Re: Primordiality, etc-sensation, avoiding thematizing.

[CROC...@aol.com]

Phil,

 

I am not reading Stein on empathy now because I haven't had access to the web site.  I read the first thing that was sent out by Stein, and I've been reading the Stein and Singer piece.

 

Phil, I thought the question  "is there bare perception/awareness?" had been settled in the negative long ago.  It's quite true that we can fail to deal with an important issue that we are only aware of vaguely and in fragments, but all the while we are aware of other objects dealing with different issues. What I wrote does not establish your point.  With the exception of the grogginess that happens when we are waking up, all of our experience is of objects.  We are not aware otherwise of unorganized sensations.  When we are standing too close to a painting to see what it's about our sensations still have shape, and simultaneously we are aware of other objects.  Intentional awareness beyond Brentano is awareness of connections or implications or "reachings" of the object(s) of present awareness to other objects that our mind moves to naturally.  Sometimes, however, especially in aesthetic experiences, we may be so focused contemplatively on an object that we do not move away from it. 

 

It's also true that there is a time lag between the physical event of sensation and the subsequent awareness.  But this is prior to awareness, not part of it.  Awareness (waking) itself is organized, not unorganized, objective not bare or formless.

 

We don't have to agree on this.  The important issue is how you want to use the distinction between sensation and objective awareness.  That is where the disagreement may become important.  I'm imagining that you want to tie this to Levinas as a way to avoid thematizing.  But the other element that I believe has to be brought to bear on this issue is the attitude of the person who meets the Other.  If such a person is interested in knowledge for its own sake, he will thematize as he beholds the Other. If, however he regards the Other as an ultimately mysterious Thou, he will not thematize, but will be open to how-ever the Other reveals himself.  If the project is for the sake of knowledge, then thematizing is inevitable.  But if the project is for the sake of meeting the other, and is done out of care, concern, and respect, then thematizing is not inevitable.  Just as, in Buber, relating to an Other as a Thou may often involve processes that are I-It, but the stance/attitude/mudra is for the sake of the well-being of the Thou.

 

Sylvia 

 

In a message dated 8/2/2010 7:54:02 P.M. Mountain Daylight Time, philbr...@logic.bm writes:

Dear Sylvia,

You don't have to think it's apt.  Yet, I can't help but think that in your list of things people are "aware" of, that you made my point.  I did not say people have NO awareness at the stage of sensation.  People must be aware of sensation.  However, the awareness of what that sensation is about is the second stage in the cycle of experience, and to me that is also a more clearly established gestalt/more well formed intentional object.  We don't have to agree.

I am curious if you are reading On the Problem of Empathy along with the rest of us right now?

Phil

On Aug 2, 2010, at 9:39 PM, CROC...@aol.com wrote:

Phil,

 

I agree that people often don't quite "get" what the situation is that they're facing.  And yet their minds are not blank or filled with a confetti of sensations.  Even the person standing near the picture in the art gallery is aware or being in a situation in which they are so close to the picture they can't make it out, and they are aware of the situation itself. If it is an exercise you are having them do in training, they are aware of the situation of doing an exercise at your direction.   Also they are probably aware of intelligible sounds and background noises as they are aware of what they are doing.  The point I'm making is that as long as a person is wide awake they are aware of any number of sensory objects and thoughts that they can identify, bodily feelings that they identify as in their head, kneeds, shoulders, etc.,m plus any number of specific thoughts they may be having during the span of time involved.  The closest we can come to sensations without definite objects during a waking state is in meditation or something of the kind.  A person's existential situation may not be clear for a time until they change perspectives, but always during this time they are aware of a variety of objects, probably attending to various needs/necessities in their everyday life, dealing with other people, remembering situations, worrying about practical matters, etc.   I don't think your example is apt if the topic is whether or not people have sensation without objects in waking experience.

 

Sylvia

 

In a message dated 8/2/2010 7:20:43 P.M. Mountain Daylight Time, philbr...@logic.bm writes:

I have seen trainees labor on and on trying to maximize their awareness by focusing on this and that sensation without ever coming to a focus–what it's all about.  Whether you call it "just Brentano" or not, I think that simple aboutness is key.  Before it, people are lost in their circumstances.  I routinely offer the following exercise to clients:

Imagine you are in an art gallery.  You are standing with your nose two inches from a painting.  All you can see are blurry object.  Step back.  Now you can see paint blotches and brush strokes.  Step back. Step back again.  Now something comes into full view.  It is the picture, the painting. Now you see it.  Take it in.  What is it.  At face value this is your situation.  What do you see?  How does it make you feel?  Based on what you feel, what do you want?

Often, I believe, people are living at the level of brush strokes without actually stepping back to take in the whole picture and let it really affect them.  That is the level of sensation.  They have not really grasped what the situation is and what it is about.

Phil

On Aug 2, 2010, at 9:09 PM, CROC...@aol.com wrote:

I don't think it's a helpful distinction (and I still doubt it is empirical except in those moments before we are altogether awake).  How do you find it useful?

 

Sylvia

 

In a message dated 8/2/2010 7:04:45 P.M. Mountain Daylight Time, philbr...@logic.bm writes:

On Aug 2, 2010, at 7:50 PM, CROC...@aol.com wrote:

My objection to the Cycle of Awareness/Experience is the assertion of "sensation" before "awareness."  I don't think that is an empirically grounded distinction.

I do.

=

=

=

[Dan Bloom]

Sylvia:

Grogginess IS an example of awareness without an object. 

That is my point.

We are in agreement, then?

Dan

[croc...@aol.com]

Hi Dan,

In Freud, and I believe in original Gestalt, id is the motivating
factor that issues in behaior. Thus it seems to me that id in our
usage has to do with a figure that we take an interest in, feeling
"something has to e done about this." Then if nothin of a solution is
obvious the ego goes into action to discover possibilities and
prioritize them, then "identity" with the solution. Thus it makes no
sense to me to think that id is mainly unfocused. Ego as a capacity to
plan that leads to action and the subsequent destruction of the figure,
does not itself bring about motivation. That is the fuction of id.
That is why I substitute "interested excitement" for id in my model.
Grogginess is a momentary and transitory state, and does not uually
motivate. So the question for your position is, where does motivaion
enter into the picture; I don't think it comes from ego.

Love, Sylvia

Sylvia:

Dan

=

[Dan Bloom]

Sylvia:

In Freud, “id” was “das Ess,” the “it.”

As PHG made its way through multiple translations from English, “id function” because “it function” --when we backtranslate from French, German, Spanish, and Italian.

“It” is not a motivating force but an experiential --sensed, felt-- processive given of the situation (a la Jean-Marie Robine).
However, “it” as a function develops further as self emerges, further.

I don’t think I every said that id functioning is mainly unfocused. I said it begins intrasitively and without an object, but develops. Awareness and consciousness are on a processive continuum.

Motivation is a function of the world within self is emergent. Motivation implicates all the partial structures of self, differently and variously. Motivation does not come from any discrete self-functioning.

Remember, I never said that id f remains unfocused.

As I consider this discussion, I think we ought to beware thinking in terms of any fully separable self-function. The ego doesn’t go into action as if it were a little person summoned to duty.

You know that. I think that is your final point.

love,

Dan

[croc...@aol.com]

---- Original Message ----
From: Dan Bloom <D...@djbloom.com>
To: edith-stein...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Aug 11, 2010 1:35 pm
Subject: Re: Primordiality, etc-sensation, avoiding thematizing.

Sylvia:

In Freud, “id” was “das Ess,” the “it.”

love,

Dan

> Hi Dan,
>
> In Freud, and I believe and in original Gestalt, id is the motivating
factor that
leads to behavior. Thus it seems to me that id in our usage has to do
with a
figure that we take an interest in, feeling "something has to be done
about
this." Then if nothing of a solution is obvious the ego goes into

action to
discover possibilities and prioritize them, then "identity" with the
solution.
Thus it makes no sense to me to think that id is mainly unfocused. Ego
as a
capacity to plan that leads to action and the subsequent destruction of
the

figure, does not itself bring about motivation. That is the function of

id. That
is why I substitute "interested excitement" for id in my model.
Grogginess is a

momentary and transitory state, and does not usually motivate. So the
question
for your position is, where does motivation enter into the picture? I

don't think
it comes from ego.
>
> Love, Sylvia
>
>
> ---- Original Message ----
> From: Dan Bloom <d...@djbloom.com>

Hi Dan, I think this is unclear. The question is, why does the person
engage with the world on any gienoccasion?/ There are all sorts of
sorts of issues the person takes an interest in, or gell's anurge to
address. I think this capacity is the id function ( lthouygh i do ot
like the term). <ost behavior is goal oriented, in he sense that we ave
addressing various pracitical issues in life. I see the id as the
capactiy to be arouses in a practial sense, as aresponse to wht is
going on now that is involves tge person in the total t=situatio.
Thepratical capacity the goes into action to find the means to deal
with the problem. I think this is consistent with PHG's position.
What is the point of construing id as some sort of amorphous and
unfocused awareness. Freud did not take it in that sense, I do not
think id is primarily erotic, but can be anything that arouses our
energies and mobilizes those energies.

> To: edith-stein...@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Mon, Aug 9, 2010 12:19 am
> Subject: Re: Primordiality, etc-sensation, avoiding thematizing.
>
>
> Sylvia:
>
>
> Grogginess IS an example of awareness without an object.
> That is my point.
> We are in agreement, then?
>
>
> Dan
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Aug 3, 2010, at 2:17 AM, CROC...@aol.com wrote:
>
>
> With the exception of the grogginess that happens when we are waking
up, all
of our experience is of objects.
>
>
> =
>

hi Dan, i think this is fuy