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Nov 14, 2021, 2:56:15 PM11/14/21

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Peirce List, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • Preliminaries

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/14/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-preliminaries/

All,

This report discusses C.S. Peirce's treatment of analogy, placing it in relation

to his overall theory of inquiry. We begin by introducing three basic types of

reasoning Peirce adopted from classical logic. In Peirce's analysis both inquiry

and analogy are complex programs of logical inference which develop through stages

of these three types, although normally in different orders.

Note on notation. The discussion to follow uses logical conjunctions, expressed in

the form of concatenated tuples e₁ … eₖ, and minimal negation operations, expressed in

the form of bracketed tuples (e₁, …, eₖ), as the principal expression-forming operations

of a calculus for boolean-valued functions, that is, for “propositions”. The expressions

of this calculus parse into data structures whose underlying graphs are called “cacti” by

graph theorists. Hence the name “cactus language” for this dialect of propositional calculus.

Resources

=========

• Logic Syllabus ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logic_Syllabus )

• Boolean Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean_function )

• Boolean-Valued Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean-valued_function )

• Logical Conjunction ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction )

• Minimal Negation Operator ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Minimal_negation_operator )

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/14/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-preliminaries/

All,

This report discusses C.S. Peirce's treatment of analogy, placing it in relation

to his overall theory of inquiry. We begin by introducing three basic types of

reasoning Peirce adopted from classical logic. In Peirce's analysis both inquiry

and analogy are complex programs of logical inference which develop through stages

of these three types, although normally in different orders.

Note on notation. The discussion to follow uses logical conjunctions, expressed in

the form of concatenated tuples e₁ … eₖ, and minimal negation operations, expressed in

the form of bracketed tuples (e₁, …, eₖ), as the principal expression-forming operations

of a calculus for boolean-valued functions, that is, for “propositions”. The expressions

of this calculus parse into data structures whose underlying graphs are called “cacti” by

graph theorists. Hence the name “cactus language” for this dialect of propositional calculus.

Resources

=========

• Logic Syllabus ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logic_Syllabus )

• Boolean Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean_function )

• Boolean-Valued Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean-valued_function )

• Logical Conjunction ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction )

• Minimal Negation Operator ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Minimal_negation_operator )

Regards,

Jon

Apr 10, 2022, 10:20:13 AMApr 10

to Conceptual Graphs, Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • Preliminaries

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/14/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-preliminaries/

All,

This report discusses C.S. Peirce's treatment of analogy,

placing it in relation to his overall theory of inquiry.

We begin by introducing three basic types of reasoning

Peirce adopted from classical logic. In Peirce's analysis

both inquiry and analogy are complex programs of logical

inference which develop through stages of these three types,

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/14/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-preliminaries/

All,

This report discusses C.S. Peirce's treatment of analogy,

placing it in relation to his overall theory of inquiry.

We begin by introducing three basic types of reasoning

Peirce adopted from classical logic. In Peirce's analysis

both inquiry and analogy are complex programs of logical

inference which develop through stages of these three types,

though normally in different orders.

Note on notation. The discussion to follow uses logical conjunctions,

expressed in the form of concatenated tuples e₁ … eₖ, and minimal negation

operations, expressed in the form of bracketed tuples (e₁, …, eₖ), as the

principal expression-forming operations of a calculus for boolean-valued

functions, that is, for “propositions”. The expressions of this calculus

parse into data structures whose underlying graphs are called “cacti” by

graph theorists. Hence the name “cactus language” for this dialect of

propositional calculus.

Resources

=========

• Logic Syllabus ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logic_Syllabus )

• Boolean Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean_function )

• Boolean-Valued Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean-valued_function )

• Logical Conjunction ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction )

• Minimal Negation Operator ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Minimal_negation_operator )

• Cactus Language ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Cactus_Language_%E2%80%A2_Overview )
Note on notation. The discussion to follow uses logical conjunctions,

expressed in the form of concatenated tuples e₁ … eₖ, and minimal negation

operations, expressed in the form of bracketed tuples (e₁, …, eₖ), as the

principal expression-forming operations of a calculus for boolean-valued

functions, that is, for “propositions”. The expressions of this calculus

parse into data structures whose underlying graphs are called “cacti” by

graph theorists. Hence the name “cactus language” for this dialect of

propositional calculus.

Resources

=========

• Logic Syllabus ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logic_Syllabus )

• Boolean Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean_function )

• Boolean-Valued Function ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Boolean-valued_function )

• Logical Conjunction ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_conjunction )

• Minimal Negation Operator ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Minimal_negation_operator )

Regards,

Jon

Apr 17, 2022, 3:48:27 PMApr 17

to Conceptual Graphs, Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 1

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/17/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-1/

All,

The following Figure is posted for future reference.

It gives a quick overview of traditional terminology

I'll have occasion to refer to as discussion proceeds.

Figure 1. Types of Reasoning in Aristotle

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/types-of-reasoning-in-aristotle.jpg

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/17/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-1/

All,

The following Figure is posted for future reference.

It gives a quick overview of traditional terminology

I'll have occasion to refer to as discussion proceeds.

Figure 1. Types of Reasoning in Aristotle

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/types-of-reasoning-in-aristotle.jpg

Regards,

Jon

Apr 19, 2022, 2:45:42 PMApr 19

to Conceptual Graphs, Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 2

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/19/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-2/

Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Types_of_Reasoning_in_C.S._Peirce

All,

Peirce gives one of his earliest treatments of the three types of

reasoning in his Harvard Lectures of 1865 “On the Logic of Science”.

There he shows how the same proposition may be reached from three

directions, as the result of an inference in each of the three modes.

<QUOTE CSP:>

We have then three different kinds of inference.

• Deduction or inference à priori,

• Induction or inference à particularis,

• Hypothesis or inference à posteriori.

(Peirce, CE 1, 267).

• If I reason that certain conduct is wise because it has

a character which belongs only to wise things, I reason à priori.

• If I think it is wise because it once turned out to be wise,

that is, if I infer that it is wise on this occasion because

it was wise on that occasion, I reason inductively [à particularis].

• But if I think it is wise because a wise man does it, I then make

the pure hypothesis that he does it because he is wise, and I reason

à posteriori.

(Peirce, CE 1, 180).

</QUOTE>

Suppose we make the following assignments.

• A = Wisdom

• B = a certain character

• C = a certain conduct

• D = done by a wise man

• E = a certain occasion

Recognizing a little more concreteness will aid understanding,

let us make the following substitutions in Peirce’s example.

• B = Benevolence = a certain character

• C = Contributes to Charity = a certain conduct

• E = Earlier today = a certain occasion

The converging operation of all three reasonings is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. A Triply Wise Act

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/triply-wise-act.jpg

The common proposition concluding each argument is AC,

contributing to charity is wise.

• Deduction could have obtained the Fact AC from

the Rule AB, benevolence is wisdom, along with

the Case BC, contributing to charity is benevolent.

• Induction could have gathered the Rule AC,

contributing to charity is exemplary of wisdom, from

the Fact AE, the act of earlier today is wise, along with

the Case CE, the act of earlier today was an instance of

contributing to charity.

• Abduction could have guessed the Case AC,

contributing to charity is explained by wisdom, from

the Fact DC, contributing to charity is done by this wise man, and

the Rule DA, everything wise is done by this wise man.

Thus, a wise man, who does all the wise things there are to do,

may nonetheless contribute to charity for no good reason and even

be charitable to a fault. But on seeing the wise man contribute to

charity it is natural to think charity may well be the “mark” of his

wisdom, in essence, that wisdom is the “reason” he contributes to

charity.

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/19/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-2/

Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Types_of_Reasoning_in_C.S._Peirce

All,

Peirce gives one of his earliest treatments of the three types of

reasoning in his Harvard Lectures of 1865 “On the Logic of Science”.

There he shows how the same proposition may be reached from three

directions, as the result of an inference in each of the three modes.

<QUOTE CSP:>

We have then three different kinds of inference.

• Deduction or inference à priori,

• Induction or inference à particularis,

• Hypothesis or inference à posteriori.

(Peirce, CE 1, 267).

• If I reason that certain conduct is wise because it has

a character which belongs only to wise things, I reason à priori.

• If I think it is wise because it once turned out to be wise,

that is, if I infer that it is wise on this occasion because

it was wise on that occasion, I reason inductively [à particularis].

• But if I think it is wise because a wise man does it, I then make

the pure hypothesis that he does it because he is wise, and I reason

à posteriori.

(Peirce, CE 1, 180).

</QUOTE>

Suppose we make the following assignments.

• A = Wisdom

• B = a certain character

• C = a certain conduct

• D = done by a wise man

• E = a certain occasion

Recognizing a little more concreteness will aid understanding,

let us make the following substitutions in Peirce’s example.

• B = Benevolence = a certain character

• C = Contributes to Charity = a certain conduct

• E = Earlier today = a certain occasion

The converging operation of all three reasonings is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. A Triply Wise Act

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/triply-wise-act.jpg

The common proposition concluding each argument is AC,

contributing to charity is wise.

• Deduction could have obtained the Fact AC from

the Rule AB, benevolence is wisdom, along with

the Case BC, contributing to charity is benevolent.

• Induction could have gathered the Rule AC,

contributing to charity is exemplary of wisdom, from

the Fact AE, the act of earlier today is wise, along with

the Case CE, the act of earlier today was an instance of

contributing to charity.

• Abduction could have guessed the Case AC,

contributing to charity is explained by wisdom, from

the Fact DC, contributing to charity is done by this wise man, and

the Rule DA, everything wise is done by this wise man.

Thus, a wise man, who does all the wise things there are to do,

may nonetheless contribute to charity for no good reason and even

be charitable to a fault. But on seeing the wise man contribute to

charity it is natural to think charity may well be the “mark” of his

wisdom, in essence, that wisdom is the “reason” he contributes to

charity.

Regards,

Jon

Apr 20, 2022, 3:00:17 PMApr 20

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 3

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/20/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-3/

Inquiry and Analogy • Comparison of the Analyses

================================================

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Comparison_of_the_Analyses

All,

The next two Figures will be of use when we turn to

comparing the three types of inference as they appear

in the respective analyses of Aristotle and Peirce.

Figure 3. Types of Reasoning in Transition

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/types-of-reasoning-in-transition.jpg

Figure 4. Types of Reasoning in Peirce

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/types-of-reasoning-in-peirce.jpg

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/20/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-3/

Inquiry and Analogy • Comparison of the Analyses

================================================

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Comparison_of_the_Analyses

All,

The next two Figures will be of use when we turn to

comparing the three types of inference as they appear

in the respective analyses of Aristotle and Peirce.

Figure 3. Types of Reasoning in Transition

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/types-of-reasoning-in-transition.jpg

Figure 4. Types of Reasoning in Peirce

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/types-of-reasoning-in-peirce.jpg

Regards,

Jon

Apr 24, 2022, 2:12:13 PMApr 24

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 4 (Part 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/24/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-4/

Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Apagogy” • Abductive Reasoning

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy.E2.80.9D_.E2.80.A2_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction

All,

Peirce's notion of abductive reasoning is derived from Aristotle's

treatment of it in the “Prior Analytics”. Aristotle's discussion

begins with an example which may seem incidental but the question

and its analysis are echoes of the investigation pursued in one of

Plato's Dialogue, the “Meno”. It concerns nothing less than the

possibility of knowledge and the relationship between knowledge and

virtue, or between their objects, the true and the good. It is not

just because it forms a recurring question in philosophy, but because

it preserves a close correspondence between its form and its content,

that we shall find this example increasingly relevant to our study.

<QUOTE Aristotle:>

We have Reduction (απαγωγη, abduction): (1) when it is obvious that

the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to

the last term is not obvious, yet nevertheless is more probable or

not less probable than the conclusion; or (2) if there are not many

intermediate terms between the last and the middle; for in all such

cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.

(1) E.g., let A stand for “that which can be taught”, B for “knowledge”,

and C for “morality”. Then that knowledge can be taught is evident; but

whether virtue is knowledge is not clear. Then if BC is not less probable or

is more probable than AC, we have reduction; for we are nearer to knowledge

for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge

that AC is true.

(2) Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms

between B and C; for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.

E.g., suppose that D is “to square”, E “rectilinear figure”, and F “circle”.

Assuming that between E and F there is only one intermediate term — that the

circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of lunules — we should

approximate to knowledge.

(Aristotle, “Prior Analytics” 2.25)

</QUOTE>

A few notes on the reading may be helpful. The Greek text seems to imply

a geometric diagram, in which directed line segments AB, BC, AC indicate

logical relations between pairs of terms taken from A, B, C. We have two

options for reading the line labels, either as implications or as subsumptions,

as in the following two paradigms for interpretation.

Table of Implications

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/table-of-implications-tuv.png

Table of Subsumptions

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/table-of-subsumptions-tuv.png

In the latter case, P ⩾ Q is read as “P subsumes Q”, that is,

“P applies to all Q”, or “P is predicated of all Q”.

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/24/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-4/

Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Apagogy” • Abductive Reasoning

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy.E2.80.9D_.E2.80.A2_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction

All,

Peirce's notion of abductive reasoning is derived from Aristotle's

treatment of it in the “Prior Analytics”. Aristotle's discussion

begins with an example which may seem incidental but the question

and its analysis are echoes of the investigation pursued in one of

Plato's Dialogue, the “Meno”. It concerns nothing less than the

possibility of knowledge and the relationship between knowledge and

virtue, or between their objects, the true and the good. It is not

just because it forms a recurring question in philosophy, but because

it preserves a close correspondence between its form and its content,

that we shall find this example increasingly relevant to our study.

<QUOTE Aristotle:>

We have Reduction (απαγωγη, abduction): (1) when it is obvious that

the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to

the last term is not obvious, yet nevertheless is more probable or

not less probable than the conclusion; or (2) if there are not many

intermediate terms between the last and the middle; for in all such

cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge.

(1) E.g., let A stand for “that which can be taught”, B for “knowledge”,

and C for “morality”. Then that knowledge can be taught is evident; but

whether virtue is knowledge is not clear. Then if BC is not less probable or

is more probable than AC, we have reduction; for we are nearer to knowledge

for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge

that AC is true.

(2) Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms

between B and C; for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge.

E.g., suppose that D is “to square”, E “rectilinear figure”, and F “circle”.

Assuming that between E and F there is only one intermediate term — that the

circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of lunules — we should

approximate to knowledge.

(Aristotle, “Prior Analytics” 2.25)

</QUOTE>

A few notes on the reading may be helpful. The Greek text seems to imply

a geometric diagram, in which directed line segments AB, BC, AC indicate

logical relations between pairs of terms taken from A, B, C. We have two

options for reading the line labels, either as implications or as subsumptions,

as in the following two paradigms for interpretation.

Table of Implications

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/table-of-implications-tuv.png

Table of Subsumptions

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/table-of-subsumptions-tuv.png

In the latter case, P ⩾ Q is read as “P subsumes Q”, that is,

“P applies to all Q”, or “P is predicated of all Q”.

Regards,

Jon

Apr 25, 2022, 5:18:15 PMApr 25

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 4 (Part 2)

sense of reduction in which we speak of one question reducing to

another. The question being asked is “Can virtue be taught?”

The type of answer which develops is as follows.

If virtue is a form of understanding, and if we are willing to

grant that understanding can be taught, then virtue can be taught.

In this way of approaching the problem, by detour and indirection,

the form of abductive reasoning is used to shift the attack from the

original question, whether virtue can be taught, to the hopefully

easier question, whether virtue is a form of understanding.

The logical structure of the process of hypothesis formation in

the first example follows the pattern of “abduction to a case”,

whose abstract form is diagrammed and schematized in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Teachability, Understanding, Virtue

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/teachability-understanding-virtue-3.0.png

The sense of the Figure is explained by the following assignments.

Term, Position, Interpretation

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/term-position-interpretation-tuv.png

Premiss, Predication, Inference Role

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/premiss-predication-inference-role-tuv.png

Abduction from a Fact to a Case proceeds according to the following schema.

Fact: V ⇒ T?

Rule: U ⇒ T.

──────────────

Case: V ⇒ U?

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/24/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-4/

Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Apagogy” • Abductive Reasoning

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy.E2.80.9D_.E2.80.A2_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction

All,

The method of abductive reasoning bears a close relation to the
Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Apagogy” • Abductive Reasoning

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CApagogy.E2.80.9D_.E2.80.A2_Abductive_Reasoning_as_Problem_Reduction

All,

sense of reduction in which we speak of one question reducing to

another. The question being asked is “Can virtue be taught?”

The type of answer which develops is as follows.

If virtue is a form of understanding, and if we are willing to

grant that understanding can be taught, then virtue can be taught.

In this way of approaching the problem, by detour and indirection,

the form of abductive reasoning is used to shift the attack from the

original question, whether virtue can be taught, to the hopefully

easier question, whether virtue is a form of understanding.

The logical structure of the process of hypothesis formation in

the first example follows the pattern of “abduction to a case”,

whose abstract form is diagrammed and schematized in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Teachability, Understanding, Virtue

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/teachability-understanding-virtue-3.0.png

The sense of the Figure is explained by the following assignments.

Term, Position, Interpretation

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/term-position-interpretation-tuv.png

Premiss, Predication, Inference Role

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/premiss-predication-inference-role-tuv.png

Abduction from a Fact to a Case proceeds according to the following schema.

Fact: V ⇒ T?

Rule: U ⇒ T.

──────────────

Case: V ⇒ U?

Regards,

Jon

Apr 26, 2022, 4:30:25 PMApr 26

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG, Conceptual Graphs

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 5

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/26/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-5/

Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Paradigm” • Reasoning by Analogy

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CParadigm.E2.80.9D_.E2.80.A2_Reasoning_by_Analogy_or_Example

All,

Aristotle examines the subject of analogical inference

or “reasoning by example” under the heading of the Greek

word παραδειγμα, from which comes the English word paradigm.

In its original sense the word suggests a kind of “side-show”,

or a parallel comparison of cases.

<QUOTE Aristotle:>

We have an Example (παραδειγμα, or analogy) when the major extreme is

shown to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar

to the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the

third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the third.

E.g., let A be “bad”, B “to make war on neighbors”, C “Athens against Thebes”,

and D “Thebes against Phocis”. Then if we require to prove that war against

Thebes is bad, we must be satisfied that war against neighbors is bad.

Evidence of this can be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that war by

Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad,

and war against Thebes is against neighbors, it is evident that war

against Thebes is bad.

(Aristotle, “Prior Analytics” 2.24)

</QUOTE>

Figure 6 shows the logical relationships involved in Aristotle’s example of analogy.

Figure 6. Aristotle's “Paradigm”

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/aristotles-paradigm.jpg

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/26/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-5/

Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Paradigm” • Reasoning by Analogy

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Aristotle.27s_.E2.80.9CParadigm.E2.80.9D_.E2.80.A2_Reasoning_by_Analogy_or_Example

All,

Aristotle examines the subject of analogical inference

or “reasoning by example” under the heading of the Greek

word παραδειγμα, from which comes the English word paradigm.

In its original sense the word suggests a kind of “side-show”,

or a parallel comparison of cases.

<QUOTE Aristotle:>

We have an Example (παραδειγμα, or analogy) when the major extreme is

shown to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar

to the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the

third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the third.

E.g., let A be “bad”, B “to make war on neighbors”, C “Athens against Thebes”,

and D “Thebes against Phocis”. Then if we require to prove that war against

Thebes is bad, we must be satisfied that war against neighbors is bad.

Evidence of this can be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that war by

Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad,

and war against Thebes is against neighbors, it is evident that war

against Thebes is bad.

(Aristotle, “Prior Analytics” 2.24)

</QUOTE>

Figure 6 shows the logical relationships involved in Aristotle’s example of analogy.

Figure 6. Aristotle's “Paradigm”

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/aristotles-paradigm.jpg

Regards,

Jon

Apr 28, 2022, 1:45:21 PMApr 28

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 6

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/28/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-6/

Inquiry and Analogy • Peirce’s Formulation of Analogy • Version 1

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Peirce_on_Analogy_1

All,

Next we look at a couple of ways Peirce analyzed analogical inferences.

Version 1 —

<QUOTE CSP:>

C.S. Peirce • “On the Natural Classification of Arguments” (1867)

The formula of analogy is as follows:

S′, S″, and S‴ are taken at random from such a class

that their characters at random are such as P′, P″, P‴.

T is P′, P″, P‴,

S′, S″, S‴ are Q;

∴ T is Q.

Such an argument is double. It combines the two following:

1.

S′, S″, S‴ are taken as being P′, P″, P‴,

S′, S″, S‴ are Q;

∴ (By induction) P′, P″, P‴ is Q,

T is P′, P″, P‴;

∴ (Deductively) T is Q.

2.

S′, S″, S‴ are, for instance, P′, P″, P‴,

T is P′, P″, P‴;

∴ (By hypothesis) T has the common characters of S′, S″, S‴,

S′, S″, S‴ are Q;

∴ (Deductively) T is Q.

Owing to its double character, analogy is very strong

with only a moderate number of instances.

(Peirce, CP 2.513, CE 2, 46–47)

</QUOTE>

Figure 7 shows the logical relationships involved in the above analysis.

Figure 7. Peirce's Formulation of Analogy (Version 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/peirces-formulation-of-analogy-version-1.jpg

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/28/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-6/

Inquiry and Analogy • Peirce’s Formulation of Analogy • Version 1

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Peirce_on_Analogy_1

All,

Next we look at a couple of ways Peirce analyzed analogical inferences.

Version 1 —

<QUOTE CSP:>

C.S. Peirce • “On the Natural Classification of Arguments” (1867)

The formula of analogy is as follows:

S′, S″, and S‴ are taken at random from such a class

that their characters at random are such as P′, P″, P‴.

T is P′, P″, P‴,

S′, S″, S‴ are Q;

∴ T is Q.

Such an argument is double. It combines the two following:

1.

S′, S″, S‴ are taken as being P′, P″, P‴,

S′, S″, S‴ are Q;

∴ (By induction) P′, P″, P‴ is Q,

T is P′, P″, P‴;

∴ (Deductively) T is Q.

2.

S′, S″, S‴ are, for instance, P′, P″, P‴,

T is P′, P″, P‴;

∴ (By hypothesis) T has the common characters of S′, S″, S‴,

S′, S″, S‴ are Q;

∴ (Deductively) T is Q.

Owing to its double character, analogy is very strong

with only a moderate number of instances.

(Peirce, CP 2.513, CE 2, 46–47)

</QUOTE>

Figure 7 shows the logical relationships involved in the above analysis.

Figure 7. Peirce's Formulation of Analogy (Version 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/peirces-formulation-of-analogy-version-1.jpg

Regards,

Jon

Apr 29, 2022, 4:45:11 PMApr 29

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 7

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/29/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-7/

Inquiry and Analogy • Peirce’s Formulation of Analogy • Version 2

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Peirce_on_Analogy_2

All,

Here's another formulation of analogical inference Peirce gave some years later.

<QUOTE CSP:>

C.S. Peirce • “A Theory of Probable Inference” (1883)

The formula of the analogical inference

presents, therefore, three premisses, thus:

S′, S″, S‴, are a random sample of some undefined class X,

of whose characters P′, P″, P‴, are samples,

T is P′, P″, P‴;

S′, S″, S‴, are Q's;

Hence, T is a Q.

We have evidently here an induction and an hypothesis

followed by a deduction; thus:

[Parallel Column Display]

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/peirce-on-analogy-e280a2-cp-2.733.png

Hence, deductively, T is a Q.

(Peirce, CP 2.733, with a few changes in Peirce’s notation

to facilitate comparison between the two versions)

</QUOTE>

Figure 8 shows the logical relationships involved in the above analysis.

Figure 8. Peirce's Formulation of Analogy (Version 2)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/peirces-formulation-of-analogy-version-2.jpg

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/29/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-7/

Inquiry and Analogy • Peirce’s Formulation of Analogy • Version 2

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Peirce_on_Analogy_2

All,

Here's another formulation of analogical inference Peirce gave some years later.

<QUOTE CSP:>

C.S. Peirce • “A Theory of Probable Inference” (1883)

The formula of the analogical inference

presents, therefore, three premisses, thus:

S′, S″, S‴, are a random sample of some undefined class X,

of whose characters P′, P″, P‴, are samples,

T is P′, P″, P‴;

S′, S″, S‴, are Q's;

Hence, T is a Q.

We have evidently here an induction and an hypothesis

followed by a deduction; thus:

[Parallel Column Display]

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/peirce-on-analogy-e280a2-cp-2.733.png

Hence, deductively, T is a Q.

(Peirce, CP 2.733, with a few changes in Peirce’s notation

to facilitate comparison between the two versions)

</QUOTE>

Figure 8 shows the logical relationships involved in the above analysis.

Figure 8. Peirce's Formulation of Analogy (Version 2)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/peirces-formulation-of-analogy-version-2.jpg

Regards,

Jon

Apr 30, 2022, 5:24:41 PMApr 30

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 8

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/30/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-8/

Inquiry and Analogy • Dewey’s “Sign of Rain” • An Example of Inquiry

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain

All,

To illustrate the place of the sign relation in inquiry

we begin with Dewey’s elegant and simple example of

reflective thinking in everyday life.

<QUOTE Dewey:>

A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time

he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily

with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it

is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between

him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in

such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor

the noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity;

looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that it will

rain is, however, something *suggested*. The pedestrian *feels* the cold;

he *thinks of* clouds and a coming shower.

(John Dewey, How We Think, 6–7)

</QUOTE>

Inquiry and Interpretation

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain_1

In Dewey’s narrative we can see the components of a sign relation

laid out in the following fashion. *Coolness* is a Sign of the

Object *rain* and *the thought of the rain’s likelihood* is the

Interpretant of that sign with respect to that object. In the

present description of reflective thinking Dewey distinguishes

two phases, “a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt” and “an

act of search or investigation” (p. 9), comprehensive stages

which are further refined in his later model of inquiry.

Reflection is the action the interpreter takes to establish

a fund of connections between the sensory shock of coolness

and the objective danger of rain by way of the impression

rain is likely. But reflection is more than irresponsible

speculation. In reflection the interpreter acts to charge or

defuse the thought of rain (the probability of rain in thought)

by seeking other signs the thought implies and evaluating the

thought according to the results of that search.

Figure 9 shows the semiotic relationships involved in Dewey’s

story, tracing the structure and function of the sign relation

as it informs the activity of inquiry, including both the movements

of surprise explanation and intentional action. The labels on the

outer edges of the semiotic triple suggest the *significance* of signs

for eventual occurrences and the *correspondence* of ideas with external

orientations. But there is nothing essential about the dyadic role

distinctions they imply, as it is only in special or degenerate cases

that their shadowy projections preserve enough information to determine

the original sign relation.

Figure 9. Dewey's “Sign of Rain” Example

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/deweys-sign-of-rain-example.jpg

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/30/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-8/

Inquiry and Analogy • Dewey’s “Sign of Rain” • An Example of Inquiry

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain

All,

To illustrate the place of the sign relation in inquiry

we begin with Dewey’s elegant and simple example of

reflective thinking in everyday life.

<QUOTE Dewey:>

A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time

he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily

with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it

is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between

him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in

such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor

the noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity;

looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that it will

rain is, however, something *suggested*. The pedestrian *feels* the cold;

he *thinks of* clouds and a coming shower.

(John Dewey, How We Think, 6–7)

</QUOTE>

Inquiry and Interpretation

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain_1

In Dewey’s narrative we can see the components of a sign relation

laid out in the following fashion. *Coolness* is a Sign of the

Object *rain* and *the thought of the rain’s likelihood* is the

Interpretant of that sign with respect to that object. In the

present description of reflective thinking Dewey distinguishes

two phases, “a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt” and “an

act of search or investigation” (p. 9), comprehensive stages

which are further refined in his later model of inquiry.

Reflection is the action the interpreter takes to establish

a fund of connections between the sensory shock of coolness

and the objective danger of rain by way of the impression

rain is likely. But reflection is more than irresponsible

speculation. In reflection the interpreter acts to charge or

defuse the thought of rain (the probability of rain in thought)

by seeking other signs the thought implies and evaluating the

thought according to the results of that search.

Figure 9 shows the semiotic relationships involved in Dewey’s

story, tracing the structure and function of the sign relation

as it informs the activity of inquiry, including both the movements

of surprise explanation and intentional action. The labels on the

outer edges of the semiotic triple suggest the *significance* of signs

for eventual occurrences and the *correspondence* of ideas with external

orientations. But there is nothing essential about the dyadic role

distinctions they imply, as it is only in special or degenerate cases

that their shadowy projections preserve enough information to determine

the original sign relation.

Figure 9. Dewey's “Sign of Rain” Example

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/deweys-sign-of-rain-example.jpg

Regards,

Jon

May 2, 2022, 4:56:21 PMMay 2

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 9

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/02/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-9/

Inquiry and Analogy • Dewey’s “Sign of Rain” • An Example of Inquiry

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain

Inquiry and Inference

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain_2

If we follow Dewey’s “Sign of Rain” example far enough to consider

the import of thought for action, we realize the subsequent conduct

of the interpreter, progressing up through the natural conclusion of

the episode — the quickening steps, seeking shelter in time to escape

the rain — all those acts form a series of further interpretants,

contingent on the active causes of the individual, for the originally

recognized signs of rain and the first impressions of the actual case.

Just as critical reflection develops the associated and alternative

signs which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores

the consequential and contrasting actions which give effective and

testable meaning to a person’s belief in it.

Figure 10 charts the progress of inquiry in Dewey’s Sign of Rain example

according to the stages of reasoning identified by Peirce, focusing on

the compound or mixed form of inference formed by the first two steps.

Figure 10. Cycle of Inquiry

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/cycle-of-inquiry-grayscale.jpg

Step 1 is Abductive,

abstracting a Case from the consideration of a Fact and a Rule.

• Fact : C ⇒ A, In the Current situation the Air is cool.

• Rule : B ⇒ A, Just Before it rains, the Air is cool.

• Case : C ⇒ B, The Current situation is just Before it rains.

Step 2 is Deductive,

admitting the Case to another Rule and arriving at a novel Fact.

• Case : C ⇒ B, The Current situation is just Before it rains.

• Rule : B ⇒ D, Just Before it rains, a Dark cloud will appear.

• Fact : C ⇒ D, In the Current situation, a Dark cloud will appear.

What precedes is nowhere near a complete analysis of Dewey’s example,

even so far as it might be carried out within the constraints of the

syllogistic framework, and it covers only the first two steps of the

inquiry process, but perhaps it will do for a start.

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/02/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-9/

Inquiry and Analogy • Dewey’s “Sign of Rain” • An Example of Inquiry

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Dewey_Rain_2

If we follow Dewey’s “Sign of Rain” example far enough to consider

the import of thought for action, we realize the subsequent conduct

of the interpreter, progressing up through the natural conclusion of

the episode — the quickening steps, seeking shelter in time to escape

the rain — all those acts form a series of further interpretants,

contingent on the active causes of the individual, for the originally

recognized signs of rain and the first impressions of the actual case.

Just as critical reflection develops the associated and alternative

signs which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores

the consequential and contrasting actions which give effective and

testable meaning to a person’s belief in it.

Figure 10 charts the progress of inquiry in Dewey’s Sign of Rain example

according to the stages of reasoning identified by Peirce, focusing on

the compound or mixed form of inference formed by the first two steps.

Figure 10. Cycle of Inquiry

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/cycle-of-inquiry-grayscale.jpg

Step 1 is Abductive,

abstracting a Case from the consideration of a Fact and a Rule.

• Fact : C ⇒ A, In the Current situation the Air is cool.

• Rule : B ⇒ A, Just Before it rains, the Air is cool.

• Case : C ⇒ B, The Current situation is just Before it rains.

Step 2 is Deductive,

admitting the Case to another Rule and arriving at a novel Fact.

• Case : C ⇒ B, The Current situation is just Before it rains.

• Rule : B ⇒ D, Just Before it rains, a Dark cloud will appear.

• Fact : C ⇒ D, In the Current situation, a Dark cloud will appear.

What precedes is nowhere near a complete analysis of Dewey’s example,

even so far as it might be carried out within the constraints of the

syllogistic framework, and it covers only the first two steps of the

inquiry process, but perhaps it will do for a start.

Regards,

Jon

May 4, 2022, 10:45:16 AMMay 4

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 10

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/04/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-10/

Inquiry and Analogy • Functional Conception of Quantification Theory

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Quantification

All,

Up till now quantification theory has been based on the assumption of

individual variables ranging over universal collections of perfectly

determinate elements. The mere act of writing quantified formulas

like ∀_x∈X f(x) and ∃_x∈X f(x) involves a subscription to such

notions, as shown by the membership relations invoked in their

indices.

As we reflect more critically on the conventional assumptions in the

light of pragmatic and constructive principles, however, they begin

to appear as problematic hypotheses whose warrants are not beyond

question, as projects of exhaustive determination overreaching

the powers of finite information and control to manage.

Thus it is worth considering how the scene of quantification theory

might be shifted nearer to familiar ground, toward the predicates

themselves which represent our continuing acquaintance with phenomena.

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/04/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-10/

Inquiry and Analogy • Functional Conception of Quantification Theory

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Quantification

All,

Up till now quantification theory has been based on the assumption of

individual variables ranging over universal collections of perfectly

determinate elements. The mere act of writing quantified formulas

like ∀_x∈X f(x) and ∃_x∈X f(x) involves a subscription to such

notions, as shown by the membership relations invoked in their

indices.

As we reflect more critically on the conventional assumptions in the

light of pragmatic and constructive principles, however, they begin

to appear as problematic hypotheses whose warrants are not beyond

question, as projects of exhaustive determination overreaching

the powers of finite information and control to manage.

Thus it is worth considering how the scene of quantification theory

might be shifted nearer to familiar ground, toward the predicates

themselves which represent our continuing acquaintance with phenomena.

Regards,

Jon

May 5, 2022, 3:30:54 PMMay 5

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 11

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/05/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-11/

Inquiry and Analogy • Higher Order Propositional Expressions

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE

Higher Order Propositions and Logical Operators (n = 1)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE_1

All,

A “higher order proposition” is, roughly speaking,

a proposition about propositions. If the original

order of propositions is a class of indicator functions

f : X → B then the next higher order of propositions

consists of maps of the type m : (X → B) → B.

For example, consider the case where X = B. There are exactly four

propositions one can make about the elements of X. Each proposition

has the concrete type f : X → B and the abstract type f : B → B. Then

there are exactly sixteen higher order propositions one can make about

the initial set of four propositions. Each higher order proposition has

the abstract type m : (B → B) → B.

Table 11 lists the sixteen higher order propositions about propositions

on one boolean variable, organized in the following fashion.

• Columns 1 and 2 form a truth table for the four propositions

f : B → B, turned on its side from the way one is most likely

accustomed to see truth tables, with the row leaders in Column 1

displaying the names of the functions f_i, for i = 1 to 4, while

the entries in Column 2 give the values of each function for the

argument values listed in the corresponding column head.

• Column 3 displays one of the more usual expressions

for the proposition in question.

• The last sixteen columns are headed by a collection of

conventional names for the higher order propositions,

also known as the “measures” m_j, for j = 0 to 15,

where the entries in the body of the Table record

the values each m_j assigns to each f_i.

Table 11. Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/higher-order-propositions-n1.png

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/05/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-11/

Inquiry and Analogy • Higher Order Propositional Expressions

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE

Higher Order Propositions and Logical Operators (n = 1)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE_1

All,

A “higher order proposition” is, roughly speaking,

a proposition about propositions. If the original

order of propositions is a class of indicator functions

f : X → B then the next higher order of propositions

consists of maps of the type m : (X → B) → B.

For example, consider the case where X = B. There are exactly four

propositions one can make about the elements of X. Each proposition

has the concrete type f : X → B and the abstract type f : B → B. Then

there are exactly sixteen higher order propositions one can make about

the initial set of four propositions. Each higher order proposition has

the abstract type m : (B → B) → B.

Table 11 lists the sixteen higher order propositions about propositions

on one boolean variable, organized in the following fashion.

• Columns 1 and 2 form a truth table for the four propositions

f : B → B, turned on its side from the way one is most likely

accustomed to see truth tables, with the row leaders in Column 1

displaying the names of the functions f_i, for i = 1 to 4, while

the entries in Column 2 give the values of each function for the

argument values listed in the corresponding column head.

• Column 3 displays one of the more usual expressions

for the proposition in question.

• The last sixteen columns are headed by a collection of

conventional names for the higher order propositions,

also known as the “measures” m_j, for j = 0 to 15,

where the entries in the body of the Table record

the values each m_j assigns to each f_i.

Table 11. Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/higher-order-propositions-n1.png

Regards,

Jon

May 7, 2022, 12:15:46 PMMay 7

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 12

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/07/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-12/

Interpretive Categories for Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE_1.2

All,

Referring to “Table 11. Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)” from the previous post:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/higher-order-propositions-n1.png

Table 12 presents a series of “interpretive categories” for the higher order propositions

in Table 11. I’ll leave these for now to the reader’s contemplation and discuss them when

we get two variables into the mix. The lower dimensional cases tend to exhibit “condensed”

or “degenerate” structures and their full significance will become clearer once we get beyond

the 1‑dimensional case.

Table 12. Interpretive Categories for Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/interpretive-categories-for-higher-order-propositions-n1.png

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/07/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-12/

Interpretive Categories for Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE_1.2

All,

Referring to “Table 11. Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)” from the previous post:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/higher-order-propositions-n1.png

Table 12 presents a series of “interpretive categories” for the higher order propositions

in Table 11. I’ll leave these for now to the reader’s contemplation and discuss them when

we get two variables into the mix. The lower dimensional cases tend to exhibit “condensed”

or “degenerate” structures and their full significance will become clearer once we get beyond

the 1‑dimensional case.

Table 12. Interpretive Categories for Higher Order Propositions (n = 1)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/interpretive-categories-for-higher-order-propositions-n1.png

Regards,

Jon

May 16, 2022, 8:00:35 AM (9 days ago) May 16

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 13

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/09/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-13/

Inquiry and Analogy • Higher Order Propositional Expressions

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE

Higher Order Propositions and Logical Operators (n = 2)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE_2

All,

There are 2¹⁶ = 65536 measures of type m : (B² → B) → B.

Table 13 introduces the first 24 of those measures in the

fashion of higher order truth table I used before.

The column headed m_j shows the values of the measure m_j on

each of the propositions f_i : B² → B, for i = 0 to 23, with

blank entries in the Table being optional for values of zero.

The arrangement of measures which continues according to the

plan indicated here is referred to as the “standard ordering”

of those measures. In this scheme of things, the index j of

the measure m_j is the decimal equivalent of the bit string

associated with m_j’s functional values, which are obtained

in turn by reading the j-th column of binary digits in the

Table as the corresponding range of boolean values, taking

them up in the order from bottom to top.

Table 13. Higher Order Propositions (n = 2)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/higher-order-propositions-n2-2.0.png

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/09/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-13/

Inquiry and Analogy • Higher Order Propositional Expressions

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#HOPE_2

All,

There are 2¹⁶ = 65536 measures of type m : (B² → B) → B.

Table 13 introduces the first 24 of those measures in the

fashion of higher order truth table I used before.

The column headed m_j shows the values of the measure m_j on

each of the propositions f_i : B² → B, for i = 0 to 23, with

blank entries in the Table being optional for values of zero.

The arrangement of measures which continues according to the

plan indicated here is referred to as the “standard ordering”

of those measures. In this scheme of things, the index j of

the measure m_j is the decimal equivalent of the bit string

associated with m_j’s functional values, which are obtained

in turn by reading the j-th column of binary digits in the

Table as the corresponding range of boolean values, taking

them up in the order from bottom to top.

Table 13. Higher Order Propositions (n = 2)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/higher-order-propositions-n2-2.0.png

Regards,

Jon

May 17, 2022, 5:00:27 PM (7 days ago) May 17

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 14

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/17/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-14/

Umpire Operators (Part 1 of 2)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Umpire_Operators

All,

[Note. Please follow the first link above for better math formatting.]

The 2¹⁶ measures of type (B × B → B) → B present a formidable array of

propositions about propositions about 2-dimensional universes of discourse.

The early entries in their standard ordering define universes too amorphous

to detain us for long on a first pass but as we turn toward the high end of

the ordering we begin to recognize familiar structures worth examining from

new angles.

Instrumental to our study we define a couple of higher order operators,

• Υ : (B × B → B)² → B

and

• Υ₁ : (B × B → B) → B,

referred to as the relative and absolute “umpire operators”,

respectively. If either operator is defined in terms of more

primitive notions then the remaining operator can be defined

in terms of the one first established.

Let X = ⟨u, v⟩ be a 2-dimensional boolean space, X ≅ B × B,

generated by 2 boolean variables or logical features u and v.

Given an ordered pair of propositions e, f : ⟨u, v⟩ → B as arguments,

the relative umpire operator reports the value 1 if the first implies

the second, otherwise it reports the value 0.

• Υ(e, f) = 1 if and only if e ⇒ f

Expressing it another way:

• Υ(e, f) = 1 ⇔ ¬( e ¬( f )) = 1

In writing this, however, it is important to observe that the 1

appearing on the left side and the 1 appearing on the right side

of the logical equivalence have different meanings. Filling in

the details, we have the following.

• Υ(e, f) = 1 ∈ B ⇔ ¬( e ¬( f )) = 1 : ⟨u, v⟩ → B

Writing types as subscripts and using the fact that X = ⟨u, v⟩,

it is possible to express this a little more succinctly as follows.

• Υ(e, f) = 1_B ⇔ ¬( e ¬( f )) = 1_{X → B}

Finally, it is often convenient to write the first argument

as a subscript. Thus we have the following equation.

• (Υ_e)(f) = Υ(e, f).

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/17/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-14/

Umpire Operators (Part 1 of 2)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Umpire_Operators

All,

[Note. Please follow the first link above for better math formatting.]

The 2¹⁶ measures of type (B × B → B) → B present a formidable array of

propositions about propositions about 2-dimensional universes of discourse.

The early entries in their standard ordering define universes too amorphous

to detain us for long on a first pass but as we turn toward the high end of

the ordering we begin to recognize familiar structures worth examining from

new angles.

Instrumental to our study we define a couple of higher order operators,

• Υ : (B × B → B)² → B

and

• Υ₁ : (B × B → B) → B,

referred to as the relative and absolute “umpire operators”,

respectively. If either operator is defined in terms of more

primitive notions then the remaining operator can be defined

in terms of the one first established.

Let X = ⟨u, v⟩ be a 2-dimensional boolean space, X ≅ B × B,

generated by 2 boolean variables or logical features u and v.

Given an ordered pair of propositions e, f : ⟨u, v⟩ → B as arguments,

the relative umpire operator reports the value 1 if the first implies

the second, otherwise it reports the value 0.

• Υ(e, f) = 1 if and only if e ⇒ f

Expressing it another way:

• Υ(e, f) = 1 ⇔ ¬( e ¬( f )) = 1

In writing this, however, it is important to observe that the 1

appearing on the left side and the 1 appearing on the right side

of the logical equivalence have different meanings. Filling in

the details, we have the following.

• Υ(e, f) = 1 ∈ B ⇔ ¬( e ¬( f )) = 1 : ⟨u, v⟩ → B

Writing types as subscripts and using the fact that X = ⟨u, v⟩,

it is possible to express this a little more succinctly as follows.

• Υ(e, f) = 1_B ⇔ ¬( e ¬( f )) = 1_{X → B}

Finally, it is often convenient to write the first argument

as a subscript. Thus we have the following equation.

• (Υ_e)(f) = Υ(e, f).

Regards,

Jon

May 18, 2022, 2:56:31 PM (6 days ago) May 18

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 14 (Part 2)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/17/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-14/

Inquiry and Analogy • Umpire Operators (Part 2)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Ump_Abs

All,

The “absolute umpire operator”, also known as the “umpire measure”,

is a higher order proposition Υ₁ : (B × B → B) → B defined by the

equation Υ₁(f) = Υ(1, f). In this case the subscript 1 on the left

and the argument 1 on the right both refer to the constant proposition

1 : B × B → B. In most settings where Υ₁ is applied to arguments it

is safe to omit the subscript 1 since the number of arguments indicates

which type of operator is meant. Thus, we have the following identities

and equivalents.

• Υf = Υ₁(f) = 1_B ⇔ ¬( 1 ¬( f )) = 1 ⇔ f = 1_{B × B → B}

The umpire measure Υ₁ is defined at the level of boolean functions as

mathematical objects but can also be understood in terms of the judgments

it induces on the syntactic level. In that interpretation Υ₁ recognizes

theorems of the propositional calculus over [u, v], giving a score of 1 to

tautologies and a score of 0 to everything else, regarding all contingent

statements as no better than falsehoods.

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/17/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-14/

Inquiry and Analogy • Umpire Operators (Part 2)

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Ump_Abs

All,

The “absolute umpire operator”, also known as the “umpire measure”,

is a higher order proposition Υ₁ : (B × B → B) → B defined by the

equation Υ₁(f) = Υ(1, f). In this case the subscript 1 on the left

and the argument 1 on the right both refer to the constant proposition

1 : B × B → B. In most settings where Υ₁ is applied to arguments it

is safe to omit the subscript 1 since the number of arguments indicates

which type of operator is meant. Thus, we have the following identities

and equivalents.

• Υf = Υ₁(f) = 1_B ⇔ ¬( 1 ¬( f )) = 1 ⇔ f = 1_{B × B → B}

The umpire measure Υ₁ is defined at the level of boolean functions as

mathematical objects but can also be understood in terms of the judgments

it induces on the syntactic level. In that interpretation Υ₁ recognizes

theorems of the propositional calculus over [u, v], giving a score of 1 to

tautologies and a score of 0 to everything else, regarding all contingent

statements as no better than falsehoods.

Regards,

Jon

May 20, 2022, 6:12:12 PM (4 days ago) May 20

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 15

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/20/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-15/

Inquiry and Analogy • Measure for Measure

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Measure_for_Measure

All,

Let us define two families of measures,

α_i, β_i : (B × B → B) → B for i = 0 to 15,

by means of the following equations:

• α_i f = Υ(f_i, f) = Υ(f_i ⇒ f),

• β_i f = Υ(f, f_i) = Υ(f ⇒ f_i).

Table 14 shows the value of each α_i on each of the 16 boolean functions

f : B × B → B. In terms of the implication ordering on the 16 functions,

α_i f = 1 says that f is “above or identical to” f_i in the implication

lattice, that is, f ≥ f_i in the implication ordering.

Table 14. Qualifiers of the Implication Ordering α_i f = Υ(f_i, f)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/qualifiers-of-implication-ordering-ceb1-2.0.png

Table 15 shows the value of each β_i on each of the 16 boolean functions

f : B × B → B. In terms of the implication ordering on the 16 functions,

β_i f = 1 says that f is “below or identical to” f_i in the implication

lattice, that is, f ≤ f_i in the implication ordering.

Table 15. Qualifiers of the Implication Ordering β_i f = Υ(f, f_i)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/qualifiers-of-implication-ordering-ceb2-2.0.png

Applied to a given proposition f, the qualifiers α_i and β_i tell whether

f is above f_i or below f_i, respectively, in the implication ordering.

By way of example, let us trace the effects of several such measures,

namely, those which occupy the limiting positions in the Tables.

• α₀f = 1 iff f₀ ⇒ f iff 0 ⇒ f, hence α₀f = 1 for all f.

• α₁₅f = 1 iff f₁₅ ⇒ f iff 1 ⇒ f, hence α₁₅f = 1 iff f = 1.

• β₀f = 1 iff f ⇒ f₀ iff f ⇒ 0, hence β₀f = 1 iff f = 0.

• β₁₅f = 1 iff f ⇒ f₁₅ iff f ⇒ 1, hence β₁₅f = 1 for all f.

Expressed in terms of the propositional forms they value positively,

α₀ = β₁₅ is a totally indiscriminate measure, accepting all propositions

f : B × B → B, whereas α₁₅ and β₀ are measures which value the constant

propositions 1 : B × B → B and 0 : B × B → B, respectively, above all others.

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/20/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-15/

Inquiry and Analogy • Measure for Measure

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Measure_for_Measure

All,

Let us define two families of measures,

α_i, β_i : (B × B → B) → B for i = 0 to 15,

by means of the following equations:

• α_i f = Υ(f_i, f) = Υ(f_i ⇒ f),

• β_i f = Υ(f, f_i) = Υ(f ⇒ f_i).

Table 14 shows the value of each α_i on each of the 16 boolean functions

f : B × B → B. In terms of the implication ordering on the 16 functions,

α_i f = 1 says that f is “above or identical to” f_i in the implication

lattice, that is, f ≥ f_i in the implication ordering.

Table 14. Qualifiers of the Implication Ordering α_i f = Υ(f_i, f)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/qualifiers-of-implication-ordering-ceb1-2.0.png

Table 15 shows the value of each β_i on each of the 16 boolean functions

f : B × B → B. In terms of the implication ordering on the 16 functions,

β_i f = 1 says that f is “below or identical to” f_i in the implication

lattice, that is, f ≤ f_i in the implication ordering.

Table 15. Qualifiers of the Implication Ordering β_i f = Υ(f, f_i)

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/qualifiers-of-implication-ordering-ceb2-2.0.png

Applied to a given proposition f, the qualifiers α_i and β_i tell whether

f is above f_i or below f_i, respectively, in the implication ordering.

By way of example, let us trace the effects of several such measures,

namely, those which occupy the limiting positions in the Tables.

• α₀f = 1 iff f₀ ⇒ f iff 0 ⇒ f, hence α₀f = 1 for all f.

• α₁₅f = 1 iff f₁₅ ⇒ f iff 1 ⇒ f, hence α₁₅f = 1 iff f = 1.

• β₀f = 1 iff f ⇒ f₀ iff f ⇒ 0, hence β₀f = 1 iff f = 0.

• β₁₅f = 1 iff f ⇒ f₁₅ iff f ⇒ 1, hence β₁₅f = 1 for all f.

Expressed in terms of the propositional forms they value positively,

α₀ = β₁₅ is a totally indiscriminate measure, accepting all propositions

f : B × B → B, whereas α₁₅ and β₀ are measures which value the constant

propositions 1 : B × B → B and 0 : B × B → B, respectively, above all others.

Regards,

Jon

May 23, 2022, 4:00:55 AM (2 days ago) May 23

to Cybernetic Communications, Laws of Form, Ontolog Forum, Structural Modeling, SysSciWG

Cf: Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 16

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/22/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-16/

Extending the Existential Interpretation to Quantificational Logic

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Ex_Quant

All,

One of the resources we have for this investigation is

a formal calculus based on C.S. Peirce’s logical graphs.

For now we’ll adopt the “existential interpretation” of

that calculus, fixing the meanings of logical constants

and connectives at the core level of propositional logic.

To build on that core we’ll need to extend the existential

interpretation to encompass the analysis of quantified

propositions, or “quantifications”. That in turn will

take developing two further capacities of our calculus.

On the formal side we'll need to consider higher order

functional types, continuing our earlier venture above.

In terms of content we’ll need to consider new species

of “elemental” or “singular“ propositions.

Let us return to the 2-dimensional universe X• = [u, v].

A bridge between propositions and quantifications can be

built by defining a foursome of measures or “qualifiers”

ℓ_ij : (B × B → B) → B defined by the following equations.

Display 1. Qualifiers ℓ_ij

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/qualifiers-lij-1-0/

A higher order proposition ℓ_ij : (B × B → B) → B tells us

something about the proposition f : B × B → B, specifically,

which elements in B × B are assigned a positive value by f.

Taken together, the ℓ_ij operators give us a way to express

many useful observations about the propositions in X• = [u, v].

Figure 16 summarizes the action of the ℓ_ij operators on the

propositions of type f : B × B → B.

Figure 16. Higher Order Universe of Discourse

[ℓ_00, ℓ_01, ℓ_10, ℓ_11] ⊆ [[u, v]]

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/venn-diagram-4-dimensions-uv-cacti-8-inch-2/

Regards,

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/05/22/functional-logic-inquiry-and-analogy-16/

Extending the Existential Interpretation to Quantificational Logic

https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy#Ex_Quant

All,

One of the resources we have for this investigation is

a formal calculus based on C.S. Peirce’s logical graphs.

For now we’ll adopt the “existential interpretation” of

that calculus, fixing the meanings of logical constants

and connectives at the core level of propositional logic.

To build on that core we’ll need to extend the existential

interpretation to encompass the analysis of quantified

propositions, or “quantifications”. That in turn will

take developing two further capacities of our calculus.

On the formal side we'll need to consider higher order

functional types, continuing our earlier venture above.

In terms of content we’ll need to consider new species

of “elemental” or “singular“ propositions.

Let us return to the 2-dimensional universe X• = [u, v].

A bridge between propositions and quantifications can be

built by defining a foursome of measures or “qualifiers”

ℓ_ij : (B × B → B) → B defined by the following equations.

Display 1. Qualifiers ℓ_ij

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/qualifiers-lij-1-0/

A higher order proposition ℓ_ij : (B × B → B) → B tells us

something about the proposition f : B × B → B, specifically,

which elements in B × B are assigned a positive value by f.

Taken together, the ℓ_ij operators give us a way to express

many useful observations about the propositions in X• = [u, v].

Figure 16 summarizes the action of the ℓ_ij operators on the

propositions of type f : B × B → B.

Figure 16. Higher Order Universe of Discourse

[ℓ_00, ℓ_01, ℓ_10, ℓ_11] ⊆ [[u, v]]

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/venn-diagram-4-dimensions-uv-cacti-8-inch-2/

Regards,

Jon

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