Recent publications by EENPS members

[EENPS (Borut Trpin)]

Dear EENPS members,

Many thanks to all who have shared information about your recent publications with us!

We have now listed 5 additional publications on our website, where you can also find instructions how to add your own to the list: https://eenps.weebly.com/members-publications.html

See also below.

Best wishes,

Borut Trpin (coordinator of the EENPS)

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Publications are listed by year, then in alphabetical order (first author's first name).

2021/forthcoming:

Adam P. Kubiak and Paweł Kawalec (Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11(52), 2021.

Abstract:

In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00370-9

Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)

Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?

Acta Analytica. Forthcoming.

Abstract:

A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. My answer to the question of this paper is negative. As I will argue, there are serious problems with the main reasons for believing in the first place that it is possible to have physical understanding of mathematical facts.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00470-4

 

Gabriel Târziu (University of Bucharest)

How Do We Obtain Understanding with the Help of Explanations?

Axiomathes 31 (2): 173-197. 2021.

Abstract:

What exactly do we need in order to enjoy the cognitive benefit that is supposed to be provided by an explanation? Some philosophers (most notably Khalifa 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017) would say that all that we need is to know the explanation. Others (e.g. Newman 2012; Strevens 2013) would say that achieving understanding with the help of an explanation requires more than that, that it requires a grasping or an understanding of the explanation. My aim in this paper is to come up with a new answer to this problem by exploring the shortcomings of the received view of understanding. In my view, besides having (at least) testimonial knowledge of an explanation, obtaining explanatory understanding requires full cognitive access to the explanation.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09488-6

Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)

Knowledge, behaviour, and policy: questioning the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Synthese (online first, open access)

Abstract:

The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6

Magdalena Małecka (University of Helsinki & Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton)

Values in economics: a recent revival with a twist. Journal of Economic Methodology (online first, open access)

Abstract:

This article reviews the relatively recent trend in economic methodology that consists in bringing insights from the debate in philosophy of science on values in science in order to analyse value-ladenness of economic research. The text claims that these insights from philosophy of science offer a slightly new approach to the topic of value judgments in economics that has been discussed in philosophy of economics for decades. It suggests that the perspective of philosophy of science reviewed in the article invites to rethinking analyses of feminist economists as important contributions to economic methodology.

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1350178X.2020.1868776?needAccess=true