Seminario Hoy: Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions

[Ana Maria Diaz Escobar]

Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions  Alexander Gotthard Real Universidad Javeriana Coautor: Lucas Coffman Abstract Typically, we assume the value of consultants and advisers comes through the information and expertise they provide. We identify an additional role: Reducing the backlash faced by those they advise. Through a series of experiments, we show that selfishness is heavily punished, but that much of this punishment can be avoided by hiring a consultant to advise selfish behavior. This is true despite, by virtue of the design, the consultant is not an unbiased third party: Through a relational contract incentive, consultants are motivated to tell the principals what they want to hear. Moreover, the reduction in punishment is not driven by information asymmetries: Not only does the consultant not have any more information than the principal, punishment is lessened whether or not the punisher knows with certainty the principal acted selfishly, or whether she has to rely on the advice as a signal.  Lugar: Sala B, Edificio Gabriel Giraldo 1er piso. Fecha:  Miércoles 1 de Junio  2016. Hora 12:30-2:00pm