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Business and commercial aircraft are being led astray thanks to their sensor-fused navigation systems. A series of spoofing incidents beginning in late September has caused complete aircraft navigational system failures in some airliners and business jets overflying the Iraq- Iran area. As a result, one bizjet almost strayed into Iranian airspace without clearance.
Until fixes for the lack of cross checking in navigation systems and GPS itself are made, the danger to commercial and business aircraft from captured avionics as a result of GPS spoofing will remain high.
GPS spoofing from an unknown source in the Iraq-Iran area is causing complete aircraft navigational system failures in some overflying airliners and business jets. As a result, one bizjet almost strayed into Iranian airspace without clearance.
A flight data intelligence crowdsourcing website called OPSGROUP began reporting incidents of GPS navigation signals spoofing on Monday. The site claims to have a membership of 8,000 pilots, flight dispatchers, schedulers, and controllers.
According to OPSGROUP, commercial and business aircraft using Airway UMB688 in northern Iraq (a major airway utilized by traffic routing between Europe and the Middle East) have experienced complete navigation system failures after receiving spoofed GPS broadcasts. They appear to have broader cyber components than just the replacement of position data beamed by the GPS signals with false coordinates.
Since then, reports of GPS spoofing have risen to 20 incidents. In one report, the site says that an Embraer 650 business jet crew enroute from Europe to Dubai related that they lost both GPS navigation units aboard the airplane and GPS signals to both pilot/co-pilot iPads.
Any delay in recognizing the loss of navigation and resultant positional drift near Iranian border areas could result in an intercept by Iranian Air Force aircraft, the consequences of which can be unpredictable.
According to OPSGROUP, the activity is centered in three regions: Baghdad, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. The group has tracked more than 50 incidents in the last five weeks, the group said in a November update, and identified three new and distinct kinds of navigation spoofing incidents, with two arising since the initial reports in September.
DGCA circular on spoofing and jammingThe DGCA issued circular is applicable to all Aircraft operators and Air navigation service providers (ANSP) Airport Authority of India. The circular provides a mechanism for ANSP to establish a threat monitoring and Analysis network in close coordination with DGCA for preventive as well as reactive threat monitoring and analysis of reports of GNSS interference
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Flight crews also are advised to familiarize themselves with the operation of their aircraft navigational systems and their inputs. Additionally, operators are encouraged to review the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) on GNSS outages, their effects on aircraft navigation systems and mitigations to maintain flight safety.
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In a recent development that has raised alarms among aviation experts, dozens of commercial airliners flying over parts of the Middle East have reported experiencing GPS spoofing attacks in recent months. These attacks involve the transmission of false GPS signals, effectively tricking aircraft navigation systems into believing they are in a different location than their actual position.
The implications of these attacks are potentially fatal. By manipulating the aircraft's perception of its location, spoofing can lead to pilots making critical navigation errors, potentially leading to collisions or even unauthorized incursions into restricted airspace.
Furthermore, these attacks appear to target the inertial reference system (IRS), a crucial backup navigation system previously thought to be immune to spoofing. The IRS utilizes gyroscopes, accelerometers, and other advanced equipment to provide navigation guidance when a pilot's visibility is limited.
The Pillars have been weighing options to address the recent threats to the freedom of navigation. However, the Biden administration is considering to have a more mitigated response, in part for fear of exploding a powder keg in the Middle East, when there is a need to draw back and focus on Asia-Pacific.
In the worst cases, the impact has been severe: complete loss of on-board nav requiring ATC vectors, IRS failure, and unnoticed off-track navigation towards danger areas and hostile airspace. The industry has been slow to come to terms with the issue, leaving flight crews alone to find ways of detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing.
These reports first surfaced around Oct 16. Most reports are within the Cairo FIR. All crew reported similar circumstances, where a false or spoofed GPS position is received by the aircraft, incorrectly showing the aircraft position as being over LLBG/Tel Aviv. Locations vary from airways over the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and also on approach into Amman, Jordan (OJAM). Reports range from 100nm to as far as 212nm from LLBG.
1. As soon as possible, de-select any GPS inputs (FMS, IRS). Crew reports suggest that quick action here (within 60 seconds) can prevent wider nav failure
2. Switch to using conventional navaids (VOR, NDB)
3. If you know that for your aircraft type the IRS is not capable of being spoofed, obviously IRS navigation is preferable for accuracy.
4. Report the occurance to ATC, primarily to warn other flight crew on the same frequency.
The meetings took place over four days and covered eight working sessions, focusing on various tasks, including reviewing the Middle East air traffic report for the past year, regional air traffic plans with new amendments and additions based on regional and global developments, discussions on relevant regional air route network schedules, the assessment of the regional air navigation service provider, and related issues and standards to enhance and sustain safety levels.
For Inertial Reference Systems that use GPS aiding, there are typically three navigation solutions available, INS Only, Blended (GPS/INS) and GPS Only. If the FMS software is not alerting the crew of a divergent solution, someone should fix the software. For pure IRS with no external aiding, they are jam and spoof-proof unless someone can change the rotational rate of the earth.
Pilots flying in the Middle East need to be increasingly wary of GPS spoofing attacks as one group continues to release new information concerning close to 50 reports. Now, these reports are being broken down into categories and analyzed, revealing two new types of GPS spoofing being reported, with one leading to new critical navigation failures.
On Sept. 26 OPSGROUP published a risk warning on complex navigational failures following fake GPS signals, otherwise known as spoofing. GPS spoofing occurs when someone uses a radio transmitter to send a false GPS signal to a receiver antenna to counter real GPS satellite signals, according to McAfee. While most navigation systems have a strong signal, a stronger fake signal can override a legitimate signal. The original risk warning described instances of spoofing occurring in the Iranian airspace, identifying 20 reports of near-identical situations. The group gave two updates in November describing the two new types of GPS spoofing being reported and three distinct scenarios with a published spoofing map.
According to OPSGROUPS, the worst-case scenario will involve a complete loss of on-board navigation requiring ATC vectors, IRS failure and an unnoticed off-track navigation toward dangerous areas or hostile airspace. The initial report recounted an incident involving an Embraer Legacy 650 en route from Europe to Dubai that lost GPS in the aircraft and both iPads and the IRS stopped working, and the crew nearly entered Iranian airspace without clearance. Another crew in a Bombardier Challenger 604 received a warning near the north of Baghdad and lost everything related to Nav and IRS, suggesting they had drifted by 70-90 miles. The Challenger crew reported that they did not get the GPS sensors back until they fired up the plane and went to home base two days later. The FAA released a memo to pilots on the situation, advising of the potential spoofing risk.
The first scenario, the Baghdad Type, encompasses the first report on Aug. 29 and the additional reports in September. These involved GPS spoofing of en route aircraft with nav failures. The Cairo Type was primarily in the Cairo FIR, Nicosia FIR (Cyprus) and Amman FIR (Jordan). The second scenario involves reports that surfaced around Oct. 16, most within Cairo FIR. In this scenario, all crews reported similar circumstances where a false spoofed GPS position was received by the aircraft incorrectly showing the aircraft position as being over the Ben Gurion Airport or Tel Aviv. The locations of these varied from over the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and on approach to Amman in Jordan. The Beirut type was primarily within the Tel Aviv FIR, Nicosia FIR and Amman FIR and the spoofing showed the aircraft over OLBA/Beirutor created subtle tracking towards OLBA. The third scenario was responsible for wayward tracking on SID departures from the Ben Gurion Airport since Oct. 25.
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