against what Lynn points out below is the tabulation process that remains absurdly vulnerable when the only verification is individual voters checking their own ballots.
> >
> > That leaves only digital ballot box stuffing, the creation and casting of ballots with identifying numbers but no voter having cast them. These will not be checked by any voter - since no voter is privy to those identifying numbers - and they would be included in both the original tabulation and the verification tabulation. The answer here is simple: the verified tabulation of total ballots must match (i.e., not exceed) the hard record of voters signing in when they cast their ballots.
> >
> > With all three checks in place, the ballot tracing and verifying process should effectively deter or detect any manipulation attempt, while not compromising ballot secrecy. I've looked at it from a rigger's standpoint and it appears to work. Thoughts?
> >
> > Jonathan D. Simon
> > Executive .
> > --

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--

o
W. Luis Mochán, | tel:(52)(777)329-1734 /<(*)
Instituto de Ciencias Físicas, UNAM | fax:(52)(777)317-5388 `>/ /\
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[Randy Moor]

If I download the set of all ballots how would the computer program know the number on my particular ballot?

 

It would need that in order to show me my ballot as cast (so I will be satisfied mine was recorded correctly) while showing enough of the other ballots doctored so that when I tabulate them the results match the official announced results.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/511173048.3137202.1605304625560%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Bruce Korb]

On 11/13/20 4:37 PM, Luis Mochan wrote:
> Ronald L. Rivest (2006). "The ThreeBallot Voting System",
> http://bit.ly/2j7ISb7
> http://theory.csail.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf
>
> The main idea is that asking the voter to fill not one, but three
> balots subject to certain rules (among the three ballots all
> candidates must get exactly one vote, except for the desired candidate,
> which should get exactly two votes; multiple or no candidates may be
> marked in each individual ballot as long as the previous rule is obeyed). The
> ballots are marked with a unique random number and the voter is given
> back a copy of one of his ballots, chosen by him. With this scheme, it
> is possible to have both secret and verifiable votes. The vote in the
> chosen ballot can be verified by the voter or it could be verified
> together with others by a third party without compromising the secrecy
> of the actual vote (the ballot that is kept cannot show which
> candidate got the necessary second vote; that would required a copy of
> at least another of the three ballots). Implementation would have its
> subtleties/difficulties, but I found it an interesting idea.
>
> I wrote a few years back simplified description of the scheme (in
> Spanish) here: http://bit.ly/2FEIagb

It is very clever. We already have problems with the occasional under
and/or over vote. Imagine how many ballots you'd see with only
"candidato 3" marked just once.

In other words, can you explain the voting to a 5 year old? If not, it's
too complicated. KISS. Use one paper ballot.

(Your paper ought to add a Figura 7 with just one ballot marked once
with Candidato 3. My wild guess would be that would be all too common.)

- Bruce

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

If it knows your ID and when your ballot was cast (in-person) or received (mail-in), then it can block out a range of ballots to show as non-suspicious on the basis of time (picking a range to be large enough to minimize the risk that it accidentally shows you your corrupted ballot), from the name that it isn't supposed to know but that a competent election thief will have programmed the computer to store anyway, for matching up to who you are when you sign on to download the ballot images.  If worst comes to worst (from the vote thieves' point of view -- like they couldn't work out a scheme to make sure the program got your personal information from the receipt of the ballot), they can just rely on the fact that they usually need only a few percent wholesale election fraud to put them over the top -- your ballot has only a few percent chance of not matching what you cast.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/43D7EBE1D26240878BFD31EA68044FB2%40tablet.

[Luis Mochan]

I agree it is not too simple to explain. On the other hand, errors such as not
marking every candidate at least once, marking more than one candidate
twice or marking one candidate three times are avoidable using an
electromechanical device to mark the ballots. It could be a dumb
device (not a hackable computer) that marks the paper
ballots only when after voter selections agree with the rules (and
they are deposited in the ballot box only after the voter verifies
them). Maybe small scale experiments can be performed and analyzed
before attempting to implement this scheme on a large scale.

It would be nice though to find simpler schemes that allow both
secrecy and verifiablility.

Regards,
Luis



>
> - Bruce

>
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[Bruce Korb]

You cannot determine which one is yours. Were that possible, then you could sell your vote by proving how you voted. The only method for ensuring ballot image integrity is being able to find the paper for every image and also being able to find the image for every paper ballot. If your ballot selections were unique, then you could theoretically find your ballot. I don't think such an approach would be an effective integrity attack vector though.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/43D7EBE1D26240878BFD31EA68044FB2%40tablet.

[Randy Moor]

Within the two-step verification/audit process we are discussing (described below) I would know my ballot number because it is “chosen by and known only to the voter who cast it.” But perhaps the process would be unacceptable after all because of the vote-selling potential you cite. 

[Randy Moor]

It would not be necessary to request a certain ballot number at all if we had the alternative to download all ballots or to do a search on a watchdog website that has downloaded the full list. Of course those sites potentially could deceive you too but presumably there would be many to choose from and double check.

 

But your final point convinces me that the two step verification process would not be likely to catch vote stealing and overturn a Presidential race. They are won in the swing states where stealing a few percent of votes would pass under the radar. It would be easily dismissed and ignored by the vote counters, the parties, and the press.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/584495648.3242455.1605372073120%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Lucius Chiaraviglio]

It's not often that I succeed in getting somebody to change their mind.  I appreciate your honest conversation about this.  You did make me think (although I do have to admit that I have a built-in tendency to think evil -- I guess it's useful for this kind of thing, though).

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/B8A067CC49704EBBBF99F9C70A743288%40tablet.

[Randy Moor]

I appreciate your honest engagement as well, and your willingness to discuss.

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/390707129.3267272.1605391150213%40mail.yahoo.com.

[Allegra Dengler]

There’s a huge danger here in abandoning the secret ballot.  If a voter can prove who they voted for, they can be bribed or intimidated into voting contrary to their wishes.  For example, the battered  spouse of a Proud Boy. 

The secret ballot was a significant reform in the progressive era.  It’s under threat now, including in NY where a bill has been introduced that would allow voters to take selfies of their ballot in the polling place.  I urge everyone on this list to weigh every proposed reform as to whether it would undermine the secret ballot.

Allegra

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ElectionIntegrity/c65a5740-1b35-04fa-116f-08f57d240139%40gmail.com.

[oli6...@aol.com]

The secret ballot is important.  It can be preserved while providing the voter with positive feedback that the vote was counted as cast.  The assumption that one is incompatible with the other is valid with current systems but not necessarily valid about future systems. The idea of allowing selfies in the polling place is a poor type of reform to patch up the present systems and provides only proof of how the vote was cast and no proof that the vote was counted as cast.

There is a lot of discussion on this site about one concern or the other many of which are valid, but none help in the search for a complete solution.  

To achieve Election Integrity one has to set out the requirements for a complete system rather than piecemeal reforms of the current systems which are riddled with anomalies.  One cannot design system by committee such as ourselves, but we could define the requirements.  That would comprise a worthwhile undertaking.

What we are doing will never achieve the result we all crave.     

 

The only safe means of ensuring transparent and verifiable results requires a system approach which publicly confirms how each vote was counted in the context of substantiating the result.   Proof which falls short of doing this is insufficient.  This proof can be furnished to the voter in a form which is both public and anonymous.  This conundrum can be solved by using currently available technology;  but not by starting with the currently used technology, concepts and baggage.  

The EI community needs to support any system which is universally available and provides end to end proof to individual voters that their vote was properly attributed to their chosen candidate and that all votes are published in the context of substantiating the declared result.

This superior level of proof could be achieved if the EI community could overcome its prejudice against on-line electronic systems.   A less effective paper system could partially emulate an electronic system, but paper does not have the same ability to encrypt data end-to-end so that it can be securely transmitted in an unintelligible form until it can be decrypted and counted in parallel by officials and observers.  Safe custody is crucial in voting systems; but also crucially absent in both paper and electronic voting system in current use.  These functionally superior attributes would achieve publicly accountable and verifiable elections.  This level of observation of the process and its performance would exceed what was ever possible with exit polls.

The crucial advantage of end-to end verification means that any attempt to subvert the vote is detectable.  In computer science the ability to test a system effectively requires satisfying two criteria:

The test conditions must be identical to the those in which the system is deployed – currently not the case.

Errors are equally detectable in both situations – not currently the case.

Error detection is the minimum level of security of any operational system and no current electronic system incorporates this requirement in its design.  By definition they are all “unfit for purpose”.     

The basic requirement for the security of any operational system is that any error is detectable.   Current systems do not meet this standard.  The fact is that the tests conducted in the testing environment do not transfer a sufficient level of proof to their use in an operational environment.

Some recent contributors to the group have urged that EI requires us to support the notion that elections need to provide positive proof of the result rather than ferret around the outside wondering if anyone knows what went on.   I totally agree.

Quite apart from advocating EI in the current system maybe we should advocate for direct election to the President.  Features of the present system make it overly sensitive to anomalies which hugely distort the importance of votes in a few fringe precincts.  To avoid these undemocratic features direct voting would level all votes and makes all voters equal.

 

Peter Oliver

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[Bob Klauber]

A friend of mine likes to say "Vote in secret. Count votes in public."  Maybe a good slogan for us to adopt. Short, not too convoluted for the person on the street, brings home the message in a few words. Something everyone can grok and accept.