the prayer of a logician

[Alan Wostenberg]

"It is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not
to exist ; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to
exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived,
can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing
greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.
There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be
conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and
this being you are, O Lord, our God."

-St. Anselm. Prosologium, chapter III.
Re: http://www.ac-nice.fr/philo/textes/Anselm-Proslogium.htm

[rappoccio]

Define "greater" in this context.

[Drafterman]

On Aug 2, 4:11 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:

Equivocation.

[Brock]

On Aug 2, 4:11 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Alan,

Studying this argument is so profitable that I highly recommend it to
persons interested in such things. This argument shows both the power
and the weakness of ontology; in particular, for a nice follow up
including weaknesses and criticisms, see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anselm%27s_argument#Criticisms_and_objections

In particular, I find of the five arguments listed:

* 5.1 Criticism on the basis of "Existence Precedes Essence"
* 5.2 General objection
* 5.3 Gaunilo's island
* 5.4 Necessary nonexistence
* 5.5 Kant: existence is not a predicate

I find (based on my research on these topics) that 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3
all explicitly or implicitly rely upon existential premises, and as
such are not tenable; for 5.4 I find (as I find also Anselm's
argument) a positivist argument for the limitations of language to be
quite persuasive; I have not yet fully appreciated Kant's (5.5)
argument, so I'll pass on that at this time (in general, my suspicion
is that Kant also implicitly/indirectly relies upon existentialism,
but its a non-trivial matter to really work that out, as its an
argument from system, and systematic arguments can be challenging to
unravel fully).

I find that "one gets what one has paid for" when one sees a
dismissive one word answer response to the ontological argument. :)

Regards,

Brock

[Brock]

On Aug 3, 10:53 pm, Brock <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> In particular, I find of the five arguments listed:
>
> * 5.1 Criticism on the basis of "Existence Precedes Essence"
> * 5.2 General objection
> * 5.3 Gaunilo's island
> * 5.4 Necessary nonexistence
> * 5.5 Kant: existence is not a predicate
>

> for 5.4 I find (as I find also Anselm's
> argument) a positivist argument for the limitations of language to be
> quite persuasive;

In particular, rappoccio shows an excellent example of this kind of
limitation:

http://groups.google.com/group/debatereligion/msg/3974f7d0563565bb

Regards,

Brock

[Alan Wostenberg]

Hi, Brock. I'd seen that wiki article & agree with your points
5.1-5.3. Regarding Kant's "not a predicate" it is easy, according to
Plantinga in _God and other minds_, to restate the argument so it does
not fall prey to that objection.

Did you know Philosophers think St. Anselm gives two distinct
ontological arguments the best-known on in chapter II of the
Proslogium; and the modal one implied in III given below?

The modal one is fascinating, because it eliminates the whole muddled
middle -- a merely possible Omnipotence -- as a self-contradiction,
like "round triangle" or "married bachelor". If true it narrows things
down to a) God is necessary b) God is impossible. That has the ring of
truth.

I posted this note as "the prayer of the logician" because when I
reread it last week, I noticed (as one of the talk pages on the
wikipedia article says), that the argument is given in the context of
a prayer. We all here enjoy debate, and who can't admire a man who
composes a prayer in the form of an argument! The proslogium is at
http://www.ac-nice.fr/philo/textes/Anselm-Proslogium.htm are well
worth reading the prelude and chapter one, which come before the famed
proofs in chapters 2 and 3.

On Aug 3, 7:53 pm, Brock <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Aug 2, 4:11 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > "It is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not
> > to exist ; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to
> > exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived,
> > can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing
> > greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.
> > There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be
> > conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and
> > this being you are, O Lord, our God."
>
> > -St. Anselm. Prosologium, chapter III.
> > Re:http://www.ac-nice.fr/philo/textes/Anselm-Proslogium.htm
>
> Hi Alan,
>
> Studying this argument is so profitable that I highly recommend it to
> persons interested in such things.  This argument shows both the power
> and the weakness of ontology;  in particular, for a nice follow up
> including weaknesses and criticisms, see:
>

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anselm%27s_argument#Criticisms_and_objec...

[Alan Wostenberg]

By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.

In this context, he claims that which is unable not to be is
ontologically greater than that which is able not to be. A pretty slim
premise, and if we grant St. Anselm that much, does his conclusion
follow?

I offer you this prayer as a spiritual exercise. Having established in
chapter 2(*) the existence of that than which no greater can be
conceived, we can use chapter 3(*) and subsequent ones to understand
the nature of Supreme Being.


(*) http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-proslogium.html#CHAPTER%20II
(**) http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-proslogium.html#CHAPTER%20III

[Brock Organ]

On Tue, Aug 5, 2008 at 12:16 AM, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi, Brock. I'd seen that wiki article & agree with your points
> 5.1-5.3. Regarding Kant's "not a predicate" it is easy, according to
> Plantinga in _God and other minds_, to restate the argument so it does
> not fall prey to that objection.
>
> Did you know Philosophers think St. Anselm gives two distinct
> ontological arguments the best-known on in chapter II of the
> Proslogium; and the modal one implied in III given below?
>
> The modal one is fascinating, because it eliminates the whole muddled
> middle -- a merely possible Omnipotence -- as a self-contradiction,
> like "round triangle" or "married bachelor". If true it narrows things
> down to a) God is necessary b) God is impossible. That has the ring of
> truth.
>
> I posted this note as "the prayer of the logician" because when I
> reread it last week, I noticed (as one of the talk pages on the
> wikipedia article says), that the argument is given in the context of
> a prayer. We all here enjoy debate, and who can't admire a man who
> composes a prayer in the form of an argument! The proslogium is at
> http://www.ac-nice.fr/philo/textes/Anselm-Proslogium.htm are well
> worth reading the prelude and chapter one, which come before the famed
> proofs in chapters 2 and 3.

Thanks, Alan, you make a good point here, about the value of context
in evaluating these arguments. It does make sense (in giving the
argument its full due) to read the entire work that it is presented
in, as the associated context will often make issues clearer.

Thanks for the link, also. :)

Regards,

Brock

--
--- brock...@gmail.com ---
"This could lead to excellence ... or serious injury" -- TMBG

[rappoccio]

On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.

What is a "higher degree of being"?

>
> In this context, he claims that which is unable not to be is
> ontologically greater than that which is able not to be. A pretty slim
> premise, and if we grant St. Anselm that much, does his conclusion
> follow?

I don't understand what "ontologically greater" refers to in the first
place, so no, I'm not willing to grant his conclusion.

[Dag Yo]

> I don't understand what "ontologically greater" refers to in the first
> place, so no, I'm not willing to grant his conclusion.

I doubt that Alan knows either, but since he thinks it sounds like the
argument makes him correct he's going to go along with it.

[rappoccio]

On Aug 11, 11:40 pm, Dag Yo <sir_ro...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > I don't understand what "ontologically greater" refers to in the first
> > place, so no, I'm not willing to grant his conclusion.
>
> I doubt that Alan knows either, but since he thinks it sounds like the
> argument makes him correct he's going to go along with it.

It's just word games. That's all.

"I can conceive of an ontologically perfect bagel, and an
ontologically perfect bagel would necessarily exist, and therefore
there is an ontologically perfect bagel."

What the hell is an ontologically perfect bagel?

[Alan Wostenberg]

On Aug 11, 11:21 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> > ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.
>
> What is a "higher degree of being"?

A higher degree of being means possessing more perfections; a being A
is ontologically greater than being B if A possesses all the
perfections of B, plus one. In Anselm's example:

"It is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not
to exist ; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to

exist.”

So both possess the primal perfection of real existence; but that
which is unable not to be adds another perfection: permanence. And a
little reflection shows the example of the "ontologically perfect
bagel" is a self-contradiction, since a bagel is made of parts, so can
be broken into parts, so is not a permanent thing. We can conceive of
something ontologically greater than the bagel or any other entity
composed of parts: something that cannot fail to exist.

> > In this context, he claims that which is unable not to be is
> > ontologically greater than that which is able not to be. A pretty slim
> > premise, and if we grant St. Anselm that much, does his conclusion
> > follow?
>
> I don't understand what "ontologically greater" refers to in the first
> place, so no, I'm not willing to grant his conclusion.

Offer a definition of "numerically greater", and perhaps you and I can
develop the concept of "ontologically greater" from that.

[Dag Yo]

> "It is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not
> to exist

I can't do it. How about you guys?

[rappoccio]

On Aug 16, 3:58 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Aug 11, 11:21 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> > > ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.
>
> > What is a "higher degree of being"?
>
> A higher degree of being means possessing more perfections; a being A
> is ontologically greater than being B if A possesses all the
> perfections of B, plus one.

How is "perfect" quantified like this for all characteristics?

Is someone possibly perfectly stupid? How does that possibly make any
sense? Of course, if God is perfectly stupid, then God isn't all that
perfect to begin with.

So you'll need to be more clear.

> In Anselm's example:
>
> "It is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not
> to exist ; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to
> exist.”
>
> So both possess the primal perfection of real existence; but that
> which is unable not to be adds another perfection: permanence. And a
> little reflection shows the example of the "ontologically perfect
> bagel" is a self-contradiction, since a bagel is made of parts, so can
> be broken into parts, so is not a permanent thing.

Aren't you a trinitarian? (Psst.... "tri" meaning "three", i.e.
greater than one, i.e. not one, i.e. made of parts).

> We can conceive of
> something ontologically greater than the bagel or any other entity
> composed of parts: something that cannot fail to exist.
>
> > > In this context, he claims that which is unable not to be is
> > > ontologically greater than that which is able not to be. A pretty slim
> > > premise, and if we grant St. Anselm that much, does his conclusion
> > > follow?
>
> > I don't understand what "ontologically greater" refers to in the first
> > place, so no, I'm not willing to grant his conclusion.
>
> Offer a definition of "numerically greater", and perhaps you and I can
> develop the concept of "ontologically greater" from that.

I sincerely doubt it. But keep trying.

[Alan Wostenberg]

On Aug 17, 11:49 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Aug 16, 3:58 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Aug 11, 11:21 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> > > > ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.
>
> > > What is a "higher degree of being"?
>
> > A higher degree of being means possessing more perfections; a being A
> > is ontologically greater than being B if A possesses all the
> > perfections of B, plus one.
>
> How is "perfect" quantified like this for all characteristics?

Perfect need not be quantified for any characteristic to rank it
ontologically, because two things that vary in degree with regards to
the same perfection are of the *same* ontological greatness.

If thing A and thing B posses the first N perfections *in any degree*,
they are of the same ontological grade. Now if thing C possesses these
N perfections to any degree, plus another perfection that A and B
totally lack, then C is said to be ontologically greater.  

It is not the degree to which a perfection, such as intelligence, is
possessed that differentiates things ontologically. People posses
varying degrees of intelligence, but all persons are equal,
ontologically. The dumbest person is greater ontologically than the
biggest mountain, which has the perfection of existence, but lacks
intelligence in any degree.

Regarding your question about “is somebody possibly perfectly
stupid?”. Stupidity is not a perfection but a privation of the
perfection of intelligence. The idea of "somebody perfectly stupid" is
a self-contradiction. For if X is somebody, not merely something, then
X possesses intelligence in some small degree. And if X has zero
intelligence, X is not somebody, merely something.

Regarding your question about the trinity being conceivable as not-
existing because "made of parts", that would be so, if the trinity
were composed of parts. But is that the Christian teaching? This would
be a good topic for a future thread, once we’ve covered these basics
on ontological greatness to your satisfaction. Have we?

[rappoccio]

On Aug 19, 3:13 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Aug 17, 11:49 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Aug 16, 3:58 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Aug 11, 11:21 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> > > > > ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.
>
> > > > What is a "higher degree of being"?
>
> > > A higher degree of being means possessing more perfections; a being A
> > > is ontologically greater than being B if A possesses all the
> > > perfections of B, plus one.
>
> > How is "perfect" quantified like this for all characteristics?
>
> Perfect need not be quantified for any characteristic to rank it
> ontologically, because two things that vary in degree with regards to
> the same perfection are of the *same* ontological greatness.

I don't buy it. You're saying one is "greater" than another. That
means it's quantifiable.

> If thing A and thing B posses the first N perfections *in any degree*,

But it requires that there BE a degree, which you haven't really
demonstrated.

> they are of the same ontological grade. Now if thing C possesses these
> N perfections to any degree, plus another perfection that A and B
> totally lack, then C is said to be ontologically greater.  
>
> It is not the degree to which a perfection, such as intelligence, is
> possessed that differentiates things ontologically. People posses
> varying degrees of intelligence, but all persons are equal,
> ontologically. The dumbest person is greater ontologically than the
> biggest mountain, which has the perfection of existence, but lacks
> intelligence in any degree.
>
> Regarding your question about “is somebody possibly perfectly
> stupid?”. Stupidity is not a perfection but a privation of the
> perfection of intelligence.

Fair enough. But what about "perfect bagel-ness"? Is there such thing
as a perfect bagel? Or a perfect smell? Or a perfect beauty? None of
that seems quantifiably "perfect" to me. So you're not making
ontological sense.

> The idea of "somebody perfectly stupid" is
> a self-contradiction. For if X is somebody, not merely something, then
> X possesses intelligence in some small degree. And if X has zero
> intelligence, X is not somebody, merely something.

Interesting side note: Then brain-dead people, and blastuoles, are not
"somebody", merely "something", according to your definition.

> Regarding your question about the trinity being conceivable as not-
> existing because "made of parts", that would be so, if the trinity
> were composed of parts. But is that the Christian teaching?

Three persons, one substance. However, one cannot exist without the
other. Therefore it is composite. The only way you consider it not-
composite is because you don't want it to be composite, then call it a
"mystery", declare yourself the victor by fiat, and smugly look on and
expect us to take it seriously.

> This would
> be a good topic for a future thread, once we’ve covered these basics
> on ontological greatness to your satisfaction. Have we?

Not even remotely close.

[Alan Wostenberg]

On Aug 19, 8:17 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Aug 19, 3:13 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Aug 17, 11:49 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Aug 16, 3:58 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Aug 11, 11:21 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> > > > > > ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.
>
> > > > > What is a "higher degree of being"?
>
> > > > A higher degree of being means possessing more perfections; a being A
> > > > is ontologically greater than being B if A possesses all the
> > > > perfections of B, plus one.
>
> > > How is "perfect" quantified like this for all characteristics?
>
> > Perfect need not be quantified for any characteristic to rank it
> > ontologically, because two things that vary in degree with regards to
> > the same perfection are of the *same* ontological greatness.
>
> I don't buy it. You're saying one is "greater" than another. That
> means it's quantifiable.

The first perfection Anselm identifies is existence. A thing must
first exist, to posses any other perfections. But this primal
perfection is pass/fail and not quantitative. A second existential
perfection Anselm identifies is that which is able not to be vs that
which is unable not to be. That’s two that are pass-fail, not
quantitative. Suppose all the ontological perfections are pass-fail
and none are quantitative. Would that stop us from ranking things
great-greater-greatest?

Consider a test students take consisting of 10 yes-no questions. Does
the fact that the individual questions are pass-fail prevent us from
ranking the test scores? No. The greatest score answers all ten
correctly. It’s just not true we need individually quantifiable
perfections to say one thing is greater than another. Agree?

> > Regarding your question about “is somebody possibly perfectly
> > stupid?”. Stupidity is not a perfection but a privation of the
> > perfection of intelligence.

> Fair enough. But what about "perfect bagel-ness"? Is there such thing
> as a perfect bagel? Or a perfect smell? Or a perfect beauty? None of
> that seems quantifiably "perfect" to me. So you're not making
> ontological sense.

I’m no connoisseur, but I assume bakers enter bagels in contests in
which judges score them against a set of standards. Now does the
standard include ‘toroidal shape’? Then there is no perfect bagel.
Does it include a threshold like ‘must be toroidal +/- 10%’? Then
there could be a perfect bagel.

However, the most excellent bagel is not ontologically greater than
any other bagel, nor any other inanimate object. Nor is the best bagel
as great as the most humble person.

> > The idea of "somebody perfectly stupid" is
> > a self-contradiction. For if X is somebody, not merely something, then
> > X possesses intelligence in some small degree. And if X has zero
> > intelligence, X is not somebody, merely something.

> Interesting side note: Then brain-dead people, and blastuoles, are not
> "somebody", merely "something", according to your definition.

Only on hypothesis "I am my brain".

That and your trinity question make two I'd like to take up in future
threads, once you've got a good enough answer to your original
question "what does greater than mean in this context". To recap: it
means a higher grade of being. Much like we would say student A gets a
higher grade than student B if he answers more questions correctly, so
we would say thing A is greater than thing B if A has all the

[rappoccio]

On Aug 21, 2:09 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Aug 19, 8:17 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Aug 19, 3:13 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Aug 17, 11:49 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Aug 16, 3:58 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Aug 11, 11:21 am, rappoccio <rappoc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Aug 5, 1:12 am, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > By greater he means possessing a higher degree of being --
> > > > > > > ontologically greater as opposed to numerically greater.
>
> > > > > > What is a "higher degree of being"?
>
> > > > > A higher degree of being means possessing more perfections; a being A
> > > > > is ontologically greater than being B if A possesses all the
> > > > > perfections of B, plus one.
>
> > > > How is "perfect" quantified like this for all characteristics?
>
> > > Perfect need not be quantified for any characteristic to rank it
> > > ontologically, because two things that vary in degree with regards to
> > > the same perfection are of the *same* ontological greatness.
>
> > I don't buy it. You're saying one is "greater" than another. That
> > means it's quantifiable.
>
> The first perfection Anselm identifies is existence.  A thing must
> first exist, to posses any other perfections.

No. A perfect circle does not exist, however it is mathematically
definable and has perfections.

> But this primal
> perfection is pass/fail and not quantitative. A second existential
> perfection Anselm identifies is that which is able not to be vs that
> which is unable not to be.

This isn't a perfection, it's an existence. It's just word games to
call it "perfection".

So you're 0 for 2.

> That’s two that are pass-fail, not
> quantitative.  Suppose all the ontological perfections are pass-fail
> and none are quantitative. Would that stop us from ranking things
> great-greater-greatest?
>
> Consider a test students take consisting of 10 yes-no questions. Does
> the fact that the individual questions are pass-fail prevent us from
> ranking the test scores? No. The greatest score answers all ten
> correctly. It’s just not true we need individually quantifiable
> perfections to say one thing is greater than another.  Agree?

Disagree. "1" and "0" are quantities, last time I checked. In fact, 1
> 0, 1 * 0 = 0, 1 + 0 = 1, etc, etc. Therefore they are quantifiable.

>
> > > Regarding your question about “is somebody possibly perfectly
> > > stupid?”. Stupidity is not a perfection but a privation of the
> > > perfection of intelligence.
> > Fair enough. But what about "perfect bagel-ness"? Is there such thing
> > as a perfect bagel? Or a perfect smell? Or a perfect beauty? None of
> > that seems quantifiably "perfect" to me. So you're not making
> > ontological sense.
>
> I’m no connoisseur, but I assume bakers enter bagels in contests in
> which judges score them against a set of standards. Now does the
> standard include ‘toroidal shape’? Then there is no perfect bagel.
> Does it include a threshold like ‘must be toroidal +/- 10%’? Then
> there could be a perfect bagel.
>
> However, the most excellent bagel is not ontologically greater than
> any other bagel, nor any other inanimate object. Nor is the best bagel
> as great as the most humble person.

You're playing word games again. You call something "perfect" without
a single definable quantity.

> > > The idea of "somebody perfectly stupid" is
> > > a self-contradiction. For if X is somebody, not merely something, then
> > > X possesses intelligence in some small degree. And if X has zero
> > > intelligence, X is not somebody, merely something.
> > Interesting side note: Then brain-dead people, and blastuoles, are not
> > "somebody", merely "something", according to your definition.
>
> Only on hypothesis "I am my brain".

There is no evidence that anything else is true.

> That and your trinity question make two I'd like to take up in future
> threads, once you've got a good enough answer to your original
> question "what does greater than mean in this context". To recap: it
> means a higher grade of being. Much like we would say student A gets a
> higher grade than student B if he answers more questions correctly, so
> we would say thing A is greater than thing B if A has all the
> perfections of B, plus one.

It still doesn't make any sense. It's nothing but word games. Anselm
fails. Sorry.