Oracle Bitlocker Encryption Download
Samatha Zwiefelhofer
Protect data in tablespaces with transparent data encryption (TDE) and dynamically mask sensitive data returned by database queries with data redaction. Oracle Advanced Security combines these powerful data protection capabilities into a single, easy-to-configure solution.
Transparent data encryption (TDE) stops would-be attackers from bypassing the database and reading sensitive information directly from storage by enforcing data-at-rest encryption in the database layer. Encrypt individual data columns, entire tablespaces, database exports, and backups to control access to sensitive data.
Store and manage keys locally in wallets or centrally with Oracle Key Vault. Encrypt data quickly with system-generated keys or use your own encryption keys with the bring-your-own-key (BYOK) capability.
The Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) Key Management Service (KMS) is a cloud-based service that provides centralized management and control of encryption keys for data stored in OCI. OCI KMS is customer-managed encryption and offers the following services:
OCI KMS has been validated with the functionality and security controls to help you meet the encryption and key management requirements of the PCI DSS 3.2.1 (primarily referenced in sections 3.5 and 3.6).
You can directly submit data to key management APIs to encrypt and decrypt using your master encryption keys stored in the Vault. Also, you can encrypt your data locally within your applications and OCI services using a method known as envelope encryption.
With envelope encryption, you generate and retrieve data encryption keys (DEKs) from key management APIs. DEKs are not stored or managed in the key management service, but are encrypted by your master encryption key. Your applications can use DEKs to encrypt your data and store the encrypted DEKs along with the data. When your applications want to decrypt the data, you should call decrypt to the key management API on the encrypted DEK to retrieve the DEK. You can the decrypt your data locally with the DEK.
Key management supports sending up to 4 KB of data to be encrypted directly. In addition, envelope encryption can offer significant performance benefits. When you encrypt data directly with key management APIs, it must be transferred over the network. Envelope encryption reduces the network load since only the request and delivery of the much smaller DEKs go over the network. The DEK is used locally in your application or encrypting OCI service, avoiding the need to send the entire block of data.
OCI External KMS is a service that allows customers to use encryption keys that are stored and managed outside OCI. This can be useful for customers who have regulatory requirements to store encryption keys on-premises or outside OCI, or who want to have more control over their encryption keys. Please refer to this blog for additional details.
OCI External KMS gives customers more control over their encryption keys, but it also comes with operational responsibility: Customers must administer, manage, and maintain encryption keys and hardware security modules (HSMs) on-premises. This is a different ownership model than the existing OCI Vault service, where Oracle manages and administers the HSM infrastructure on behalf of customers.
Overview
BitLocker Drive Encryption is a native security feature that is available in some versions of Windows. It is a whole disk encryption solution; it encrypts everything on the drive that Windows is installed on.
When you enable BitLocker, you create a personal identification number (PIN), which you need to enter every time you start up your computer. A recovery key is also generated. You can use the recovery key to gain access to your computer if your forget your password. You should print the recovery key and store it in a safe place., apart from your computer. After the recovery key is generated you will be prompted to restart your computer. The encryption process starts when the computer reboots.
The second post in this series described how to map storage at an arbitrary cloud storage provider as an ordinary local drive in Windows, using virtual hard disks. This post will look at how to encrypt that drive such that any information data backed up to the cloud remains private under the worst-case scenario: the service provider going rogue and deciding to rifle through user data. While there are many ways to encrypt storage locally, we are primarily interested in options supported out-of-the-box on common operating systems such as Windows. It turns out that there is a built-in feature with exactly the right properties for this job: BitLocker-To-Go disk encryption or BL2G for short.
Some context is required to distinguish BL2G from its better known cousin, BitLocker for boot volumes. There is plenty in common as the shared branding suggests. Both variants are full-disk encryption schemes; they operate at the level of an entire drive. This is contrast with a much older Windows feature called Encrypting File System, which operates at the level of files and directories. With EFS it is possible to designate particular directories or even individual files for encryption. For BitLocker that choice is made at the granularity level of a complete drive. (Strictly speaking these are logical drives, rather than physical instances. A single physical drive may be formatted with multiple partitions, each appearing as independent logical volumes.)
BitLocker-To-Go is specifically aimed at solving that mobility scenario. While internal drives are rarely migrated between machines, USB thumb-drives are frequently used as low-tech high-latency network to carry data around. Unfortunately their size and mobility also makes them frequent subjects of theft or accidental loss. This is where BL2G comes in, providing full-disk encryption on removable media. In many ways BL2G has a simpler design because there is no boot sequence to worry about. On the other hand the mobility requirement rules out using an on-board TPM as the source of encryption keys, since TPM is bound to a single machine by design.
As the shield icon suggests, the command requires administrator privileges. Selecting that and confirming the UAC prompt leads to a wizard walking the user through the steps of encrypting the drive and backing up the encryption key:
When the smart card option is selected, the wizard will require that a card is already inserted in the reader and search for a certificate with suitable properties. After encryption is complete, the drive icon changes to show a gray open padlock superimposed. This signals that the volume is protected by BL2G and that it is currently unlocked to allow access to the data.
Azure Disk Encryption helps protect and safeguard your data to meet your organizational security and compliance commitments. It uses the DM-Crypt feature of Linux to provide volume encryption for the OS and data disks of Azure virtual machines (VMs), and is integrated with Azure Key Vault to help you control and manage the disk encryption keys and secrets.
Before enabling encryption, the data disks to be encrypted must be properly listed in /etc/fstab. Use the "nofail" option when creating entries, and choose a persistent block device name (as device names in the "/dev/sdX" format may not be associated with the same disk across reboots, particularly after encryption; for more detail on this behavior, see: Troubleshoot Linux VM device name changes).
Various methods exist to protect data from unauthorized access while data is in transit and at rest. These approaches typically encrypt the entire payload. As a complementary approach Field Level Encryption has an important role to play by ensuring that only appropriately configured clients can read sensitive data fields. This approach also allows clients without the encryption keys to work with the non-sensitive data which would be impossible to do with a fully encrypted payload.
When implementing Field Level Encryption we need to be aware that we are working with sensitive data (the data fields which need encrypting but also the encryption keys themselves). As such, the following need to be considered:
When deciding on a field level encryption approach, you may already have your requirements clearly defined. If not; this is a good time to think about the following questions which may guide you to the approach that is right for you:
The below section aims to present a simple implementation of each of the above patterns. I hope to give you just enough here so that you could take the idea and apply it to your specific use case. I have decided to use symmetric key encryption based on the AES standard for my implementations as symmetric key encryption is somewhat easier to understand and demonstrate.
I love the simplicity of this approach and it works well when we only need to do field level encryption for a small number of fields. However if there are many fields to encrypt/decrypt then performance may become an issue due to the large number of requests that we would need to make to the OCI Vault service which currently does not offer a batch encrypt API.
In this pattern, I will use a custom JavaScript function to do the actual encryption/decryption however I also want to ensure that I store the Master Encryption Key in OCI Vault. To achieve this I will use the following high-level flow for encryption:
In step 3 of the above diagram, you can see that the JavaScript function which I uploaded earlier is available in the mapper under User Defined functions. This offers the best experience as OIC developers can use it just like any other native xslt function. In addition to usability there is a point to be made here about re-use. In the one mapper I can reuse the function to encrypt many different fields. This pattern of a single call to OCI Vault and a native encrypt function, offers in my opinion the best user experience when you have requirements to encrypt multiple fields or to do encryption/decryption across multiple integrations.
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