it doesn't matter whether mines last weeks or decades?

[Robin Collins]

Hi all,

I would appreciate your comments on a claim that has been in circulation from the Canadian APM ban campaign. The language that is of concern is this, and I would appreciate as many comments as possible: “The myth of advanced non-persistent landmines reducing casualties is just that a myth. The problem with landmines is their indiscriminate nature [and] whether they are indiscriminate for a month or a decade is not important.”

The concern that is flagged here is the idea that it is "not important" whether a mine lasts months or decades. (It is accepted by all that we do not know for sure if a mine has been deactivated or not, nor whether the "smart" mechanism is faulty or not.)

I have stated that in my view every deminer would prefer smart mines over dumb mines, even if smart mines are not 100% effective in deactivating/self-destructing. 

Please comment with your thoughts on all of this and I will forward them into the discussion we are having. The discussion is in the context of the new US policy to start using mines again. And the related question is IF the US starts using mines, is it better that they be SD/SDA "smart" mines, or is it unimportant?

Robin

[Bob Keeley]

Hi Robin

I remember when this came up during the discussions for the same CCW review which led to Axworthy calling for a ban to be signed in Ottawa.

Whist yes, SD mechanisms are in principle better than non-SD mines, there are two practical problems.

1. From a technical point of view, if we are trying to clear an area 100%, we still have to search 100%, whether we’re looking for 1 active mine or 100. And, when the mines are merely ‘self neutralising’ we’ll still have to treat them as live.

2. The political problem is potentially more intractable. America gets to keep GATOR. The Soviets say in that case they’ll keep their no-quite-so-smart POM2S. The Chinese then claim the right to keep their snide and perhaps less reliable copy of POM2S. Then, someone will make the case (as, IIRC, indeed Gaddafi did in ‘96) that it is unfair that only the Northern Hemisphere should have mines, and that if poor countries can’t afford smart mines, they have the right to keep their dumb mines.

I’m not saying I agree with Gaddafi, but I can see how it could unravel the treaty.

Yours

Bob

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[Robin Collins]

Thanks Bob, perhaps I should provide some more context. The argument is not whether demining is any easier with "smart" mines (although that could be the case.) It is whether (in effect) deactivated mines are safer than live mines, or does it make no difference to deminers. I realize that sounds like a silly question, but it is the one we are trying to focus the comments on. For your second point, lets assume the USA is going to use mines. Do you care what kind of mines? (I am trying NOT to sabotage the objectivity of my question here. I am really not trying to steer to a result I want!)

Robin

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[Bob Keeley]

Thanks Robin

Sorry if I wasn’t clear enough!

Unless we are 100% certain that deactivation mechanisms (self destruct or self neutralising) work 100% of the time, we’re going to have to use the same procedures. Whilst it might mean a net decrease in overall risk in terms of ‘exposure hours’, the ‘point risk’ at the 1% (or whatever) of those mines which remain active will be the same.

Also, I suspect that the deactivation process will be a bit like radioactive decay. We might know the half-life of different mine types, but we won’t be able to say precisely when each individual mine is deactivated.

Hope this is clearer

Bob

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[Robin Collins]

Bob,

OK, I perhaps was not clear. 

I think all agree with the points you made (ie uncertainty about deactivation etc.) We are assuming that deminers must act as if all mines are live because smart mechanisms are not 100% assured. Given that assumption, do deminers care whether mines are smart or dumb, or is it "unimportant"?

Would deminers not care that 99% were inactive, for instance, in terms of their missing a mine, and later stepping on it.

This is a practical question, not a theoretical question.

Robin

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[Robert Keeley]

Hi again Robin

Formally speaking, Risk is a function of the probability of the incidence and the severity of the outcome.

R = P x S

The severity of the outcome doesn’t change, so we would keep the same drills.

But the probability of the incidence would reduce.

It is effectively reducing the density of contamination.

Bob

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From: demi...@googlegroups.com on behalf of Robin Collins <robi...@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2020 8:55 pm
To: DEMINING
Subject: Re: [HD] it doesn't matter whether mines last weeks or decades?

 

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[Robin Collins]

Bob,

so, do you agree with this phrase: "whether they are indiscriminate for a month or a decade is not important.”

Robin

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[Robert Keeley]

I don’t really understand it.

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Robert Keeley (mobile) www.rk-consulting.net

[Andy Smith]

Robin,

 

This looks like a call where everyone is right, up to a point. On reflection, I think that it can matter, but not necessarily so.

 

Some confusion results from considering Self Destruct (SD) and Self De-Activate (SDA) as if there were not critical differences between them from both the demining and civilian safety points of view.

 

Bob’s probability of occurrence is not determined entirely by reference to how many mines are functional. If it is believed that all the mines are non-functional and actions are taken based on that belief, the probability of a detonation in an area can actually increase. People may go into the area they would otherwise have avoided in the belief that the mines are ‘safe’, or deminers may use ‘robust’ tools and procedures that increase the probability of a functional mine detonating. The use of the ludicrous ‘clutivator’ tool where HSTAMIDS failed to indicate the definite presence of an object illustrates how willing demining organisations can be to increase speed at the cost of safety (especially when under donor pressure). Even without changing tools and procedures, the recovery of many de-activated mines may be expected to make deminers ‘compacent’ and so increase the probability of a detonation with the few that are functional.

 

However, if most mines were not functional, the probability of an accident occurring when people move over the area without knowing it was mined would apparently be reduced. That is less likely than it sounds when these mines are dispersed without concealment, so are visible. People would see the de-activated mines and not know they had de-activated, so still avoid the area – at least until someone (person or animal) failed to detonate one and word went around that they were ‘safe’.

 

Most civilian victims of ERW after conflict are young males who, in many cases, deliberately interact with the hazard. The presence of man-made objects with explosive inside is a temptation to the boy wanting to be a ‘man’, so if they were believed to have SDAed they would almost certainly be collected and probably dismantled. When the collection included the odd live mine, the consequences could be far more devastating than the detonation of a single device.

 

Whenever people (civilians or deminers) believe inert mines are ‘safe’ and some of them are not, their risk of injury from the minefield (not from any one individual mine) can be increased. While the probability of detonation of an individual mine is reduced, the probability of a detonation occurring amongst any functional mines is increased. And the severity of consequences may also be increased.

 

The above comment only apply to mines that de-activate (SDA), and the way they de-activate can be important. If de-activation relies on a battery discharge, the mine is left with an explosive charge and a detonator (not a good combination for exploration by a curious child). Any capacitor inside may receive a charge from temperature extremes and re-active a mine erratically. If de-activation relies on chemical decomposition or other atrophy in the detonation system, that may be more reliable but would still leave a neat package of high explosive available for re-use.

 

In any scenario in which the US forces were to use SDA AP mines themselves, the presence of easily harvested high-explosive for use by non-state actors may be a greater security concern to the US forces than any risk to civilians and deminers. That is an argument that the military knows all too well, so I think that SDA will probably not happen.

 

When talking of Self Destruct (SD) AP mines designed to detonate after a set period or on remote command, the risks are different. If scattered, they would often remain visible when they do not function. If concealed, their detonation would often leave evidence of a detonation that deminers should recognise. If fragmentation mines SD, the area is covered with fragments making the use of metal-detectors to find the remaining mines much more problematic, but this is countered by an intact mine being probably visible and giving a very large detector signature – as long as no minimum metal AP blast mines are used in the same area. This may work with scattered SD fragmentation mines – but is complicated when they include a fiendish spread of filament tripwires that will always present a great danger to the approaching deminer (whether they are designed to SD or not). When mines are placed by hand, the use of minimum metal blast mines in the same area as fragmentation mines is common – partly because the fragmentation mines are usually designed to be (at least partly) visible and so they are ‘protected’ by the concealment of blast mines around them.

 

The use of SD blast mines probably makes a deminer’s task easier and possibly safer if they are used in a patterned minefield, but not necessarily so if they are dispersed by air. The use of an SD fragmentation mine may make the deminer’s task harder and more hazardous. It both cases the methods of deployment influence any risk assessment – and that also applies to SDA mines. Also, as always, the time since placement and the context of placement introduce other risk factors (such as the concealment in undergrowth of air-dispersed mines).

 

So yes Rae, my first comment on this was superficial – but after reflection, I still believe that the US use of SD/SDA mines would not make a significant difference to the deminers, who will develop any new tools and procedures necessary and carry on taking risks for the campaigners, as before. It took time, but this happened when sub-munitions began to be used as area denial weapons instead of mines. (The ICBL was always crippled by concentrating on what a munition was designed to do, rather than what it actually did.) Deminers have always dealt with every explosive hazard they find after conflict – and finding and clearing AP mines is a lot less hazardous than some tasks they face. Ironically, I believe that the use of SD/SDA AP mines is likely to increase the risk to the population in the area – which it is presumably intended to reduce – but it does seem that simplistic two-dimensional thinking has become the fashion, so no one is likely to listen to complex arguments that must include speculation. 

 

If the change of US policy encourages countries that have not signed up to the ban to use AP mines more widely (and it may predictably do so with China and Russia), that would make a real difference to the deminer and, in my view, be a step backward for humanity. The latter is because the AP mine ban was a small step on the path to conducting conflict in a way that did not have lasting or unnecessary consequences for non-combatants. The CCM was a smaller step (fewer signatories) on the same path. The USA did not step in line for either – but did kind-of respect the AP mine ban principles and has funded a lot of demining around the world. If it steps backward, perhaps the whole world will? Bad news for all, including deminers.

 

Clinton got the AP mine ban train moving but idealist intransigence over the Korea exception (and there was an undeniable case arguing that marked. fenced and patrolled border minefields presented a tolerably low threat to civilians) meant that he could not sign. It might have been so more effective to compromise... because AP mines were only ever the first step – but yes, retrospect generally makes things easier to see. Obama moved things forward against a growing right wing trend... and now his humanitarian efforts have been drumped...

 

Dear ol’ USA. It really is the “cradle of the best and the worst”.

 

Funny old world,
Andy

 

 

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[a...@ddasonline.com]

But all that said, I still think that any mine that really did destroy itself after a set time would present far less risk to non-combatants of all kinds than one that lasted for decades. That’s true as soon as risk duration is factored in. It’s the inevitable failure rate that gets us into complications.

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[Rae McGrath]

Hello Robin

I’m somewhat confused by your post and your question. 

The ICBL came into being as a response to the suffering caused by a weapon, the AP mine, the military utility of which was far outweighed by its disproportionate impact on non-combatants and its persistent properties. 

The subsequent treaty banned anti-personnel mines as defined in the treaty and made no exceptions for self-destruct or self-neutralising mines. Thus it is absolutely clear that all the countries who are party to the treaty and the ICBL agreed that neither the use of terminology such as ‘smart’ or ‘dumb’ (most commonly terms introduced by US delegates during discussions) nor any claimed deactivation period was relevant nor, to use your wording, ‘important’. Thus the article you attach and the current MAC newsletter are perfectly correct legally and logically in their statement ... and, to my knowledge, the campaign position in that regard have not shifted since the 1993 London Conference.

Now, if I understand your reason for raising this issue, you feel that MAC (and thus the ICBL, since it would, I hope, not be a unilateral position you envisage) should somehow respond to the US landmine policy suggesting a preference for self-destruct mines. I think Bob has clearly and simply summarised the practical realities in his points1and 2 of his initial response and that is really all the discussion required in terms of clearance and the probable response by other countries to any suggestion that there was an informal ‘preference’ for a smart over a dumb AP mine.

What bothers me somewhat more is your suggestion that some vague measurement of comparative clearance safety should be a consideration in suggesting that it would be better that the US deploy ‘smart’ (always their interpretation of what constitutes smartness of course) mines rather than ‘dumb’ mines. I don’t understand the purpose of such a discussion unless you are suggesting that the campaign should ‘signal’ such a preference to the US government, because otherwise it’s just meaningless chatter. But surely you understand that even a hint of such a position would (cynically but effectively) be interpreted by those in the US administration and the Pentagon who would most like to begin using mines again (and the manufacturers certainly) as an ICBL stamp of approval for smart mines. The kind of suggestion that once said will never be effectively unsaid. And I would think that’s why MAC have stated their position strongly.

It’s about the victims and their access to their land, everyone I’ve ever known involved in humanitarian clearance wants to see no more victims and definitely no new mine-laying - perhaps the truest slogan on the subject is the simplest ‘smart mines are dumb’

Hope you’re well

Rae

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[Robin Collins]

Rae

Your response has been similar to that of a few others. Let's remove any doubt that the (our) call is for a ban on all AP mines, whether smart, dumb or dumber. There is no effort to wiggle in smart mines for US forces. The US military will do whatever it wants, as permitted by the civilian order, and its stable geniuses.

The question is entirely over the language of a single line in a statement that some of us felt was badly written and not factual. 

The claim was this: “The myth of advanced non-persistent landmines reducing casualties is just that a myth. The problem with landmines is their indiscriminate nature [and] whether they are indiscriminate for a month or a decade is not important.”

The problem element is over the alleged "unimportance" of the duration of being active. It is pretty clear to me that a mine that is live for a decade is more problematic than one that is live for a month. That is not argument for short-lived mines given they are all indiscriminate. But if the US is going shopping for mines, what would you say after you say "Don't buy mines!"

Now, from a campaign point of view, all mines must be banned. From the point of view of a deminer or farmer in the field, same story, but when (s)he steps on a missed mine, in order of preference  (s)he would  prefer: 1. it  is known to be Inactive 2. Likely inactive (smart) or 3.  Active (dumb). Or would the deminers stepping on that missed mine say it is "unimportant"?

This isn't meant to be a trick question. 

So, no, (in your words) the campaign should not "... ‘signal’ such a preference to the US government, because otherwise it’s just meaningless chatter...[or would]  be interpreted by those in the US administration..." Etc 

We can chew gum and whistle at the same time. This is what makes civil society useful. We do not state a false view ("it doesn't matter") but we do explain why militaries must ban both smart and dumb (dumb and dumber) AP mines. (I've now accumulated 8 reasons why smart mines are a bad idea.) 

No other campaign statement issued and that I've read made the same claim about "unimportance".  The ICBL and HRW statements do not mention smart, dumb or persistent at all (see http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/home.aspx). 

In what I think is the ICBL letter to Trump, they use accurate language, although a difficult-to-read sentence (I haven't found this letter online; it was sent excerpted to me):

"So-called “non-persistent” or “smart mines” equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms that the US now retains the right to use indefinitely anywhere in the world,

under the new policy, still pose humanitarian dangers and are by no means safe for civilians. Therefore, they are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty."  

The reason I've circulated this exchange here on the HD list is because I said I would ask some folks in the HD demining community whether they thought the distinctions are "unimportant". 

Response has been underwhelming so far, aside from Bob, Andy and yourself, Rae. Is the question just too political? 

Robin

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[Rae McGrath]

Robin

I think the reason few have answered is because it's only an issue of any real interest beyond a choice of wording if, as I assumed, the intention was to adopt a stance other than that expressed. You say that's not the reason, although I'd argue that's not very complimentary to the work of MAC - I would assume that MAC's statements, press releases and newsletters are monitored and analysed as a matter of course by a number of USG and connected offices, especially so soon after a change of US policy. Any indication, intended or not, that questioned whether the campaign saw the treaty definition as being anything less than absolute would not be missed.

I like the wording as it stands because, while it may not meet everyone's favour, it would certainly match how people who live in mined areas would see things ... it's really not important whether a mine is claimed to self-destruct or neutralise within a certain time, they just want the world to keep its promise and to not use mines.

Best

Rae

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From: demi...@googlegroups.com <demi...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Robin Collins <robi...@gmail.com>

Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 1:41:41 PM

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[Robin Collins]

Rae

You are right that the concern was over a crack in the door opening through which continued use of APM is permitted or enabled. That caused the absolutist position. No question the goal was benign. The claim however just wasn't true. It does matter if you step on it.  

Similarly your "it's really not important whether a mine is claimed to self-destruct or neutralise within a certain time" is also not the contention. 

The question raised was not about a claim but the reality. 

If the mine is neutralized, it is safer than if it is not. If a mine is active for one week, that is better than if it is active for decades. Those are demonstrably true statements.  And all the caveats about smart versus dumb are unaffected.  

We should defend the caveats, not the incorrect statements. 

Robin 

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[Rae McGrath]

Hi Robin

Glad we agree on most of the salient points. I was hoping not to have to get into detail we spent many months examining in the early and mid ‘90’s but here goes anyway:

1. You are correct ‘it’s not about a claim but the reality’

2. Discussions about SD and SN mines - so-called ‘smart’ mines - almost by default, and conveniently for their supporters, are conducted in isolation - technically, scientifically and statistically - thus about as far from reality as it’s possible to get. In the real world, where landmines are a fear, a threat, an unknown, a denier of land and, ultimately, a maimer and killer of people and livestock who mostly know little about the properties of mines, and probably nothing about the concept of being safer if a mine on their land they don’t yet know exists may not blow them, or their children, or their livestock, up if they stand on it after it becomes inoperable. Risk semantics is not a major focus of discussion in post-conflict subsistence communities. They usually learn that an area contains mines because a person or animal becomes a victim. They then must either stop using that land (and they will have few clues about where is not mined, as opposed to where is mined, so not an easy call) or take the risk because they need to eat. Neither can demining organisations tell the community ‘it’s okay, you can use this land because these mines are SD or SN, so you’ll be safe’ - because your ‘demonstrably true statements’ are altogether more serious if being wrong results in a real person having their leg blown off or dying. So while you can be confident in Ottawa, or DC or London - wherever - the closer you get to reality the less certain you’ll become, if you’re blessed with a level of good sense and responsibility.

3. Funny how theoretical minefields are always neater than the real thing - the reality. So when you discuss SD or SN mines you visualise a minefield laid with SD and/or SN mines ... which is convenient but rarely matches the post-conflict reality. Because, of course, we aren’t talking about ‘minefields’ as such, we’re talking about land - perhaps, say, an irrigation ditch, which was, in wartime, for passing periods of time, dead ground, but dead ground has no relevance to a farmer. One day as he begins to clear the overgrown ditch he finds a mine - it doesn’t explode and he takes it to a friend who was in the military who tells him it’s a ‘smart’ mine and enough time has passed so it has deactivated. Reassured, the farmer returns to his ditch and gets killed by a PMN. Because this is reality - as Shakespeare may have said ‘one smart mine doth not a whole risk picture make’ - wars aren’t neat and neither is mined land. If you instill confidence in the safety of a deactivated ‘smart’ mine (assuming the claimed reliability is accurate) based on an incomplete understanding of the local risk, you will place lives at risk - at least.

If you recall Chris Moon and I did a somewhat anarchic workshop in Maputo (1995?) entitled, as I recall, Captain Schweik’s Dilemma - designed to encourage campaigners to understand that the landmine crisis was not a consequence of soldiers being evil but most likely of the complexity and mobility of modern warfare and that, because the reality of the wartime geography is very far removed from the peacetime landscape, and because soldiers must wage war with the weapons provided in the reality of the moment, even the most caring soldier, totally dedicated to jus in bello, may leave behind a nightmare. It’s in that environment ... today’s Syria - Idlib or Aleppo, or in Yemen ... where a discussion about tomorrow’s safe, more safe, self-destruct or just plain ‘who knows today what tomorrow’s risks will be?’ ... that such discussions should take place.

Enough said ... the most important campaign positions were those that originated from the realities faced by mine-affected communities ... other realities are not important.

Best

Rae

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Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 10:04:03 PM

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[Robin Collins]

Hi Rae,

No real disagreements. But one clarification needed. 

So while you can be confident in Ottawa, or DC or London - wherever - the closer you get to reality the less certain you’ll become, if you’re blessed with a level of good sense and responsibility.

Not sure what you mean here. Demonstrably inactive and demonstrably active mean the same thing no matter where you live. This isn't about smart mechanisms working or failing. This is an objective assessment made either by 1. clearance professionals; or 2. limbs and eyes being blown off. 

The reality in the US is that their government is about to start putting mines back in their inventories. 

I return to the simple point: it is not true to say that the distinction between a mine lasting a week or decades "is unimportant". 

Campaigners  must also stop thinking they are smarter than everyone else; stop dumbing down the message, and start writing statements more clearly. Most people can smell when the logic is off. That's also when Campaign credibility is put at risk. 

Robin 

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[Rae McGrath]

Robin,

You begin by saying we are pretty much in agreement and then make it clear that's not the case. You clearly don't understand the point I was making about perceptions and reality differing for those living in mined areas as opposed to those at a distance. Now, assuming you would define us both as 'campaigners' the question, based on your homily (which coincidentally indicates you are right - because otherwise it would have been unconnected to the points being discussed), is whether you are right or you simply don't understand or, to be fair, vice versa. So one last effort from me:

The phraseology used in the original paragraph challenged the difference between a mine lasting weeks or decades and argued it was not important. The obvious reasons being:

a) the affected community have no way of knowing if there is a difference

b) the device must be dealt with as an active mine by clearance personnel even if, as a US delegate at an ICRC experts meeting once suggested, it has a flag which appears when it is inoperable.

c) no military force or manufacturer has ever ventured to claim that a 100% effective SD or SN does or can exist. There is more than ample evidence around the world and in clearance logs that even the most conservative estimates of maximum failure rates cannot be reliably achieved.

It follows, therefore, that, since there is no way of telling at point of delivery whether a given mine is operable other than through initiating it accidentally or during the course of clearance, that the difference between a mine designed to become inoperable (the claimed active period is irrelevant since it gives no surety that the device is inoperable) or a so-called dumb mine is unimportant.

That's on the ground - as I pointed out and you didn't understand, it may be considered of importance in Ottawa, DC, London or Geneva (or at other capitols where such things are discussed and negotiated) in respect of, for instance, wording used in treaty, legal or campaigning documentation.

Sometimes you need more than a sense of smell to grasp the nuances that divide living in different parts of the real world.

Rae

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[Robert Keeley]

Hi all

 

I’m afraid I must differ a bit with Rae, if only in a pedantic way.

 

I think it’s clear that 1000 sn/sd mines that only have a 90% success rate pose significantly less hazard than 1000 mines without a sn/sd capacity. From a deminer’s position that’s clear, even if we have to keep working in the same way, the overall risk reduces if we are comparing smart with dumb.

 

But the issue is that the remaining 100 sn/sd mines pose a significantly GREATER hazard than 0 mines. Which is also self-evidently true.

 

The campaign was based on an absolutist approach (typical of lobby groups). Indeed, in Oslo there were campaigners dressed up as bottles of vodka demanding an ‘absolut’ ban! This meant ‘no exceptions, no delays, no excuses etc’. Allowing the Americans room to now have their smart mines would be a slap in the face to the campaign. Anything >0 can have no other effect.

 

The Americans never signed, but they did follow their own self-imposed moratorium on AP mine use. The question is whether ‘falling off the wagon’ results in a significant increase in civilian casualties compared to the current situation.

 

I suspect it may, but I also suspect that the effect could be lost in the noise in the huge increase of IED use since 2001.

 

Personally, if we are going to revisit Ottawa, I’d rather consider the concept of ‘impact free’ where we able to disregard contamination that is not having a significant effect, and spend that money somewhere where it can actually do some good.

 

Bob

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[Robin Collins]

Bob, Rae,

And this is the point, isn't it, Bob. However --  it's not a small pedantic point. Is there on a balance of probabilities a higher risk with respect to any single mine if the mine is disabled "by design" or not or, put another way, does it matter whether a mine last weeks or decades. Very clearly it does. Unequivocally so. It is not "unimportant".

Put aside the things we all agree on -- and Rae, I assume you also agree on all these points:  the need to ban all AP mines; the necessary assumption during clearance that all mines are live; the costs of removal; the denial of land/the harm on communities because of [even] the perception of persistent, live mines; the concern that permitting smart mines will increase all use; that smart mine use will encourage dumb mine use; the failure rate of "smart" mechanisms; the political concern about  abandoning an absolutist position, etc. 

What are the relative risks?

Rae, here is your key sentence: "since there is no way of telling at point of delivery whether a given mine is operable other than through initiating it accidentally or during the course of clearance, that the difference between a mine designed to become inoperable (the claimed active period is irrelevant since it gives no surety that the device is inoperable) or a so-called dumb mine is unimportant."

The logic of your argument is flawed, I think you know it, and you have indicated why within your statement. There is a way of telling with certainty whether a mine is live or not (by stepping on it or clearing it), and that importance exists WHETHER OR NOT you known the mine is there. From the point of view of the person stepping on it (unlike for the person "in Ottawa, London or DC or Geneva"), it is not just a theoretical point. 

If the Americans are going to use mines, does it matter whether they use smart of dumb mines, or do we simply say "it is unimportant", do what you wish, we are against all mines. This is the difficult argument the Campaign is afraid to address. For that reason, some folks prefer to defend a mathematically flawed argument. But campaigners are useful when we show a way through the complexity of the smart versus dumb argument by showing why smart mines are still a bad idea. We don't enhance our credibility by denying the math. Quite the opposite. 

Robin

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[Rae McGrath]

Bob

Let’s not get into criticism of campaigners ... I unashamedly became one for the same reason that I became involved in humanitarian demining - because nothing of any relevance was being done in the 1980’s from either (1) a technical (clearance) or (2) political/diplomatic/legal (action to restrict the uncontrolled dissemination of landmines). I know, because I spent a great deal of time looking for credible people/organisations doing something about it - primarily because I really didn’t want to spend my time around minefields. All I found was the early Halo in Kabul and Pnomh Penh, who at that time didn’t really want to talk, and Liz Bernstein in Aranyaprathet and a couple of surgeons at ICRC - one in a frontline clinic in Cambodia the other in Geneva. I never saw the point of (1) without (2) and still don’t - largely because there isn’t any point. It would be so refreshing if, after all this time and progress, the harping about campaigners was put to rest, it’s sad and, mostly, inaccurate. For the record I had very many disagreements and reservations about campaigning strategies in both the landmines and the cluster munitions campaigns - international advocacy is, by its very nature, dynamic - the idea that everyone might agree on every strategy is ridiculous. However so is the suggestion that a campaign to ban landmines should not be seeking an absolute ban (although the treaty is somewhat less than absolute).

On the specific issue relating to Robin’s question, and you can be excused being pedantic in response to a somewhat pedantic point. I never see the safety of demining operations as a starting point, that wasn’t a reason for the campaign (partly because there was very little happening when the campaign began) - the reason was to stop the loss of life and the maiming caused by mine explosions, and the denial of land caused by mines. So my response to Robin focused on the importance of any design difference between ‘dumb’ and SN/SN mines in actual mined areas  - in short that the difference has no actual relevance, thus it’s correct to say it is of no importance. As you point out, from deminer’s viewpoint the comparisons are somewhat different - but that’s not the primary legal or humanitarian consideration.

Hope you’re well

Rae

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From: demi...@googlegroups.com <demi...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Robert Keeley <rkconsu...@gmail.com>
Sent: 19 February 2020 13:33

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[Robin Collins]

Rae

As our agreements are now more clearly outnumbering our disagreements, I'll reply just to this new point you made: "However so is the suggestion that a campaign to ban landmines should not be seeking an absolute ban (although the treaty is somewhat less than absolute)."

Who made this suggestion? Not I, not Bob, not Andy, not Rae. No one said we should not seek a full ban on all APM. It's a straw man argument. It's based on a fear by some campaigners that if you make one important point about relative risks, you must therefore also be agreeing to another problematic point (ie advocating for smart mines). Not so. 

Robin 

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[Rae McGrath]

Robin

When you tell me that I’m wrong and I know it, thus that my response was disingenuous, we have no more to discuss. 

Rae

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From: demi...@googlegroups.com <demi...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Robin Collins <robi...@gmail.com>

Sent: 19 February 2020 14:17

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[Rae McGrath]

Robin

I trust you will share this whole discussion with MAC and the ICBL rather than just your own summary. 

Rae

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From: demi...@googlegroups.com <demi...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Robin Collins <robi...@gmail.com>

Sent: 19 February 2020 14:17

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[Robin Collins]

Will do Rae, full disclosure is my way of doing things. 

Robin 

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[Robin Collins]

Rae

That was poorly worded by me. It was meant to say "and you would understand that" but I used a short form. No insult intended and I did not wish to imply your response was disingenuous. 

This is a not a time to exit a useful debate. The points raised are significant, from all angles. 

Robin 

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[Robert Keeley]

Hi Rae

I'm not criticising campaigners per se here. But the aims (or perspectives) of campaigners and deminers were at best a Venn diagram.

Bob

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[Robin Collins]

More important, campaigners do make mistakes. Mistakes need to be corrected, not covered up. Worst case is circling the wagons and encouraging group think. That helps no one. 

In my case I sent a private  email to the relevant party. The statement was not changed. Then there was a doubling down and denial of the point I was making. 

Should we just pretend no mistake was made? Or should we make an effort to make our messaging clearer and more precise? 

Robin 

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[Andy Smith]

Nicely put Bob. A Venn diagram (Wittgenstein’s ‘cluster concept’, however it is named) describes the overlap (and lack of overlap) very well.

 

Whether they are SD/SDA (SN, whatever) is a secondary detail. The USA deciding to allow the use of any kind of AP mine again is what is being argued against. If the arguments against that decision do not recognise the ‘intent’ behind the SD/SDA detail – they can be more readily dismissed as ill-informed. A mine that is not there a week later is less of a long-term indiscriminate risk than one that is. Whether that is reliably achievable is a separate point.

 

Regards,

Andy

www.nolandmines.com
www.ddasonline.com

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[Rae McGrath]

Robin

My reference to the absolute ban was responding to the specific mention of the same by Bob -  'The campaign was based on an absolutist approach etc ...'

Anyway, I initially responded to your question about the wording used by MAC, I felt it was good and explained why I thought that to be the case.

I'm out.

Rae

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From: demi...@googlegroups.com <demi...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Andy Smith <a...@nolandmines.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 6:30:54 PM

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