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Update on Axon license plate reader (ALPR) contract (26‑0246): details, pros/cons, and how to weigh in
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Neighbors,
I want to share an update on Denver’s proposed contract with Axon for Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology (Council Resolution 26‑0246). We held a courtesy public hearing on March 23 and postponed the final vote so Council and the public have more time to review the details—especially around privacy, data storage, and oversight. I recognize this is long, but this is an important topic that needs context.
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I use values in every vote I cast. Denver has a set of values, and we’ve placed those values into a large document called Denver Revised Municipal Code (DRMC). Of course, this is a living city, and sometimes those values change. When they do, it’s important we update DRMC to reflect the current set of values for Denver.
As one example: I believe as a whole, Denverites value accountability. If someone steals your car, that person should be held accountable. If someone hurts or kills someone else, they should be held accountable. ALPR helps with that value.
As another example: I believe Denverites (and District 10) as a whole believe in women’s reproductive rights and in being a welcoming city for everyone. If another state wants to review data we own to see if their residents are coming to Denver, Denver shouldn’t help that jurisdiction because that is counter to our values. If another entity wants to review data we own because they think someone legally authorized to be in our city should be removed, Denver shouldn’t help that jurisdiction because it is counter to our values.
And: can we trust a vendor to act the way we want them to? If we cannot trust a vendor (like Flock) to follow our contract and to be transparent with us, we shouldn’t do business with them. Have we learned from that experience and created a new relationship with a vendor that will be transparent and a contract that incorporates lessons learned from the previous vendor?
And: can we achieve these Denver values without a significant sacrifice to other values, particularly surveillance and privacy?
I want to share with you my thought process as this is a topic that has divided residents in Denver and in District 10.
And now, if you want more detail, I will share 4 more sections:
- Background
- Case for approval
- Case for denial
- What District 10 residents can do
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ALPR cameras capture a plate image plus a contextual vehicle image, tied to a time and location. The proposed Axon system includes 50 fixed “Axon Outpost” cameras and access to Axon Vehicle Intelligence software. Axon markets Outpost as combining ALPR + livestreaming + vehicle attribute recognition, designed to capture multiple lanes at highway speeds, day or night.
Contract snapshot (as published in City materials):
Vendor: Axon Enterprise, Inc.
Amount: Not to exceed $150,000
Term: April 1, 2026 - March 31, 2027
Cameras: 50 fixed ALPR cameras (Outpost) that will be deployed in fewer than 20 locations citywide (a camera only views one direction, so for a major intersection, 4 cameras could be at the same intersection)
Retention: City states 21 day retention (auto purge); contract says the City sets retention in its tenancy
Storage: Axon cloud services are hosted on evidence.com; City notes Denver has used this storage system for a decade for sensitive evidence
Access: City says access limited to Denver Safety personnel; invite only, revocable sharing; “no national database.” Contract bars sharing PII for immigration enforcement and requires notice if DHS seeks access.
Oversight: City describes immutable audit logs, training requirements, prohibited uses, and monthly audits.
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Supporters (including the Mayor’s office) argue ALPRs are a “force multiplier” for public safety. City leadership cited results under the prior system: recovering hundreds of stolen vehicles and using ALPR information in a significant share of homicide investigations.
They also argue this contract is meaningfully more privacy‑protective than what Denver has used before: shorter retention (21 days), access limited to Denver Safety personnel, auditability, and “no national database.” The contract includes unusually explicit limits on sharing data for federal immigration enforcement, referencing D.R.M.C. § 28‑251 and C.R.S. § 24‑74‑102, and requires the vendor to notify Denver if DHS requests access.
Supporters emphasize oversight controls like training requirements, prohibited uses (e.g., discrimination/harassment), and a policy that an ALPR “hit” alone does not justify a traffic stop—an attempt to reduce harms from misreads/false alerts.
Supporters point to actual benefit vs. potential risk: 42% of 2025 homicides were meaningfully helped by ALPR along with other crimes vs. the perceived risk of data sharing. Supporters share that Axon is not Flock, the Axon contract is not the Flock contract, and real benefits in helping solve crimes on Denverites outweigh the perceived risk of data sharing that supporters say have been mitigated by the contract.
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Opponents argue that even with safeguards, ALPRs create a location‑tracking database that can be repurposed (“mission creep”), misused, or breached—especially because Axon’s fixed cameras are marketed as combining ALPR with livestreaming and “real‑time intelligence.” A broad coalition urged Council to vote no, saying the process is rushed and Denver should adopt clearer citywide surveillance rules first. (These letters often focus on the structural risks and may not fully engage with every contract‑level guardrail; residents should consider both the contract text and the broader policy questions.)
Legal context is evolving. Colorado law already limits retention of passive surveillance records to three years (which is a ceiling, not a best practice). Colorado also defines “personal identifying information” to include a license plate number, underscoring the sensitivity of ALPR data. Separately, SB26‑070 is under consideration at the state Capitol and has been referred (as amended) from Senate Judiciary to Senate Appropriations; it would restrict government access to “historical location information” databases and require compliance policies. Courts are also mixed: some decisions uphold certain ALPR uses, while the U.S. Supreme Court’s location‑privacy reasoning in Carpenter shows how “mosaic” tracking over time can trigger Fourth Amendment concerns in other contexts.
Also, the Mayor convened a “surveillance technology” task force, and that task force has not created a recommendation. Some say that recommendation is delayed because the first meeting was a few months after the announcement of the committee, others say some task force members are delaying the recommendation to delay a decision. There is also discrepancy on whether the group was tasked with making a formal recommendation as the group is for surveillance technology, not specifically ALPR.
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What District 10 Residents Can Do
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If you want to weigh in, you can submit written testimony or sign up to speak at Council/committee meetings using Denver City Council’s public comment session. You can also email my office and other Councilmembers with what you want prioritized (public safety outcomes, retention limits, audit/public reporting, clear rules for when searches are allowed and how sharing is controlled, and an ordinance process).
Thank you for engaging—this is exactly the kind of issue where Denver needs both rigorous governance and an honest conversation about tradeoffs.
Chris Hinds
Denver City Council, District 10
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