FW: #India- The Dark Side of #UID : Why the west dumped #Biometrics #Aadhaar
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Subject: Fwd: #India- The Dark Side of #UID : Why the west dumped
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#India- The Dark Side of #UID : Why the west dumped #Biometrics #Aadhaar
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SANDEEP KHURANA | 11/01/2013
, Moneylife.com
UK scrapped in 2010, its The Identity Cards Act, 2006, that was Aadhaar’s equivalent
and aimed to capture 50 key data about each individual, including
fingerprints, facial scan, iris scan and more. It did enough
deliberations on the issue almost around same time as India. Reason for scrapping—“to
reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties”
Identities like Social Security Number
(SSN), or National Insurance Number (NI)
in the west, or Aadhaar now in India, promise to validate not just
identity. Through identity as the master-key (index field in database
technology), the respective security agencies can relate identity to past,
present and future personal data. For example, PDS querying
theAadhaar database for identifying a citizen then digs into its own
database to validate, if the said recipient had availed the benefit before.
To access The Dark Side of UID-I, please click here.
It is important to know that all such validation means and requires more data
capture of all kinds for all seemingly legitimate purposes, so that such
validations can be done against it. But each custodian of data—from
front-end shopkeepers to ministries and more—also starts keeping copies
of such data for validation, commercial use, corruption, stalking or just like
that for the future. More data and more copies of data mean a death knell for
privacy. Why create such targets of interest for vicious minds. Can the creator
of such a Frankenstein monster absolve itself of such consequences merely
because it was not the original intent but the creator failed to see the
possibilities?
Both USA and UK had a huge hue and cry
over possible ramifications of such invasion of privacy despite relatively
mature, trusted, independent agencies, unlike India. Australia attempted national ID cards way back in 1985 but
withdrew them in 1987 after severe opposition from all quarters.
UK scrapped in 2010, The Identity Cards Act, 2006, that
was Aadhaar’s equivalent and aimed to capture 50 key data about
each individual, including fingerprints, facial scan,iris scan and more.
It did enough deliberations on the issue almost around same time as India.
Reason for scrapping—“to reverse the substantial erosion of
civil liberties”. Opinion polls and public reaction were opposed
by the majority. 500 hard disks were shredded to destroy all data captured as
part of the brief period of restricted implementation of the scheme. As a
British politician said, “This marks the final end of the
identity card scheme:
dead, buried and crushed…What we are destroying today is the last
elements of the national identity register, which was always the most
objectionable part of the scheme.”
On a similar note, there is a public outcry in the USA, in the aftermath of the
Petraeus scandal. NSA whistleblower William Binney in a TV interview, said on
the surveillance by US government, “They are building social
networks on who is communicating with whom… social network of
every US citizen is being compiled… .they are taking from one
company alone 300 million records a day (for storage)…over time
accumulated to close to 20 trillion every year… the original program that
we put together to handle this was to be able to identify
terrorists.” He also said that the original plan was to
encrypt all mails and decrypt only those that met certain criteria of security
risk. It is actually a lot easier and efficient for the intended purpose, but
now it is much worse. (http://youtu.be/TuET0kpHoyM)
Every single tweet from twitter is archived in the US Library of Congress. Big data
and the world’s best processors and servers run algorithms to not just
identify terrorists but for all political purposes. It is at best a poorly kept
secret.
There are eerie similarities between the ways the US government agencies track personal
information, how it came into being quickly after 9/11 fears, how it was
intended and where it is now at. The immense power the state gets through
controlling such information is enough temptation for any ruler. We have seen
through mass exposes on corruption in recent times that there is enough
power-sharing between powerful elite of politicians. This includes the
opposition, big businesses, bureaucrats and policing agencies. They buy out any
resistance from any quarter.
The US attempt to have stronger identification systems (“Real ID”
linking many IDs from driving license to SSN and more, in the aftermath of
9/11) was defeated as 25 of 50 statesopposed it. Some of the irrefutable
objections were:
- • “It went against Jeffersonian principles of individual liberty, free markets and limited government”.
- • “There is no practical way to make national identity document fraud-proof”. “Costs of identification—in dollars, lost privacy and lost liberty, are greater than security provided”
Electronic Healthcare Records (EHR) in the US too aimed to
create unified personal database of health history. Despite obvious
efficiencies, it is not finding favour with the masses. The people do not
trust corporate entities (who lobby with the government) withpersonal health histories.
Many argue that even without UID, it was not difficult for the state to ferret
details of any individual. The whole point now is the ease, speed and volume of
such actions. And the ease, speed and volume are not altered by increments but
by order of magnitude. Getting the political dirty tricks department to scour
files of activists opposed to government is so common today. Ramdev, Kejriwal,
Anna, VK Singh, Vinod Rai, have all had possibly true, half-true and even
false witch-hunts launched based on information dug up on them
selectively and viciously. How can one trust such state with omnipotent powers
of handling all personal data?
A lot has been said in the media criticizing the Aadhaar on multiple
lines. I desist from repeating issues of risks with process, technology, costs,
promised chimera of zero corruption in PDS and more (a complete and logical
argument can be made on what to expect on the PDS front—and believe it or
not, it makes no dent into corruption levels in PDS. Only form changes). It is
not just the one-time costs either. It is a maintenance monster on the budget.
But I restrict and further extend arguments on privacy issues that are the most
serious of the risks.
Aadhaar and its aftermath
Apart from the state using information selectively against
political opponents whether to buy votes in parliament, silence political
opponents or power-mongering over citizens, corporates and global MNCs also
have sufficient interest in prizing information of citizens.
An insurance service provider would be keen to get all personal
information and then base its decision on them. This can be done with, or
without, revealing the source of such information. Illegal or unethical,
motives for such actions would be created by Aadhaar. Motives established,
such acts are only a matter of time.
Similarly, any marketer would love to obtain such information to do targeted
marketing. Companies want it and when demand exists, through bribery or legal
means, such information would be public. Attending one such govt-industry event
where entrepreneurs showcased their proposed business models riding on UID
data, was, to say the least, scary in terms of threats to personal data
privacy. Even today, most civil/ criminal cases in courts are fought on
evidence of illegally obtained telephone bills, call records and bank/credit
card details. Tomorrow there will be more and easier availability of proofs and
a larger grey market trading in private information would emerge.
Moneylife is conducting a seminar on “Why UID/Aadhaar is a medicine
worse than disease”, with no cost to you, in Mumbai, on 12 January 2013.
Register now! For details on registration and the event, please
click here.
The corporate sector has vested interests, short-sighted though, in supporting
UID for the moolah it generates through the projects. That some of these
companies/ partners working on projects have CIA directors on board and gather
crucial biometric data is already voiced as a risk in itself.
It is also argued with good reason that by having such a lucrative database, we
are creating incentives for wrong interests—from hackers to enemy
nations. Probability is low or high is a premature question and not of primary
concern. But given the risks, it is enough to worry about.
The way ahead is to raise public awareness and stall this costly and dangerous
experiment by over-riding the vested interests of a few. Step by step, adding data
agency by agency, and integrating link by link we are headed towards an
Orwellian state that wishes to control all aspects of our lives. The benefits
of not having such controls over our lives far exceed the restriction on our
freedom. The world has studied, debated and moved on from the idea of unified
personal ID. Indians should not allow ourselves to be the guinea pigs of the
world.
Moneylife recently published a 9-part series on how and why
Aadhaar is a bane more than a benefit. To read the complete analysis, click here.
(Sandeep Khurana is an independent consultant and researcher. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at his twitter Id @IQnEQ.)
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