Democracy Cannot Function ...
Harbin Pelletier
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, democracy is more widely accepted and practiced than ever before. At no time in history have so many people enjoyed the right to participate, through elections, in the government of their country.
But the spread of democracy should not tempt us into triumphalism; threats to democracy have by no means ceased to exist. Recent experiences in a number of countries have shown that democratic processes still can and do suffer severe setbacks, and that such situations can create tensions leading to destabilization and even to violent conflict.
The greatest danger today may be the weakening of the substance of democratic government, even as its outward forms appear intact. Democracy does not mean simply holding elections. Democratic governance depends on strong institutions and requires participation and accountability, with a free and vigorous public debate on the issues of the day, among an educated and enlightened electorate who have meaningful choices placed before them. It also requires adherence to the principle of the rule of law, which is essential for the proper functioning of society.
It is also highly appropriate that you have chosen to discuss democracy together with good governance and civil society. The formal institutions of democratic government mean very little unless they are underpinned by a strong and vibrant civil society. The active debate and enlightened electorate that democracy thrives on require people to organize themselves freely, independent of the State, around ideals, issues and causes important to them. If there is no space for civil society, the simple casting of votes becomes an empty exercise.
A principle underlying this conference is that while democracy cannot be imposed from abroad, it can be encouraged and assisted through international efforts. Since the future of democratic government cannot be divorced from the global context in which each society must function, a global dialogue is essential. That means not only that new and restored democracies can learn from each other, but that old and established democracies can and should learn from newer ones;and that in exploring different forms of democracy, we should not lose sight of, but rather strengthen, its substance. So let us not look at our work as the export of one form of government from one part of the world to another. Rather, let us focus on common challenges to governance in the twenty-first century, and ensure that democracy is at the heart of our solutions. In that spirit, I wish you a most productive conference.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Trk, today expressed serious concern at the recent rise in killings of civilians across Burkina Faso, with allegations of responsibility pointing to both armed groups and State actors.
Among the challengers to liberal democracy in Europe, we can count populists, autocrats, and the increasingly often mentioned illiberals. But who are they and what is illiberalism? How does it relate to populism? Can illiberals be democrats at all? What are the policy implications of having illiberal politicians, especially of the radical right, in power in the EU? This interview explores these questions with Professor Cas Mudde. It covers various issues at the intersection of academic and policy research on populism, illiberalism, democracy, and the radical right. It discusses whether the growing body of literature on illiberalism addresses something that is fundamentally new on the global political agenda, how this literature relates to academic research on populism, and if illiberalism and democracy are reconcilable against the backdrop of a global trend of autocratization, which many scholars of democracy have noted, and which is often attributed to illiberal and populist leaders. Furthermore, the conversation sets out to understand how the recent election outcomes in Slovakia and Poland fit into the aforementioned trend and also predict what is in store for European democracies in the near future as illiberal actors of the radical right are readying themselves for the next European parliamentary elections in June 2024.
Cas Mudde is a professor of international affairs and a distinguished research professor at the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia. His academic research agenda centres around the question how liberal democracies can defend themselves against political challenges without undermining their core values. He has published widely on uncivil society, democratization, Euroskepticism, extremism, and the practices of political parties, especially those of far right and populist inclinations.
Zsuzsanna Vegh: After nearly two decades of what we refer to as the populist Zeitgeist, it seems that scholars have recently turned their attention towards studying illiberalism or illiberal democracy. How do you interpret this new scholarly trend? Does it capture something that you think is qualitatively new and different? Do you consider this concept of illiberalism analytically useful? What do you make of this new line of research in terms of conceptual coherence?
I also believe that a lot of the literature on European populism has traditionally come out of party scholarship. From a theoretical point of view, a lot of the literature on populism originated from democracy studies, and in Latin America, a lot of the literature was closely related to the democratization literature. Populism literature has therefore gravitated towards questions of democracy, rather than electoral behavior or party systems. In my own work, there is a significant difference between my initial writings on radical right parties, which were just party literature and barely ever touched upon questions of liberal democracy; and my work on populism, which has focused on the relationship to democracy from the start. The illiberalism literature is more in line with the literature of democratization. It is also more empirical than theoretical literature.
Cas Mudde: The term illiberalism comes out of a concern for liberal democracy in particular. The idea of liberal democracy separates liberalism and democracy. In this limited, narrow definition of democracy, it is seen as a system of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Liberal democracy combines popular sovereignty and majority rule with a set of principles as well as institutions, including free media, independent judiciary, pluralism, rule of law and minority rights. One the one hand, some argue that democracy cannot exist without being a liberal democracy. One the other hand, a lot of people argue that there is an inherent tension between the two fundamentally different traditions and ideological ideas of liberalism and of democracy: liberalism is concerned with autonomous individuals and their rights, whereas democracy is concerned with majority rule.
I think illiberalism tries to capture everyone who is against liberal democracy. However, some disagree with liberal democracy because they are anti-liberal but pro-democratic, there are others who do so because they are anti-democratic but liberal, and then also some people who are against both liberalism and democracy. Illiberalism captures all three, which are very different. Anti-democrats are generally referred to as authoritarians, which is a problematic terminology as well. As a result of adopting a terminology wherein liberalism and democracy are separated and a minimal definition of democracy is used, illiberals can be seen as democratic because illiberals believe in popular sovereignty and majority rule despite disagreeing with minority rights or separation of powers.
Slovakia and Poland had intriguing elections, causing confusion for the media that is striving to identify trends. Articles were already being written about the demise of populism after the Polish elections, but then Robert Fico returned, leaving the media uncertain about their narrative. Poland is bigger than Slovakia, so Poland wins the story at the moment. But the next time some populist wins, they will argue that populism is back again.The problem with this approach is that it ignores that every individual election is always primarily driven by national or local factors, rather of global ones. People do not vote for or against Law and Justice (PiS) because Trump won or lost. It does not work like that. We must see things in the context. In Central and Eastern Europe, it is always remarkable when a government stays in power. It has been happening a bit more nowadays, but on average, parties in government tend to lose elections. PiS had been in government twice. You lose elections if you do not have full control of the state like Hungary. You lose particularly if you are faced with a half-decent opposition, which is another fundamental difference from Hungary. Therefore, I do not see PiS as being down and out. Rather, it is still a phenomenally strong party, despite having openly subverted liberal democracy, diminished the rights of women and LGBTQI, and mismanaged various elements of the economy, among other things. In the next elections, they are poised to return to power because the incoming government will have a hard time governing in general. The experience from Slovakia is the same. Slovak politics is incredibly volatile: the last government was completely divided and could not get almost anything done. Therefore, the opposition came back. It makes sense that Fico would return, considering the infrastructure of his party and his personal talent. Is he particularly successful? No, he actually does not have that much support. It is a very fragmented party system in which he is the strongest. Consequently, this is not a massive vote for Fico in any way, shape or form. It is not even about being pro-Russian. You have to keep in mind that only less than a quarter voted for him, and that most of the people voted against the incumbent government. I do not see any other trend than that of generally people voting the government out.
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