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Anna Martin

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Mar 30, 2026, 7:56:25 AMMar 30
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Dear EENPS members,

The 36th round of our newsletter is available under the link and also pasted below.

Enjoy! 
 
Best wishes,
Anna Martin
(Member of the Steering Committee)

***

36th Round


Elena Popa, University of Seville 

Jay Zameska, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

Causal pluralism and public health ethics trade‐offs: a toolkit for acting on social determinants of healthPhilosophy Compass, 20(11), e70064.

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to specify causal pluralism through considerations from public health ethics for causal analyses featuring social determinants of health. We will argue that choosing approaches to causality within a pluralistic framework can be informed by ethical considerations. More specifically, we will show how different conceptions of justice set different explanatory demands and how those demands constrain which causal concepts are appropriate to use. We will particularly illustrate this by examining how these causal concepts differentially support competing theories of justice, namely distributive and relational conceptions of justice, in the context of understanding and addressing health inequalities linked to social determinants like income inequality. We will further argue that this strategy can be employed more broadly to different causal concepts and ethical priorities.

 

Gabriel Târziu, Leibniz Universität Hannover

The power of knowledge, Episteme 22(4), 2025, 1074-1093.doi:10.1017/epi.2025.10059

ABSTRACT

According to a well-known aphorism attributed to Francis Bacon, knowledge is power. But what does it mean for knowledge to be power? This paper addresses the question not by offering a new theory of knowledge, but by examining how, and under what conditions, knowledge places an epistemic subject at an advantage over those who lack it. The account developed here does two things: first, it explicates the widely held intuition that possessing knowledge confers an empowering advantage; second, it explains why, in certain contexts, increased knowledge can paradoxically generate a sense of powerlessness. This account diverges from both causal and practicalist views of the power of knowledge: the former takes power to be a causal consequence of possessing knowledge, while the latter understands knowledge as inherently linked with the ability to perform potentially useful actions. In contrast, I argue that the power of knowledge is best understood as a probabilistic advantage, namely, an increase in the likelihood that an epistemic subject will be more successful in interacting with the outside world.

 

 

 

 

Gabriel Târziu, Leibniz Universität Hannover

What is the IPCC’s assessment style, and what shaped it?, Open Research Europe 4, 2024.

ABSTRACT

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is one of the best-known global expert organizations. Its main objective is to supply policymakers with policy-relevant recent scientific information about climate change. The way in which the IPCC is obtaining this information is called an assessment. But assessments can be performed in a wide variety of ways. An important step, then, in understanding what this important organization does and why, is to figure out what characterizes the particular type of assessment it performs. The main objective of this paper is to contribute to the literature dedicated to understanding the work of IPCC by outlining the characteristics of the IPCC's assessment style and providing an in-depth analysis of the factors that have contributed to its development. As it will be argued here, understanding the climate-scientific-specific obstacles that had to be overcome by the IPCC in the process of pursuing its objectives is crucial for understanding why the IPCC is performing the type of assessment that it does and also for understanding some of the most important controversies associated with it.

 

Gabriel Târziu, Leibniz Universität Hannover

What does it mean, what does it take, and why is it important to understand climate change?, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 11, 959, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03481-9

ABSTRACT

What kind of cognitive state occupies the central stage in our interest in the phenomenon of climate change? What exactly is required to achieve this cognitive state? This paper addresses these questions from a purely conceptual footing by delving into the recent philosophical literature on the nature of understanding. As it will be argued, given the cognitive benefits associated with this state and the (mostly) practical concerns underpinning it in this context, understanding is what we are after, at a cognitive level, when we are interested in climate change. Knowing this is important because it can be used to further determine (in a purely conceptual way) what is required to achieve this cognitive state as well as who can achieve it. Much of the discussion in this paper is devoted to showing that understanding climate change is a highly demanding cognitive state that can be achieved to different degrees and that requires different things depending on what we take ‘climate’ and ‘climate change’ to mean. The most important implication of this discussion concerns the level of understanding of this phenomenon that is achievable by laypeople: even though gaining a basic degree of understanding of climate change isn’t above laypeople’s capacities, when it comes to making the connection between climate change and the kind of phenomena that can negatively impact our society (e.g., extreme weather events), laypeople cannot do better than to trust the scientists.

Jakub Mihálik, Czech Academy of Sciences

Tomas Marvan, Czech Academy of Sciences

Neurophenomenal structuralism as a general theory of consciousness?, Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 6, 2025, https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2025.11821

https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/11821

ABSTRACT

While neurophenomenal structuralism (NPS) is typically viewed as an account of why an experience, i.e. a conscious mental state, has a specific phenomenal character, Sascha Fink has suggested that NPS might also account for why one has an experience in the first place. According to Fink, the character-determining structures are incorporated in larger (meta-)structures that make the incorporated structures conscious, while also contributing their own Gestalt-related phenomenology. We examine the commitments of such generalized ‘NPS+’, formulating three challenges for Fink’s approach. According to the unconsciously perceived gist objection, there is evidence for unconscious Gestalten, which suggests that the Gestalt-forming mechanism fails to make the relevant mental state conscious. Moreover, the existence of Ganzfeld experiences suggests that some experiences lack Gestalt-structures. Thirdly, as we explain, proponents of one-factor NPS+ face the mirroring dilemma of having to choose between a vicious regress of incorporating structures, and compromising their theory’s methodological promise. We then formulate two challenges for any two-factor form of NPS+: The more of the same challenge concerns the question of why adding more structures to content-related structural features makes these features conscious, while the structure-selection challenge concerns the question of why some neural structures, but not others, are selected for consciousness.

 

Andrew R., Dykstra, University of Central Florida

Yunkai Zhu, University of Central Florida

Carolina Fernandez Pujol, Brown University

David W. Zhou, Brown University

Stephanie R. Jones, Brown University

Tomas Marvan, University of West Bohemia

James J. Bonaiuto, Institut des Sciences Cognitives Marc Jeannerod & Université de Lyon, France

Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humansTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 30(3), 226–238, 2026.

https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613%2825%2900237-2


ABSTRACT

Our understanding of the neural basis of consciousness is mostly restricted to large-scale brain activity patterns as measured by methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magneto/electro-encephalography (M/EEG). In contrast, we lack even basic understanding of circuit-level mechanisms supporting consciousness – particularly in humans – despite the fundamental role that such mechanisms likely play in instantiating larger-scale brain activity patterns supporting conscious states and contents. Here, we review what progress has been made on circuit-level theories of consciousness (e.g., apical amplification theory, dendritic integration theory) and argue that such theories can be tested in humans using recently developed, state-of-the-art methods. Doing so will further facilitate translation of consciousness science into clinical settings and strengthen the bridge between circuit- and network-level theories of consciousness.

 

Matias Pasqualini, Universidad Nacional de Rosario

The principle of composition and decomposition of properties in modal interpretations of quantum mechanics, Culturas Científicas, 6(1), 2025. https://www.revistas.usach.cl/ojs/index.php/culturas/article/view/7883.

 

Sebastian Fortin, Universidad de Buenos Airos

Matias Pasqualini, Universidad Nacional de Rosario

Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the ontology of phonons, Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 62(4), 114–132. https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202562462.

ABSTRACT

The philosophy of science in general, and the philosophy of physics in particular, have increasingly focused on cases of reduction and emergence in recent decades. While the paradigmatic examples arise in the context of thermodynamics and classical statistical mechanics, relevant cases have also emerged in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, such as that of quasiparticles. Traditionally, these entities have been regarded as mere mathematical tools that do not contribute to the construction of quantum ontology. However, this position has recently been challenged, and frameworks have been proposed in which some of these objects acquire a significant ontological status. In particular, phonons have been considered a case of emergence that may have either an epistemic or an ontological character. In this paper, we further enrich the discussion by emphasizing that quantum mechanics only refers to entities in the real world through the adoption of a specific interpretation. A century after the development of quantum theory, there is still no consensus on how to interpret it, and multiple competing interpretations are currently proposed. Consequently, the outcome may vary depending on the interpretation adopted. Based on this, we will show that the choice of interpretation not only influences the conceptual understanding of quantum mechanics but also determines the identification of its fundamental entities. Specifically, we will argue that, under the Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation, phonons acquire a fundamental status, challenging the standard reading of their emergence and their relationship to quantum ontology.

 

Matias Pasqualini, Universidad Nacional de Rosario

Quantum entanglement as an internal relation, Análisis Filosófico 45, 2025, Special Issue, 695721. https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1122.

ABSTRACT*

The metaphysical nature of quantum entanglement is a topic that has attracted the attention of philosophers of physics over the past decades. Entanglement has been characterized as a relation that does not supervene on the non-relational properties of its relata. Moreover, entanglement has been invoked to support several innovative metaphysical proposals, now established within the metaphysics of science, such as structuralism, monism, and, more recently, coherentism. This article defends a non‑reductionist view regarding internal relations. To do so, it draws on Fine’s analysis of propositions involving essential properties. Assuming that quantum entanglement is a widespread phenomenon, it is argued that it is preferable to consider quantum entanglement as an internal relation, in the sense of an essential relation. Entanglement understood in this way can be accommodated within different metaphysical frameworks: (1) as a fundamental internal relation, it fits structuralism; (2) as a derivative internal relation, it fits monism; (3) as a relation of dependence, it fits coherentism.

*Translated from Spanish via Copilot

 

Ivan Boldyrev, Radboud University

History and Philosophy of Market Design: Mathematical Politics of Resource Allocation, in Y. Shan, Y. (eds.) History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (263–284), Springer, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-08167-4_13

ABSTRACT

The standard economic problem of optimally allocating scarce resources has, over recent decades, evolved into a set of practical and consequential policy interventions on the part of economists. Key fields of (mostly game-theoretic) microeconomics—social choice and mechanism design—have joined forces with experimental economics and, more recently, computer science to help ‘build economic machines’ (Guala 2001). In fact, a substantial share of today’s theoretical microeconomic research is directly or indirectly related to market design. It would be fair to say that the field became a key driver in the development of ‘theory’ in economics. The chapter explores the emergence of market design and its major conceptual and policy achievements. It argues that this field prompts us to challenge the traditional notion of economic models as epistemic artifacts devised by scholars to solely understand the world. Market design models also serve as instruments for intervention and accompany the actual design process in a way that could be ‘performative’. The chapter reviews existing critical work on market design, which attempts to make sense of the specific cases, contexts, and conceptual/epistemic significance of market design interventions. It also reflects on research challenges and offers some general insights drawn from the survey.

 

Javier Pérez-Jara, the University of Seville, Yale University

Íñigo Ongay, the University of Deusto

Beyond Nature and Nurture: Perspectives on Human Multidimensionality, J. Pérez-Jara & Í. Ongay (eds.), Springer 2026.

ABSTRACT

This book gathers several of the world’s leading scholars in the nature vs. nurture debate, offering a timely reconsideration of the dynamic interactions between physical, chemical, biological, social, and cultural factors that shape human multidimensionality. Emphasizing this multidimensionality, this edited volume seeks to bridge the divide between biology and social theory—two research communities that have too often overlooked each other. These disciplines, despite being central to understanding human nature, have long operated in isolation.

While some animal species exhibit higher degrees of phenotypic plasticity in specific traits, humans stand out as the most plastic species in both their neurological and sociocultural systems. This plasticity leads the contributors of this book to move beyond both biological reductionism and the blank-slate hypothesis. While biology undoubtedly plays a role in shaping and stabilizing human social and cultural processes, it does so only within the framework of an inherently social environment—one shaped by historically contingent and socially constructed realities, such as values, codes, and cultural perceptions. More importantly, cultural structures and social interactions actively shape and transform certain biological features that were once considered immutable.

This book lays the groundwork for a productive dialogue among biologists, psychologists, social theorists, and philosophers. It also highlights some of the moral and political consequences of different perspectives within the nature vs. nurture debate. Through updated scientific and philosophical theorizing, the chapters in this book aim to overcome, once and for all, the simplistic yet persistent opposition between nature and nurture, offering a far more complex and dynamic—yet richer and epistemologically manageable—picture of the human being.

 

 

Ewelina Grądzka, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Philosophy for modernizing and strengthening Polish society: Kazimierz Twardowski’s contribution to the discussion on the development of philosophical propaedeutics, Edukacja Filozoficzna, 78, 59–109. DOI: 10.14394/edufil.2024.0026

ABSTRACT

This paper is an introduction to the first English translation of Kazimierz Twardows ki’s article Filozofia w szkole średniej [Philosophy in High School], published in 1919 as part of  a greater discussion on the significance and content of the school subject called propaedeutics of philosophy in Polish education at the beginning of the 20th century. Papers that contributed  to three major periods of the debate (early 1902 discussion in Galicia; 1919–1920 discussion in newly reborn Poland; mid-1920s until mid-1930s discussion) will be presented. A reconstruction  of these exchanges reveals that many Polish philosophers participated, and most of the contributors were members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Finally, Twardowski’s involvement in the discussions will be examined.

 

Roman Krzanowski, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Machines are not like us: Arguing for the gap, in: P. Stacewicz, ed., Ethical Aspects of AI(7–14).Warszawa: Instytut Problemów Współczesnej Cywilizacji im. Marka Dietricha; Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej. Available at: <https://www.ipwc.pw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/IPWC-Ethical-Aspects-of-AI.pdf> [Accessed 18 November 2025].

 

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II

Galicja jako polskie centrum neoscholastycznej recepcji teorii ewolucji w latach 1900–1914. Główne nurty dyskusji [Galicia as the Polish Center of Neoscholastic Reception of the Theory of Evolution, 1900–1914: Main Topics of Discussion], Galicja. Studia i materiały, [online] 12, 2025, 203–44. https://doi.org/10.15584/galisim.2025.12.2.

ABSTRACT*

The article presents the special role played by the Neo‑Scholastics of Galicia within Polish Catholic thought between 1900 and 1914. Thanks to the activity of academic lecturers involved in teaching Christian philosophy and theology in the three main intellectual centers of Galicia (Kraków, Lwów, Przemyśl), contemporary discussions on the theory of evolution developed. The Jesuits played a key role, along with their journal Przegląd Powszechny, which was the most important forum for Catholic worldview debates during this period. The article highlights the main themes of interest and presents an intriguing current of “new apologetics,” which sought to incorporate the latest scientific findings into Christian apologetics (Erich Wasmann SJ).

*Translated from Polish via Copilot

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II Polak, P., 2025b.

The historical and philosophical context of Marian Zdziechowski’s intellectual activities in Krakow, Studies in East European Thought, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-025-09739-5.

 

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Peter Niewiarowski, University of Akron

John Huss, University of Akron

Roman Krzanowski, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Towards beneficial AI: A biomimicry framework to design intelligence that cooperates with biological entities, Proceedings, 126(1), 7, 2025.  https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2025126007.

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes biomimicry as a paradigm for helping to overcome both the conceptual and technological limitations of current AI systems. It begins by outlining three key challenges faced by modern AI and then proceeds to introduce the concept of biomimicry, offering examples of how biologically inspired approaches have informed technical solutions. Furthermore, this paper presents a framework for integrating biomimicry principles into AI research and development. The three central challenges identified here are the energy challenge, the gap challenge, and the conceptual challenge. This paper also presents a case study on beneficial AI to illustrate how a biomimetic approach can be applied to address some current shortcomings in AI technology.

 

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Jacek Rodzeń, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland

Apologetic (ab)uses of scientific concepts: Case of entropy in the Polish theological thought, Theology and Science, 23(2), 2025, 325–343. https://doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2025.2472124

ABSTRACT

The second law of thermodynamics and the concept of entropy have been used by Catholic thinkers for almost a century to argue for the divine creation of the universe and the existence of God—contributions of Franz Brentano (1869) and Pope Pius XII (1951) were turning points. This article presents examples of how the concept of entropy were used by Polish Catholic theologians and philosophers between 1870 and 1955. Based on the analysis, we draw more universal conclusions about science and theology relationships, not just for the period under consideration but also for the nature of this relationship today.

 

Paweł Polak, Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków

Jacek Rodzeń, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland

Natural Sciences as a Contemporary Locus Theologicus, J. Rodzeń, J. and P. Polak, P., (Eds), 2026, MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute. https://doi.org/10.3390/books978-3-7258-6225-2.

SUMMARY

Can the natural sciences, in particular, be a subject of interest for the doctrine or theology of different religions? Can science have a positive influence on religious truths, their expression, and their communication? These questions are addressed by twelve original research papers collected in a reprint entitled “Natural Sciences as a Contemporary Locus Theologicus”. This Reprint’s central issue is addressed by eminent authors from the three main Christian denominations (Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy), as well as by an author from the Islamic theological tradition. Their work constitutes an innovative contribution to the contemporary discussion on the theology of science, a new theological discipline that has emerged in recent years. The results also demonstrate the potential for reflecting on the 16th-century concept of loci theologici in relation to modern scientific linguistic, logical, and methodological tools and presuppositions of science as elements of theological discourse that can be adopted by different religions. The uniqueness of the works presented in this Reprint is also evident in the fact that nearly half of the authors are both professional theologians and natural scientists.

 

Stefan Petkov, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

On two accounts of misunderstanding: A reply to Collin Rice and Kareem Khalifa, forthcoming in Balkan Journal of Philosophy. https://philpapers.org/rec/PETPSF-10 

ABSTRACT

When developing theories of understanding, philosophers have tried to provide a full package by offering criteria both for the epistemic success of understanding and for various related epistemic failures. One of those failures is misunderstanding. Currently, there are only two theories of misunderstanding. The first one, from Yu and Petkov, analyzes the unique epistemic conditions for misunderstanding. The other one, by Rice and Khalifa, studies the process of correcting misunderstanding. In this paper, I show that both theories have shortcomings. I argue that Rice and Khalifa’s theory is too broad and permissive. It effectively blurs existing distinctions between proto-understanding or understanding based on falsified theories. The reverse holds for Yu and Petkov’s theory. It is too narrow and thus fails to capture broad issues related to clearing misunderstanding. I conclude by suggesting that Yu and Petkov’s theory describes misunderstanding more plausibly, whilst Rice and Khalifa’s theory can capture the correction of misunderstanding.

 

Martin Zach, Czech Academy of Sciences

On representation and similarity: The case of mouse models of cancer, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 114, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.102069.

(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368125001104)

ABSTRACT

According to the similarity account, scientists use models to represent their targets by utilizing similarities in certain respects and to certain degrees between a model and its target. According to the critics, however, representation is conceptually distinct from the notion of accurate representation, and rather than being the relation that grounds representation, similarity should be considered as setting a standard of accuracy. Based on the case study of research practices involved in using mouse models to study cancer, this paper argues that while the overarching skepticism regarding the similarity account may be justified, the role of similarity in specific contexts deserves attention. Indeed, it will be shown that similarity plays a significant role in determining whether a mouse model represents a particular aspect of cancer. Thus, authors dismissive of similarity grounding representation, while correct in the general picture, should take into consideration the role that similarity plays in deciding whether a model is or not a representation in concrete scientific practices.

Sebastian Urbaniak,

Filozofia społeczna ruchu Black Power (The Philosophy of Black Power: Between Nationalism and Marxism), Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2025.

SUMMARY

The work "The Philosophy of Black Power: Between Nationalism and Marxism" is a attempt to describe the history and philosophy of the Black American movement, especially at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s. The author tries, first of all, to reveal how activists of the Black Power movement appealed to various philosophical concepts, in which he tries to recover this historical phenomenon for the present, and secondly: to demonstrate the internal dialectic of the movement that led to its pacification in the 1970s and contributed to the establishment of the ideology of multiculturalism. The approaches to this issue so far have focused on the historical and political perspective, which the author tries to transcend towards a philosophical perspective, revealing how the concepts of Black activists were an expression of a lively discussion with advocates of the liberal and Marxist concepts, as well as how they were a response and reaction to ideological transformations of the public debate on the development of the American state, as well as more or less conscious references to 20th-century political philosophy. To reveal the tension between the nationalist and Marxist elements, it is necessary to understand the specific concept of the nation and nationalism developed by the classics of Marxist thought - which is the subject of the first chapter. The author tries to indicate how, in particular, the Leninist, Stalinist and Trotskyist concepts of nation and revolution co-shaped the development of the American left. Of decisive importance for the further development of Black social thought is the concept developed by C.L.R. James, which is a separate subject of consideration. The next chapter is devoted to the development of the liberal concept of the black struggle, including to a large extent the activities of the NAACP in the field of the judicial path to equal rights for Black Americans and the concept of M.L. Kinga, which was the starting point for the development of Black Power. King is the most famous spokesman for Black Americans' fight for freedom and equality, and his activities are the catalyst for much of the socio-political change. From a philosophical perspective, King should be considered the main representative of the non-violence strategy, which has its roots in the legacy of Thoreau, Gandhi and the Christian gospel. An important reverse of King's activity is the activity of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Robert F. Williams, the development of which can be understood as an expression of the aporetic nature of the liberal interpretation of the Black freedom movement, and for this reason they constitute a separate subject of reflection, which already assumes and anticipates the activities of the organizations from the late 1960s. The third chapter is devoted to black nationalism: the author reconstructs its development from the activities of the African Blood Brotherhood, through the works of Marcus Garvey, Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X and the continuators of their legacy: in particular organizations such as the Revolutionary Action Movement, Republic of New Africa and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, but also thinkers like James Boggs. Particularly important is the evolution of the thought of Malcolm X, who is emerging as the main patron of black nationalism: from the moment he crossed the Nation of Islam ideology to the horizon of the Organization of Afro-American Unity. The last chapter is an attempt to describe the history and ideology of the Black Panther Party (of Self-Defense), pointing to the internal tensions that arose through the clash of ideas of the leading ideologists of this organization: Huey P. Newton and Eldrigde Cleaver. BPP appears to be the most consistent implementation of the Black Power slogan, but not free from the internal dynamics that ultimately led to the collapse of the organization and the pacification of the entire movement. The analysis of the presented concepts leads the author to question some of the dominant narratives about Black Power as a break with the legacy of the civil rights movement and its crisis nature: in fact, Black Power appears as not only a creative continuation of the previous freedom and equality aspirations of American Black people, but also an element of the global resistance movement against capital-centric civilization and Western imperialism. In this mode, the dialectic of the development of the Black Power movement also reveals how this movement was one of the most significant moments of questioning the neoliberal hegemony and a field of creative search for new solutions in the field of social practice.

 

 

 

Silviu-Constantin Federovici, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași

Brouwer–Hilbert on the limits of mathematical knowledge, Studia UBB. Philosophia, 70, 2025, 27–46.
DOI: 10.24193/subbphil.2025.sp.iss.02

ABSTRACT

Brouwer famously challenged the limits of mathematical knowledge by arguing that classical formalism obscures intuitive evidence. Hilbert, by contrast, considered that intuitive insights could safely be ignored as long as formal systems remained consistent and complete. Such a disagreement created a paradigmatic tension between intuitionism and formalism in how the foundations of mathematics should be regarded. This paper evaluates Hilbert’s eventual pragmatic dominance and explores, via a shared Kantian heritage, how intuitionistic insights might coexist with formal approaches. Focusing on axioms, the analysis reveals how neglecting certain epistemic values while admitting alternative forms of evidence shapes our understanding of mathematical limits.

Joanna K. Malinowska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland

White by default: conceptual and methodological limits of binary white logic in global health equity research, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2026, 1–21. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-026-10330-w

ABSTRACT

This article examines the conceptual and methodological limitations of how the category “White” is interpreted and used in health equity research. I argue that such studies often rely on a binary White logic – a framework that organises ethnoracial comparisons around a dichotomy between people racialised as White and Non-White Others. Within this logic, the White category is treated as a homogeneous reference group that reliably signals uniform protection from racism and access to White privilege. This assumption operates both statistically and epistemically, with profound implications for how health disparities are measured and understood. Although this framework reflects broad ethnoracial dynamics rooted in White supremacism, it has serious shortcomings. One relevant but underexplored consequence is that it tends to biologise and essentialise Whiteness. It also obscures complex, context-specific processes of racialisation and marginalises groups that do not fit prevailing classificatory practices. I demonstrate that the uncritical use of the White category – as a default homogenous comparator category – in global health equity research reproduces epistemic injustice and misrepresents complex dynamics of racialisation, thereby concealing medically relevant experiences of representatives of such groups. I focus on people racialised as Eastern Europeans, whose ambiguous positioning within global ethnoracial hierarchies – often termed Off-White – renders them largely invisible in scholarship, despite evidence of racism affecting their health. To produce more accurate and socially responsible science, I call for a shift away from binary White logic towards more thoughtful, precise, and contextually appropriate uses of ethnoracial categories – and other proxies for racism – in research on racism and health

 

Joanna K. Malinowska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań,

Valentina Petrolini, University of Bologna

Davide Serpico, University of Milan

Why does the theory-of-mind paradigm of autism persist?, Psychological Inquiry, 36(4), 2025, 289–293.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1047840X.2025.2605598

ABSTRACT

The theory-of-mind (ToM) paradigm in autism research exhibits the hallmarks of a degenerating research programme, yet continues to attract institutional authority and research effort. We extend LaCroix's (2025) Lakatosian diagnosis by identifying three forces that jointly explain this persistence. First, underdetermination enables indefinite belt revision: when empirical anomalies accumulate, the response has been iterative task redesign rather than conceptual revision, a pattern exemplified by the reframing of autistic camouflaging as ToM compensation rather than as evidence against the core deficit claim. Second, epistemic-network structure governs the selective uptake of contrary evidence: epistemic bubbles and echo-chamber dynamics, testimonial hierarchies, and the paradigm's historical convergence with belief-desire psychology have systematically insulated the ToM framework from substantive revision. Third, the standardisation payoff confers infrastructural inertia: entrenched task batteries, scoring protocols, and training pipelines reward replication over reform, tilting incentives toward convenience constructs – a dynamic with close parallels in IQ research. We argue that counterevidence alone cannot dislodge a programme sustained by these structural forces. Effective demarcation requires institutional intervention: belt revisions conditional on validity and replication audits, pre-registered head-to-head testing of competing frameworks, and harm review integrated into the research workflow – the institutional shadow of Lakatos' own criteria for progressive science.

 

Joanna K. Malinowska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland

Oops! You are doing it again: Pharmacogenomics and the biologisation of drug labels, Behemoth: A Journal on Social Dis/Order, 18(1), 2025, 7–27. 10.6094/behemoth.2025.18.1.1117

https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/files/271749/ejTd6qdKEeB3fFkp/Oops_You+Are+Doing+It

ABSTRACT

In this paper I explore how pharmacogenomic findings regarding the impact of genetic variability on patients’ responses to drugs translate into drug labels. Despite growing recognition that such categories fail to reflect human genetic diversity, they continue to be applied in prescribing information, reinforcing outdated notions of race in medicine. By analysing pharmacogenomic data, I demonstrate that racialised labels offer no epistemic benefits and are methodologically flawed. Moreover, their widespread use in the pharmaceutical industry not only undermines scientific accuracy but also risks perpetuating racial biases in healthcare. Finally, I argue that guidelines and standards established by various stakeholders – including research funders, pharmaceutical regulators, global databases, and standards-developing organisations – can inadvertently reproduce frameworks rooted in race (and racist) science. They should therefore be subject to critical examination and, where necessary, revision

https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/files/271749/ejTd6qdKEeB3fFkp/Oops_You+Are+Doing+It

 

Emmanuel Jas, University of Hradec Kralove

Embodied transcendence: Psychedelics and the evolution of moral abstraction, Journal of Conscious Evolution, 22(1), 2026. https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/cejournal/vol22/iss1/6

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the role of psychedelics in the context of evolutionary brain development and the conceptual capacity for moral realism. Drawing on theories from evolutionary anthropology, neuroscience, and moral philosophy, the first part provides a brief overview of human evolution and brain expansion. From here, recent empirical data from the neurosciences is assessed on the effect psychedelics have on the brain, along with speculations on the role of psychedelics in our hominoid evolutionary history—specifically, the capacity for phenomenologically rich, conscious, subjective experiences that are incredibly vivid and real. This imaginative capacity for transcendence and disembodiment could enable the realization of new forms of abstract, absolute, and perfect concepts. The influence of epigenetic neurogenesis may have enabled our brain to expand and function as it does now, with its complex neural structures that facilitate conceptualization, visualization, association, and categorization, allowing for more advanced structures of vocalized noises, such as syntax and eventually, meaning. Finally, the concept of moral realism is analyzed within the framework of the theories outlined in the first part and demonstrates how it may have evolved. The claim is that psychedelic use and the psychedelic experience could have created this abstract moral concept, which would then be encoded in our collective consciousness over evolutionary time.

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