We are looking forward to this week’s DRI Drug and Medical
Device Seminar and the opportunity to get together with so many old friends.
We'll learn some new things, relearn too many old things, maybe learn some
wrong things, and listen to judges tell us how we should be able to work out
most of our disputes with plaintiffs. When lawyers congregate, they waste
liters of vodka and oxygen bragging about their latest wins. By contrast,
plaintiff lawyers are content merely to show off the proofs of their successes,
in the form of Porsches, Patek Phillippes, and pinky rings. It is passing strange how we
lawyers feel the imperative to tell war stories where we always emerge as
winners. That impulse is possibly understandable, but it is not particularly
useful. The medical profession has a much sounder practice of focusing on cases
gone kablooey. The periodic mortality and morbidity meetings at hospitals
discuss errors and ways to avoid them. Everyone says that you can learn more
from defeats than victories. But while lawyers just say it, doctors practice
it. Wouldn't it be great to see a lineup of litigation stars ruminating on
"My Biggest Blunders"? Moreover, if there was a judicial panel
on that topic, it would be a must see. The conference planners could plant that
program at the end, on Friday afternoon, and the speakers for once wouldn't be
drowned out by the sound of fleeing rollaboards.
Today we will discuss a case that did not turn out so well
for the good guys. Normally in this blog we focus on defense wins. After all,
we do not relish the idea of doing the plaintiffs’ work for them. But today we
will conduct a mortality and morbidity meeting on the case of Marcum v. DePuy
Orthopedics, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62875 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2013), and see
if there is any wisdom to be gained from it. We will not exactly be performing
a dissection, but there are definitely a few grisly bits to hold up and
examine. We’re not saying there was any discernible error or fumble – no
legal-doctrinal equivalent of a sponge left in the chest cavity. But the
court’s failure to consign the case to the dustbin of history was eminently
predictable.
Marcum is not an entirely bad case. The medical device in
issue was a ceramic femoral head component for hip replacement, as opposed to
all those metal-on-metal devices that gave rise to so much litigation. Because
this is a product liability case, something went wrong. The component broke
four years after the plaintiff’s hip replacement surgery and there had to be a
revision surgery. Consequently, the plaintiff filed an action alleging every
cause of action in sight. Those causes of action include strict liability
(defective manufacturing, defective design, and nonconformance with
representations), common law negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty, and negligent misrepresentation. None of this is surprising.
Our system seems to encourage the transformation of ignorance about what really
happened into allegations that everything bad happened. It is also not
surprising that the plaintiff sought punitive damages in her prayer for relief,
even though there was no reason to believe that the defendant did anything
particularly terrible or malicious. Again, our system of litigation prompts
allegations of the most and the worst. When you think of it, that process
evinces a scurvy view of human nature. And it's not as if it is especially
logical or inevitable. But it's what we've got.
The defendant did the right thing and tried to clean up this
mess of a complaint by cutting away unnecessary underbrush. The initial
question was the extent to which the various product liability claims were
subsumed or abrogated by the Ohio Product Liability Act. That matters, if only
because if this thing goes to trial any defendant would prefer that fewer
causes of action linger in front of the jury. There is always the danger that
the jury might arrive at some silly compromise that latches onto a
seemingly-throw-away count. Less is not more; less is less. Less is good.
The plaintiff did not contest that the negligence, breach of express warranty,
and breach of implied warranty causes of action were abrogated by the Ohio
Product Liability Act. [So why file them?] But the plaintiff argued that her
negligent misrepresentation claim was not abrogated because it implicated a
more general duty not to deceive rather than a duty to warn. Oh, that argument.
It usually does not work. It did not work here. The court correctly held
that however the plaintiff dressed up the misrepresentation claim, the
fundamental beef was failure to warn, and that is covered by the Ohio statute.
At this point, the case has become a little less clunky, and
that's a good thing. But here is where the defendant might have gotten just a
tad too ambitious. There's something to be said for quitting while you're ahead. Mind you, we know only what we read in the opinion. It is
possible that the court's discussion does not do justice to the defense
arguments and is looking to make their rejection seem as inevitable as possible
by making the arguments seem as weightless as possible. For this case, we have
no inside skinny. We are helplessly dependent on the judge's account of things.
In any event, let's all agree that the allure of preemption is
undeniable. It makes claims go away completely. No muss, no
fuss. No need to worry about bad science, bad documents, or bad
experts. So it is no marvel that the defendant sought dismissal of the
case on grounds of preemption. But the ceramic femoral head is a Class II
medical device. We lost that issue in Lohr years ago. So it is also no marvel that the court rejected the preemption
argument, even if the court garbled the law in getting there. For
instance, the court held that the plaintiff's strict liability claims "are
not, at base, claims for violation of federal law." Marcum, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62875 at *10. Okay. So what? Instead,
"Plaintiff’s claims in question are that Defendant breached well-recognized
state law duties owed to her through conduct that is also a violation of
federal law, and these claims are therefore not preempted by
Buckman." Id. We'll confess that we are not sure what the
court means by that. Is this an invocation of the "parallel"
claim exception, even though, like we said, this isn't a PMA device? That word nowhere appears in the decision. Look, there
probably was not going to be preemption for this 510(k) cleared product anyway,
but now we have some baffling, ugly language that will be cited in cases where
there might actually be a vigorous preemption claim. We can think of
arguing preemption in a case where a plaintiff is challenging the 510(k) status
of a product, where the plaintiff argues that the clearance process is
illegitimate, or that the manufacturer should have insisted on going the PMA
route, or that the manufacturer should have engaged in testing above and
beyond that required by the 510(k) clearance process. Otherwise, don't lead with your chin, not on a defense as precious as preemption. We'd like to
think those valid preemption arguments are not foreclosed by the court's reasoning in Marcum,
but we're not certain what that reasoning is or what argument by the defendant
provoked such reasoning.
It looks like the defendant mounted a TwIqbal challenge to
the complaint, and the court mushed together the manufacturing and design
defect claims in a way that mystifies: "Plaintiff pleads and
references good manufacturing practices that Defendant is required to maintain,
including establishing and maintaining quality audits, quality testing, and
process validation for the Articul/EZE ceramic femoral head, and that here, in
their absence, the product was defective and failed, resulting in a fracture of
the ceramic femoral head and injuries." Id. at *13. How
precisely did the defendant depart from manufacturing specs or good
practices? Dunno. Has the Marcum court just blessed a formula that
will permit every manufacturing defect claim to survive via a blizzard of empty
words? According to the Marcum court, such a blizzard is enough to blow
away pleading requirements: "Specifically, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant
designed, manufactured, sold, distributed and supplied the Articul/EZE ceramic
femoral head into the stream of commerce, that it was defective when it left
Defendant’s hands, and that it reached Plaintiff on November 12, 2007 when she
underwent a left total hip replacement." Id. at *13-14. Check
out that word "Specifically." That is what we in the biz call a
howler.
The court also rejected the defendant's assertion that the
plaintiffs claims were "inadequately pled because she does not currently
have the device in question or because her surgeon's assembly of the hip
implant device rendered the product substantially altered." Id. at
*14-15. The court reasoned that the unavailability of a medical device is
not fatal if there is circumstantial evidence of the alleged defect, and the
alteration of the device was expected and intended and, thus, not a barrier to
either design or manufacturing claims. Id. at *15. It is far from
pellucid how any of this fits in with pleading issues, unless the idea is that
the unavailability or alteration rendered the product liability claims
implausible. It just might be that the court is not telling us what the
defendant actually argued.
Similarly, we are never told exactly what the defendant's
argument was against the claim for nonconformance with representations
claim. What we are told is that the plaintiff "pleads that she
and/or her physician justifiably relied on Defendant’s representations about
the wear characteristics of Defendant’s product in choosing the Articul/EZE
ceramic femoral head. Additionally, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant’s
representations were false and the femoral head fractured inside her body.
" Id. at *17. Again, those are rather empty allegations.
Anyone could author them, untethered to a single fact. And what gives
with the "she and/or her physician"? Shouldn't it just be the
physician? As is so mind-numbingly often the case with these cases, it
becomes enough for the plaintiff simply to say that the product failed.
There's your proof of defect. There's your proof of a lie. Except
it isn't.
Finally, the court says that the complaint adequately sets
forth a request for punitive damages. Under Ohio law, punitive damages
are precluded if the device was manufactured and labeled in conformance with
Food and Drug Administration regulations. The Marcum court holds that
"[a]though the fact that Defendant received marketing approval does not
establish that Defendant’s product was actually manufactured and labeled in
accordance with that approval, Plaintiff must allege facts to show a lack of
the required compliance." Id. at *18. Hmmm. So we are
talking about compliance with federal law, ay? And some jury in Ohio, as
opposed to the FDA, will decide that, ay? Getting past that, how does the
plaintiff allege lack of such compliance? Here's how:
"Plaintiff pleads that, in conflict with the requirements of the 510(k)
approval process, the Articul/EZE ceramic femoral head was adulterated because
the product failed to meet performance standards, that Defendant failed to
establish and maintain current good manufacturing practice with respect to
quality audits, quality testing, and process validation, and that as a result
of Defendant’s failure to maintain such standards as required by the 510(k)
approval process, the device failed and caused Plaintiff’s
injuries." Id. Hence, according to Marcum, a few vague
generalities are enough to conjure up the threat of punitive damages.
As we said, all we can do is hold up the nasty parts of this
opinion and gaze in distaste. We recommend using tweezers and rubber gloves.
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Posted By Steve McConnell to
Drug and Device Law at 5/15/2013 08:15:00 AM