Many thanks to all who have shared information about their recent publications with us!
Because there are too many publications to share each individually, I list all of them below in a sort of digest. We will also spread the news about these publications through our social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter) in the coming weeks, presumably not all at once as it may be a bit too much for the nature of social media.
Note: If you would like us to showcase your recent publications in philosophy of science (broadly conceived), please see my previous email or the website listed above for instructions.
Publications are listed by year, then in alphabetical order (first author's first name).Published in 2021Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences), Marek Havlík (National Institute of Mental Health, Klecany)
Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness?
New Ideas in Psychology 61.
Abstract:
Predictive
Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and
philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive
phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the
theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious
perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is
realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory
cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception
in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly
concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine
material substrate of consciousness untouched.
Link:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0732118X20302129?via%3DihubPublished in 2020Agustina Borella (ESEADE University Institute, Argentina)
TRAZOS Ensayos de Filosofía para el Mundo Social. Grupo Unión, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
Abstract:
Entender
algo sobre un mundo que se nos presenta de modo desordenado e
incompleto constituye buena parte de la tarea de la filosofía y de la
ciencia.
La
racionalidad, los modelos, y el mundo social introducen preocupaciones
propias de la filosofía de la ciencia en general y de la epistemología
de la economía en particular.
Los
aportes de Popper, Lawson, Mäki, Hayek y Cartwright se expresan en
estos trazos como intentos abiertos para alcanzar a comprender nuestro
mundo.
English:
To
understand something about a world, that is presented to us in a
disorderly and incomplete way, is a large part of the task of philosophy
and science.
Rationality,
models and the social world introduce specific issues of philosophy of
science in general and of epistemology of economics in particular.
The
contributions of Popper, Lawson, Maki, Hayek and Cartwright are
expressed in these strokes as open attempts to understand our world.
Link to the book:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B08FMSXNQV/ref=cm_sw_r_fa_dp_DcSnFb3XRPQQH?fbclid=IwAR1XsryCgzcCZjlbztz_hI17g1XMm0FFSpPDKNff11um1p03I3_qHmiqDi8 Anguel S. Stefanov (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
Space and Time: Philosophical Problems. Minkowski Institute Press, Montreal.
Abstract:
The
monograph comprises interconnected philosophical analyses of issues
related to the nature of space, time and spacetime – that of the very
existence of space and time, transcendental philosophy of space and
time, whether there exists a middle way between the A- and B-theories of
time, the growing block theory, the phenomenology of temporal passage,
whether time flows at any rate, the relationalist-substantivalist debate
and time travel. Two essays on Zeno’s paradoxes and on the arrow of
time and irreversible processes are included as appendices. The book can
also serve as a textbook of a course on the philosophy of space, time
and spacetime.
Link:
http://www.minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/books/stefanov2.html Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Euclid’s Kinds and (Their) Attributes.
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(2), 362-397.
Abstract:
Relying
upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s
Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a
philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show
that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between (i)
substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, (ii) different
kinds of substance, and (iii) different kinds of non-substance. While
the general meta-physical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that
of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s
terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at all. Instead,
Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish
between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object.
Link:
https://philpapers.org/rec/WILEKABenjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy)
Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?: Geometry and Scepticism Reconsidered.
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 23(1), 253-288.
Abstract:
In
this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the
application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend
belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing
arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since
Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical
definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that
Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However,
commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations
in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient
geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why
they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various
strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical
definitions.
Link:
https://philpapers.org/rec/WILCTP-9 Borut Trpin (MCMP/LMU Munich)
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution.
Philosophical Studies, 177(10), 2985-3012.
Abstract:
It
has been argued that if the rigidity condition is satisfied, a rational
agent operating with uncertain evidence should update her subjective
probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) or else a series of
bets resulting in a sure loss could be made against her (the Dynamic
Dutch Book Argument). We show, however, that even if the rigidity
condition is satisfied, it is not always safe to update probability
distributions by JC because there exist such sequences of non-misleading
uncertain observations where it may be foreseen that an agent who
updates her subjective probabilities by JC will end up nearly certain
that a false hypothesis is true. We analyze the features of JC that lead
to this problem, specify the conditions in which it arises and respond
to potential objections.
Link:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3 Tomáš Marvan (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences), Michal Polák (University of West Bohemia, Pilsen)
Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II).
Abstract:
The
claim of this paper is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious
perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the
processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate
of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents
conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two
constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a
consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a
perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between
content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper
elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its
favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of
consciousness.
Link:
https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/61 Vassil Vidinsky (Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”)
(Post) phenomenological Approach to Homo Sapiens Technicus.
Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), 31-36.
Abstract:
In
this paper I use a (post)phenomenological approach to clarify the
objective cultural expansion of our technology. Thus, I establish a
conceptual analogy between two different philosophical analyses of
human–machine relations – one historical and one phenomenological. I
develop the analogy between them and their corresponding concepts in
several steps. (1) First, I present the Homo sapiens technicus tendency
and then the phenomenological differentiation between body schema and
body image. All of these elucidate our involvement with machines. (2)
Then, I conceptualize the term ‘context’, coupling its structural
stability with the idea of distextaulity in order to achieve a better
empirical understanding of our technological contradictions. (3) I
continue to develop and enrich the analogy by illuminating the
functional similarities – fluid boundary, automation, complexity –
between contextual structures on the one hand and body schemata on the
other. (4) Finally, I explore a deeper causal and narrative connection
between those strands, shedding light on an interesting twofold
circularity: a circular causation and a double narrative within Homo
sapiens technicus.
Link:
https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20201215