The aim of Operation Oluja [Storm} was not to drive out the Serbs

[CroRadio.net]

http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2459

The aim of Operation Oluja [Storm} was not to drive out the Serbs

Author: Ozren Žunec - interview
Uploaded: Thursday, 07 August, 2008


Ozren Žunec, author of Goli život [Naked Life], a seminal study of the
Serb rebellion in Croatia - two volumes containing nearly 1,000 pages
- argues that the ideological and strategic weaknesses from which the
revolt suffered from the very start made it inherently unachievable.
The rebellion, according to Žunec, carried within itself the seeds of
its own ultimate defeat.

Ozren Žunec is a professor of sociology at the University of Zagreb
and the author of Goli život [Naked Life], a seminal study of the Serb
rebellion in Croatia brought out in Zagreb by the Demetar publishing
house. This extensive work - two volumes containing nearly 1,000 pages
- details the social and political aspects of the revolt, and examines
in some detail the ideological and strategic weaknesses from which the
project of the Croatian Serb leaders suffered from the very start, and
which made it inherently unachievable. The rebellion, according to
Žunec, carried within itself the seeds of its own ultimate defeat. A
thorough examination of the available sources, including the archives
of the Hague tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, leads him to conclude
that the Croatian military action known as Oluja was directed not at
driving the Croatian Serbs out of the country, but rather at achieving
a quick victory with minimal casualties in a relatively restricted
area. The plan did nevertheless anticipate the departure of the
population and the concomitant retreat of the Belgrade-controlled Serb
army from Croatia. Whereas the Croatian military action had been well
prepared and was efficiently executed, moreover, the Croatian
authorities did nothing to prevent the killing of several hundred
remaining Serb civilians and the torching of thousands of Serb homes.
The crimes and devastation committed after Oluja were frightening in
their nature and extent; however, Žunec argues, Operation Storm did
not actually cause the civilian exodus, which for the most part
preceded the arrival of the Croatian army.


***


Glas Istre: It is quite strange that the rebels refused all
possibility of living with Croats, even after the likelihood that the
Republika Srpska Krajina would collapse became quite evident.


Žunec: That is the most frightening thing. The whole project of the
rebellion was concerned exclusively with territory as a value in
itself, regardless of what it contained and who lived in it. One may
view a territory in various ways, but it is at all times a political
space. Yet the territory that the Serb rebels claimed for themselves
they never saw as a political space, with inhabitants and
institutions. They turned it into a void. The population of the
Republika Srpska Krajina found itself in the end trapped by a project
based on the idea that it was not possible to live with Croats. This
is why they had to leave when the Croats arrived. It was a great
tragedy.


A Serious Lapse After Oluja

It is interesting that the Croatian project of reintegrating the
Krajina into the Croatian constitutional order was also primarily
focussed on territory as opposed to restoration of the legal system in
the area.


This was negligence on the part of the Croatian government, which did
take some steps but they were insufficient. Thus only Orthodox
churches were protected, while everything else was left to chaos. As a
result the churches remained untouched, except for one in Karin that
was allegedly blown up when a policeman went off to relieve himself .
What happened after Oluja was grave negligence. The war had its own
logic, however, and no one asked what would happen after the military
action was over. Croatia is no exception here. Baghdad too was so
badly looted after the arrival of the Americans that a traffic jam was
created because of the great number of looters in the streets. There
too it was necessary to achieve victory, and little thought was given
to what would happen next.


The Hague prosecutors believe, on the other hand, that the intensity
of the destruction and killing, the length of time these lasted, their
scale, and the fact that they were carried out by soldiers, argue that
this could not have been the result simply of chaos, of spontaneous
action. So they argue that there must have been a plan, that orders
were given.


One should differentiate, in my view, between the fact of the loss of
control and the prosecutors' thesis that this was intended to drive
out the Serbs, as a joint criminal conspiracy. I think that the
prosecution will be unable to prove the latter. I am no legal expert,
but the category of joint criminal conspiracy was taken from a US
penal law that is used in the struggle against the mafia. Its use by
The Hague displays a misunderstanding of reality, because the way in
which the mafia functions is completely different from the way
politicians and military commanders do. I also find puzzling the
assertion by the prosecution that history is being written at The
Hague, although the court is basically applying Anglo-Saxon law,
according to which the accused can bargain with the prosecution. What
kind of history can we have here, when its outcome can be negotiated?
It is more like a manipulation of history.


Where the Hague tribunal is Wrong

Do you deny then that the Hague tribunal has played a positive role?


No, not at all. The Hague tribunal has played a very positive role,
and the problem is that it is about to close down. But the fact that
the Hague tribunal is a positive institution does not mean that it
does not make mistakes, sometimes very serious ones. One problem had
been the absence of law applicable in such cases.


You are ready to charge the Croatian government with responsibility
for the crimes, yet you insist that Croatia did not conduct ethnic
cleansing of the Serbs.


For ethnic cleansing there must be intent. I did not discover such
intent, not even in the famous transcripts that are taken as the
crowning proof that Franjo Tuđman negotiated a criminal undertaking. I
see nothing of that nature there. There is no agreement there that the
size of the Serb national community should be reduced. In my view, the
departure of the Serbs was an anticipated consequence not just of
Oluja, but of the rebellion as such - its assumption having been that
there could be no co-existence with Croats. We find the same model of
behaviour in both Croatia and Bosnia. We are talking about an ideology
that insisted on there being a thousand-year-war between us [Croats
and Serbs], and that anything was better than to live with them
[Croats]. The logical consequence of this was that the day the Croats
came - without asking for permission, because they had grown stronger
and could not be stopped - the Serbs would leave. That is what they
did. It was a logical consequence of their rebellion. It is also the
case that, in this kind of conflict, the departure of the population
seems to assume also the departure of the army. If you provoke the
population into leaving, then it is highly likely that the army will
leave too. The same happened on the Croatian side.


Whom then did Tuđman have in mind when he said that the Serbs had to
be hit so hard that they would practically disappear - soldiers or
civilians?


Tuđman was talking to his military commanders about where to hit the
Serbs, in which directions, after which Gotovina said that the Serbs
were already leaving, which later proved to be true. The Croatian side
failed to consider, however, how to resolve politically the situation
that the military action would create. Asked whether he feared
unnecessary destruction after the liberation, General Ivan Tolj
replied in the negative, insisting that the area was part of Croatia.


A Tale of Dishonour

The Croats, on the contrary, by torching and destruction treated
Krajina as part of Serbia.


That's a complete paradox. Everything was looted and destroyed, as if
by destroying Serbia one could take revenge for the Serb crimes in
Croatia. It only goes to show what war does to people.


Does this mean that Tuđman was not responsible for the departure of
the Serbs?


He was responsible in that at one point he launched a military action.
But the operation would have had to happen sooner or later, because
the Serb rebels showed no desire for a political settlement.


Tuđman did not bother to hide that he was glad that the Serbs had
gone, their departure made him happy.


It was quite odious. Croatia is a country with a demographic problem,
and the departure of a couple of hundred thousand people was very bad
for it. It is a great demographic loss.


Thirteen years have passed since Oluja, and Croatia has not as yet
succeeded in revitalising this area.


So far as I know, Lika has about 50,000 inhabitants. This is the same
number of people who are planned to live in the new Zagreb suburb of
Vrbani 2.


The crimes committed after Oluja have called into question the
legitimacy of the whole action, which was based on the idea that
Croatia would make secure an area that had been in a state of anarchy
for four years.


Croatia had always tried to keep to international law, international
conventions and Security Council resolutions, while the Serb rebellion
was more based on naked force. It is a fact that what happened after
Oluja represented an ugly regression, but in my view this problem
should be viewed in the context of the whole war. The focus is now on
1995, thanks to the Hague tribunal, so that attention is on the end of
the war, while the character of the previous five years of war is
forgotten. Some things were caused by the behaviour of the actors in
the previous period, and should be treated in that way. Oluja did not
take place in a simulator, but involved real people and real
relations, following many years of dishonour, of a history of mutual
violence.


War does not of itself solve problems

The intensity of fighting in Oluja was exceptionally low. You explain
this by a desire on the Croatian side to avoid contact with civilians
and to prevent greater hardship, but some believe it to be proof of a
prior agreement between Tuđman and Milošević.


I do not believe there were such agreements, because they would be
hard to implement. Such agreements are unrealisable on the ground.
Nonetheless, the belief in there having been an agreement is very
strongly present, especially among the Serbs. The fact that Milošević
did nothing, and that the news about Oluja was broadcast in the 20th
minute of the main news programme, is taken as the crowning proof that
such an agreement existed. I think it was not like that, however, but
that matters proceeded in parallel. Milošević gave up on the Croatian
Serbs, while Tuđman seized the opportunity.


How should we in Croatia view Oluja? Should we celebrate this action,
which led to mass suffering and hardship, as a victory?


The homeland war is often presented as a pillar underpinning Croatia.
I know that I am in a minority when I say that war is the worst
possible solution. This war was a Croatian victory, of course, a
victory of David against Goliath. But I always think of war as a sad
event, regardless of who suffered as a result of it or of how they
suffered. While Croatia celebrates Oluja, it would be advisable for
the Serb side to ask itself how it came to pass that Croatia won. The
war happened because someone made use of the JNA, in the belief that
they could achieve something. In the same way, I think that
celebration of the war and military victories on the Croatian side is
questionable, if it leads to a belief that problems are solved through
war.


Serbia Remains Obsessed by Territories

How do you judge Serbia's attitude to Kosovo?


It is interesting that the same policy that led to the war [in 1991]
is visible also in regard to Kosovo, which is treated as a
metaphysical, ethnic and exclusively Serb area. During the last
referendum on the Serbian constitution, which was held precisely in
order to confirm that Kosovo was part of Serbia, the Albanians were
not allowed to vote, even though they were constitutionally Serbian
citizens. In other words, the people are not part of Serbia but only
the territory. But what then is to be done with the Albanians? Here I
see the unique continuity of Serbian policy.


In your book you deal also with the future of the Croatian Serb
community. You argue there that Krajina and Oluja could become a new
Serb myth.


It is likely that the Croatian Serb community will in future seek
additional rights. If the existing state policy continues, then there
is little likelihood that this would lead to violence. But if Krajina
and the 1995 events were to become a myth, then this could change and
the power of the myth might lead to the choice of violent strategies
again in the future. That would be very dangerous.




Translated from a longer interview in Glas Istre [The Voice of Istria]
online, 30 July 2007