Cf: Double Negation • 2
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/02/18/doublenegation2/
 If we stand back for a moment to regard the structure of
 an implicational logic, such as Whitehead and Russell's,
 we see that it is fully contained in that of an equivalence
 logic. The difference is in the kind of step used. In one
 case expressions are detached at the point of implication,
 in the other they are detached at the point of equivalence.

 G. Spencer Brown • Laws of Form
All,
We have been exploring the properties of a simple but
elegant formal system exhibiting useful applications
to logic. This very simplicity helps us focus on core
features of formal systems and logical reasoning in a
far less cluttered environment than the general run of
logical systems. Earlier we touched on the theme of
duality sourcing the radiation of mathematical form
into logical subject matter, a theme we'll touch on
again.
But while we have the simple but critical example of Double Negation
in our sights let's use it to illustrate another central feature of
logical graphs bearing on the mathematical infrastructure of logic.
This is the power of using equational inference over and above
implicational inference in proofs.
Here again is the formal equation corresponding to
the principle of double negation, shown below in
graphtheoretic and traversalstring forms.
Figure. Double Negation Theorem
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/doublenegation3.0.png
Whether any principle is taken for an axiom or has to be
proven as a theorem depends on the formal system at hand.
In the present system double negation is a consequence
of the following set of axioms.
Axioms
======
Logical Interpretation
======================
One way of assigning logical meaning to the initial equations
is known as the entitative interpretation (En). Under En, the
axioms read as follows.
I₁ : true or true = true
I₂ : not true = false
J₁ : a or not a = true
J₂ : (a or b) and (a or c) = a or (b and c)
Another way of assigning logical meaning to the initial equations
is known as the existential interpretation (Ex). Under Ex, the
axioms read as follows.
I₁ : false and false = false
I₂ : not false = true
J₁ : a and not a = false
J₂ : (a and b) or (a and c) = a and (b or c)
Equational Inference
====================
Formal proofs in what follows employ a variation on
Spencer Brown's annotation scheme to mark each step of
proof according to which axiom is called to license the
corresponding step of syntactic transformation, whether
it applies to graphs or to strings. All the axioms in
the above set have the form of equations. This means
the inference steps they license are all reversible.
The proof annotation scheme employs a double bar ======
to mark this fact, though it will often be left to the
reader to decide which of the two possible directions
is the one required for applying the indicated axiom.
Here is the proof of Double Negation.
Figure. Double Negation Theorem • Proof
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/doublenegationproof3.0.png
The actual business of proof is a far more strategic affair than
the simple cranking of inference rules might suggest. Part of the
reason for this lies in the circumstance that implicational inference
rules combine the moving forward of a state of inquiry with the losing
of whatever information along the way one did not think immediately
relevant, at least, not as viewed in the local focus and short hauls of
moment to moment progress of the proof in question. Over the long haul,
this has the pernicious sideeffect of one being strategically forced
to reconstruct much of the information one had strategically thought
to forget in earlier stages of the proof, where “before the proof
started” may be counted as an earlier stage of the proof in view.
This is one of the reasons it is instructive to study equational inference rules.
Equational forms of reasoning are paramount in mathematics but they are less
familiar to the student of conventional logic textbooks, who may find a few
surprises here.
Reference
=========
• Spencer Brown, G. (1969), Laws of Form,
George Allen and Unwin, London, UK, p. 118.
Regards,
Jon