Alex, All ...
Those are just ordinary unicodes for things like
bullets, ellipses, mdashes, quotes, right arrows,
math symbols, etc.
Every now and then some processor along the way fails to do its duty
and I get those triple question marks. It doesn't seem to be anything
I've done and or can do and it usually goes away after a couple of days.
I've been to the Mozilla help forums and no one seems to know why.
It appears to be an ISP issue, not anything at my source since my
automatic bcc: to myself is okay, nor anything at the listserves.
It started late last year after some changes at Yahoo,
the middleman AT&T imposed on me a few years back.
I'll append a fresh copy below to see if
it's worked its way out of the system.
At any rate, I always include a link my blog copy,
which is much better formatted in LaTeX with Figs
and Tables and all.
Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 7
quotes “ ”
Cf: Sign Relations • Discussion 7
Re: Sign Relations • Definition
Please forgive the long and winding dissertation. I've been through many discussions of Peirce's definition of “logic
as formal semiotic” but I keep discovering new ways of reading what I once thought a fairly straightforward proposition.
That's all useful information but it makes me anxious to avoid all the missteps of exposition I may have made in the
past. At any rate, I think I've set enough background and context — it will take more, but later — to begin addressing
your comments now.
For ease of reference here is Peirce's twofold definition again.
Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human
thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the
same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this
definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a
historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no
novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally
recognized. (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).
Turning to your first comment —
<QUOTE Alex Shkotin>
A Sign is unusually active in Peirce's definition:
A (a sign) brings B (interpretant sign) into correspondence with C (object of sign).
Moreover, A determines B or even creates B.
It would be nice to get an example of such an active sign, its interpretant sign, and an object. My point is to make
the Peirce definition as clear as to be formalized.
Several issues stand out. There are questions about paraphrases,
the active character of signs, and the nature of what is being defined.
• The problem of paraphrases arises at this point because it affects
how literally we ought to take the words in a natural language proxy
for a logical or mathematical formula.
For example, a conventional idiom in describing a mathematical function f : X → Y is to say f “maps” or “sends” an
element of X to an element of Y. A concrete verb may quicken the intuition but the downside is its power to evoke
excess meanings beyond the abstract intention. It is only as we become more familiar with the formal subject matter of
sign relations that we can decide what kind of “bringing” and “creating” and “determining” is really going on in all
that sign, object, interpretant relating, whether at the abstract level or in a given application.
• There is the question of a sign's active character.
[Peirce's] triadic explanations do not cover the dynamics of the sunflower’s behavior. It favors static descriptions
“to develop mutual applications of systems theory and
artificial intelligence to each other”.
Anything approaching an adequate answer to that question is going to be one of those things requiring more background
and context, all in good time, but there are a few hints we can take from Peirce's text about the way forward.
A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to
human thought than does the definition of a line as the place
which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
My reading of that tells me about a division of
labor across three levels of abstraction. There is
a level of psychological experience and social activity,
a level of dynamic process and temporal pattern, and
a level of mathematical form.
To be continued …
On 6/27/2020 3:56 AM, Alex Shkotin wrote:> Dear Jon,
> Just a clarification question: what does it mean "???" in your message
> above? Is that something you put in the message by your own hand? What does
> the sign "???" mean in this case?
> I study a phenomenon of definition and a way to formalize them. Peirce
> definition of sign is a challenging example.
> The point number one is that any scientific, technological and law term
> definition may be written in Simple English with variables introduced by