Estimados colegas, junto con saludarlos, los invito al Seminario de Economía del Job Market del Departamento de Economía de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana que se realizará
hoy. Los detalles, a continuación:
- Invitado: Daniel Prudencio (Rice University)
- Sitio personal:
http://danielprudencio.com/
- Título: Elections and Productivity in Procurement Auctions of Pavement Contracts in Mexico (link al paper)
- Abstract: When allocating contracts, governments decide between exercising hiring discretion or allowing a higher level of competition without firm selection. Ex-ante, it is
not clear which allocation mechanism will lead to better outcomes. The trade-off depends in part on the government’s ability to select the best firms when restricting competition and on the probability that this practice will lead to corruption. In this paper,
I study the allocation of street pavement contracts in Mexico and combine auction methods with an analysis of the firms' productivity to test whether local governments select the most cost-efficient firms when restricting competition. Furthermore, I study
the firms' behavior under different auction formats. I find that firms selected to settings with less competition are more experienced and have lower costs in complex pavement projects, but have higher costs in simple ones. When comparing auction formats,
firms are more aggressive under auctions by invitation than in public auctions in complex projects, but bid similarly under both auction formats in simple projects. Contrary to the current practice, the results suggest that the government would benefit from
opening up simple projects to public auctions. The use of auctions by invitation for complex projects seems warranted, but mixed results on the influence of political factors raise concerns of misuse of a greater hiring discretion on the part of the government.
- Link zoom:
https://javeriana-edu-co.zoom.us/j/81113923377
- Hora: 12:30-14:00
- Día: Miércoles 27 de enero de 2021.
Atentamente,
Nicolás A. Lillo Bustos, Phd.
Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
Bogotá, Colombia
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