Oped: Calif High Speed Rail Should be Stopped
Demographia/PublicPurpose/RentalCarTour Updates
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
Taking taxpayers for a ride california focus
Proposed state high-speed rail system would cost too much to do too
little
There has been considerable discussion about the proposed California
High Speed Rail project. California taxpayers are being subjected to
grandiose claims about reduced traffic congestion and cost-effective
alternatives to flying and driving.
The HSR system, which would connect Los Angeles, San Francisco, San
Diego, Sacramento and areas in between, would require as a down payment
a $10 billion bond issue that voters may consider as soon as November.
The California High Speed Rail Authority says the system could cost
much more - $37 billion. Reality is more like $75 billion.
Luckily, the Assembly last month passed a bill that would delay the
bond election until 2008. That bill is now in the Senate Appropriations
Committee, where there is no clear indication whether it will come to a
vote anytime soon. However, there is evidence the Assembly's caution is
justified, and the Senate should follow its lead.
First, the HSR system is likely to cost much more than advertised. Cost
projections for large transportation projects are notoriously
inaccurate. Boston's two-decade "Big Dig" racked up three times its
projected cost, even after accounting for inflation. Across the
country, transit megaprojects have escalated in cost after approval;
these are not isolated cases.
What's more, it appears these overruns are not accidental. Research by
Bengt Flyvbjerg of the University of Aarlborg (Denmark) published in
the Journal of the American Planning Association demonstrates these
projects routinely surpass estimated costs due to "strategic
misrepresentation." Planners and proponents underestimate costs in
hopes of obtaining project approvals that would otherwise be
impossible.
As a Los Angeles County transportation commissioner, I witnessed costs
escalate for the Blue Line light rail from Los Angeles to Long Beach
eventually exceeding three times original projections
(inflation-adjusted). At no point did anyone seriously question the
increases, because the taxpayers had already committed to the project.
There was simply no incentive to keep costs down. Why should we expect
the HSR project to be any different?
Flyvbjerg and others also have found that ridership estimates tend to
be overstated. The Los Angeles Red Line subway even today carries less
than one-half the ridership that was projected when we approved it.
Ridership is important because the California high-speed rail system is
advertised as not needing its operations subsidized by taxpayers. But
this claim is likely based on an overestimation of the ridership and an
underestimation of the operating costs. Amtrak's high-speed Acela
service between Washington, D.C., and New York City carries little more
than one-tenth the passengers that proponents promise for the
California system, despite serving a larger market. So it is likely
taxpayers will need to keep their checkbooks open indefinitely to
subsidize HSR operation.
All this would be irrelevant if we needed such a system. The California
HSR has been touted as a strategy for reducing highway congestion. In
fact, projections indicate that traffic congestion along the rail
corridors will still increase 26 percent by 2020, even with the
high-speed trains. Without them the increase by 2020 would be 31
percent.
Claims of reduced air traffic congestion are similarly flawed. Most air
travel between the San Francisco Bay Area and Southern California
already avoids the busy San Francisco International and Los Angeles
International airports, and their share of travel is declining.
Planners delude themselves into believing HSR will take away half of
air traffic volume. But last year Amtrak said its New
York-to-Washington high-speed service lost ridership to stronger
airline competition. Planners assume airlines will stand idly by as
their customers jump on the train. In fact, airlines will compete, and
compete hard.
Much has been made of HSR's purported cost-effectiveness, with claims
that highway improvements would cost more than twice as much as the
rail project. But the highway alternative would produce four times the
congestion relief, making it twice as cost-effective, even without the
inevitable cost escalations for high-speed rail.
Thus, for California, the question is not whether high-speed rail would
be nice - it would be. The fundamental question is whether it is
worth the tens of billions it could cost. At this point, there is every
reason to believe this project would be, quite simply, a waste of
money.
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Wendell Cox
Former member, Los Angeles County Transportation commission