Roger, would you please reply to the efforts that people put into
replying to your last email before you continue? Otherwise I doubt
people are going to be interested in continuing to reply to you. I'm
kind of hesitant, since it seems my efforts are going nowhere with
you. But I'm willing to give the benefit of a doubt for the moment.
> Do you think people might be receptive to some measure of absolute
> prohibition, along the
What is "absolute prohibition"?
> lines of "Thou shalt not design, nor build, nor isolate, nor modify,
> nor grow, nor release any
I think that happened in my gut this morning. Am I going to prison?
> self replicating organism, with the intent of causing harm?"
Wouldn't it be more useful if people who are actively trying to cause
harm to publicly admit it?
> Are their circumstances under which people might agree voluntarily
> to a moratorium on projects involving animal viruses, particularly
Voluntary to a moratorium ("suspension of activity")? But this is a
basic misunderstanding of both human and non-human biology. The mold
growing on your cheese in the refridgerator does *not* read UN
international backjournals.
> human ones,
Disregarding whether or not people have agreed to a moratorium, how
would you identify whether or not a moratorium is actually implemented
and isn't just some lie you tell yourself to feel better?
> The idea is behind the second question is that the realistic prospect
> of such
> projects being of interest to and accessible to this community may be
> some time
> off, and in the interim a community might be able to think through
> how or if it wanted to regulate these, whether it should submit such
> experiments for review, if so what kinds of review structures if any
> might be
> appropriate.
I would appreciate any recommendations for the formal semantic
structure of submissions of reviews, if you have any. For instance,
I've been thinking of some tools that would take SBML files and other
experiment description formats and generate information and analyses
of materials involved (like for the clinical/molecular biology
protocols), spit out relevant Material Safety Datasheets, etc., so
maybe we can collaborate on this front?
> microbiological commons, can one try to ensure that this particular
> democratization
> and dissemination remains a good thing?
That's too vague though. You can't do that.
(1) "Good" according to each of our utility functions and valuing functions?
(2) "Good" according to some vague, amorphous grouping of people?
(3) "Good" according to some non-existent community standard?
etc.
I don't think you're making any sense. :-(
I previously did a quick writeup on XML for clinical protocols:
http://groups.google.com/group/openmanufacturing/msg/1fc4fbbfd4a6fb23
This sort of system could be extended to the representation of amateur
experimentation, such as the specifying materials, protocols, tools
and items of interest, and then a safety analysis tool for lab
protocols would be kind of neat to have. I can see how it might be
architectured.
- Bryan
On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 9:55 AM, Roger <brent...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Do you think people might be receptive to some measure of absolute
> prohibition, along the
> lines of "Thou shalt not design, nor build, nor isolate, nor modify,
> nor grow, nor release any
> self replicating organism, with the intent of causing harm?"
Yes, I think you'd find a consensus behind this statement. In fact,
and feel free to correct or augment my understanding, but I believe
this is essentially already in place in the US, under the Bioterrorism
Act of 2002.
>
> Related
>
> Are their circumstances under which people might agree voluntarily
> to a moratorium on projects involving animal viruses, particularly
> human ones,
> and projects aimed at altering the host range of bacterial pathogens,
> or that attempt
> to enable bacterial colonization of mammalian organisms, or that
> enable invasion
> of mammalian cells?
Speaking for myself, absolutely. To do such a project in a safe and
acceptable manner requires institutional support. My working
assumption is that the rules which govern my kitchen or basement are
no different than the ones elsewhere. If an experiment would require
review elsewhere, I can't do it in my basement, since there is no IRB
for my basement. Lots of interesting demonstrations and experiments
require no review, however. For example, extracting DNA from pumpkin
seeds can be done with food-grade reagents, and I've done this in my
kitchen. I started with food, I added dish detergent and vodka, and I
ended with food. Recombinant DNA work, however, in my understanding,
if we operate under the NIH guidelines, requires a basic (Level 1)
lab, and my kitchen could never qualify. My basement, on the other
hand, could potentially be made into a Level 1 lab. If I then chose
experiments which would be exempt from review (again, under NIH)
anywhere else, I think I could operate in a manner which would be
generally seen as safe and acceptable. For the moment, though, since
my basement isn't (yet?) a lab, if I want to make bacteria glow, I
have to do it elsewhere.
Still, I think there's a role for some kind of advice and review
process for DIYers. In particular, if an institutional investigator is
uncertain as to whether or not a particular study is in fact exempt,
they have someone to ask. This provides both a check, and a way of
spreading blame. DIYers have no such formal backup... but maybe we
should.
doug.