Hi Alex.
> - Is crt.sh accidentally picking up the CRL from the issuer certificate and trying to verify the EE cert against that?
crt.sh uses the "Full CRL Issued By This CA" field as an additional source of CRL Distribution Point URLs. Since the data is supplied by the CA responsible for disclosing the certificate, crt.sh assumes that it's authoritative and correct!
> - Is crt.sh trying to verify the entire chain and encountering the error when checking whether an issuer is revoked?
No. Having accepted the incorrectly specified CDP URL, crt.sh is trying to (1) access that URL, (2) parse it as a CRL, and (3) verify its signature using the CA's public key. There's no chain validation going on. Steps 1 and 2 succeed, but step 3 understandably fails.
If I manually remove the incorrect record from the crt.sh DB's "crl" table right now, it'll be automatically recreated the next time crt.sh pulls the CCADB data (which happens every 10 minutes). So we'll need to wait for Identrust to fix the CCADB record first. I've just reported this issue to Identrust via an email to the primary "CA Email Alias" listed in their "CA Owner" CCADB record.